Determination
48 The essential criterion for the exercise of the power under r 12.7 is whether or not, in all the circumstances, justice requires that the proceedings be dismissed [or the defence struck out] - Witten v Lombard Australia Limited (1968) 2 NSWR 529 at 534. Mason P has described summary dismissal as an extreme measure - Fairey v Fairey No.2 [2000] NSWCA 173 at [5].
49 There are many factors which may be relevant in determining whether justice requires that proceedings should be dismissed [or a defence struck out] see Hoser v Hartcher [1999] NSWSC 527 at [19] - [30]. Regard must be had to the objects of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, see, in particular, sections 56 and 59 thereof.
50 Primary considerations are the length of the delay, procedural non-compliance and prejudice to the parties.
51 On the face of the pleadings the defendant has an arguable defence to the claim as now formulated by the plaintiff. There is no evidence before me to establish that the defence is untenable. The delay and procedural non-compliance have been discussed earlier in these reasons. As the plaintiff observed, the primary consideration is the events since the filing of the further amended statement of claim on 20 March 2007. There has been some delay by the defendant since that time but in my opinion it is largely explicable. Initially the defendant was overseas and in ill health which would have created difficulty obtaining the defendant's instructions in relation to the settling of the defence. Then, from about June 2007 until 20 September 2008, the defendant's solicitors were of the opinion that the defendant required a tutor to be appointed and steps were taken to obtain the appropriate orders.
52 Rule 7.14 of the UCPR provides that a person under a legal incapacity may not carry on proceedings except by his or her tutor. Accordingly, if the defendant was legally incapacitated, she could take no steps in the proceedings until a tutor had been appointed. Although the applications to the court for the appointment of a tutor were unsuccessful it has not been suggested the applications to appoint a tutor were not made bona fide.
53 Following the dismissal by Fullerton J of the application for the appointment of a tutor the defendant signed the defence to the further amended statement of claim, it was certified and filed. In my opinion, whilst there has been delay occasioned by the defendant since 20 March 2007 much of that delay is explicable for the reasons referred to above.
54 The plaintiff has asserted that it would be prejudiced if its application was refused. The primary areas of prejudice alleged were presumed prejudice by reason of the passage of time, that the plaintiff will be delayed in receiving money to which it is entitled and the possibility that the value of the mortgaged property may be eroded with the passage of time.
55 There is no evidence of actual prejudice to the plaintiff. I note that the plaintiff has pleaded that the payment on forged cheques was investigated and established by the Victorian police. The plaintiff is entitled to interest on the money outstanding if its claim is upheld. There is no satisfactory evidence that the defendant has relocated permanently to Taiwan and no evidence was put before the court as to the value of the mortgaged property.
56 The plaintiff also asserts that the costs of preparing its case for hearing would be thrown away if the defendant ultimately does not defend the proceedings. It submits that the court can have no satisfaction that the defendant has any interest in properly defending the case. I am not prepared to infer that the defendant will not defend the proceedings. The plaintiff's solicitor gave evidence that relevant documents and some proofs of evidence have been obtained from which I infer at least part of the plaintiff's costs of preparation has already been incurred.
57 The amount claimed by the plaintiff, including interest, is in the order of $1 million. The defendant stands to lose the Artarmon property. In my opinion the prejudice to the defendant, if she is prevented from contesting the plaintiff's claim on the merits, far outweighs the suggested prejudice to the plaintiff if the application is refused.
58 I have considered the competing contentions of the parties. In my opinion justice does not require that the orders sought by the plaintiff should be made at this time. The plaintiff's application is dismissed.
59 However the history of the matter is unsatisfactory. Not all of the defendant's defaults are explained by the evidence before me. It will be necessary to impose a strict timetable on the parties and to ensure that it is complied with.
60 I propose to list the matter before me at 9:30am on 27 February 2009 for directions.
61 In my opinion the circumstances of this matter are such that the costs of this application should be costs in the cause.