Power to make orders
15 Section 90-15 of the IPS relevantly provides that the Court may make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company.
16 The relevant principles have been discussed in many cases, but were usefully collected by White J in Lewis (liquidator), in the matter of Concrete Supply Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] FCA 841 as follows:
[30] The principles applied by the courts in the exercise of the power under cl 90-15 are, in effect, the same as those which were applied in the exercise of the power under the former s 479(3) (in the case a court-ordered winding up) or under s 511 (in the case of a voluntary winding up) of the Act: In the matter of HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited (in liquidation and Subject to Schemes of Arrangement) ACN 008 482 291 [2018] NSWSC 1886 at [4]-[5]; Warner (Liquidator), in the matter of Sakr Bros Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] FCA 547 at [18]. In In the matter of Hawden Property Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (ACN 003 528 345) [2018] NSWSC 481, Gleeson JA noted at [8], that the power under cl 90-15 to 'make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company' (cl 90-15(1)), including 'an order determining any question arising in the external administration of the company' (cl 90-15(3)(a)), is wider than s 479(3) and accommodates the determination of substantive rights. His Honour noted that the Court would not make a determination of substantive rights without affording potentially affected parties an opportunity to be heard: ibid.
[31] The established principles indicate:
(a) the power to give directions is intended to facilitate the performance of the liquidator's functions and should be interpreted widely to give effect to that intention: Re Octaviar Administration Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] NSWSC 1556 at [9];
(b) the power is available to give a liquidator advice as to the proper course of action to be taken in the liquidation: Re Bell at [47]; Re MF Global Australia Ltd (in liq) [2012] NSWSC 994 at [7];
(c) the Court may give directions that provide guidance on matters of law and the reasonableness of a contemplated exercise of discretion but will usually not do so when the subject of the directions sought relates to the making and implementation of a business or commercial decision and when there is no particular legal issue raised and no attack on the proprietary or reasonableness of the decision: Re MF Global at [7];
(d) the Court does not interfere with or seek to second guess the liquidator's judgment unless there is evidence of a lack of good faith, an error of law or principle, or real and substantial grounds for doubting the prudence of the liquidator's conduct or when the Court considers that the liquidator's decision is not a proper and reasonable one: Re One.Tel at [36]; Re Bell at [31], [47] and [50]; Re Octaviar at [10];
(e) the effect of a direction is to sanction a course of conduct on the part of the liquidators so that, providing full disclosure has been made to the Court, the liquidator may adopt the course free from the risk of personal liability for breach of duty: Re Bell at [47]; Re One.Tel at [32]; and
(f) the directions do not bind third parties, and do not determine substantive matters in dispute between the liquidator and third parties: Re Bell at [47].
17 A similar summary was more recently adopted by Downes J in Park, in the matter of Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2022] FCA 1301 at [119].
18 Similar directions to those made in this application have been made in the context of both receiverships and administrations: see, for example, Re Arcabi Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) (in liq); Ex parte Theobald & Herbert in their capacities as Receivers & Managers of Arcabi Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) (in liq) [2014] WASC 310; and In the matter of International Art Holdings Pty Ltd (admin apptd); International Art Holdings Pty Ltd (admin apptd) & ors v Adams & ors [2011] NSWSC 164.
19 Other options that might be considered by insolvency practitioners dealing with unclaimed property were addressed in those cases. In particular, in Arcabi Master Sanderson addressed in detail options that might be available to a receiver. Relevantly, he noted some of the cumbersome aspects of utilisation of the Disposal of Uncollected Goods Act 1971 (WA) (DUGA) (at [114]-[117]). I respectfully endorse the comments of Master Sanderson in that regard and note that in any event, the DUGA does not limit the operation of other legislation. In International Art Holdings Ward J observed that it would not be in the interests of creditors for unclaimed artworks to be disclaimed (at [119]).
20 In this case, similarly to the position in Arcabi, the directions sought offer protection to parties that are similar to those protections potentially offered under the DUGA, but in the case of the DUGA by a more complex and inefficient process. And, similarly to the position in International Art Holdings, a disclaimer of the property would limit any recovery to the creditors. Furthermore, ownership by the Company would need to be clear.
21 I note that directions have been made in other cases allowing administrators to deal with and sell unclaimed property, including Carson, in the matter of Hastie Group Limited (No 3) [2012] FCA 719; and In the matter of Renovation Boys Pty Ltd (admins apptd) Renovation Boys Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2014] NSWSC 340.
22 In light of the detailed reasons in both Arcabi and International Art Holdings, it is not necessary to further set out the principles. I simply add that I am not aware of any reason why a liquidator cannot proceed to obtain similar relief to that granted in those cases. The circumstances of this liquidation justify the approach to this Court by the liquidators to seek the relevant directions.
23 I am satisfied that the issues raised by the application in relation to the schedule property are the kinds of issues that may properly be addressed by the Court under s 90-15 of the IPS in order to facilitate the performance of the liquidators' functions and obligations. The application raises matters of law, such as the right and ability of the liquidators to deal with the schedule property. It does not purport to justify what might be considered only a business or commercial decision.
24 In granting the relief sought, matters I have taken into account include:
(a) the schedule property constitutes chattels in the possession of the Company;
(b) the liquidators have taken reasonable steps over a period of time to ascertain whether the Company owns the schedule property,
(c) it is possible that the Company does in fact own the schedule property;
(d) the liquidators have taken reasonable steps to ascertain whether there are any genuine claims of ownership of the schedule property by the parties most likely to have such a claim, being Mr Bryce and the related entities of the Company that shared occupancy of the Clayton Road premises;
(e) as at the date of this application, no claim has been made by any third party to the schedule property;
(f) while Mr Bryce has made certain claims (via his solicitors) as to ownership of unspecified assets at the Clayton Road and Edwards Street premises, he has not specified any particular assets that he says that he owns and has not pursued any claim;
(g) it is not in the interests of creditors for the schedule property to continue to be stored indefinitely at a cost to the Company;
(h) the directions proposed by the liquidators provide for a further and final opportunity for Mr Bryce, the related parties and any other third parties, to put forward a claim for ownership of the schedule property;
(i) the liquidators only propose to proceed with and complete the sale, and to treat the proceeds as assets in the liquidation if no genuine claim is made in the interim; and
(j) the liquidators propose to provide copies of any orders made by the Court to Mr Bryce and the related parties and there will be liberty to apply for further orders granted to any interested party.
25 For those reasons, I made orders substantially in the form sought by the liquidators, with the proposed suppression order modified to comply with the requirements of s 37AF and s 37AG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
I certify that the preceding twenty-five (25) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Banks-Smith.