PROPOSAL THAT AFFECTS RIGHTS ATTACHED TO B CLASS PREFERENCE SHARES
21 The first question is whether the proposal in resolution 1 in the Notice of Meeting is one that affects rights attached to the B Class preference shares. HNA says that the proposal both positively affects rights attached to the B Class preference shares and negatively affects rights attached to the B Class preference shares within the meaning of paragraph 2(a)(ii).
22 Under the Constitution, including Part C of Schedule 14 in its present form, the holder of B Class preference shares is not entitled to vote at general meetings except on a proposal of one of the sorts referred to paragraphs 2(a)(i), 2(a)(ii) or 2(a)(iii), or on a resolution to approve the terms of a buy back agreement or during the period in which a dividend is in arrears. If the proposed resolution in the Notice of Meeting were passed, the holder of B Class preference shares would be entitled to vote at a general meeting in each of those circumstances, but would also be entitled to vote during a winding-up, as well as on any proposal:
· to appoint or remove directors;
· to amend the Constitution;
· to wind-up RILA VQY;
· to convert ordinary shares into a larger number;
· to alter the voting rights of any shares.
Further, whereas, under the Constitution in its present form, the preference shares cannot be converted into ordinary shares, if the proposal were to be implemented paragraph 6 of Part C would have the effect that any B Class share may be converted into an ordinary share at the election of the holder of the B Class preference share. Thus, HNA says, in that way, the proposal in the Notice of Meeting affects the rights attached to the B Class preference shares. It affects the rights by enlarging and enhancing them quite significantly, including the creation of new rights.
23 On the other hand, under paragraph 2 of Part C as it presently stands, the holder of B Class preference shares is entitled to vote on a proposal to reduce the share capital of RILA VQY and on a resolution to approve the terms of a buy back agreement. If the proposal is implemented, the holders of B Class preference shares would not be entitled to vote on:
· a proposal to reduce the share capital, if the reduction was no more that a return of capital to the ordinary shareholders of an amount not exceeding the paid up capital on those shares; or
· a proposal to approve the terms of a buy back agreement relating to only one or more ordinary shares for an aggregate consideration of no more than the paid up capital on those shares.
To that extent, the rights attached to the B Class preference shares would be diminished or reduced if the proposal were implemented. If that were the extent of the proposal, it is clear enough that the proposal would be one that affects rights attached to the B Class preference shares within the meaning of para (2)(a)(ii) of Part C of Schedule 14 as it stands. That is to say, it would affect the right to vote on a proposal to reduce capital or to approve a buy back agreement.
24 However, the proposal, for the reasons already indicated, goes well beyond diminishing or reducing particular rights attached to the preference shares. Further, it goes beyond merely altering or affecting exiting rights. The question is whether a proposal that creates additional rights for holders of B Class preference shares is one that affects rights attached to them within the meaning of paragraph 2(a)(ii) of Part C.
25 The Court has been asked to consider the question in the abstract, in the sense that the parties have consciously eschewed adducing evidence as to the economic value of the various classes of shares in the RILAs. It is necessary, nevertheless, to approach the question, of the construction of paragraph 2(a)(ii) in the context in which that provision appears in the Constitution of RILA VQY. That context includes the incorporation into the Constitution of references to the Corporations Act together with the provisions of the Corporations Act pursuant to which and under which RILA VQY is given independent legal existence.
26 One such provision of the Corporations Act is s 140, which provides that the Constitution has effect as a contract between the company and each member and between a member and each other member. Another provision is s 254A(1)(b), which empowers a company to issue preference shares. That term is not defined in the Corporations Act, but it is one that is well known in company law. A preference share is one that is given some preference or priority over other shares in the capital of a company, normally referred to as ordinary shares. It is common for preference shares to be given a preference or priority over ordinary shares in relation to the payment of fixed dividends on the preference shares and the return of the paid up capital on the preference shares. Otherwise the profits of a company and any surplus assets of the company would ordinarily be available for distribution to the holders of the ordinary shares. That arrangement is by no means dictated by the Corporations Act or by particular practice. It is, however, a not uncommon arrangement.
27 The capital structure of RILA VQY, and the other RILAs, is unusual in the way in which it provides for holders of ordinary shares and preference shares to share in profitability and assets. Thus, paragraph 4 of Part C provides that, so long as there are unredeemed Preference Shares, RILA VQY may not declare or pay any dividend or make any distribution in respect of shares of any class other than the Preference Shares. Further, under paragraph 7, if there is a return or distribution of capital, whether on a winding-up, dissolution or otherwise, the holders of the Preference Shares are entitled to receive all surplus assets and capital of RILA VQY and the holders of the ordinary shares are to be entitled to receive only the return of their initial contribution.
28 Paragraph 3 of Part C provides for redemption of the preference shares and for a preferred dividend calculated in the manner specified in Part C, the particular details of which are not presently relevant. The capital structure provided for in the Constitution is unusual, in the sense that, so long as there are preference shares on issue, which have not been redeemed, the preference shares have the lion's share of the immediate benefits flowing from prosperity or profitability and of any return of capital or surplus assets. On the one hand, the contingency of redemption leaves open the possibility that there may well be significant residual value attaching to the ordinary shares.
29 The language of paragraph 2(a) of Part C of Schedule 14 is not unique to the RILAs. Section 254A(2) of the Corporations Act provides that a company can issue preference shares only if the rights attached to the preference shares with respect to certain matters are set out in the company's constitution or are sanctioned by a resolution of members. Those matters are as follows:
· repayment of capital;
· participation in surplus assets and profits;
· cumulative and non-cumulative dividends;
· voting;
· priority of payment of capital and dividends in relation to other shares.
The purpose of that provision is to ensure that the interests of existing shareholders are protected by requiring them to agree to the terms of preference shares. A consequence of the issue of preference shares in contravention of s 254A would be that the issue would be invalid.
30 The Corporations Act also contemplates a distinction between voting shares and non-voting shares. Non-voting shares are shares other than voting shares. A voting share is one that carries any voting rights beyond the following:
· a right to vote while a dividend in respect of the share is unpaid;
· a right to vote on a proposal to reduce share capital;
· a right to vote on a resolution to approve the terms of a buy-back agreement;
· a right to vote on proposal that affects the rights attached to the share;
· a right to vote on a proposal to wind-up;
· a right to vote on a proposal for the disposal of the whole of the property business and undertaking;
· a right to vote during winding up.
It follows that a share that carries only the above rights and no more is a non-voting share for the purposes of the Corporations Act.
31 Under paragraph 5 of Part C, the rights attaching to the Preference Shares must not be varied without the consent or sanction of the holders of the Preference Shares, in accordance with the Constitution. In particular, the issue of preference shares, or the conversion of existing shares into Preference Shares, which rank pari passu or in priority to the preference shares, is to be treated as a variation of the rights of the Preference Shares. Paragraph 5 is consistent with the exception contained in paragraph 2(a)(ii) of Part C, which is necessary to enable the holders of Preference Shares to vote on a proposal to vary the rights attached to preference shares. The specific prohibition in paragraph 5 mirrors, and perhaps duplicates, the protection afforded to different classes of shares generally by clause 64.2 of the Constitution.
32 It is necessary to consider the respective powers that would be conferred upon the holders of the B Class preference shares if the proposal were implemented, as compared with their powers under the Constitution as it presently stands. Thus, there is presently no right to vote on the appointment of directors, but specific power would be given by proposed paragraph 2(d)(iii). Further, proposed paragraph 2(d)(iv) would confer power to vote on proposals to amend the Constitution whereas there is presently no such power. Similarly, proposed paragraph 2(d)(v) would confer power to vote on a proposal to wind-up where there is presently no such power. Under the proposed amended paragraph 6, specific power to convert preference shares into ordinary shares would be conferred, whereas under the Constitution as it stands at present, there is an express prohibition on conversion.
33 I consider that the exception in paragraph 2(a)(ii) is limited to a proposal that affects existing rights attached to the preference shares under the Constitution and does not apply to a proposal that has the effect of adding material new rights. That is to say, it must be possible to identify rights that are presently attached to the preference shares and determine whether those rights are affected by the proposal. That follows from the use of the word "attached" in paragraph 2(a)(ii), which signifies rights that are actually in existence, and therefore attached to the shares at the time when the proposal is put forward. Rights that are not so attached, but would arise, and thereafter be attached, if a proposal is implemented, are not envisaged by par 2(a)(ii).
34 To construe paragraph 2(a)(ii) otherwise would be inconsistent with the clear intention of the overriding prohibition in paragraph 2 on the holder of the preference shares voting at general meetings except in the restricted circumstances specified. The overall intention to be gleaned from the provisions of paragraph 2 is that the holders of preference shares would not, except in the circumstances expressly contemplated by paragraph 2, be entitled to vote on a matter that involves the control of RILA VQY.
35 HNA says that to construe paragraph 2(a)(ii) as being limited to existing rights is to impose a restrictive gloss on the plain language of the Constitution. Further, HNA says that such a construction would be inconsistent with established principle.
36 For example, a scheme of arrangement between a company and its members, whereby the company would be authorised in general meeting to make a buy back offer in relation to preference shares and acceptance of the terms of the buy-back offer would be compulsory for all holders of preference shares, may well be a proposal affecting rights attaching to the preference shares. The buy-back resolution may have no legal effect upon the rights attaching to the preference shares of itself and the buy back offer would have no operative existence independently of the scheme. Further, the buy-back resolution would be meaningless without reference to the scheme and inseverable from it. Nevertheless, the existing rights attached to the preference shares would be affected by such a proposal, which would entitle the company to buy-back all the preference shares, resulting in the compulsory acquisition and cancellation of the preference shares (see Re Village Roadshow Limited 48 ACSR 167 at [28]). Those principles, however, are not inconsistent with the proposition that paragraph 2(a)(ii) refers to existing rights of preference shareholders. An existing right of the holder of a preference share is to continue to be the holder of the preference share. It is inconsistent with that right for the right to be extinguished (See Gambotto v WCP Limited (1995) 182 CLR 432).
37 I do not consider that the resolution proposed in the Notice of Meeting is one that affects rights attached to the B Class preference shares within the meaning of paragraph 2(a)(ii) insofar as it would create additional rights, being rights that are not presently attached to those shares. To the extent that the resolution would do so, it is not one on which the holders of the B Class preference shares are entitled to vote. The first question should be answered in the negative.