Principles - power under s 477(2A) and s 477(2B)
30 The principles that apply to the exercise of power under s 477(2A) and s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act are well known and were usefully collected by Halley J in Vardy v Linz, in the matter of Bondi Pizza Pty Ltd (in liq) [2021] FCA 530. I respectfully adopted those reasons in Rathner v Fopar Nominees Pty Ltd, in the matter of Reliance Franchise Partners Pty Ltd (in liq) [2022] FCA 1313 at [14], and again adopt the following from his Honour's reasons:
[13] Section 477(2A) of the Corporations Act, combined with reg 5.4.02 of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) provides that, except with the approval of the Court, of the committee of inspection or of a resolution of the creditors, a liquidator of a company must not compromise a debt to the company if the amount claimed by the company is more than $100,000.
[14] Section 477(2B) of the Corporations Act provides that except with the approval of the Court, of the committee of inspection or of a resolution of the creditors, a liquidator of a company must not enter into an agreement on the company's behalf if the term of the agreement may end, or obligations of a party to the agreement may, according to the terms of the agreement, be discharged by performance more than three months after the agreement was entered into.
[15] It is well established that the Court does not concern itself with the commercial desirability of the transaction in an application for approval pursuant to ss 477(2A) and 477(2B) of the Corporations Act. As Giles J stated in the much quoted passage in Re Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 9 ACSR 83; 10 ACLC 1742 at 85-86:
… the court pays regard to the commercial judgment of the liquidator (re Chase Corporation (Australia) Equities Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 1118). That is not say that it rubber stamps whatever is put forward by the liquidator but, as is made clear in Re Minerals Securities Australia Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 207 at 231-2, the court is necessarily confined in attempting to second guess the liquidator in the exercise of his powers, and generally will not interfere unless there can be seen to be some lack of good faith, some error in law or principle, or real and substantial grounds for doubting the prudence of the liquidator's conduct.
[16] Further, the observations of Bathurst CJ in Fortress Credit Corporation (Australia) II Pty Ltd v Fletcher and Barnet (2015) 89 NSWLR 110; [2015] NSWCA 85 at [125] are apposite:
Further, it is not generally the function of the court, in granting approval under s 477(2B) of the Act, to review a liquidator's commercial judgment or to second guess its decision. The court will generally not interfere unless there seems to be some lack of good faith, some error of law or principle, or a real or substantial ground for doubting the prudence of the liquidator's conduct. However, as was pointed out in each of the cases cited, the court does not act as a mere rubber stamp and will confer the power only when it is satisfied that a case for its exercise, in the particular circumstances, has been shown.
[footnotes omitted]
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[22] A further potential issue arises by reason of the fact that the Deed of Settlement and Release has already been entered into, albeit that it is subject to the approval of the Court. While approval should normally be obtained in advance of the exercise of the power in question, there appears to be no doubt that the Court has the power to give approval that operates from an earlier time: Re Bell Group Ltd (in liq); ex parte Woodings (2013) 97 ACSR 117; [2013] WASC 409 at [34]; Chamberlain v RG & H Investments Pty Limited, in the matter of Hardy Bros (Earthmoving) Pty Limited (in liq) (No 2) (2009) 76 ACSR 415; [2009] FCA 1531 at [22]-[24]; and Re Bell Group Ltd (in liq); ex parte Woodings [2020] WASC 121 at [61]-[62].
[23] As noted in those authorities, there is some divergence of opinion as to the precise basis as to how retrospective approval ought to be effected. The divergence of opinion, however, would appear to make clear that, for an abundance of caution, it may be prudent for the Court to order that the approval be granted nunc pro tunc and potentially also make a declaration under s 1322(4)(a) that the settlement agreement is not invalid by reason of it having been entered into without the Court's prior approval. In addition, consideration has been given in those authorities to the making of directions under s 479(3) of the Corporations Act that each plaintiff may rely on the settlement agreement as if it had been entered into with the prior approval of the Court, and that in appropriate circumstances, an extension of time might be required for a plaintiff to bring an application for approval under s 477(2A) or s 277(2B), and in those circumstances, an order may be made that time be extended. Section 479(3) of the Corporations Act has since been repealed, but I note that such a direction could now be made pursuant to s 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), being Sch 2 of the Corporations Act.
31 It is also established that the role of the court is to grant or deny approval of the liquidator's proposal, not to develop some alternative proposal: Corporate Affairs Commission v ASC Timber Pty Ltd (1998) 16 ACLC 1642 at 1649 (Austin J).
32 The main consideration in determining whether to give approval under s 477(2B) is the impact of an agreement on the duration of the liquidation and whether it is, in all the circumstances, reasonable in the interests of the administration: Re Opel Networks Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1245 at [7] (Brereton J); Lindholm (liquidator), in the matter of Aviation 3030 Pty Ltd (in liq) [2021] FCA 1244 at [44] (Anderson J); and Ball, in the matter of ACN 605 650 182 Pty Ltd (in liq) [2022] FCA 2 at [24] (Cheeseman J).