Health Care Complaints Commission v Catt

The Respondent's submission addressing the Non-Publication order she seeks.

1. The Respondent provided a supplementary submission which addressed this application. That submission was permitted by the Tribunal although it was well outside the orders which had been made on the last day of the hearing, providing for the parties to provide their further written submission.
2. We have had the advantage or reading that submission and note in particular the following: 1. The Respondent seeks the Non-Publication order be extended to cover "any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person". 2. The Respondent submits that if the judgment is published without a non-publication order as sought "it will cause harm to individuals which, in the circumstances renders the public interest in favour of the non-publication order". 3. It is submitted "the non-publication order of the Practitioner's name is pressed. An alternative would be to name the Practitioner but to anonymise the subject matter of "specified evidence" and the "subject matter of a complaint" (5D(1)(b)(iv) or (v)). In the circumstances it is submitted the non-publication of the Practitioner's name is the best way (between the two options) to balance the principle of open justice with the public interest of harm to specified individuals evidenced in Exhibit R2." 4. The Respondent points out that even were it the case that the victim of the Respondent's misconduct (Patient A) sought to identify both herself and the Respondent, in the face of a non-publication order, that would be a breach of the protective order. Without saying so, there is inherent in that submission, that a prosecution of Patient A, for identifying the Respondent contrary to the non-publication order, would then be available. The Respondent submits that possible circumstance should not deter the Tribunal making the order sought. 5. The Respondent then addressed her submission to the reason why the order should be made. The Respondent identified the range of persons who she says would be affected should the Respondent be named in this judgment. She submitted: "The range of people are: the Practitioner's family member, (name removed), (the harm being potentially to his life and certainly his well-being), her wife who has a public profile, her two other daughters that work in the mental health space, the psychologists and other health care practitioners trading under her name, potentially her clients who are in the LGBTQI space, organisation Twenty10 and its work (she is no longer on the board but is associated with it by reason of her previous tenure) and last but by no means least, the Client herself. The latter is at risk because there is a risk of identification of her if there is no non-publication order". 6. The Respondent submitted: "To address the first proposition, in all probability if the specifics of the Practitioner's offending are not anonymised, it will become a matter of public comment. That is because of the nature of the misconduct in question, the work the Practitioner does in the space of LGBTQI, the size of that community and by reason of being married to someone who has a public profile." She submitted further: "In relation to the second proposition, the evidence in Exhibit R2 does establish a material risk of harm that tilts the public interest in favour of a non-publication order. As submitted on the last occasion, the evidence need not be from medical practitioners or establish things to a degree of exactitudes or of a real likelihood. For example, the evidence accepted in the case of HCCC v CSM [2016] NSWCATOD 125 was of less probative weight than that presented before the Tribunal here." 7. The Respondent emphasised the potential harm which could flow to the relative of her former husband, which she addressed in her evidence. She submitted the potential for harm to him across a number of levels was sufficient, really on its own, to outweigh the public interest which required the publication of the Respondent's name, at the very least. 8. The Respondent submitted that although the other harms which might flow to specific persons would not be seen as significant as that possibly being raised in relation to the relative of the Respondent's former husband, it does not mean they should not be seen as carrying weight to support the argument for the order sought. 9. The Respondent referred us to the decisions in Health Care Complaints Commission V CSM [2016] NSWCATOD 125 and Health Care Complaints Commission v Firth (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 8. 10. The Respondent concluded her submission on this matter with the following: "For the reasons advanced on the interim application, there is a material risk the Client's identity will be revealed if the Practitioner's misconduct is not anonymised. In short, this is because of: i. the size of the LGBTQI community; ii. the public scrutiny that would be brought to bear on the specifics of misconduct because of the Practitioner's position in that community and the public profile of her wife; iii. the peculiar, and specific nature of the misconduct (disputed and admitted); and iv. the fact that the Practitioner treated the Client is a matter the Client has already spoken of with individuals within the community. The material risk of harm to multiple individuals should not be dismissed by this Tribunal but accepted as over-riding the open justice principle in this particular case. The non-publication order should be made on a permanent basis."

The Law affecting this application

1. The HCCC provided a written submission in relation to this application by the respondent. We have detailed that submission earlier in this judgment.
2. The HCCC referred us to the decision in Cakan v Health Care Complaints Commission [2020] NSWCATOD 116. In particular, paragraph [18] of that decision. The extract emphasises the overarching principle of open justice and the fact that it is only displaced in special or exceptional circumstances. The decision drew on the principle set out in Health Care Complaints Commission v Vo [2014] NSWCATOD 127 [181] to [185]. That decision referred to the requirement of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 No 2 (NSW). In section 49 the Tribunal hearing is required to be open to the public unless the Tribunal orders otherwise. In this case no order to the contrary was made.
3. When the Tribunal sits in public it publishes the name of each party as a function of its ordinary procedure. The Court room is open to the public unless formally closed by order of the Tribunal for a particular hearing. Thus, as stated in Vo there needs to be "something special, exceptional, or out of the ordinary, before the Tribunal will make an order avoiding that result."
4. In Vo there is reference to a decision where a non-publication order was refused even in circumstances where the practitioner, the subject of the proceeding was terminally ill. There is reference to another decision where an order was made after expert evidence was provided to the Tribunal in relation to the mental health of the practitioner's daughter who had a history of admission to a psychiatric unit following a serious suicide attempt.
5. In Health Care Complaints Commission v CSM [2016] NSWCATOD 125 the Tribunal did make a non-publication order of the nature sought by the Respondent in this hearing. At paragraph [84]- [87] of the decision the following was said by the Tribunal. Statutory framework 84. The combined effect of s 49(1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (the Tribunal Act) and s 165K of the National Law is that proceedings before NCAT brought under the National Law are open to the public unless otherwise ordered. The power to order that a hearing be held in private can only be exercised if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is "desirable to do so in the public interest for reasons connected with the subject-matter of the proceedings or the nature of the evidence to be given": s 165K of the National Law. 85. Clause 7(1)(b)(iii) of Schedule 5D to the National Law provides that the person presiding in proceedings before the Tribunal may, if they think it is appropriate "in the particular circumstances of the case", direct that the name of nominated persons involved in the proceedings, including a registered health practitioner, not be published. The power to make an order under this provision vests in the presiding member of the Tribunal. Accordingly, the decision to make a non-publication order in this case was made by the presiding member, Principal Member Britton. In the interests of consistency, in these reasons the maker of the decision will be referred to in the plural. 86. In exercising the power to make an order under cl 7(1)(b)(iii) of Schedule 5D to the National Law, the presiding member must have regard to the norm of open justice established by ss 49(1) of the Tribunal Act and 165K of the National Law, together with the objects of the Tribunal Act, which include ensuring that the Tribunal is accountable and has processes that are open and transparent: s 3(f). The authorities have consistently emphasised that the power to depart from that norm must be exercised sparingly. 87. As noted by the Tribunal (Acting Judge K P O'Connor) in Health Care Complaints Commission v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135 at [16], it is an "unavoidable incident" that a health practitioner the subject of proceedings brought under the National Law will often suffer a deep sense of shame and embarrassment and will be concerned about the impact of the proceedings on other members of their family. His Honour explained at [25] the rationale for disclosing the health practitioner's identity: Disciplinary proceedings and disciplinary orders have as their ultimate purpose the protection of the public. The public has an interest in knowing whether a practitioner has been charged with a disciplinary offence, and of the outcome especially where it is adverse. The public has an interest in satisfying itself as to the integrity and fairness of decision making in relation to the conduct of professional persons. Publicity also serves that end. Other members of the profession have an interest in knowing whether a colleague has been disciplined, and the nature of the offence. Decisions also provide a marker of what is unacceptable to other members of the profession.
6. The Tribunal did make a non-publication order in CSM because of two substantial reasons. The first was that the disclosure of the Respondent's name would potentially identify the patient with whom he had conducted a relationship. She had a significant psychiatric disorder and was well known in the psychiatric wards of the hospital in which the offending conduct took place. The second reason related to the mental health of CSM himself. It had deteriorated significantly after he was discovered having the relationship with the victim patient. It was submitted that it was likely that his mental health would deteriorate further should his identity be published in the decision of the Tribunal. He had informed the Tribunal he did not propose to return to the health industry again. Although he did not present independent expert evidence about his mental health, the Tribunal member considered there was sufficient other evidence the enable them to accept his evidence about his health. The practitioner was no longer registered at the time of the hearing before the Tribunal and in any event, it determined that had he been registered they would have made an order cancelling same.
7. In concluding their decision on the issue of non-publication, the Tribunal stated: "94. Even though publicity generally disadvantages the subject health practitioners and their families, non-publication orders are seldom made in this jurisdiction. This is because of the overriding importance of justice being administered openly and in public and the recognition that disclosing the identity of health practitioners in this class of matters has a deterrent effect amongst their peers. We accept that a cautious approach should be taken in this jurisdiction to the making of a non-publication order in respect of health practitioners. Nonetheless, we have decided that, in the circumstances of this case, the risk of disclosing Patient A's identity, and the risk of a further deterioration in CSM's mental health, represent special circumstances that warrants the making of a non-publication order in respect of CSM."
8. In Health Care Complaints Commission v FTR [2023] NSWCATOD 46, the Tribunal determined an application for non-publication. In that decision, the Tribunal set out the following (at [66]-[75]): "Application for non-publication 66. On 16 January 2023, the Practitioner made an application that 'Non-publication or non-disclosure orders re Respondent's name - [FTR]'. The ground in the application stated the Practitioner's mother was very unwell, physically and mentally, and that the disclosure of the Practitioner's name could be detrimental for her health and/or fatal. The Practitioner's 76 year old mother is a retired school teacher and he is her only child. She lives with her frail husband. 67. The Applicant opposes this application. Relevant principles 68. As this Application seeks an ancillary decision, the Tribunal is constituted by the presiding member: see National Law, ss 165(b), 165B(5A); definition of "ancillary decision" in CAT Act, s 4. Clause 7(1)(b)(iv) of Schedule 5D of the National Law provides that the Tribunal may, if the person presiding thinks it is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case, direct that any specific evidence not be published. Section 64(1)(c) of the CAT Act provides a similar power with a slightly different test, namely '[i]f the Tribunal is satisfied that it is desirable to do so'. 69. In Walton v Momot [1997] NSWCA 334, Handley JA (with whom Priestly JA and Grove AJA agreed) said at p 3: 'The general principal provided for in s 46(3) is that the Tribunal will sit in public [now see s 65K of the National Law and s 49(2) of the CAT Act]. If the Tribunal sits in public the details of the proceedings, including the names of the complainant and the practitioner, may become known to interested members of the public and the media, who will be entitled to publish details of the proceedings including the name of that practitioner. This being the prima facie method by which the Tribunal should conduct its proceedings as laid down by the Act, it follows that something special, exception, or out of the ordinary, must be established before the Tribunal can make an order avoiding such a result. … This of course reflects the general principle that the administration of justice under our system is carried on in public. This has been repeatedly emphasised by the courts. … (authorities omitted; emphasis added)' 70. Whether the facts of a particular case constitute something special, exception, or out of the ordinary which displaces the general principle is a discretionary decision. 71. Cases in which something special, exceptional, or out of the ordinary has been found to exist include cases where there has been a finding of a real risk that publication could lead to the practitioner's suicide: Health Care Complaints Commission v XC [2015] NSWCATOD 9; Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr CRF [2016] NSWCATOD 120; Health Care Complaints Commission v FTE [2023] NSWCATOD 30. In other cases, risk of mental harm to, or the fragile mental health of, a practitioner has been a factor weighed in favour of making a non-publication order: Health Care Complaints Commission v CSM [2016] NSWCATOD 125; Health Care Complaints Commission v ZXY [2021] NSWCATOD 136. 72. In contrast, general anxiety, depression, embarrassment or even a complex bereavement disorder was insufficient: Cakan v Health Care Complaints Commission [2020] NSWCATOD 116; Health Care Complaints Commission v Rickard [2017] NSWCATOD 120. In HCCC v Dr Gow (Suppression order) [2008] NSWMT 3, the practitioner, who had been found guilty of professional misconduct, developed a terminal illness. Expert opinion said that any disruption to his immune response that might flow as a consequence of the psychological stress resulting from publication may lead to severe and potentially fatal infection. The Tribunal found that was insufficient when balanced against the protective function of publication and refused to make a non-publication order. 73. Less common are cases where the alleged risk is not to the Practitioner but to a third party, usually a close relative(s). A case analogous to the present is Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr A [2012] NSWMT 10, where the Tribunal found, at [28], 'the prospect of a renewal of the trauma associated with repeat publicity, which trauma led to a most serious life threatening circumstance for one child and psychological damage to the doctor's other children, is such as to demonstrate the 'serious and exceptional circumstances' that justify a temporary extension of the current interim order to be in the form of a non-publication order to continue until the youngest children attain 18 years of age.' In contrast, in Health Care Complaints Commission v Vo [2014] NSWCATOD 127 there was insufficient evidence to establish any psychological effect publication would have upon the practitioner's children who were completing their Higher School Examinations, and in Health Care Complaints Commission v FDE [2021] NSWCATOD 215 there was insufficient evidence to support a contention that the practitioner's children would be psychologically affected by publication, although a limited non-publication order was made because of the serious risks publication posed to the practitioner whilst he was incarcerated. 74. It may be difficult to set a time limit on a non-publication order but it should not be assumed to be permanent and such an order is irregular: Walton v Momot; Health Care Complaints Commission v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135 at [37]-[39]. 75. A non-publication order may be unnecessary where the matter over which it is sought is already public: Health Care Complaints Commission v Reid (Publication Application) [2019] NSWCATOD 31 at [42]; Health Care Complaints Commission v Quan [2019] NSWCATOD 160 at [19]."
9. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Jamnagarwalla (No 2) [2023] NSWCATOD 1, the Tribunal determined an application for non-disclosure of the practitioner's name. The Tribunal set out the following (at [81]-[91]): "Application for non-publication order Basis for the application 81. Dr Jamnagarwalla applied for an order that disclosure of his name is prohibited except to the parties, their legal representatives and to any other person where disclosure is necessary for the effective implementation and administration of the orders made in the proceedings. After applying for this order at the beginning of the Stage 2 hearing, Dr Jamnagarwalla amended the application so that it also applied to the Stage 1 proceedings. A decision in those proceedings was published, without restriction, on 15 June 2022. The Commission opposed the application both in its original and in its amended form. 82. Dr Jamnagarwalla set out the reason for the application in his statement of 23 November 2022. Those reasons relate to the effect of the publication of the Stage 1 decision on members of Dr Jamnagarwalla's immediate family, especially his wife and his youngest child. Dr Jamnagarwalla noticed the demeanour of his wife and children changing around the time of the Stage 1 decision. His wife told him she felt ashamed and embarrassed by the case. His youngest child heard about the case from friends at school and when she accessed the internet, she saw reports of the case. She was reluctant to attend social gatherings or see her friends for several weeks after publication of the Stage 1 decision. Dr Jamnagarwalla is concerned that publication of the Stage 2 decision will cause further shame, embarrassment and upset. It may even mean that they need to move from the area in which they are currently living. The legal test 83. The Tribunal is generally obliged to publish decisions about complaints which have been proved or admitted in whole or in part. That is done via the NSW Caselaw website: National Law, s 165M(4) and Health Care Complaints Commission v Rickard [2017] NSWCATOD 120 at [71]. However, the Tribunal does have power under s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) to make an order prohibiting the disclosure of Dr Jamnagarwalla's name. There is a similar provision in cl 7 Schedule 5D of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (the National Law). The test under that provision is whether it is 'appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case'. 84. Dr Jamnagarwalla accepts that the principles of 'open justice apply to proceedings under the NCAT Act and the National Law': Health Care Complaints Commission v FCE (No 2) [2021] NSWCATOD 203 at [9]. Consistent with that principle, the name of a person who is the subject of disciplinary proceedings is expected to be disclosed unless there is good reason for making a non-publication order. 85. When considering whether to make a non-publication order, the health and safety of the public must be the paramount consideration: National Law, s 3A; Health Care Complaints Commission v Rickard [2017] NSWCATOD 120 at [91]. The public has a right to know whether a practitioner has been charged with a disciplinary offence and the outcome of the proceedings: Health Care Complaints Commission v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135 at [25]. It is inherent in the protection of the public that information is available to a potential patient who wishes to enquire whether a health practitioner has been the subject of disciplinary proceedings: HCCC v Simring (Suppression Order) [2010] NSWMT 6 at [8]. Conclusion 86. I have decided not to make a non-publication order for three reasons. Firstly, Dr Jamnagarwalla's name was disclosed in an adjournment decision published on 10 September 2021 and in the Stage 1 decision on 15 June 2022: Health Care Complaints Commission v Jamnagarwalla [2021] NSWCATOD 149; Health Care Complaints Commission v Jamnagarwalla [2022] NSWCATOD 61. The Stage 1 decision has been available on several websites including the Commission's website: Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW), s 94B. Even if Dr Jamnagarwalla's name is anonymised now his identity is already publicly known and could easily be detected by anyone sufficiently interested in the case: Cakan v Health Care Complaints Commission [2020] NSWCATOD 116 at [54]. 87. The risk that publication will have further negative impacts on Dr Jamnagarwalla's family members is unfortunate and concerning. But it is unavoidable that disciplinary proceedings may cause practitioners shame and embarrassment and impact on their family relationships: Health Care Complaints Commission v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135 at [16]. Publication of the practitioner's name may also cause embarrassment and upset to their immediate family. We accept that that has happened in this case and that Dr Jamnagarwalla wishes to protect his family, as best he can, from further distress. 88. As the Tribunal held in a similar legislative context in Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v EFA (No 2) [2021] NSWCATOD 84 at [45]: 'The risk of reasonably foreseeable negative impacts upon the Respondent's family from disclosure, such as embarrassment, and negative social impacts, would not, by themselves, be sufficient reason to make a non-disclosure order. They are factors to be weighed in consideration of the issue, but they do not weigh heavily.' 89. Expert evidence of much more serious effects on mental health, including risk of suicide for the practitioner or a family member, have been held to justify a non-publication order: Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr A [2012] NSWMT 10 at [28] and Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr CRF [2016] NSWCATOD 120 at [104]. 90. As to Dr Jamnagarwalla's evidence that the family may move to another area, that evidence falls short of any serious risk to physical or mental health which might justify a non-publication order. 91. Thirdly, but less significantly, there was no evidence that Dr Jamnagarwalla had told his children about these proceedings or offered them any assistance such as professional counselling. Those kinds of steps may have helped lessen the embarrassment and upset they have undoubtedly felt. (See Health Care Complaints Commission v Vo [2014] NSWCATOD 127 at [186])."
10. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr CRF [2016] NSWCATOD 120, the Tribunal having considered the applicable law, determined to anonymise the medical practitioner's name for the following reason (at [104]): "Discussion and conclusions 104. The expert retained by the Medical Council, Dr Fisher, has highlighted the risk of suicide in a patient such as the practitioner who suffers from Bipolar Disorder if depressed. Dr Florida's [sic] brief statement is explicit. It must be read in context of her other reports and the evidence before us including the practitioner's previous serious suicide attempts when depressed. We are satisfied exceptional circumstances exist in this case and that we should make the non-publication orders sought."
11. When we heard this application on 14 June 2023, we determined that the application was not one without apparent merit. We determined to make the order sought on an interim basis and thereby have the opportunity to consider it with the benefit of all available evidence which the Respondent may wish to rely upon. Further, the HCCC took the appropriate pathway of not opposing the order on an interim basis.
12. We have now before us all the evidence which the Respondent has sought to rely upon and regretfully, we conclude the application has not met the required standard for such an order to be made.
13. The evidence which we considered had the potential to satisfy us that the order should be made was that which addressed the mental health of the Respondent's former husband's relative. However, no expert evidence has been given in relation to the mental health of that person and the potential risk which the expert considers could or would be visited upon that person should the Respondent's name be published. Thus we have been unable to assess the potential impact upon him by the publication of information which would identify the Respondent in a formal manner.
14. We know nothing of the qualification of the persons mother, upon whose evidence the Respondent also relies to support her application.
15. We had anticipated the Respondent might have informed us if she had taken any steps to prepare the subject person for the possible publication of her name. The same is true in relation to her children. However, on the evidence before us, the Respondent has done nothing. She has either anticipated her application would be successful or she has not considered it necessary to put in place any supports or plans to address her stated concern should her application not be successful. Alternatively, if she has so acted, she has not provided evidence of that fact.
16. As we have stated above, the utility of a non-publication order in this case must be seen as very limited. The evidence before us has demonstrated to our satisfaction that the community in which the Respondent and the subject relative of her former husband, live and work, is small and supportive of its members. It uses social media extensively for communication. The Respondent holds a position of trust and respect in that community, and we accept, is very well known. She is clearly a leader in the community. In such a circumstance we cannot see how the use of a description in the title of the judgment, and throughout, which is clearly not the name of the person who the judgment is about, would shield the person of concern to the Respondent, from learning the case was about the Respondent.
17. The Tribunal would never intend the publication of its' judgments to harm any person in the community, who may be shocked or severely mentally impacted by the content of, or the knowledge of the outcome stated in a judgment. However, it is clearly a primary obligation of the Tribunal to ensure it practices open justice as the legislation, which governs the operation of the Tribunal and gives it jurisdiction, requires. The importance of that provision has been emphasised in the decisions we have set out above.
18. The other concerns the Respondent has about people in her family, her colleagues and associations with which she has held high office, are no greater than face all members of a health profession who feel disgraced by the potential outcome of a proceeding before the Tribunal. To have the Tribunal anonymise the name of a practitioner on those grounds would see many of the Tribunal's decisions anonymised and it would also conceivably lessen the deterrent role of the judgment itself. It also would have the effect of limiting the requirement of open justice. The public has the right to know the identity of the Respondent so that it can make its' own decision as to whether to use her services when she returns to practice. This has greater application to the members of the LGBTQI+ community.
19. In light of the above, we have reached the decision that the Respondent's application is to be refused.
20. During the last days of the hearing the Respondent informed the Tribunal she has adopted a surname which includes her wife's maiden name. In the giving of her evidence the HCCC counsel addressed her by that name. In order not to make the identity of her wife immediately recognised, we propose to name the proceeding using Ms Catts maiden name only.

Costs

1. The HCCC seeks its' costs be paid by the Respondent. It submitted the power to make such an order is found in Schedule 5D clause 13 of the National Law.
2. It submitted that commonly costs will follow the event. (HCCC v Dinakar [2009] NSWMT 8; HCCC v Dr Mazzaferro [2011] NSWMT 9 at [67])
3. The awarding of costs to compensate the successful party will only be displaced where there has been disentitling conduct on the part of that successful party. The HCCC submits there is no such disentitling conduct in this case.
4. The Respondent agreed, in her amended Reply, that the costs order sought by the HCCC should be made, "if the matters denied in this Reply are not pressed by the HCCC." She stated that if the denials are challenged by the HCCC and that challenge is unsuccessful, then the HCCC should be ordered to pay the Respondent's costs.
5. In the normal course we would deal with an application for costs which accompanies a Complaint. However, in her final supplementary submission, provided 7 December 2023, the Respondent submitted the following: "The Practitioner seeks the opportunity to address on costs following judgment. That is the usual procedural course which should be followed here for the usual reasons that the Tribunal is understandably not yet privy to all matters and communications pertaining to questions of costs. The Practitioner is content for any question of costs to be dealt with on the papers, with the usual regime for staggered submissions."
6. In our experience, such a request is unusual in this Tribunal. As such we assume there has been some communication between the Respondent and the HCCC prior to the hearing commencing, or during the hearing, the content of which has a real and relevant connection to whether a costs order, as sought by the HCCC, ought be made. We really have to rely on counsel for the Respondent, seeking a postponement of that determination, because she is privy to relevant communications being available to put before us.
7. We will order that the Respondent provide her submission in relation to the HCCC cost application within 14 days of the date of publication of this judgment.
8. The Orders to be made: 1. As and from the 22nd January 2024, the practitioner's registration as a psychologist is suspended for a period of 12 months. 2. Upon the completion of the period of suspension, the Respondent's registration is to be subject to the following conditions: 1) To practise under Category C Supervision in accordance with the Psychology Council of NSW's Compliance Policy - Supervision (as varied from time to time) and as subsequently determined by the appropriate review body. a) The supervision sessions must be: i) a minimum of one hour in length. ii) the supervision sessions must be face to face iii) the supervision sessions must be conducted on a fortnightly basis iv) supervisor reports must be completed and submitted to the Council three monthly. b) to authorise the Psychology Council of NSW to provide proposed and approved Supervisors with a copy of this decision and any subsequent relevant reports or decisions. c) Not to practise until a supervisor has been approved by the Psychology Council of NSW. 2) At each supervision meeting, the supervisor is to review and discuss practitioner's practice and address any relevant work-related or professional matters with particular focus on: a) Knowledge of the Psychology Board's Code of Ethics and the Australian Psychological Society's ethical guidelines b) Ethical and boundary considerations c) Privacy and Confidentiality d) Record-keeping e) Treatment plans f) Practice management. 3) To practice only in a group practice approved by the Psychology Council of NSW where there is at least one other person physically present in the practice at all times. 4) To advise the Psychology Council of NSW in writing at least seven days prior to changing the nature or place of her practice. 5) To provide evidence to the Psychology Council of NSW within fourteen days of recommencing practice, that she has provided a copy of the conditions and Tribunal's decision to all persons employed at the practice, and any place that she works as a psychologist. 6) The respondent is to satisfactorily complete an ethics course focusing on ethical obligations, which is approved by the Psychology Council of New South Wales, within six (6) months of re-commencing work as a psychologist in Australia or as otherwise specified by the Council. a) Within two (2) weeks of being notified that the course is approved, the practitioner must provide evidence to the Council of enrolment in the specified or approved course. b) Within four (4) weeks of completing the specified or approved course, the practitioner is to provide documentary evidence of satisfactory completion to the Council. 7) The Psychology Council is the appropriate review body for the purposes of Division 8 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW). 8) Sections 125 to 127 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law are to apply whilst the practitioner's principal place of practice is anywhere in Australia other than in New South Wales, so that a review of these conditions can be conducted by the Psychology Board of Australia. 3. The practitioner is to provide her submission, to the Tribunal and to the HCCC in relation to the application of the HCCC that the Respondent pay its' costs of the proceeding, within 14 days of the date of publication of this judgment. The HCCC is to provide the Tribunal and the Respondent with its' reply to that submission with 14 days of receipt of the Respondents submission.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 22 January 2024