Substantially, this judgment resolves what has reduced mainly to a cost dispute generated by a cost dispute. The plaintiff legal practice acted for Mr McKenzie in criminal proceedings brought against him. He was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment commencing on 11 February 2019. The legal practice's costs of acting for Mr McKenzie were assessed under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) ('the Act'). A Certificate of Determination of the costs under s 70 of the Act in the sum of $17,776 and a Certificate of Determination of the Manager's assessment costs under s 71 of the Act in the sum $783.75 were filed in the Supreme Court Registry under s 133 Civil Procedure Act 2005 and Rule 36.10 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) on 11 June 2020. The aggregate amount of $18,559.75 is taken to be a judgment of this Court under ss 70 and 71 of the Act.
When the judgment went unpaid, the plaintiff caused a bankruptcy notice for the amount of the unsatisfied judgment to be served on Mr McKenzie in custody on or about 19 March 2021. Mr McKenzie instructed his solicitors that service of the Bankruptcy Notice constituted the first notice he had received of the costs assessment and its registration. On 9 April 2021, Mr McKenzie's solicitor filed a Notice of Motion seeking to set aside the judgment, or in the alternative a stay of enforcement pending the review of the costs assessment for which application, and an extension of time, had been made on the same day.
Proceedings were also commenced in the Federal Court to forestall the making of any bankruptcy order against Mr McKenzie based on non-compliance with the Bankruptcy Notice.
By consent at various times Mr McKenzie's application to set aside the judgment in this Court was adjourned pending the outcome of his application for review of the costs assessment. On 30 June 2021, the Manager of Costs Assessments granted an extension of time to file the Review Application and referred the matter to a Review Panel. By force of s 86 of the Act, the cost assessor's original determination was suspended pending the Review Panel's decision which was made on 15 December 2021. By a Certificate under s 87 of the Act, made by the Review Panel on 15 December 2021 and published by the Manager, Costs Assessment on 21 January 2022, the Review Panel set aside the Cost Assessor's determination, substituted a certificate for costs assessed in the amount of $13,200 and directed the legal practice to pay the costs of the Review Assessment, certified separately in the sum of $783.75.
Following the Review Panel's decision, the parties were unable to agree on what should happen next and the Registrar listed Mr McKenzie's motion for hearing on 7 April 2022. There was an exchange of detailed correspondence as to what should happen, including the making of "without prejudice, save as to costs" offers. Essentially the position of Mr McKenzie is that the judgment under s 133 Civil Procedure Act should be set aside, and he should have the benefit of an order for his costs in this Court. The legal practice's position is that the judgment should be varied to reflect the Review Panel's decision and each party should bear his or its own costs of the proceedings in this Court.
On the hearing of the application, I raised my concerns with the solicitor for each party about the proportionality of the costs generated by the dispute taking full account of the importance, complexity and the subject matter of the proceedings. If Mr McKenzie was correct that he had not been duly served due to his incarceration, he may have had a right to have the s 133 judgment set aside ex debito justitiae: Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571; [1944] HCA 5. On the other hand, notwithstanding the grounds upon which the original assessment was impugned, he clearly had some costs liability to the legal practice for acting for him. Indeed, by applying for an extension of time to have the original assessment reviewed, he took what must be regarded as a pragmatic approach. But it is important to have regard to the small amount involved in the dispute. Doubtless $18,000 odd or $13,000 odd is a large sum of money for Mr McKenzie, but the difference between the two is not great and this raised the concern that the costs generated in resolving the dispute were likely to exceed the amount in dispute. Moreover, having regard to the amount even of the original costs assessment, there was no real justification for filing the certificate in the Supreme Court, rather than in the Local Court. To my mind, this raised the question of whether I should make any order as to costs.
In the end, I am persuaded that Mr McKenzie should have his costs of the proceedings in this court on a party and party basis. This, of course, does not extend to any costs of the Federal Court proceedings, which will be entirely a matter for that court. Mr McKenzie did not choose the forum. By seeking to have the original assessment reviewed, as I have said, Mr McKenzie is taken as having acknowledged that he may have some liability to the legal practice. Although the legal practice seems to have co-operated by agreeing to Mr McKenzie's Notice of Motion being adjourned until the Review Panel determination was known, it chose the forum and Mr McKenzie had no option but to accept it.
Although concerned with the former costs regime under Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), in my view the reasoning in Doyle v Hall Chadwick [2007] NSWCA 159 applies equally to the current regime. In that case, Hodgson JA (Campbell JA agreeing, Mason P in dissent) said (at [49] - [52]):
"…. in my opinion the clear legislative intention is that an appeal to the Supreme Court should be able to proceed after a judgment has been obtained under s 208J [s 70] and [s 71]. Further, in my opinion, there is no difficulty in giving effect to this legislative intention. It is well recognised that there are judgments that are not based on any decision of the Court of which they are taken to be judgments but have some other basis; and such judgments may be set aside or varied if that basis is defeated or varied.
One example is judgments entered by consent. They are "mere creatures" of the agreement, and may be set aside, without an appeal, on any ground on which the underlying agreement may be set aside: Logwon Pty Ltd v Warringah Shire Council (1993) 33 NSWLR 13 at 28-30.
Another example is judgments arising from the registration of a certificate of judgment from another jurisdiction. If the judgment in that other jurisdiction is set aside or varied, then the judgment arising from registration can similarly be set aside or varied: Remilton v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1907) 24 WN(NSW) 177; Bell v Bell (1954) 73 WN(NSW) 7.
A judgment arising from a certificate pursuant to [s 70 (5) of the Act] is this kind of judgment; and is liable to be set aside or varied if the certificate on which it is based is set aside or varied: cf Croker v Commissioner of Taxation [2005] FCA 127 ; (2005) 145 FCR 150 at [14]. A further limitation of the effect of such a judgment is considered in Khoury v Hiar [2006] NSWCA 47."
Quite clearly from this passage, the Court has the discretion to either set aside or vary the judgment created by the filing of costs certificates. It goes without saying, that such discretion must be exercised judicially.
For a number of reasons, it is my opinion that the judgment should be set aside. First, there is a question of the appropriate forum. Had appropriate choices been made initially, the Certificate would have been filed in the Local Court. It is my opinion that should happen now in relation to the Review Panel's Certificate. Secondly, Mr McKenzie may well have had the right to have the judgment set aside for non-compliance with the rules of natural justice in relation to the costs assessment process. Thirdly, as I have said, he did not choose the forum and did not have the opportunity to call the Assessment Certificate into question or otherwise challenge its correctness until served with the bankruptcy notice while in custody. It should be acknowledged that he thereafter acted with appropriate celerity to instruct his present solicitors to take the appropriate action on his behalf.
While acceding to the Law Practice's application would have the advantage, perhaps, of cutting through unnecessary procedural steps, for the reasons I have explained, I regard the setting aside of the judgment as the more appropriate order in all the circumstances.
My orders are:
1. Set aside the judgment obtained by registration of Certificates of Determination of Costs and of the Manager's Assessment Costs on 11 June 2020.
2. Order the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of his Notice of Motion filed on 9 April 2021 on the ordinary basis.
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Decision last updated: 12 April 2022