Pooling of the Group
18 The plaintiffs seek an order determining that the companies constitute a "pooled group" for the purposes of s 579E of the Act. The relevant principles are again set out in the submissions for the plaintiffs, including the importance of a pooling order for the group. I accept the summary of the importance of the pooling order contained in the plaintiffs' submissions at [68] as follows:
The importance of a pooling order for the Group is set out at paragraphs 215 to 265 of the affidavit of the Liquidator sworn 25 March 2019. In short:
a. without a pooling order:
i. the return to creditors in the liquidation of Stacey Apartments is estimated to be between 15 cents to 20 cents in the dollar;
ii. the proceedings commenced in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on behalf of Liverpool Business Estate may not be able to be continued as they are not presently funded, meaning that it is unlikely that there will be any return to creditors in that liquidation; and
iii. it is unlikely that there will be any further investigations or recovery action in the liquidations of Argyle Builders, Southern Cross Rigging or Southern Cross Estate Developers, as those administrations are without funding, and it is therefore unlikely that there will be any returns to creditors in those liquidations;
b. with a pooling order:
i. the proceedings commenced in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on behalf of Liverpool Business Estate can be continued;
ii. there can be further investigations and recovery action in the liquidation of Argyle Builders, Southern Cross Rigging or Southern Cross Estate Developers; and
iii. the return to creditors of the Group is estimated to be approximately 70 cents in the dollar.
19 The plaintiffs also relied on the questions that need to be asked and answered for a pooling order to be made as identified in In the matter of Kirby Street (Holding) Pty Ltd [2011] NSW SC 1536 at [7].
20 In short, whether there is a group of two or more companies. The group consists of five companies and the requirement is therefore satisfied.
21 Further, each corporation in the group, subject to the orders that I will be making today, is being, or will be being, wound up.
22 In addition, at least one of the conditions in subs (i) to (iv) of s 579E(1)(b) of the Act is satisfied. The plaintiffs relied on s 579E(1)(b)(iv).
That is:
one or more companies in the group own particular property that is or was used, or for use, by any or all of the companies in the group in connection with a business, a scheme, or an undertaking, carried on jointly by the companies in the group.
23 The submissions for the plaintiffs explain that it is apparent from the evidence that the real property owned by one member of the group, Stacey Apartments, was used or was for use by any or all of the companies in the group as security for facility agreements between NAB and certain companies in the group. This is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. As the plaintiffs submitted:
[84] The companies in the Group clearly each contributed to a business, scheme or undertaking carried on jointly by all of them, in the sense that they were each part of the Merhis group, which appears to have operated four main businesses through the various entities in the Merhis Group, being:
a. property development;
b. property investment;
c. construction; and
d. structural steel framing manufacturing.
[85] The real property owned by Stacey Apartments was therefore used, or was for use, in connection with that business, scheme or undertaking carried on jointly by all the companies in the Group in that it was used, or was for use, as security for facility agreements between the NAB and certain companies in the Group. The funding from those facility agreements was used to fund the projects being undertaken by the companies in the Group, which were part of the relevant business, scheme or undertaking carried on jointly by all of them as members of the Merhis group.
[86] The condition in subsection 579E(1)(b)(iv) is satisfied.
24 Section 579E(12) is also relevant. That is, the Court must be satisfied that it is just and equitable to make a pooling order, having regard to the matters set out in s 579E(12). I again adopt the submissions for the plaintiffs as set out at para 68 (quoted above). In terms of the requirement that it be just and equitable that the order sought be made, the matters set out in para 68 confirm that it would be just and equitable for such an order to be made.
25 Section 579E(10)(a) is also relevant, in that the Court must not make a pooling order in relation to a group of two or more companies if, relevantly:
The court is satisfied the order would materially disadvantage an eligible unsecured creditor of a company in the group and the eligible unsecured creditor has not consented to the making of the order.
26 In this case, it is put against the plaintiffs that the terms of s 579E(10) have not been satisfied. However, the two creditors in issue, in fact, maintain that they are secured creditors, not unsecured creditors. Accordingly, I am satisfied that s 579E(10) does not preclude the making of the order.
27 In respect of the submissions which have been put against the making of the orders sought by the plaintiffs, I have already addressed the status of Southern Cross Rigging as a person aggrieved. As to the other matters, I do not accept that the plaintiffs have not established any real prospect of recovery by reason of the reinstatement of SCED and the setting aside of the DOCA. On the evidence, it is apparent that a large number of assets have been transferred out of the company and that the explanation for such transfers is, at least on its face, inadequate, raising more questions than answers.
28 In terms of the issue that the plaintiffs have not identified how they intend to repay the funds that were paid under the DOCA, I accept the submission for the plaintiffs that there is no obligation to do so under the terms of the DOCA and that the DOCA does not contemplate any such repayment.
29 In respect of the issue that the plaintiffs have not identified how the creditors who voted in favour of the DOCA would benefit from the DOCA being set aside, where the transaction to be impugned would not be voided or set aside, the fact is, under the DOCA, the related parties received nothing and stand to have their position improved in the liquidation.
30 Further, contrary to the submissions of the defendants, there is sufficient evidence to support the making of the winding up order under ss 459A and 461 of the Act.
31 In summary, I accept the submissions for the plaintiffs, both written and oral, that this is a matter which calls for the making of the orders which have been sought.
I certify that the preceding thirty-one (31) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Jagot.