Teachings of Queen Kunti
Shrila Prabhupada - Lilamarita
Nectar of Devotion
Nectar of Instruction
8 Mr Barrow said in evidence that these written teachings are supplemented by recorded lectures by and conversations with Prabhupada and a collection of other books which are available to all members of the community. All in all the evidence refers to some scores of volumes of teachings. A number of extracts and passages from various parts of this large volume of material were put in evidence, but I have not been able to form an overall view from that material and I rely on the exposition of beliefs given by Mr Barrow. It appears to me that, as occurs in other contexts in the interpretation of large bodies of written material, many different interpretations and shades of interpretation could be based on the whole body of material, and that exposition by teachers such as Mr Barrow is essential for any overall understanding.
9 As explained by Mr Barrow, with supporting references to scripture, the teaching requires that devotees should follow the instructions of authentic spiritual preceptors. The sacred works place great emphasis on the position of an authentic spiritual preceptor and on obedience by spiritual aspirants to a preceptor. In Mr Barrow's words (paras.23 and 24 of his affidavit):
"Central to this understanding of authority in Krishna Consciousness is the principal of parampara or disciplic succession. This means that a spiritual master is only authorised to give instructions due to the fact that he himself has been a good disciple of his own spiritual master…. His qualification is that he only repeats the instructions he received from his own guru, without adding his own interpretation or slant on the teachings. Therefore, the spiritual master is respected, not out of some sentiment of worshipping another man, but simply due to the fact that he is faithfully speaking the teachings of God, which he has received from his authority."
10 Mr Barrow also says (para.27):
"Therefore, the understanding that Krishna Consciousness means to simply obey the orders of the Superior without discrimination is factually not correct. The authorities are only holding such positions because they are strictly following the principals of Krishna Consciousness. If they stop following the regulative principals or try to teach something which is not in line with the scriptures, the disciple is instructed to reject such teacher."
11 Mr Barrow also said (para.33):
"Therefore, rather than extolling a kind of 'blind surrender' to authority, the process of Krishna Consciousness actually demands that one must discriminate between those devotees who are beginners and those who are more advanced; one should give respect and obedience to a devotee in proportion to his spiritual status. "
12 In Mr Barrow's account of the tenets of Krishna Consciousness, members living in a community should obey the minimum requirement as established by leaders of that community for devotional services; and the minimum requirement for New Govardhana Farm was chanting 16 rounds of Japa per day (meditation), attending the morning religious program including a lecture, and contributing towards the support of the community either by working or by contributing a part of wages earned outside the community. He said to the effect that it is required that devotees or spiritual aspirants should follow the instructions of spiritual authorities, that the person whose instructions were to be followed is an authentic spiritual preceptor, and there are clear guidelines as to which persons a spiritual aspirant should obey. The principle of Parampara or disciplic succession means that a spiritual master is only authorised to give instructions due to the fact that he himself has been a good disciple of his own spiritual master. A bona fide spiritual teacher never claims to be speaking on his own authority, but rather is humbly repeating the word of God which is received from his own spiritual master in disciplic succession. The disciple is to reject the teacher if the teacher stops following regular principles or tries to teach something which is not in line with the scriptures; blind following is condemned as against the principles leading to Krishna Consciousness.
13 The plaintiff does not identify any person and it is clear that there was no person who was in the position of spiritual master to her or in any substantially similar position, and she does not give evidence of anything in the nature of a direction or command requiring her to make the gift, or to give up her property. Further, there is no reason to equate submission to a spiritual master (and she did not make a submission) with an obligation of obedience in a matter such as dealings with property.
14 Mr Barrow dealt at length in evidence with claims by the plaintiff as follows:
(iii) It was a tenet of the faith of the community that devotees would obey the directions of the leaders of the community.
(iv) It was a tenet of the faith of the community that devotees should divest themselves of their material possessions.
(v) It was a tenet of the faith of the community that diverse material possession was an important step for devotees to obtain Krishna Consciousness and enlightenment."
15 It was Mr Barrow's evidence that these claims were untrue. I have referred earlier to his evidence on obedience. He also said (para.38):
"…the actual philosophy of Krishna Consciousness, as taught now and at the time the plaintiff was at the farm, stresses that rather than simply giving away one's material possessions, one should maintain them nicely, and actually engage such possessions in the service of God.
39. A clear distinction is made in the philosophy between simply giving up material objects, and actually giving up the desire to be an enjoyer and controller of our actions separate from the will of God. The mere renunciation of material objects is actually considered inferior…..
40. Therefore, rather than saying that 'the divestiture of material possession was an important step for devotees to obtain Krishna Consciousness', as claimed by the plaintiff, Krishna consciousness philosophy actually describes this kind of mentality as being not really conducive to a high level of spiritual advancement.
16 Mr Barrow developed an exposition of this evidence with references to sacred works. Mr Barrow also said (para.44):
"This principle of utilising everything in the service of Krishna rather than mere abnegation of material possessions, is technically known as yukta-vairagya in Sanskrit, and is one of the corner stones of the Krishna Conscious[ness] philosophy."
17 After further references to sacred writings Mr Barrow said:-
"47. These are just some references to yukta-vairagya. There are many more such references in classes by Srila Prabhupada. Put simply, it is common knowledge among devotees….that the philosophy of Krishna Consciousness does not recommend simply divesting oneself of material possessions, but rather directs the follower to use whatever one has to act in full consciousness of God."
18 In explaining renunciation in the Vedic System found in ancient Hindu Scriptures Mr Barrow said (para 48):
48. In the Vedic system there are four orders of spiritual life, namely brahmacarya (celibate student life), grhastha (householder life), vanaprastha (retired life) and sannyasa (complete renunciation). The system is that a young person is trained from an early age in spiritual values and practices celibacy, focussing his mind and actions on God. When he has reached the age of approximately 25 years, he takes to household life, taking responsibility for his religious wife and children. Then at around the age of 50 years when his children are grown and the family responsibilities have been handed over to the older sons, the husband and wife would travel to holy places and cultivate spiritual life again. Then after some time, the husband would completely renounce his family and devote himself fully to spiritual practice, while the grown-up sons would look after their mother.
49. Generally, when we read directions in scriptures about renouncing material possessions, these are directed at the vana prasthas or sannyasis .
19 Mr Barrow gave an example drawn from the Srimad Bhagavatam relating to Maharaja Ambarisa, who utilised all his wealth to rule his kingdom in a godly way, but at the end of his life gave up his wealth to his sons and took to the retired life. Mr Barrow's evidence went on:
50. Note that the renunciation of family life and wealth is sanctioned here for one who has reached the vanaprastha (retired) stage of life. Generally speaking, devotees who are in householder life are not encouraged to give up their family and possessions and take to renunciation, unless their family situation is very unfavourable to their spiritual development. Rather they are encouraged to responsibly execute their household duties and care for their dependants in a God conscious atmosphere.
20 Mr Barrow went on to give further examples drawn from scripture. He said to the effect that although total renunciation of material possessions may be applicable to sannyasis, a significant example drawn from scripture relating to Srila Rupa Gosvamy showed a person in the disciplic succession who retained a quarter of his wealth for personal emergencies when he entered a state of complete renunciation. In his conclusion Mr Barrow said (para.56) to the effect that it was simply not a tenet of the faith that devotees should divest themselves of their material possessions. "Rather the philosophy is that one should utilise whatever possessions he has in the service of the Lord."
21 Mr Barrow explained the use of the term "surrender" in Krishna Consciousness teachings and in the course of his exposition said:
62. Surrender certainly doesn't mean merely giving up material things on one's own account. Rather, whatever the Lord wants, whether it be great riches or poverty, the devotee will accept …
63. Surrendering in the context of Krishna consciousness is a gradual process of developing faith and becoming aware of the Lord (Krishna conscious) throughout our daily dealings. Although the devotee endeavours to the best of his ability, he leaves the results of his actions up to Krishna. Just as a devotee doesn't renounce his material possessions but rather engages them in the service of the Lord, similarly a devotee does not renounce the ability to act in this world. Rather he acts only for the pleasure of Krishna and leaves the results up to Krishna.
22 Mr Barrow gave further exposition of the concept of surrender, with scriptural reference and said:
66. Thus we can see that the meaning of surrender in Krishna Consciousness has very little to do with simply obeying orders and even less to do with renouncing material possessions. Saranagati , or surrender, as explained Srila Prabhupada and the scriptures, is a very deep internal process of change, whereby one comes to depend on God throughout all of one's activities. In this way the devotee actually becomes liberated from all kinds of worldly anxieties and gradually progresses towards the ultimate goal of full Krishna Consciousness or union with the Lord.
67. In the material world, the word surrender conjures up ideas of being taken prisoner, losing ones liberty, becoming bound up etc. However, we can see from the scriptural reference above that surrender in Krishna consciousness is describing something quite different. In spiritual life, surrender to God is actually the cause of supreme liberation and bliss for the devotee, and is the process by which the devotee is re-instated in his natural, spiritual position of complete dependence on the Supreme Lord.
23 In his conclusion he said:
69. Rather than instructing prospective devotees to divest themselves of their material assets, the philosophy instructs that one should utilise whatever wealth or possessions one has, with the consciousness that God is the ultimate proprietor. It is not the material possessions that one needs to renounce, but rather the mistaken idea that we are the ultimate owners of such possessions and that there is no supreme controller.
24 I accept that Mr Barrow's evidence illustrates orthodox teaching and exposition in the Krishna Consciousness Movement in the present age, but at the same time I observe that the written material in evidence shows that there is ample room for misunderstanding, or for understanding the authority of spiritual teachers and the significance of possessions in ways which give them different emphases and significance to that taught by Mr Barrow. The writings in evidence include passages giving great emphasis to the authority of spiritual teachers, and also passages deprecating materialism and reliance on possessions and attachment to them.
25 The plaintiff's claim is now found in her Second Further Amended Statement of Claim filed on 7 June 1999. The claim is to the effect that her execution of the Deed of Gift and Transfer were procured by undue influence of the defendant over her, and she alleges facts which it is claimed show that undue influence should be presumed and that the burden of proof lies on the defendant to show that there was not in fact any exercise of undue influence. The matters which were alleged to show that undue influence is presumed are to the effect that at the time of execution of the documents there was a relationship of spiritual adviser or of trust and confidence between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the transaction was manifestly disadvantageous to the plaintiff in that she received no valuable consideration therefor, and that she received no independent advice in relation to the Deed and Transfer. Particulars of the facts alleged to show such a relationship refer to the defendant's position in the Krishna Consciousness Movement and the objects of the defendant, allege the plaintiff's participation in festivals and Sunday feasts and other observances, refer to alleged tenets of faiths which I have set out, and specify many written teachings. The Defence, now the Defence to Second Further Amended Statement of Claim filed on 20 September 2001, denies the existence of the relationship of spiritual adviser and the relationship of trust and confidence, denies that there is a presumption of undue influence, and denies that the gift was procured by undue influence. The Defence alleges that the plaintiff is estopped from denying the effectiveness of the gift by reason of a number of facts and circumstances, and alleges that she has confirmed and acquiesced in the gift, and that she is guilty of laches, and also contends that the plaintiff is not entitled to any remedy because, with the sale to the Pecks, it is not possible to bring about restitutio in integrum and restore the subject matter of the gift. The Defence also raises a number of subsidiary matters. The issues debated at the hearing went somewhat wider than the case literally expressed in the pleadings.
26 In my view it would be a mistake to concentrate on the plaintiff's relationship specifically with the defendant as an incorporated association or to attempt in some way to sever that relationship from the plaintiff's relationship with the persons who constituted the Krishna Consciousness Movement and conducted its affairs. The defendant, like many bodies holding property which has been set aside for religious or other charitable purposes, does not necessarily have any agency relationship with the individuals who are actively propagating the religion. The corporation holding the property is usually relatively inactive, but if donations come to it through the exercise of undue influence by any other persons the donations are just as much liable to be set aside as they would have been if the exercise of undue influence had been within the scope of authority conferred by the corporation. As the defendant took the property directly from the donor as a volunteer the question of notice or absence of notice of the exercise of undue influence, or of circumstances leading to its presumption, is not significant in the context of equitable relief against undue influence. If it is correct to classify the plaintiff's claim as a mere equity enforceable only against persons directly involved in the transaction, the defendant was so involved. In any event the defendant would be affected by notice of matters known to Mr Evans the Temple President and Mr Barrow its Chairman, because they were the persons in whose hands the defendant left the conduct of this part of its affairs.
27 There is no possible view of the plaintiff's case, or of the facts, in which she made the gift with anything less than a full and complete understanding that she was giving away the Rosebery Creek Farm and parting with complete ownership of it, or that at the time of executing the document she fully wished and intended that an effective gift would take place. That is the common characteristic of claims to set aside gifts on the ground of undue influence; if there had been a lack of understanding of the nature of the transaction, or if the transaction could be attacked or set aside on the ground that the donor had not understood the true nature of the transaction, or had been misled or defrauded, there would be no need or ground for this form of equitable relief. It is an essential part of a claim to set aside a gift on the ground of under influence that there should have been a fully effectual and intended gift; in an allusion to the words of Lord Eldon LC in Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Vesey Junior 273 at 300, 33 ER 526 at 536, the question is not whether the intention existed, but how it was produced.
28 In the application of this basic principle to gifts to religious institutions or religious advisers, the court does not act only for the restraint of deceptions and of intended exploitation of religious enthusiasms or beliefs; if there has been behaviour of those kinds the court will set aside gifts which the behaviour has produced, but the grounds of the court's intervention extend well beyond such behaviour. The court's approach, in cases of gifts influenced by religious advisers or religious beliefs, is more exacting than ordinary community standards and goes well beyond overcoming deliberate exploitation. It may be unconscionable to accept and rely on a gift which was fully intended and understood by the donor and originated in the donor's own mind, where the intention to make the gift was produced by religious belief. Characteristically persons claiming this relief have made gross errors of judgment, obvious to any objective outsider. Finally, an owner of property is entitled to dispose of it, even to dispose of it in a very improvident way, but the court requires to be satisfied that the transaction is not unconscionable after examining the events and circumstances closely.
29 The law relating to undue influence has had much attention from courts and is the subject of a number of significant restatements. I am not called on to make full review or restatement of all the principles in this branch of the law. The principles are in my understanding not susceptible of exhaustive statement or syllogistic application, and the cases are instances where the court has, on the basis of detailed address to the facts of the relationship between the donor and donee and the whole situation of the donor, concluded that it would be unconscionable that the defendant should rely on the validity of the donation, and that the court should intervene. A conclusion of that kind cannot be reached readily; it is only in cases of enormity that transactions which according to common law are effective should not be allowed to have their effect. The court does not act idiosyncratically or adduce concepts of unconscionability afresh for each case, but acts in the context of earlier judicial experience; yet each decision is a judgment on the facts to which it relates. An intended donation and an effective transfer of ownership of property are assumptions with which consideration starts; the question at the heart of the court's power is how the intention was produced, and the advice given to the donor or available to the donor is brought under examination by that question; see Huguenin v. Baseley (1807) 14 Vesey Jnr 273 at 300, 33 ER 526 at 536 (Eldon LC).
30 Many undue influence cases have involved, in greater or less degree, some religious influence on the decision of the donor, usually involvement of a clergyman or spiritual adviser as donee or otherwise in the events leading to the donation to a religious institution or other person connected to the spiritual adviser. In Huguenin v. Baseley the donor actually had an active adviser; he was a clergyman although that fact was not given great prominence by Lord Eldon and the donations were made to him and persons connected to him but not to religious institutions. A closer consideration of the interaction of religious teaching and undue influence was given in Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 ChD 145. In Quek v. Beggs (1990) 5 BPR 11761 McLelland J reviewed the legal principles which were applied at 11764 to 11766, in a passage which has often been referred to in this Division.
31 The question referred to by Lord Eldon LC of how the intention was produced naturally leads a court to consider what advice or counselling was available to the donor, the terms of any advice and the position of any person who gave advice, as to general understanding of the donor's position and also as to association or lack of association with the donee or its religious purposes. Occasionally there have been judicial observations suggesting that actual independent advice is essential for validity, but this may be an overstatement. Support for the view that independent advice is indispensable is found in Watkins v. Coombs (1922) 30 CLR 180 at 194 (Isaacs J), referring to authority on Indian law which may have been affected by statutory provisions. In concept there could be a showing that the decision to make a donation was free from undue influence even though there was no independent advice: in practicality, that would be a very rare event. There are no legal rules prescribing in a clear way who is qualified to give the advice or what advice must be given; rather the court must examine the actual events and form a judgment upon them. It would be incorrect to appraise the question of independent advice from the point of view of a supposed duty of the donee to see that the donor obtained independent advice, and concepts of fault or good performance by the donee are not necessarily involved.
32 In counsel's submissions I had the benefit of an extensive survey of authorities relating to undue influence, particularly religious influence. I was taken in particular to passages in Huguenin v. Baseley, and to the judgments at first instance and on appeal in Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch.D 145, and in more recent times Union Fidelity Trustee Co of Australia Ltd v. Gibson [1971] VR 573, particularly at 579 (Gillard J) and Quek v. Beggs (1990) 5 BPR 11, 761 and 11,764-766 (McLelland J). Although case law on religious influence includes examples of grossly exploitative behaviour, such as Morley v. Loughlan [1893] 1 Ch. 736, this is not a necessary or usual element in the facts of such cases, and in Allcard v. Skinner there clearly had not been such behaviour. In my respectful view the operation of the principles and the basis of the equitable jurisdiction are clearly shown in Johnson v. Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 in the judgment of Dixon J at 134-136. The passage at 134-135 shows that there is no need for the relationship to fall into any highly defined category. Dixon J said "[The doctrine] applies whenever one party occupies or assumes towards another a position naturally involving an ascendency or influence over that other, or a dependence or trust on his part. One occupying such a position falls under a duty in which fiduciary characteristics may be seen. It is his duty to use his position of influence in the interest of no-one but the man who is governed by his judgment, gives him his dependence, and entrusts him with his welfare. When he takes from that man a substantial gift of property, it is incumbent upon him to show that it cannot be ascribed to the inequality between them which must arise from his special position."
33 Although Dixon J spoke in terms of duty, the reference was not in my understanding to a duty imposed by law but to what must be done if it is to be established that the transaction is to be treated as effectual. The matter was put in this way in Allcard v. Skinner by Cotton LJ at 171. Speaking of cases where a presumption of undue influence has been raised his Lordship said "… the Court interferes, not on the ground that any wrongful act has in fact been committed by the donee, but on the ground of public policy, and to prevent the relations which existed between the parties and the influence arising therefrom being abused." This passage was quoted with approval by Williams J in Bank of NSW v. Rogers (1941) 65 CLR 42 at 85. To a similar effect is a passage in the judgment of Bowen LJ in Allcard at 190: "This is not a limitation placed upon the action of the donor; it is a fetter placed upon the conscience of the recipient of the gift, and one which arises out of public policy and fair play." The focus of attention on public policy and prevention of abuse is important for understanding why the law is as exacting as it is, which is not well understood by focussing on the position of the donor, who in the nature of things has behaved foolishly and has brought about a transaction against his own interests.
34 In the same judgment at 183 Bowen LJ said "The undue influence which Courts of Equity endeavour to defeat is the undue influence of one person over another; not the influence of enthusiasm on the enthusiast who is carried away by it, unless indeed such enthusiasm is itself the result of external undue influence. But the influence of one mind over another is very subtle, and of all the influences religious influence is the most dangerous and the most powerful, and to counteract it Courts of Equity have gone very far. They have not shrunk from setting aside gifts made to persons in a position to exercise undue influence over the donors, although there has been no proof of the actual exercise of such influence; and the courts have done this on the avowed ground of the necessity of going this length in order to protect persons on the exercise of such influence under circumstances which render proof of it impossible. The Courts have required proof of its non-exercise, and, failing that proof, have set aside gifts otherwise unimpeachable." This passage has been repeatedly referred to with approval; see Quek v. Beggs at 11,765 and (in a very different context) Ryan v. The Queen (2001) 75 ALJR 815 at 827 (Gummow J).
35 The plaintiff's counsel also referred to cases where the presumption has arisen and the onus has been reversed on the ground of a general relationship of trust and confidence in which the defendant was in a position to exert influence or dominion, illustrated by Johnson v. Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 - Latham CJ at 119, Dixon J at 134-135.
36 It is not possible to state in an exhaustive or even in an altogether clear way what the court will require as indications sufficient for validity, because the court's conclusion is adduced from a detailed examination of the facts of each case. On the need for precise examination of the particular facts see Jenyns v. The Public Curator (Queensland) (1953) 90 CLR 113 at 118-119. Although it should not be said that independent advice is essential for validity, it would not often happen that an improvident donation for religious purposes would be upheld unless some person who was altogether independent of the donee and who had a full understanding of the donor's circumstances had actually succeeded in bringing the donor's mind to bear on the implications of the gift for the donor's own economic position and welfare. It is an enormity when a person with the means to solve such a basic problem in life as the need for housing for herself and her children gives those means away to the religious institution of a religion in which she has received instruction, and leaves herself and her children unprovided for. That is an entire departure from ordinary behaviour and from acts of benevolence usually encountered, and the enormity calls for close examination before it is accepted that the gift is effective. The enormity of the gift is particularly great in the plaintiff's circumstances where she had small children whose housing she was giving up, and she had no other resources which were significant in the context of providing for her housing need, or any other long-term need, and she received no formally expressed or binding commitment, from the defendant or anyone else, to make any countervailing provision for her or for her children. It does not often happen, to my observation, in the case law to which I was referred that a woman gives up all her capital assets and receives no countervailing commitment; the plaintiffs in Huguenin v. Baseley and in Allcard v. Skinner had other capital resources to rely on, and in the plaintiff's circumstances the donation which she now challenges was a far greater enormity.
37 On views I have formed about the facts, there was nothing in the nature of a deliberate attempt by the defendant or by anyone in the Krishna Consciousness Movement to get the better of the plaintiff, to overbear her or deceive her, or to deprive her of the opportunity of making up her own mind. Nobody was insidiously working to make the plaintiff behave contrary to her own interests. At the same time however it should be observed, as a dominating fact in all considerations, that the extreme improvidence of the gift would have been obvious to any reasonable observer who knew anything of her circumstances and was, I am quite satisfied, obvious to the officers of the movement who conducted the defendant's side of the transaction. When she signed the document the plaintiff did not have any other significant capital resource; nor did her husband. They had two small children, the elder aged three, and their third child was born later that month on 24 December 1988. They may have had some relatively small amount of money in a bank account, but they had no other significant capital resource which could meet the needs of a young family for housing, or contribute significantly towards doing so, even to the extent of a deposit. They owned a car. They owned some farm animals, and some household effects; but when she gave up ownership of the Rosebery Creek Farm she lost her opportunity to care for the farm animals. She had no other significant financial resources. The plaintiff and her husband had lived on the Rosebery Creek Farm for less than six months and did not have any productive farming activity in hand, and neither had any employment. I see no reason to suppose that the resources of them both in savings, earnings, proceeds of sale of properties in California or in Queensland, or from any other source, produced any large balance not explained by the acquisition of the Rosebery Creek property, bearing in mind their journeys, their many moves and the absence of any sign of productive employment of Mr Hartigan since he says he lost his employment and opportunity to earn commissions as a strategic metals trader after the Stock Market Crash of October 1987. The idea that the plaintiff was in 1989 or ever was a wealthy woman is quite wrong. She had not received any significant inheritance, and later received one small sum of about A$1000 from an uncle and A$1000 from an aunt. In practical terms the plaintiff was completely impoverished by the gift and placed in a situation where she was completely dependent on whatever arrangements could be made within the Krishna Consciousness Movement for housing herself, her husband and her children. The gift could not be explained by ordinary human motivations of generosity, charity or religious feeling, and was so extraordinarily improvident as itself to call for consideration of the circumstances and state of mind which led the plaintiff to decide to make it.
38 The plaintiff was born at San Jose, California on 18 March 1952. She did not have a religious upbringing or instruction in any religious belief. She was educated in San Jose and completed High School in 1970, and after three years of tertiary study obtained a qualification as a technician in radiography from the San Jose School of Radiologic Technology in 1974. She then worked as a radiographer, and by 1984 had been employed by Radiological Medical Group of San Jose for some years and had an entitlement in the nature of a superannuation fund. She acquired several dwellings in or near San Jose as investment properties; they were heavily mortgaged. She took leave of absence from the Radiological Medical Group about April 1984 and travelled overseas; she came to Australia and while in Australia met Michael Hartigan, whom she married at Alice Springs on 24 August 1984. She returned to California in late 1984 with Mr Hartigan, and found that she had lost her employment because she had overstayed her leave. She thus received money representing superannuation, which went towards her investment properties. She obtained other employment. Their first child Sean was born in California on 30 April 1985. After the birth the plaintiff was again employed by Radiological Medical Group. The family travelled to Australia in about August 1986 and lived for a while at Tewantin, inland from Noosa in Queensland. Their second child Julia was born at Tewantin on 9 February 1987. In about April 1987 they again travelled to the United States and lived first near Santa Cruz and later in Los Angeles.
39 Mr Michael Hartigan was born on 30 October 1958, completed his High Schooling in Victoria in 1974, and in the following years on four separate occasions attempted University courses. He studied Indian philosophy, among other things, in the Arts Faculty at La Trobe University; he did not however complete his degree. He developed a fascination with India and its culture and visited India in 1982, 1983 and, he says, again in 1986. His first significant contact with the Krishna Consciousness Movement appears to have taken place in Melbourne about 1982 after his first journey to India, while he was studying Indian philosophy at La Trobe University. He then encountered the Hare Krishna Movement in Melbourne in 1984, attended Sunday Feasts and obtained a copy of Bhagavad-Gita As It Is; he says he stole it. He visited temples occasionally, and attended temples across Australia for the Sunday Feasts but did not join the Hare Krishna Movement. It is Mr Hartigan's evidence that the plaintiff and he met devotees of the Hare Krishna Movement while they lived in Tewantin near Noosa.
40 About September or October 1986 while living at Tewantin the plaintiff with her husband began attending the International Society Brisbane Temple; she received some literature there and from reading the literature learnt of the ISKCON Farm at Murwillumbah known as the New Govardhana Farm Community. On several occasions the ISKCON travelling bus party visited the plaintiff and her family and stayed at her house at Tewantin. The bus party was a mobile preaching unit consisting of a bus with a temple set up inside it and a number of devotees who travelled around the countryside preaching the word of Krishna. Some members of the bus party spoke with commendation of religious celebrations on the New Govardhana Farm. The plaintiff says in evidence "I recall that at this time I had seen reference to the [New Govardhana] Farm in Hare Krishna literature and I began to be attracted to the idea of living on a farm, growing our food, taking our produce to town for sale and living a simple and devotional life. I recall also that at about this time I had begun to have an understanding that the journey towards Krishna Consciousness involved ultimately the surrender of material possessions."
41 Mr Michael Hartigan was enrolled as a life member of the International Society (not, literally, of the defendant) at Laguna Beach on 30 August 1987. His registration form, Ex A, shows that he paid a fee of US$1,111 on registration. The plaintiff understood that she became a life member at the same time, although according to the terms on the reverse of Ex A she was mistaken on this, as membership is granted only on an individual basis, and the spouse of the member is not considered a member, but may use the membership identification document to obtain accommodation.
42 The plaintiff said (affidavit of 20 December 2000 para 12):
12. In or about April 1987, Michael and I returned to live in the United States. Whilst living in Aptos, outside Santa Cruz, in or about April or May 1987 Michael and I visited the ISKCON Three Rivers Farm near Fresno. I had learnt of the existence of the Three Rivers Farm through reading the Back to Godhead Magazine. I visited that farm as at the time I was considering moving to live near an ISKCON Temple because of the simple living and high thinking I thought was involved in that lifestyle and which I also believed would be conducive to raising a family in Krishna Consciousness. I also wanted my children, when they were old enough, to attend an ISKCON school. ISKCON schools are only located on ISKCON farms. I believed that Michael shared my views at the time as I had several conversations with him to that effect.
13. The farm in ISKCON thinking exemplifies simple living close to Krishna.
43 About July 1987 the plaintiff with her family moved to Los Angeles and lived there until May 1988, when they returned to Australia.
44 While the plaintiff and her family lived in Aptos near Santa Cruz they visited the Three Rivers Farm near Fresno California. They found that the Three Rivers Farm was closed. They found this disappointing. In California in 1987 Mr Michael Hartigan was employed, first selling cars and then trading in strategic metals, in which for some months he earnt very high commissions. The plaintiff said in evidence (para.15):
While living in Los Angeles, and with Michael selling, first cars and then strategic metals, I began to think that we were moving away from Krishna Consciousness because we could not find it around us.