179 An earlier passage in the judgment was cited with approval by Basten JA in Baker-Morrison when he was dealing with the nature of the knowledge which the person is required to have:
Section 50D - "know"
[45] This last line of reasoning has relevance also to the nature of the knowledge which the person is required to have, for the limitation period to commence to run. In common with extension provisions, s 50D refers, somewhat simplistically, to whether the person "knows" (or ought to "know") the identified facts. It is rare that facts will be known in any absolute sense: rather, as a practical matter, the person will have a belief that certain matters can be established, usually on the balance of probabilities, which is sufficient for the purposes of legal proceedings. Such a belief may be held on firm grounds or on shaky grounds. The belief is likely to involve an assessment of various matters, none of which can be readily quantified. Questions involving causation, fault and assessment of damages are all susceptible to these kinds of uncertainty. Nevertheless, the chapeau of the sub-section refers to knowledge of identified facts, and not to an assessment of prospects of success in the prospective proceedings. Further, despite the inability to bring proceedings without a solicitor in a position to certify in accordance with the requirements of the Legal Profession Act , it is the knowledge of the plaintiff's mother which is the focus of the statutory test.