The correct valuation approach
11 The amount of compensation must be determined with regard to the following matters in accordance with s 55 of the Just Terms Act:
"(a) the market value of the land on the date of its acquisition,
(b) any special value of the land to the person on the date of its acquisition,
(c) any loss attributable to severance,
(d) any loss attributable to disturbance,
(e) solatium,
(f) any increase or decrease in the value of any other land of the person at the date of acquisition which adjoins or is severed from the acquired land by reason of the carrying out of, or the proposal to carry out, the public purpose for which the land was acquired."
12 In the present case the applicant claims only the market value and an amount attributable to disturbance. The applicant did not dispute that the amount attributable to disturbance is $15,000, being the amount supported by the respondent's evidence.
13 Market value is in turn relevantly defined in s 56(1) of the Just Terms Act as follows:
" market value of land at any time means the amount that would have been paid for the land if it had been sold at that time by a willing but not anxious seller to a willing but not anxious buyer, disregarding (for the purpose of determining the amount that would have been paid):
(a) any increase or decrease in the value of the land caused by the carrying out of, or the proposal to carry out, the public purpose for which the land was acquired, and
(b) any increase in the value of the land caused by the carrying out by the authority of the State, before the land is acquired, of improvements for the public purpose for which the land is to be acquired, and
(c) any increase in the value of the land caused by its use in a manner or for a purpose contrary to law."
14 The definition of market value is a statutory formulation of the Pointe Gourde principle - that compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land cannot include any increase or decrease in the value of the acquired land which is due to the scheme underlying the acquisition: Pointe Gourde Quarrying & Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565.
15 This principle requires the Court to ignore the fact that the acquired land is within zone 9(c) (Regional Open Space Reservation) under the LEP. The parties agree that consistently with their town planning advice, if the acquired land was not zoned 9(c), it would have otherwise had the same zoning as the adjoining land, namely zone 2(a2) (Residential "A2"). In another way, the present zoning and the market value of it must be assessed by how the land would have been zoned but for the proposal to carry out the public purpose, which in this case is an acquisition by the Minister for regional open space: Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2005] NSWLEC 438 at [63] per McClellan J.
16 Moreover, it is not just the zoning of the acquired land that must be set aside. In disregarding the blight caused by the process of compulsory acquisition, the Court must also disregard its effect on other land and must take account of development that would otherwise have occurred in the area but for the blight caused by the public proposal: Woollams v The Minister (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 103; (1957) 2 LGRA 338, Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Mosca [2006] NSWCA 159; (2006) 146 LGERA 335 at [50].
17 According to the evidence of Mr Ingham - which is undisputed - the foreshore land at Woodford Bay was first reserved in the County of Cumberland Planning Scheme in 1951. In 1971 and 1972 there was a proposal which was discussed by the Council and the State Planning Authority for a road to be constructed through the foreshore land to provide access to the open space and to any new allotments created by subdivision of the remaining vacant portions of residentially zoned land: letter dated 15 September 1972 from the State Planning Authority to the Council. In Mr Ingham's opinion, which I have no reason to doubt, the whole of the foreshore of Woodford Bay would have been otherwise placed within the Residential 2(a2) zone and subdivided, with an allowance for an appropriate foreshore building line.
18 The present zoning map under the LEP shows that there are two kinds of open space zoning around the foreshore. Some foreshore land is shown as being within zone 9(c) (Regional Open Space Reservation) - the same zoning as the acquired land. Other foreshore land is shown as being within zone 6(a) (Open Space (Recreation)).
19 Mr R P L Lancaster SC and Mr L T Livingston, appearing for the Minister, submit that in disregarding the blight caused by the compulsory acquisition process, the Court is limited to disregarding the effect of the proposal of the relevant acquiring authority - here, the Minister - on planning controls in the area; and restrictions and limitations imposed by other authorities for which the Minister is not responsible, such as the local council are not to be disregarded: Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2008] HCA 5; (2008) 233 CLR 259 at [53] - [54]. That is, according to the submission, the Court can only disregard the 9(c) zoning but must assume that the 6(a) zoning was and is in place, so that only part of the foreshore land would otherwise have been notionally developed as residential land. The 6(a) land is, I understand, land which is already owned by the Council and used for open space recreation.
20 I accept, as I must, the principle explained in Walker Corporation - that it is the public purpose ("the proposal") for which the acquiring authority is responsible which must be disregarded and not that of the local council or some aggregation over time of the policies of the local council or of the government.
21 In another way, Walker Corporation, which is binding upon me, requires the Court to disregard only the increase or decrease in value for which the acquiring authority is responsible: see in particular the joint judgment in the High Court at [54]. That is, par (a) of the definition of "market value" in s 56 of the Just Terms Act limits "the proposal" to that of the acquiring authority.
22 The question is, what is "the proposal" of the acquiring authority - the Minister in the present case. According to the notice of compulsory acquisition published in the Gazette, the land was acquired "for the purposes of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979". The only possible purpose for acquisition under that Act is to fulfil the stated objective of the 9(c) zone as described in the LEP: "to identify, preserve and plan future development of privately owned land of Regional Open Space significance which should eventually be acquired by the State".
23 The 9(c) zone is the only zone, together with the 9(b) (Arterial Road Reservation), in the LEP, which appears to involve the acquisition of land by the State. There is no evidence to show when or by what means the land zoned 6(a) (Open Space (Recreation)) was acquired, or by whom it was acquired. I have noted in par [21] above that I am bound by the joint judgment of the High Court in Walker Corporation. That is, I can only disregard any increase or decrease in value for that for which the acquiring authority is responsible, namely the proposal to give effect to the acquisition of the land within the 9(c) zone in accordance with its zoning. The same case requires that I do not disregard the fact of the zoning of other land in the vicinity zoned 6(a).
24 Most of the foreshore in the vicinity is zoned 6(a) and I must thus assume that it is not and was not developable for residential purposes. The few allotments within the 9(c) zone, being part of the purpose for the acquisition, must be assumed to have an underlying zoning of Residential 2(a2), and are notionally developable land. Apart from the subject land there are at most six other lots within the 9(c) zone along the north-western shore of Woodford Bay which, but for that zoning, would otherwise have been notionally developable in accordance with the underlying zoning.