The Grounds of Appeal and Our Reasons for Deciding They Have No Merit
- In this part of our reasons, we shall only deal with those grounds of appeal, which strictly relate to the decision to terminate the residential tenancy agreement. The tenant also raised other issues only relevant to the rent reduction appeal, and we shall consider those issues under that heading below.
- Some of the grounds of appeal could conceivably have raised questions of law, some raised issues for which leave to appeal would be required. We shall not take up undue time in attempting to ascertain which grounds of appeal conceivably require leave to appeal and which do not as none have any merit. Therefore, we shall simply deal with the merit of each ground. Suffice to say that leave to appeal any of the grounds for which leave would have been required, had we extended time, would have been refused, with the balance of the appeal dismissed.
- What follows below broadly follows the order of the grounds of appeal mentioned by the tenant in the document attached to the Notice of Appeal and paginated as pp.18-48.
- The tenant first submitted that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to determine the proceedings, and that various (unidentified) sections of the RTA we are not satisfied. Why that was so was not explained. The Tribunal was satisfied it had jurisdiction and so do we. The matter fell within s 187.
- The tenant submitted that the residential tenancy agreement tendered by the landlord was not the same as the document that she has in her possession. The tenant never tendered to the first-instance Tribunals or to the Appeal Panel a copy of the agreement she says she has, and which is allegedly different to the one relied on by the landlord. Therefore, there is no substance to this assertion.
- The tenant submitted that the decision in the termination proceedings was incorrect because only a single page of the rent ledger was ever given to her, and therefore she was not given an opportunity to look at it or pick up errors. There was no error in the Tribunal relying upon the evidence given to it and which disclosed the balance of the rental arrears owing. At no stage, either at first instance, or on appeal, did the tenant attempt to lead any evidence of the amounts of rent that she had paid if she desired to prove that the arrears were different to those stated in the one page of the rent ledger tendered.
- The tenant submitted that the termination notice was retaliatory. No oral or written submissions were advanced to support that submission and it does not appear to have been raised below. We take the view the ground was abandoned. If not abandoned, we see no substance in it.
- The tenant submitted that the termination notice given to her on 21 March 2022 did not comply with s 88(3) and was therefore invalid. Section 88(3) says:
A non-payment termination notice must inform the tenant that the tenant is not required to vacate the residential premises if the tenant pays all the rent, water usage charges or utility charges owing or enters into, and fully complies with, a repayment plan agreed with the landlord, unless the Tribunal makes a termination order on the basis that the tenant has frequently failed to pay rent, water usage charges or utility charges on time.
- In this case, the termination notice said that the landlord would not terminate the tenancy if the tenant paid all the rent she owed or entered into and followed an agreed repayment plan until the outstanding amount was paid off. In our view the termination notice complied with s 88(3) in substance. It may not have used the exact words of s 88(3), but it was not required to. It was required to convey certain information which it did.
- The tenant submitted that the circumstances of the case were not sufficient to justify termination of the residential tenancy agreement. She submitted that the Tribunal erred in failing to consider the history of the matter (what "history" was not identified), the efforts she made to engage with the landlord and the other proceedings (the rent reduction proceedings). She submitted that the landlord did not afford her procedural fairness or natural justice (how that was so was not identified) in their conduct of the case, their handling of the cancellation of the rental subsidy and the termination of the tenancy. There is no substance to these assertions which are made without any attempt to identify any factual or legal basis for the assertions. Simply making these assertions does not make them so. There is nothing to indicate any unfairness or lack of natural justice in the landlord's conduct. The tenant's engagement with the landlord (or rather the lack thereof) and other matters is dealt with elsewhere below. Suffice to say, however, that the accumulation of substantial rental arrears over a long period of time where the premises were in hazardous and poor condition because the tenant denied access to the landlord to effect repairs and maintenance amply justified termination of the tenancy.
- The tenant submitted the Tribunal erred in its application of s 87 and particularly s 87(5)(c). Section 87(1)-(5) is in the following terms:
87 Breach of agreement
(1) A landlord may give a termination notice on the ground that the tenant has breached the residential tenancy agreement.
(2) The termination notice must specify a termination date that is not earlier than 14 days after the day on which the notice is given.
(3) The termination notice may specify a termination date that is before the end of the fixed term of the residential tenancy agreement if it is a fixed term agreement.
(4) The Tribunal may, on application by a landlord, make a termination order if it is satisfied that -
(a) the tenant has breached the residential tenancy agreement, and
(b) the breach is, in the circumstances of the case, sufficient to justify termination of the agreement, and
(c) the termination notice was given in accordance with this section and the tenant has not vacated the premises as required by the notice.
(5) In considering the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal may consider (but is not limited to considering) the following -
(a) the nature of the breach,
(b) any previous breaches,
(c) any steps taken by the tenant to remedy the breach,
(d) any steps taken by the landlord about the breach,
(e) the previous history of the tenancy.
- The Tribunal found, at [31], that the tenant had not taken any steps to rectify the breaches (being failures to pay rent), engage with the landlord or seek to try and resolve the matter. The relevant breaches were the recurrent non-payment of rent. The tenant's submissions were not directed to those breaches, but rather to her alleged attempts to engage with the landlord in terms of the landlord's attempts to undertake maintenance and repairs. That is not the focus of s 87(5)(c) which concerns any steps the tenant took to remedy her recurrent failure to pay rent. There were none.
- On the appeal Mr Hassan took us to two documents in which he said the tenant attempted to engage with the landlord in relation to rent. Neither document supported his submission.
- The tenant also complained about the Tribunal's consideration of the steps taken by the landlord concerning the breaches per s 87(5)(d). Most of the tenant's submissions in this regard raised several grievances concerning the cancellation of the rental subsidy, the landlord's actions which allegedly disadvantaged the tenant in the proceedings (none of which were made out), the delay in the determination of her rental subsidy appeal and certain procedural matters. These were not related to the breach of the residential tenancy agreement upon which the landlord relied, namely, the recurrent failure to pay rent. Insofar as the tenant complained about the landlord's alleged disadvantageous conduct of the litigation, none of the allegations were made out.
- As s 87(5) is discretionary, in that the sub-section says that the Tribunal "may" consider certain matters, the tenant would be required to establish error per the principles in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, namely that the Tribunal:
1. made an error of legal principle,
2. made a material error of fact,
3. took into account some irrelevant matter,
4. failed to take into account, or gave insufficient weight to, some relevant matter, or
5. arrived at a result so unreasonable or unjust as to suggest that one of the foregoing categories of error had occurred, even though the error in question did not explicitly appear on the face of the reasoning.
- That is, in considering the circumstances of the case per s 87(5), the tenant would have to establish that in considering the matters the Tribunal did consider it committed one of the errors mentioned above. The tenant failed to establish any of those matters.
- The tenant submitted that cl 10(2) of Schedule 4 of the NCAT Act was not considered by the Tribunal in the tenant's adjournment application determined on 12 September 2022. That clause says:
10 Proceedings causing disadvantage
(1) The Tribunal may exercise the powers conferred by this clause if the Tribunal is of the opinion that a party in any proceedings for the exercise of a Division function is conducting the proceedings in such a way that unreasonably disadvantages another party in the proceedings by any conduct (including by failing to comply with an order or direction of the Tribunal).
(2) The Tribunal may -
(a) if the party causing the disadvantage is the applicant - order that the proceedings (or part of the proceedings) be dismissed or struck out, or
(b) if the party causing the disadvantage is not the applicant -
(i) determine the proceedings (or part of the proceedings) in favour of the applicant and make any appropriate orders, or
(ii) order that the party causing the disadvantage be struck out of the proceedings (or part of the proceedings).
(3) Before making any order under subclause (2) against a party, the Tribunal is to have regard to the following -
(a) the extent to which the party is familiar with the procedures of the Tribunal,
(b) the party's capacity to understand, and act on, a direction of the Tribunal,
(c) whether the party suffers from a disability,
(d) whether the party is acting deliberately in failing to comply with the Tribunal's directions.
(4) The provisions of this clause are in addition to, and do not limit, the provisions of section 55 (Dismissal of proceedings) of this Act.
- The tenant submitted that the landlord conducted the proceedings in a way that disadvantaged her and cited the landlord's failure to comply with the Tribunal's directions. That assertion related to the late lodgement and service of the landlord's evidence which allegedly prejudiced the tenant's preparation of her case. The Tribunal addressed that issue at [18] as follows:
"Based upon the lodgement of the applications and the history of the matters, the Tribunal considers that the tenant has had more than sufficient time to prepare and present her case in respect of both the applications. The final documents that the landlord presented were submitted and given to the tenant on 29 July 2022. The tenant at that time did not request any extension of time to respond. The original procedural directions required the tenant to respond within approximately 11 days. Based upon those original procedural directions and the timeline for responses, even though the landlord's documents were late, the Tribunal finds that the tenant has clearly had more than sufficient time to prepare and respond to the landlord's documents before the hearing date. In any event, if there was an issue or that time was insufficient time for the tenant to respond, then there is no explanation from the tenant as to why she did not contact the Tribunal back then and request an extension of time to respond."
- We note that 45 days elapsed between the date the landlord served its evidence and the hearing date.
- Returning to the submission, the issue raised by cl 10(2) of Schedule 4 of the NCAT Act was considered by the Tribunal and the alleged error - the failure to consider it - is incorrect.
- The tenant next submitted that she was a long-term tenant pursuant to s 94 and therefore the Tribunal, in determining the day on which vacant possession of the residential premises was to be given, could not order that vacant possession be given earlier than 90 days after the order was made. In this case the termination was effective immediately, and possession was to be given immediately, although the order for possession was suspended for about one month.
- The tenant was not a long-term tenant because she only became a tenant when she signed the residential tenancy agreement in 2019. Before that time her husband was the tenant, he being the only one to sign the previous tenancy agreement.
- The tenant submitted that the landlord's original cancellation of the rental subsidy was invalid. This was not an issue in the proceedings. In any event, it was irrelevant. The tenant appealed that decision and was successful.
- The tenant submitted that the Tribunal erred in its application of s154E. That section says:
154E Exercise of discretion to make termination order
(1) In considering whether to make a termination order for a social housing tenancy agreement, the Tribunal must have regard to the following -
(a) the effect the tenancy has had on neighbouring residents or other persons,
(b) the likelihood that neighbouring residents or other persons will suffer serious adverse effects in the future if the tenancy is not terminated,
(c) the landlord's responsibility to its other tenants,
(d) the history of the current tenancy and any prior tenancy arising under a social housing tenancy agreement with the same or a different landlord,
(e) whether the tenant, wilfully or otherwise, is or has been in breach of an order of the Tribunal.
(2) This section does not limit any other matter that may be considered by the Tribunal under this Act.
- The Tribunal expressly referred to this section in its reasons and several factual matters which were relevant to it. The submissions now made by the tenant were not made to the Tribunal as the tenant failed to appear at the hearing, although the Tribunal realised that some hardship would be occasioned to the tenant and therefore took the hardship she would experience into account. Be that as it may, the tenant would have to establish the Tribunal failed to have regard to one or more of the matters set out in s 154E(1) or House v R error in relation to any matter considered under s 154E(2), and she failed to do either on the appeal.
- The tenant submitted she suffered a miscarriage of justice because the landlord served its documents late (which we have already addressed above), that the Tribunal erred in refusing her adjournment application on 12 September 2022 because she desired to serve a summons seeking additional documents on the landlord, she required legal representation, and that the original cancellation of the rental subsidy was malicious and vexatious litigation.
- The allegation that the original cancellation of the rental subsidy was malicious and vexatious is simply that, an allegation. There is no substance provided to support that serious charge, and the facts as known contradict it. In any event, the original decision was changed and to the benefit of the tenant. She never sought to challenge that later decision within the time allowed.
- We deal with the adjournment application later in these reasons in relation to the rent reduction appeal. Suffice to say it was based on the alleged need to collate, lodge and serve 1,500 pages of documents and to issue a summons to the landlord to produce certain documents concerning the maintenance of the premises.
- The tenant had legal representation for a time, provided by the Western Sydney Tenants' Advice & Advocacy Service which ceased acting for her as the Service was unable to get in contact with the tenant or Mr Hassan.
- Further, the matters were not complex. The plain fact is that the tenant recurrently failed to pay the rent she had agreed to pay and refused to allow the landlord to effect maintenance and repairs. Any complexity in the matters arose from the tenant's conduct of the proceedings, her many attempts to obtain adjournments, her failures to appear, and her unfocused, unstructured assertions and misconceptions repeated often and at length.
- We have attempted to set out above and deal with what might be regarded as matters touching on grounds of appeal. The document we have referred to was not easy to follow or understand. It stated a matter, moved to other matters, then returned to the original matter more than once later in the document. It is full of legal misconceptions, contains a plethora of unsupported assertions, and, where it does touch on evidence, is frequently inaccurate. We point that out not to be critical of the tenant but to describe the difficulty we have had in trying to determine whether there were any arguable grounds of appeal (per Cominos). We have described above as best we could those matters which we were able to distil from the materials.
- For the reasons set out above, we see no merit in any of the grounds alleged and accordingly refuse to extend the time to appeal.