The form of condition 8202
18 The ordinary presumption is that a change in a legislative provision will not be construed as affecting events that have occurred already, unless the legislation itself makes it clear that the change is to have such an effect. That presumption would be all the stronger in the case of a condition such as condition 8202, which establishes a standard to be met by a person if he or she wishes to avoid having an existing visa cancelled, or to apply for a further similar visa in the future.
19 The change in the form of condition 8202 involved several changes of substance relevant to the present case. Instead of compliance with the 80 per cent attendance rule being assessed on an overall basis, the new form required that it be assessed on a term by term or semester by semester basis. The option of establishing 80 per cent attendance 'otherwise' than by records of attendance of the education provider was removed. The only requirement in the new form to prove 80 per cent attendance was imposed in cases in which the education provider kept records. In relation to satisfactory academic results, the requirement to prove such results became a universal one, and not one which only applied if attendance could not be evidenced. This meant that a certificate of satisfactory academic result, supplied by the education provider, was to be required in every case and in every case on a term by term and semester by semester basis.
20 The problem about applying the normal presumption is that the new form of condition 8202 was accompanied by the provision in item 4(2) of Sch 4 to the Migration Legislation Amendment (Overseas Students) Act 2000 (Cth), which makes it abundantly clear that the new form is to apply 'for all purposes'. The provision could not be clearer. Because the appellant's subclass 560 visa was in effect on 21 December 2000, when item 4 came into operation, it fell within item 4(1)(a), and therefore was a visa to which item 4 applied. The effect of the provision was to deem condition 8202 in the appellant's subclass 560 visa to be in the form in item 4(3).
21 Counsel for the appellant relied on Kwan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 498. In that case, Finkelstein J expressed the view that the Tribunal should have judged compliance with condition 8202 by reference to its old form up to 21 December 2000, and only thereafter by reference to its new form. Subsequently, without reference to Kwan, Tamberlin J came to the opposite conclusion in Gurung v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 772. In Siddique v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1226 at [19] - [27], Mansfield J discussed the issue at length and came to the view that the conclusion reached by Tamberlin J was the preferable one. Similar views were expressed by Merkel J in Alam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 630 (2002) 121 FCR 471 and by Hill J in Zou v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1126 (2002) 124 FCR 289. On appeal from Mansfield J, in Siddique v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 16 at [12], the Full Court expressed a tentative view that Mansfield J was correct in coming to the conclusion that he did on that issue. These authorities confirm my view that the legislative provisions are clear, and that Kwan should not be followed.
22 The Tribunal in the present case was therefore correct to apply the new form of condition 8202 in determining whether the appellant had complied substantially with that condition as a condition of his previous subclass 560 visa. The federal magistrate was correct
in finding that the Tribunal's approach had been correct. See her Honour's reasons for judgment in Gunawardena v Minister for Immigration [2003] FMCA 362 at [8].
23 In any event, it is by no means clear that the appellant would have succeeded before the Tribunal if the old form of condition 8202 had been applied. On no calculation of the figures supplied by RMIT University in a letter dated 7 February 2002, and forwarded to the Tribunal by the appellant's solicitor and migration agent by facsimile on 6 March 2002, could the appellant establish better than 77 per cent attendance for the year 2000 and 77 per cent attendance for the whole of the two year period in 2000-2001. At best, he established an 87 per cent attendance record for the second semester in 2000 and an 86 per cent attendance record for the second semester in 2001. These figures were dragged down by his 66 per cent attendance records in each of semester one of 2000 and semester one of 2001. For him to have succeeded in establishing substantial compliance with the 80 per cent requirement overall, or for so long as condition 8202 was in its old form, it would have been necessary for the Tribunal to have accepted his explanation that there were occasions on which he did not fill out the necessary attendance form, because it was not passed to him. As the federal magistrate held at [12] of her reasons for judgment, the Tribunal must have been taken to have rejected this explanation. It was not surprising that it did so, as the appellant did not attempt to provide any detail. In his evidence to the Tribunal, he drew a distinction between lecture classes, which were larger, and smaller classes, which the Tribunal characterised as tutorials. The appellant made no attempt to tell the Tribunal what portion of the total number of classes was made up by lectures, in which he said that students passed the attendance forms around, and what portion was made up of tutorials, in which the tutor marked the attendance sheet. Although he filed an affidavit in the proceeding at first instance, the appellant did not refer to this question. Unless he could show that there was a chance of a different result if the Tribunal had applied the old form of condition 8202, either for the whole period or for the year 2000, the appellant should not be entitled to any relief at all.
24 There is a real question as to whether the appellant ought to have been entitled to raise a totally new submission in reply. In any event, the submission that the Tribunal could not have found that this was a case in which the education provider kept attendance records is manifestly bad. As I have said, the attendance records were supplied by RMIT University and forwarded to the Tribunal on behalf of the appellant. Whether or not students took some part in the compilation of the records, the records were undoubtedly kept by RMIT University, and not by the students themselves.
25 The suggestion that the Tribunal was obliged to seek out its own information as to whether the attendance records were accurate cannot be maintained. It was not put to the court below and runs counter to a long line of authority to the effect that, although the Tribunal has powers to seek out information, it is not obliged to exercise those powers for the purpose of helping to make a case for an applicant for a visa. See Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 45, where the Full Court approved what was said by Wilcox J in Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 167 at 178.