Procedural fairness and error of law
7 The decision to grant or refuse an adjournment is a discretionary one. The guiding principle is set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 the High Court said:
"The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred."
8 The factors to be taken into account in considering whether to grant an adjournment are set out in State of Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146; Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625; Thomas v Nedeljkovic [2004] NSWSC 524; and more recently in Menzies v CRCI Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 118 at [27] where the Court of Appeal stated:
"It was put that, in accordance with JL Holdings , the Court should grant an amendment, unless prejudice was caused to the other side that could not be met by an adjournment and costs, and that any prejudice in this case could have been so met. However, in my opinion, where an amendment would require vacation of a hearing date which was set to take place within a few days, generally there is prejudice through prolongation of the litigation that is not entirely met by costs, and the imposition of that prejudice on the other party needs to be justified by the strength of the case made for the indulgence by the party applying for it. I do not think this was made out in this case, for the reasons I have given, especially in circumstances where no explanation was given for not complying with the terms of the previous indulgence granted."
9 A denial of procedural fairness in the exercise of a discretion will result in an error of law - see Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323; Opitz v Repatriation Commission (1991) 29 FCR 50; Humphrey v Wills (1989) VR 439.