Ground 2 - extension of time for tenant's application
- The timeframe within which a claim for breach of a residential tenancy agreement is three months of the applicant becoming aware of the breach: s 190 of the Residential Tenancies Act and cl 22(9) of the Residential Tenancies Regulation 2010 (NSW). Many of the matters raised by the tenant were out of time, some having first been raised in 2018 or 2019. The Tribunal extended the time for the making of the application under s 41 of the NCAT Act. The landlord submits that time should not have been extended.
- The landlord appears to quibble specifically with an extension of time in relation to the mould and leaking issues. In her reasons, the Member found that the breach was a continuing breach and stated that "the tenant would be within time for the mould and leaking issues regardless as it was not until she became aware of the extent of the problem and the health risk when the landlord's expert attended in March 2022 that she determined she should vacate the property and make a claim".
- In his written submissions the landlord argues that the tenant was aware of the issues with mould by at least May 2021 when she consulted a doctor and asserted that the "severity of the mould would have been communicated by a health care professional at this time". At the appeal hearing he referred to photographs of mould which had been submitted by the tenant in the Tribunal proceedings showing mould on ceilings in July 2021. The landlord submitted that the claim was therefore clearly out of time.
- On the other hand, at the appeal hearing, the landlord, although conceding there was some mould at the property, stated that the condition report (which he referred to in the previous ground) would have shown there was no mould in the property at the beginning of 2021 and, when the landlord visited the property in November 2021, mould was not an issue at that time. He therefore states that the tenant was awarded compensation for a longer period than was warranted.
- Insofar as the landlord seeks to rely on a condition report which was not before the Member, our findings in relation to that issue as discussed above are relevant. In addition, if the landlord is seeking to rely on further evidence which was not before the Tribunal Member, as the Appeal Panel explained in Al-Daouk v Mr Pine Pty Ltd t/as Furnco Bankstown [2015] NSWCATAP 111 at [23]-[25], the test of whether evidence is reasonably available within the meaning of cl 12, Sch 4 NCAT Act is not to be considered by reference to any subjective explanation from the party seeking leave but, rather, by applying an objective test and considering whether the evidence in question was unavailable because no person could have reasonably obtained it.
- We are not persuaded that the evidence which the landlord now seeks to rely upon was not reasonably available at the time of the hearing and, indeed, he does not necessarily argue that it was not as it was within his possession at all times. The landlord simply did not think did not think it was necessary to put it before the Tribunal.
- The landlord appears to assert that a factual error was made by the Tribunal with respect when the tenant became aware of the mould and leaking issues. While it is clear that the tenant was concerned about mould at an earlier time than March 2022, it was open to the Member on the basis of the evidence provided to determine that she became aware of the extent of the problem in March 2022, on receipt of the report of Peter Thornton. The landlord's assertion that the tenant's doctor would have made her aware of the seriousness of the issue sometime earlier is mere speculation. We see no error in the Tribunal Member's conclusion that this aspect of the claim was made within time.
- In relation to other matters in relation to which an extension of time was granted, the Tribunal has a broad discretion concerning the grant of an extension of time. As noted above, Jackson v NSW Land and Housing Corporation sets out the principles relating to consideration of an application to extend time. The Tribunal Member referred to the relevant factors in her reasons for decision and ultimately exercised her discretion to extend time.
- As set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, an error of law in the exercise of a discretion will arise only if it is shown that a decision maker acts on a wrong principle, has regard to extraneous or irrelevant matters in the exercise of discretion, mistakes the facts or does not take into account some material consideration. Further, even if the error cannot be precisely identified, "if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust" an appellate body may infer there has been a relevant failure to properly exercise the discretion because "a substantial wrong has in fact occurred". What must be shown by the landlord is that some error was made by the Tribunal in exercising the discretion to allow the extension of time.
- The landlord has not in fact pointed to any error in the Member's decision with respect to these matters. We do not consider that the Member's decision to extend time was clearly unreasonable or plainly unjust or that she failed to exercise her discretion properly. This ground of appeal must fail.