First limb: Reasonable belief in a right to relief - 7.23(1)(a)
22 Gold Coast Marine, HTC and the Department each relied upon Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals v Samsung Bioepis AU Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 193; 257 FCR 62; 351 ALR 103; 128 IPR 205. In that case, Allsop CJ, with whom Perram and Nicholas JJ agreed, explained the scope and operation of Rule 7.23:
2. … the words of the rule are the framework of analysis for deciding applications under the rule. Secondly, these are summary applications not mini-trials.
…
4. … Rule 7.23 is a beneficial provision, the purpose of which is to enable a person who believes he, she or it may have a right to seek relief to obtain information to make a responsible decision as to whether to commence proceedings…
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8. …There have been a large number of cases now (both at first instance and Full Court) dealing with and explaining the relevant rule. Those authorities should not be utilised to form a complex matrix of sub-rules for the operation and application of a tolerably straightforward provision. Whilst there was no submission that any of these cases was wrongly decided, there does appear to have been a tendency to create an overly abstracted conceptualisation of refined states of mind which, if the words of the rule are not kept in mind, can lead in application to a misstatement of the essence of the rule, focused as it is upon what may be the position. The foundation of the application in r 7.23(1)(a) is that an applicant (a person or a corporation) reasonably believes that he, she or it may have a right to relief. The belief therefore must be reasonable (expressed in the active voice that someone reasonably believes) and it is about something that may be the case, not is the case. It is unhelpful and likely to mislead to use different words such as "suspicion" or "speculation" to re-express the rule. For instance, it is unhelpful to discuss the theoretical difference between "reasonably believing that one may have a right to relief" and "suspecting that one does have a right to relief" or "suspecting that one may have a right to relief" or "speculating" in these respects. The use of such (different) words and phrases, with subtleties of differences of imprecise meaning, and not found within the rule itself is likely to lead to the proliferation of evidence and of argument, to confusion and to error. One must keep the words of the rule firmly in mind in examining the material that exists in order to come to an evaluation as to whether the relevant person reasonably believes that he or she may have a right to relief. That evaluation may well be one about which reasonable minds may differ.
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69. …one needs to remind oneself of the nature of the task demanded by r 7.23(1)(a) in circumstances such as this. The relevant question posed by the rule is whether the applicant reasonably believes that it may have the right to obtain relief. It is not whether one scientific view is more or less persuasive than another. In the field of science, expert views may differ about important scientific aspects that can be seen to bear upon a question. If the applicant has a belief that is founded on considerations or views reasonably open (even if contested as incorrect by others) that may well found a conclusion that the applicant has a relevant reasonable belief. On the other hand, if in the application it can be shown that the belief of the applicant appears to be based on considerations or views that are unreasonable, untenable, irrational or baseless, it would be difficult to conclude that the applicant has a reasonable belief. Much will depend on the evidence and the nature of the question in issue. The kind of interlocutory hearing anticipated for the operation of the rule will, however, generally be inapt for the making of final judgments on contested scientific evidence. This is all the more so when, as here, there was no cross-examination.
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(emphasis added)
23 I am satisfied that Gold Coast Marine has established a reasonable belief that it may have a right to obtain relief from each of HTC and the Department. Gold Coast Marine has obtained:
(a) the 2009 BA Report;
(b) the 2017 Diggles Report and 2018 Diggles Submission;
(c) the Senate Interim and Final Reports;
(d) the IGB Report; and
(e) the 2018 Kelly Affidavit.
24 The Department submits that the evidence and submissions relied upon by Gold Coast Marine do not reveal any consideration of the elements of any possible causes of action, but merely assert that it may have a right to obtain relief against the Department in respect of one or more of the following causes of action: breach of statutory duty, negligence, contraventions of the Australian Consumer Law, and intentional, unlawful interference with property and economic interests. The Department submits that absent any evidence of consideration of the elements of these possible causes of action, any belief that Gold Coast Marine may have a right to obtain relief from the Department is mere speculation.
25 I disagree. There is no dispute that Gold Coast Marine has suffered damage. Damage has been identified and, on the information currently available, the events that were likely to have caused that damage have been identified. However, Gold Coast Marine will need to identify who engaged in conduct that caused the outbreak and consequently the harm to its business, whether there were factual circumstances from which it may be found that the Department owed it a duty of care, the content and standard of that duty and any conduct, taking into account what was known to the Department, or should reasonably have been known, that may result in a finding that the Department breached the duty. The discovery sought from the Department and HTC respectively is relevant to ascertaining whether a claim might reasonably be made against either or both of them.
26 I am satisfied that the evidence currently available to Gold Coast Marine supports the contention that it has a reasonable belief that it may have a claim against the Department and/or HTC in negligence and/or other causes of action mentioned above.
27 It is unnecessary in a preliminary discovery application to break down each element of a cause of action in order to show that there is a reasonable belief that a prospective respondent may be liable. As Kirby J held in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54; 211 CLR 540; 77 ALJR 183; 194 ALR 337 at [230]:
There are certain "standard questions" that dissect the composite notion of common law liability in negligence. Relevantly, those questions analyse the concept in terms of: (1) the duty of care; (2) the scope of the duty; (3) the breach; and (4) the causation of damage. Although these issues are commonly considered separately, it has been pointed out many times that "each element can be defined only in terms of the others" and, for example, that "the actual nature of the damage suffered is relevant to the existence and extent of any duty to avoid or prevent it". These words teach an important lesson. Excessive analysis and undue intellectual subdivision of what is basically a unitary concept can lead a decision-maker into over-sophisticated elaboration of a notion that is, at its heart, a reflection of practicality and common sense. Long ago and far away, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr said, correctly, that "the general foundation of legal liability in blameworthiness, as determined by the existing average standards of the community, should always be kept in mind". Although that was said years before Lord Atkin wrote his speech in Donoghue v Stevenson, it is reflected in what his Lordship said there :
"The liability for negligence … is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy."
28 The Department further submits that Gold Coast Marine cannot have a reasonable belief in a right to obtain relief from the Department where the causes of action against the Department will confront the statutory immunity in s 644 of the Biosecurity Act. That section provides as follows:
(1) No civil proceeding lies against the Commonwealth or a protected person in relation to anything done, or omitted to be done, in good faith:
(a) by a protected person in the performance or purported performance of a function, or the exercise or purported exercise of a power, conferred by this Act…"
29 Although s 644 may be raised by the Department in any proceedings commenced against it, the onus will be on the Department to raise s 644 as a defence, and establish the elements of that defence, including that the Department carried out its duties in good faith. At this preliminary stage, I am not able to conclude that s 644 of the Biosecurity Act will provide immunity to the Department if proceedings are commenced against it.
30 Further, I respectfully adopt what Allsop CJ said in Pfizer at [121]:
In practice, to defeat a claim for preliminary discovery it will be necessary either to show that the subjectively held belief does not exist or, if it does, that there is no reasonable basis for thinking that there may be (not is) such a case. Showing that some aspect of the material on which the belief is based is contestable, or even arguably wrong, will rarely come close to making good such a contention. Many views may be held with which one disagrees, perhaps even strongly, but this does not make such a view one which is necessarily unreasonably held…
31 For the above reasons I am satisfied that Gold Coast Marine has established a reasonable belief that it may have a right to obtain relief from HTC and the Department.