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[2010] NSWDC 4
District Court of NSW
2009-06-19
Mr AJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
CATCHWORDS: TORTS - negligence - occupier's liability - unwitnessed electrocution death of self - employed handyman in course of repairing a roof leak at the base of a redundant roof mounted solar hot water installation on rental property owned by first defendant - second defendant plumbing contractor previously carried out work on the system - redundant hot water system left connected to electricity supply - considerations under Civil Liability Act 2002 - contested liability in negligence for damages claimed by surviving de-facto spouse of deceased - liability assessment where precise mechanism of electrocution not known - whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased - apportionment of liability between defendants - DAMAGES - damages agreed pursuant to Compensation to Relatives Act 1897
Civil Liability Act 2002, ss 5B; 5D; 5E, 5F, 5G, 5I, 5R and 5T LEGISLATION CITED: Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 Electrical Safety (Electrical Installations) Regulations 1998 Evidence Act 1995, ss 79 and 80
Bhambra v Roet [2003] NSWCA 393 Chapman v Hearse [1961] HCA 46 at [6]; (1961) 106 CLR 112 Chappell v Hart [1998] HCA 55; (1998) 195 CLR 232 Container Terminals Australia Ltd v Huseyin [2008] NSWCA 320 Donoghue v Stevenson [1931] UKHL 3; (1932) AC 562; Haber v Walker [1963] VR 339 Haynes v Harwood (1935) 1KB 146 Kolodziejczyk v Grandview Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 267 CASES CITED: Luxton v Vines [1952] HCA 19; (1952) 85 CLR 353 March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506 Mason v Demasi [2009] NSWCA 227 Modbury Triangle v Anzil [2000] HCA 61; (2000) 205 CLR 254 Nominal Defendant v Gardikiotis [1996] HCA 53; (1996) 186 CLR 49 Northern Sandblasting v Harris [1997] HCA 39; (1997) 188 CLR 313 Papatonakis v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1985] HCA 3; (1985) 156 CLR 7 Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer & Anor [2007] HCA 42; 234 CLR 330 Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] HCA 62; (2005) 223 CLR 442 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40
Fiona Giovenco (Plaintiff) PARTIES: Geoffrey John Dick (First defendant) Paul Thomas Stephens t/as CTS Plumbing (Second defendant)
Mr AJ Stone (Plaintiff) COUNSEL: Mr R Cheney (First defendant) Mr ADM Hewitt SC (Second defendant)
Stacks / Goudkamp (Plaintiff) SOLICITORS: Lee & Lyons (First defendant) Curwoods (Second defendant)
Nature of the case and background [1] - [4] Issues for determination [5] - [6] Summary of findings [7] - [9] Evidence survey [10] - [56] Overview of the array of evidence [10] - [13] Oral evidence [14] - [38] Mr Gell [14] - [16] Mr Dick [17] - [26] Mr Stephens [27] - [38] Factual reports [39] - [44] Expert reports [45] - [56] Mr Armstrong [46] Mr Carmody [47] - [49] Mr Blacker [50] Associate Professor Blackburn [51] - [56] Facts [57] - [90] Ownership, use and condition of premises [58] - [59] A problem with the solar hot water system on the premises [60] Defendants' knowledge of problem with hot water service [61] - [65] Installation of a new gas hot water system [66] - [70] Mr Harley's involvement with the premises [71] - [78] The Gell/Harley inspection in September/October 2004 [79] - [81] The events of 23 October 2004 and the death of Mr Harley [82] - [90] Credit issues [91] - [104] Findings on the liability issues in dispute [105] Issue 1 - Continued electricity connection to redundant system [106] - [109] Issue 2 - Awareness of first defendant of continued electrical connection [110] - [133] Issue 3 - Duty of care of first defendant [134] - [155] Issue 4 - Whether second defendant had a duty to advise first defendant [156] - [173] Issue 5 - Scope of first defendant's duty of care [174] - [184] Issue 6 - Whether first defendant was negligent [185] - [208] Issue 7 - Duty of care of second defendant [209] - [216] Issue 8 - Scope of second defendant's duty of care [217] - [224] Issue 9 - Whether second defendant was negligent [225] - [266] Issue 10 - Causation [267] - [287] Issue 11 - Alleged contributory negligence [288] - [332] Issue 12 - Apportionment between defendants [333] - [338] Disposition [339] Costs [340] Orders [341]
Q. I'm not quite following your terminology. You say on the one had "squeezed" which to me denotes a crimping mechanism. And then you refer to it being "capped off" which denotes a sealing mechanism. Which one are you referring to? A. Yes, it's capped off. It's a kinko nut and a screwed cap, basically. All we did was disconnect the pipe - the hot water pipe off the solar and we cap it off. So it closes that end, otherwise if we turn the hot water back on we are going to have water shooting out of that pipe, or feeding back - back feeding into the existing solar.
Q. So I can be clear on what that means, does the capping which you've described prevent water getting into the solar tank? A. Yes.
Q. And does it prevent the water that remains in the tank from draining down into the household when the household taps are turned on? A. Yes.
Q. How does it do that? A. Basically, all we did was disconnect - there's two pipes, there's the cold going in, the hot coming out. We just capped them both off so they were physically disconnected from that tank.
Q. So the effect of what you did was to leave a quantity of water in the tank? A. Yes."
Q. So did you just leave it to leak itself out? A. Yes.
Q. So you didn't actually drain the tank? A. No.
Q. Again is that an estimate as to what you would have done or is that an actual recollection? A. We definitely didn't drain it. Well, yes well the tank was leaking so and we weren't - the quote was to put the new gas hot water system in. There was no quote of disconnect and remove the solar off the roof.
Q. Let me show you the quote in the very last item on it - if the witness could have exhibit C. Could you just read to yourself the very last line of the quote? A. Yes.
Q. We can agree that you quoted that you were going to drain it? A. Yes."
The police investigation proceeded upon the premise that Mr Harley had been electrocuted. An ambulance report described the problem as being cardiac / respiratory arrest. There was no scope for resuscitation.
The inspectors from Workcover ascertained that there was no labelling evident on the wall mounted fuse box within the premises. There was no electrical safety cut out switch installed. An inspection of the roof revealed the storage tank of the solar hot water system to have been dislodged from its framework cradle at one end and one solar panel appeared damaged with cracked glass and it was bent up from its anchorage points on the roof. Plastic conduit was seen to traverse a path across the roof.
A statement made by an investigating police officer suggested that the damaged glass solar panel on the roof had been damaged for some time because it was evident that dirt had accumulated on the broken shards of glass that formed part of the unit. Significantly, that police officer described the hot water storage tank in the following terms: "… The reservoir tank had broken from its mount at the southern end, however had remained attached at the northern end. As a result the tank was sitting at an angle with the southern end sitting on the rooftop and the northern end still elevated. It appeared to me that the tank had fallen recently, as the water that would normally have been retained in the tank had spread all over the sides of the adjoined roof. …"
The police statement did not identify any definite sites of electrocution injury to Mr Harley's body when it was observed at the scene. No post-mortem medical reports were tendered. No death certificate or coronial inquiry findings were tendered, although it was apparent from Exhibit "A' that the coroner had at some stage been involved and his findings were made available to Mr Armstrong, the expert plumber engaged by the solicitor for the plaintiff.
In the paragraphs that follow I set out the essence of the opinions contained in the expert reports that were tendered in the proceedings.
The report of Mr Armstrong indicates at the time of the incident, it would have been common industry practice to disconnect both power and water to an existing hot water unit when replacing that system and this would have required the retention of a licensed electrician to disconnect the power to a solar roof mounted hot water system. There was no scope for controversy within that statement. There were other statements made in the report of Mr Armstrong which were based on assumptions and which involved speculation which in turn indicated that those latter matters had limited probative value.
The plaintiff tendered two reports from Mr Noel Carmody, a consultant electrician. Mr Carmody's first report outlined a general explanation as to how a solar hot water system operated. The report raised the prospect that the plumber in question may have installed the new gas hot water system to operate in parallel to the existing solar hot water system. It should be noted that there was no basis to infer this from within the array of factual evidence. The evidence of Mr Stephens and Mr Dick did not support that proposition. Whilst it is possible that Mr Harders may have achieved that result whilst carrying out his work, which was not checked by Mr Stephens, there was no evidentiary basis for such a view. I consider the suggestion raised by Mr Carmody to be non-probative and entirely speculative.
Mr Carmody expressed the view that if the redundant hot water system in question had been isolated from the electricity supply to the premises, the electrocution death of Mr Harley would not have occurred. He identified an inter-relationship between plumbing and electrical connections on the solar hot water system such that in his view, it would have been prudent for the plumber installing the new system to call an electrician to ensure compliance with the applicable wiring rules. Mr Carmody stated that a plumber installing a new hot water system in 2001 ought to have been aware that there was already another hot water system in place. That view was confirmed by Mr Stephens, who stated that he was aware that this was the situation at the premises. Mr Carmody cited the Electrical Safety (Electrical Installations) Regulations 1998, otherwise known as the Wiring Rules, in force at the time but repealed and subsequently replaced on 31 August 2004 as support for his opinion that when the redundant solar hot water service was taken out of service it should have been disconnected from the electricity supply. Those rules do not represent statutory counts but they do demonstrate a prudent course to be adopted in disconnecting disused electrical installations.
The supplementary report by Mr Carmody dealt with his responses to matters raised in an expert's report prepared for the first defendant by Associate Professor Blackburn. I will refer to his comments in that regard when analysing the defendant's expert evidence.
The first defendant tendered a report dated 23 November 2008 from Mr Bruce Blacker, a consultant electrician. Mr Blacker's report listed a number of documents some of which were not in evidence in these proceedings. His report was based on a number assumptions, one being that it appeared the covering plate over the electrical wiring on the solar water tank was removed by Mr Harley, thereby exposing live cables and terminals thus creating a hazard. I set out my analysis of that assumption in my reasons concerning the contributory negligence arguments raised by the defendants. Mr Blacker also expressed the view that it was not necessary for Mr Harley to remove the covering plate of that terminal box on the unit in order to seal the fixing bolts which mounted the structure on the roof. He also expressed the view that, provided the wiring of the redundant hot water system was in good order, there was no requirement for disused electrical equipment, here being a reference to the redundant solar hot water system, to be removed or to have its electrical supply disconnected. In this regard he was in agreement with the opinions of Associate Professor Blackburn. The assumptions underpinning those views require analysis.
Associate Professor Trevor Blackburn, an electrical engineer
The second defendant tendered a report dated 17 November 2008 from Associate Professor Trevor Blackburn, a consultant electrical engineer. Associate Professor Blackburn identified a number of assumptions upon which he based his opinions. A number of those assumptions had been provided to him by Mr Stephens and were ultimately shown to be unfounded or incorrect. It was assumed that Mr Harley had removed the cover plate of the unit's terminal box containing electrical wiring on the tank thus exposing live wiring. He postulated the possibility that Mr Harley may have turned on the water supply to the tank and thereby restarted the water leak. It was also assumed that the structure collapsed causing substantial quantities of water flowing over the roof and resulting in the electrocution of Mr Harley. Associate Professor Blackburn expressed the opinion that Mr Stephens was not required to warn Mr Dick of the need to disconnect the old solar hot water system even though he thought that leaving it connected in its redundant state was undesirable and inefficient. He said there was no mandatory requirement to disconnect it. Associate Professor Blackburn expressed the opinion that Mr Harley was partly responsible for the incident in question. These opinions will be examined in the course of identifying my findings on the key issues calling for decision.
Associate Professor Blackburn reviewed the materials provided to him and confirmed that he could not determine the cause and time of Mr Harley's electrocution nor could he determine the exact way in which the electrocution occurred. Notwithstanding this, he went on to postulate that the photographs taken by the police appear to show some burns to Mr Harley's hands which may have been consistent with electrical contact with live conductors, but he also noted that the precise current path through Mr Harley's body has not been determined. He noted that the possible opportunities for Mr Harley to come into contact with electricity were direct contact with the electrical wiring of the terminal box on the solar hot water storage unit or due to an extended range of potential electrical contact from the live wires in the terminal box due to the presence of water on the roof acting as an electrical conductor. He further explained that water on the skin acted to increase the severity of an electric shock by decreasing the electrical contact resistance of the skin. A number of other possibilities were canvassed and all of these involved speculation because of the limited nature of the factual evidence. Associate Professor Blackburn raised some possible causes for the electrocution of Mr Harley which bear consideration with regard to the allegations made by the defendants concerning alleged contributory negligence.
Associate Professor Blackburn analysed the set up of the gas hot water service installation on the premises and confirmed that the operation of it was not at all dependent on any connection to an electrical supply. He confirmed that the installation of that system did not require Mr Stephens to access the electricity supply. He also confirmed that the earthing system for electrical supply to the house was not dependent on an earthing connection between the supply source and the plumbing pipes, as sometimes occurs. The significance of this observation was that at the time Mr Stephens and Mr Harders worked on the plumbing they would not have had an electrical safety reason cutting the electricity supply to the solar hot water system on account of pipe earthing issues. This technical details of this issue were not discussed in the evidence given by Mr Stephens, apart from noting that he took volt meters with him on sites in case he came across old power lines so that he could check them. He did not give evidence of having inspected or examined the pipes for the presence of electrical current as was described in the observations of Associate Professor Blackburn.
In making an argument against the potential liability of Mr Stephens, Associate Professor Blackburn pointed out that on the return visit to the site by Mr Stephens to install the gas hot water system on the premises there was no need for Mr Stephens to go onto the roof. This was because the water supply to the solar hot water system had already been turned off and his remaining gas installation work was only required to be carried out at ground level. In this regard he also pointed out that because there was no electrical connection required for the new gas system, therefore there was also no need for Mr Stephens to examine the electrical switchboard.
Associate Professor Blackburn constructed his pivotal assumption that Mr Harley had removed the cover plate of the terminal box to the solar hot water storage unit. On the basis of that assumption he arrived at what he regarded to be the "inescapable conclusion that the accident was partly self-inflicted" by Mr Harley. He also postulated that the "collapse of the tank structure was most likely instigated by Mr Harley performing some work on the structure legs to try to prevent water leakage through the roof."
Associate Professor Blackburn discussed some issues which arose from the reports of the other experts. These issues will be analysed where relevant and necessary when I set out my findings on the liability issues calling for decision.
Before addressing the issues calling for determination it is necessary to review the non-controversial factual chronology concerning the history of the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system located on the roof of the premises and to also review the events that led up to the electrocution death of Mr Harley.
In about 1997 Mr Dick purchased the property at 334 Abercrombie Street Darlington and thereafter continued his ownership of the premises until the time of Mr Harley's death. The premises were rented out to tenants through Mr Dick's agents, L J Hooker, Newtown. The premises had been fitted with a roof mounted solar hot water system which had incorporated within it a hot water storage unit.
On 14 April 1999 a significant hailstorm occurred in Sydney. At that time one of the two glass solar panels on the roof of the premises became damaged. At some time after that hailstorm Mr Dick went onto the roof of the premises and inspected the damage occasioned by that storm. He did so in connection with an insurance claim in order to check on the reported damage. The plaintiff asserted that at the time of his inspection of the roof after the hailstorm, Mr Dick should have known that the solar hot water system was partially powered by electricity. Mr Stephens supported that submission. Mr Dick contended that such an inference should not be drawn.
A problem with the solar hot water service in the premises
In November 2001 Mr Dick's agents L J Hooker received a complaint from tenants of the property regarding the problematic operation of the solar hot water system in the premises. There was no evidence from the agents or from those tenants to describe the precise nature of the problem with the hot water system. Mr Dick's evidence was that his tenants had complained that the system had been running out of hot water.
Defendants' knowledge concerning problem with hot water service
Following complaints by his tenants concerning the hot water, Mr Dick's agents, L J Hooker, engaged Mr Stephens to carry out a plumbing inspection of the hot water system in order to identify the problem. Mr Dick said he had been told by the plumber that the hot water service had developed a leak. The plaintiff submitted that an inference should be drawn from the inspection of the hot water service by Mr Stephens, that in the circumstances, the plumber in question was Mr Stephens.
On or shortly before 21 November 2001 Mr Stephens attended the premises and saw Mr Joe Sama, an electrician in attendance on the premises. The plaintiff submitted that the inference should be drawn that Mr Sama was engaged by L J Hooker as agent of Mr Dick to inspect and report upon the state of the hot water service and advise on the installation of an electric hot water system if one was needed to replace the existing solar hot water system. The plaintiff submitted that there would have been no other reason for Mr Sama to be there on that occasion. Mr Stephen described seeing Mr Sama in the vicinity of the fuse box of the premises.
The plaintiff and Mr Dick maintained that there was no evidence that Mr Sama did anything to any of the fuses in the fuse box on the occasion of his attendance. On behalf of Mr Stephens it was submitted that it should be inferred that Mr Sama removed the fuse to allow for the hot water system to be inspected by both Mr Stephens and Mr Sama. That submission was not supported by the evidence of Mr Stephens.
There was no evidence that Mr Sama went onto the roof of the premises on the occasion of his visit. However there is evidence that Mr Stephens did so and on that occasion he personally did nothing to interfere with the electrical operation of the hot water system by way of disabling it or disconnecting it from the electricity supply although Mr Stephens said that he did turn off the water tap to the system to save water from being wasted by leakage.
Following his roof inspection Mr Stephens telephoned the agent at L J Hooker and he also rang Mr Dick who had asked him for a quotation of the cost of providing a new hot water system. That quotation, which was dated 21 November 2001, was accepted by Mr Dick. It was tendered as Exhibit "C." It is plain from the terms of the quotation that Mr Stephens was only quoting for the work involved in the disconnection of the water connections to that system as well as quoting for drainage of water from the rusted storage tank which formed part of that system.
On 23 November 2001, Mr Stephens delivered to the premises a gas hot water system to be installed at the ground level at the rear of the premises. Some part of the installation of the gas hot water system was carried out by Mr Harders who was an employee of Mr Stephens. It is claimed by Mr Stephens that either he or Mr Harders disconnected the water supply to the solar hot water system on the occasion of the new installation. That claim is disputed by the plaintiff and also by Mr Dick. They pointed out that Mr Stephen was unable to identify where on the photographic evidence the claimed capping of the pipes had been carried out to terminate the water supply to the redundant system. In this context it was also pointed out that hot water was still found to have been leaking from the system on the roof some 3 years later when Mr Gell and Mr Harley inspected the roof, thereby suggesting that disconnection of the water supply to the redundant system had not occurred as was quoted for, and invoiced by Mr Stephens and paid for by Mr Dick when the new gas hot water system was installed.
On the occasion of the installation of the new gas hot water system neither Mr Harders nor Mr Stephens inspected the electrical power board within the premises. Similarly, during the installation of the new gas hot water system, neither Mr Harders nor Mr Stephens took any steps to disconnect the electricity supply to the solar hot water system. This was not unexpected in the circumstances as neither of them were qualified to do so. Neither Mr Harders nor Mr Stephens had drained the water from the solar hot water system notwithstanding that such drainage had been specified in the quotation and invoice prepared by Mr Stephens.
The parties were in agreement that at the time Mr Stephens quoted for the work of installing a gas hot water system, and at the time that work was carried out, Mr Stephens did not speak to Mr Dick to specifically raise with him the need to have an electrician disconnect the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system on the roof. It was also agreed that no advice was given by Mr Stephen to Mr Dick as to the need to seek advice from an electrician concerning what was needed to be done in the circumstances. In this regard the Mr Stephens asserts he was under no duty to so warn in this regard particularly as Mr Stephens was a plumber.
Mr Stephens and Mr Harders installed a gas hot water service on a concrete slab located on the ground at the rear of the premises. Once that installation was complete the solar hot water system located on the roof of the premises was regarded by both Mr Dick and by Mr Stephens as being redundant.
The plaintiff and Mr Dick agreed that if advice had been given to Mr Dick to the effect that he needed to either seek advice from an electrician or that he needed to have an electrician attend and disconnect the supply of electricity to the solar hot water system, then Mr Dick would have acted on that advice and would have obtained the services of an electrician, either by arranging this himself or by arranging it through his agents. Mr Dick agreed that once he had paid the invoice from Mr Stephens for the quoted work he had acted on the assumption that all hot water issues on the premises had been dealt with.
In 2003 and 2004, at the request of Mr Dick, Mr Harley had performed a number of small handyman type tasks at the premises. These tasks included the affixing of tiles in a bathroom, fixing a tap washer and some woodwork at the front of the premises. There was no paperwork associated with these tasks and payment had been made in cash. At an unspecified point in time, Mr Dick and Mr Harley discussed the presence of some water stains in the ceiling of the upstairs hallway of the premises. In this regard it was agreed that Mr Harley would look at the roof of the premises to investigate and fix the problem.
In particular, Mr Dick stated that Mr Harley had informed him that he would investigate the possible causes of the stain in the ceiling. Mr Dick then agreed that Mr Harley would attempt to effect repairs to the roof in order to fix this problem. Mr Dick claimed that he did not approve the removal of the redundant hot water system at the initial stage of Mr Harley's work although Mr Harley had mentioned that this may be necessary. If the solar hot water system was truly redundant at that stage it is difficult to envisage a sound reason as to why it should not have been removed. No time frame or supervisory arrangements were made by Mr Dick with regard to Mr Harley's proposed work.
The plaintiff claims that the removal of the redundant hot water system, either permanently or so as to better fix leaking bolt holes at its base, was within the scope of the work that was discussed between Mr Dick and Mr Harley. Mr Dick disputes that this was so and claims that he and Mr Harley only discussed the possibility of removing the solar panel but only in the context that this might be required if sealing around the bolts at the base of the roof mounted storage unit stand was not effective in dealing with the leak. In this regard Mr Dick claims that no instructions were given to Mr Harley to remove the solar hot water service and he claims that neither was any agreement reached that Mr Harley would proceed with any work in that regard without further recourse to Mr Dick, who asserted that Mr Harley was not authorised to remove the solar hot water system.
The plaintiff pointed out that it is not possible to test Mr Dick's account of these events in the absence of an account from Mr Harley or from some other witness. The credibility of Mr Dick's evidence on these and other matters was challenged by the plaintiff.
Whatever view Mr Dick had of the last critical conversation he had with Mr Harley, it is clear that he envisaged that Mr Harley would be performing some type of dismantling work on the roof to seal it and that this would have necessarily involved some component parts of the redundant solar hot water system, otherwise it would not have been possible for Mr Harley to carry out his investigations with the aim of then applying a silicone seal around the mounting bolts at the base of the unit.
The plaintiff claims that due to the alleged flawed recollections of Mr Dick, is not possible to determine precisely how many conversations regarding the work to be done on the roof took place between Mr Dick and Mr Harley, nor it possible to determine the times at which those conversations took place or indeed the precise contents of those conversations.
In this regard, Mr Dick was adamant that in none of the conversations with Mr Harley, did he instruct or authorise removal of the solar hot water service. He claims that he had no knowledge that Mr Harley was on the roof on the day of his death and had no knowledge that he was attempting to remove the solar hot water service on that occasion, if that was what Mr Harley was in fact doing.
At least one of the conversations that took place between Mr Dick and Mr Harley was initiated by Mr Dick. This involved Mr Dick following up Mr Harley to ascertain when he would complete the required work. In my view, apart from providing confirmatory evidence that Mr Dick was content to trust Mr Harley to make his own arrangements as to the timing of the works without the need for supervision or instruction, nothing else of significance turns on this fact.
The Gell and Harley inspection in September/October 2004
In about late September or early October 2004, Mr Harley and Mr Gell inspected the solar hot water system on the roof. At this time Mr Gell observed water to be leaking from a pipe that was steaming and which was also hot to touch. A conversation then ensued between Mr Gell and Mr Harley. At the trial, Mr Gell gave account of that conversation. This evidence was in summary or conclusion form and was to the effect that there was a risk of working on the hot water system whilst it was potentially still electrified. That evidence in summary and conclusion form has to be viewed in the context of a factual statement that Mr Gell gave to the investigating police in 2004. That was likely to be more accurate than his recollection at the trial.
Mr Gell said that he had observed Mr Harley to make a call on his mobile telephone. Both the plaintiff and Mr Stephens submitted that the overwhelming inference from this evidence is that the call was made to Mr Dick and not to an electrician or another party.
At the trial Mr Gell acknowledged that he had an imperfect recollection of these events and he said he had not heard the whole conversation. The plaintiff and Mr Stephens asserted that the conversation in question involved the topics of the roof and electricity but Mr Dick disputed this and claimed that Mr Gell was not able to hear what was said in that conversation.
The events of 23 October 2004 and the death of Mr Harley
On the morning of 23 October 2004 Mr Harley left his home in order to work on the roof of the subject premises. He was seen by Mr Sams to be working on the roof of the premises that morning in conjunction with a significant flow of water coming from the roof. Later Mr Harley went home for lunch.
The evidence of the plaintiff was that at about 2:30pm on that day Mr Harley returned home, changed into shorts and a T-shirt and then returned to work at the premises. This evidence was contained in a statement made by the plaintiff to the investigating police and also in a record of interview taken by the police which comprised Exhibit "A.11". There, the plaintiff recounted that Mr Harley had said something to her to the effect that he had to call an electrician.
Later on that day Ms Symonds opened the back gate of the premises to allow Mr Harley to obtain access to the roof. There were some minor discrepancies as to time of this event but I do not consider this to be significant. Later on that day Ms Sams observed Mr Harley to be present on the roof of the premises wearing white overalls. She had observed that there had been some noise and some "thumping about". It was suggested from these facts that the hot water system had fallen over and that water was overflowing the gutter from a water supply.
At an unknown time on the afternoon of 23 October 2004, Mr Harley died whilst he was on the roof of the premises. It was agreed that the cause of his death was by electrocution. The source of the electricity that had electrocuted him was the electricity that was then still connected to the redundant solar hot water system. The precise sequence and mechanism of the events that surrounded Mr Harley's death was not witnessed by any person and these events remain unknown. The precise mechanism by which the electrocution occurred, including the electric current flow pathway and contact point on Mr Harley's body for the passage of the electric current that fatally injured him is not known.
It remains unclear as to precisely what Mr Harley was doing and precisely where he was at the time he was electrocuted. Associate Professor Blackburn has postulated that Mr Harley had somehow turned on the water supply and refilled the tank causing it to fall off its mounting stand. Whilst that is a possible and indeed plausible explanation it is not the only one and it is not possible to conclude that this was the mechanism although it does provide a potential explanation for the electrocution involving water as a conductor.
There was a factual investigation undertaken by police and Workcover inspectors. Whilst those investigations undoubtedly fulfilled the formal requirements of those agencies, the tendered parts of the products of those investigations were of limited probative value as evidence in the proceedings, containing hearsay, unsubstantiated assumptions and speculation, as would be expected in an investigation of the facts surrounding an unwitnessed death. This analysis is not a criticism of the work of those agencies, but the product of those investigations highlights the different consideration that applied to those undertakings, compared to the requirements of proof, even on the civil standard of the balance of probabilities.
The defendants have argued that Mr Harley had removed the cover to the electrical panel on the storage tank of the redundant solar hot water system. This was said to be an inference arising from the appearance and the location of these items as shown in the photographs and in the police statements. This conclusion is somewhat speculative and problematic in the absence of evidence as to what was encountered and what was observed at the scene in conjunction with what is seen on the photographs.
The defendants submitted that Mr Harley had come into contact with the electrical system within the solar hot water system by physically touching it or touching it with one of his work tools in the knowledge that he was touching a live electrical connection. Whilst it is undoubtedly correct that Mr Harley had somehow come into contact with live electricity, I reject the submission that these facts necessarily require an inference that he did so knowingly. The plaintiff submits that the opposite inference is more likely in the circumstances because an experienced handyman was unlikely to knowingly touch live electricity. The plaintiff points to the earlier cited explanation of Associate Professor Blackburn as the more likely explanation.
The defendants assert that at all relevant times Mr Harley was aware that the hot water system was dangerous to work upon because it was electrified. The plaintiff disputed that assertion, which was based on inferences which the defendants sought to have drawn from the plaintiff's statement to the police which refers to Mr Harley's stated need to call an electrician. In contrast, the plaintiff maintained that it is unreasonable to draw the asserted inference in the circumstances, and argued instead that the appropriate inference to be drawn on the evidence is that Mr Dick had a conversation with Mr Harley who was then misled with regard to safety issues as a result of that conversation. Many of the inferences sought to be drawn by the parties involve matters of incompletely reasoned or unreasoned competing speculations.
The plaintiff did not give oral evidence. The credibility of her tendered statement was not challenged although there was some debate as to what liability inferences should be drawn from that evidence on the issue of Mr Harley's state of awareness of the electrical risks he faced in carrying out the work in question on Mr Dick's premises. I will deal with those inferences when recording my findings of fact on the matters in issue.
There was a contest over the interpretation of the evidence given by Mr Gell concerning his observations that impacted on the liability issues. There was no direct challenge to the credibility of Mr Gell's testimony. Instead, the debate centred around the reliability of that testimony because of concessions he made concerning his state of recollection as at the time of the trial as distinct from the time he made a statement to the investigating police.
I found Mr Gell to be a credible witness who, when giving his evidence, took obvious care to differentiate between what he could recall and what he could not recall as at the date of the trial as distinct from what was recorded in his statements that were made closer in time to the events in question. The parties made disparate submissions on the reliability of Mr Gell's testimony. I will analyse the specific matters at issue within the evidence of Mr Gell when recording the inferences I draw from his evidence concerning the factual issues to be determined. In the meantime I record my view that he gave his evidence to the best of his recollection and in a way that I considered to be truthful.
The plaintiff challenged the credibility of the evidence of Mr Dick on a number of aspects of his testimony. For the reasons that follow, I find that the plaintiff has largely substantiated the criticisms that were made concerning the credibility of Mr Dick's testimony.
I find that Mr Dick was evasively defensive in answering the questions of the investigating police and the investigating Workcover inspectors during the course of their factual investigations into the death of Mr Harley. I find that he did so in order to deflect potential criticisms from being made against him concerning any responsibility that may have been thought to rest with him concerning the death of Mr Harley. I also consider that despite his denials, he adopted a similar approach to the evidence he gave in these proceedings. I find that he did so in order to shape his evidence to best fit his defence of the plaintiff's claim against him.
I also find that Mr Dick was disingenuous in his denial of any awareness that the redundant solar hot water system on the premises had an electrical connection. I base this conclusion on divergent answers he gave when questioned on the issue. On the one hand he said he did not appreciate that the system had an electrical connection, representing that position as his considered view when in fact, as he later conceded he gave the matter very little if any thought. In my view, I consider that Mr Dick's denial of knowledge of an electrical connection was motivated by a desire to deflect criticism from himself concerning potential liability on his part for the death of Mr Harley.
I observed that Mr Dick was able to give specific evidence where it suited his case for him to do so, and in contrast he claimed a lack of knowledge and recollection where it did not suit his case to give specific evidence. I found his "I don't know" answer to the question as to why, in January 2009 he had been able to recall an alleged conversation with Mr Harley which he had 3 years earlier despite not referring to that conversation in thorough and detailed interviews with the police and with a Workcover inspector, to be disingenuous. I found his explanation for not raising that asserted recollection with his lawyers for some months until the day before he gave his evidence to be somewhat glib and unconvincing. That view was reinforced by his later concession that the conversation in question could have been something he had made up in his mind.
I found Mr Dick's references to Mr Harley not being authorised by him to remove the redundant hot water system to be gratuitous, self-serving and unconvincing in the context that he had left it to Mr Harley to scope the work required to fix the leak. I consider Mr Dick's evidence in this regard to have been put forward in order to deflect criticisms directed at him, knowing his evidence in this regard could not be contradicted.
I accept the submission made by the plaintiff that Mr Dick's statements to the investigating police were either not complete or forthcoming and were designed to distance himself from knowledge of the circumstances of Mr Harley's death. In these circumstances I find myself unable to rely upon the self-serving and exculpatory aspects of his evidence of denial of knowledge of the electrical connection to the redundant hot water system and his assertions that he did not authorise the removal of the redundant hot water storage tank. I consider that Mr Dick structured the latter evidence on his mistaken belief that Mr Harley was in the course of removing or taking down the tank because he had not considered or had possibly declined to consider that the tank had fallen rather than having been partially dismantled as he asserted. He was the only person who described the structure as having been pulled to pieces, conveying the impression of a dismantlement of the structure rather than the structure having collapsed and having fallen.
The plaintiff also challenged the reliability of the testimony of the testimony of Mr Stephens. I find that Mr Stephens generally did his best to relate his evidence in a truthful manner, especially insofar as he ultimately candidly explained why it was that he chose not to discuss electrical matters with Mr Dick during the course of his dealings with Mr Dick, namely that he was a plumber and not an electrician. However I find that the reliability of the evidence Mr Stephens gave on other issues was undermined by a number of critical matters that affected the resolution of important issues in the case.
I consider that much of the detail of the evidence of Mr Stephens, when explored, was found to have been based on assumptions he had made rather than being based on his personal recollections. It was apparent from his evidence that Mr Stephens engaged in reconstruction of his evidence rather than basing it on actual recollections. An example was his initial evidence concerning having capped the water pipes on the roof. Other examples were his evidence of turning off the tap for the water supply to the system and initially not differentiating his own work from that carried out by his employee Mr Harders. Another example was his evidence concerning his claimed observations concerning the activity of Mr Sama at the fuse box, initially claiming to have seen Mr Sama doing work there and then subsequently agreeing that he had not seen such work as earlier described.
I consider that there was an aspect of the evidence of Mr Stephens which reflected poorly on his credit as a witness. This concerned his initial refusal to concede that it was dangerous and hazardous to leave a live electrical connection running to a defunct hot water system. That stance was based on the proposition that he was a plumber and not an electrician. I find that stance to have been a remarkably unrealistic one for a tradesman to adopt. That stance did not sit well with his evidence that he was aware of electrical issues, evidenced by the fact that he carried volt meters amongst his tools. It also did not sit well with his ultimate concessions that it would have been appropriate to advise Mr Dick of the fact that the redundant solar hot water system had a live electric current running into it. That concession did not sit well with his evidence that he consciously refrained from raising electrical matters with Mr Dick.
I find that I cannot accept as reliable, the evidence Mr Stephens gave to the effect that the water connections to the redundant solar hot water system were disconnected and capped with screw capping before he sent his invoice to Mr Dick on 26 November 2001 and by which he charged for that work. I also find that the evidence Mr Stephens gave concerning the detail of the decommissioning work on the solar hot water system and the installation of the new gas hot water system was largely based on hearsay considerations relating to the work of his employee Mr Harders, rather than being based upon his own observations and as such was inaccurately reconstructed. I consider that this analysis undermines the factual reliability of that evidence. This problem also served to undermine the factual foundations of the report of Associate Professor Blackburn, whose factual assumptions have been shown to be inaccurate insofar as they were dependent upon assumptions provided to him based upon the asserted recollections of Mr Stephens.
Accordingly, for these reasons, I consider that I cannot totally rely upon the evidence of Mr Stephens in determining the issues in dispute in these proceedings.
In the paragraphs that follow I set out my analysis and findings concerning the facts and issues that arise for determination in these proceedings.
Issue 1 - whether the electricity supply continued to remain connected to the redundant solar hot water system
As a result of the material that came to light during the police investigation concerning the circumstances of the death of Mr Harley, in my view it has been plainly established that the electricity supply of the premises had remained connected to the storage unit of the redundant solar hot water system after the installation of the gas hot water system had occurred. Ultimately there was no real dispute between the parties on this issue however I set out my findings on the point as they relate to other issues calling for decision.
I consider that such a conclusion is confirmed by the evidence of Mr Gell. Several weeks before Mr Harley's death, Mr Gell and Mr Harley inspected the rooftop of the premises. At the time Mr Gell was able to see hot water and steam escaping from a pipe connected to the apparatus of the solar hot water system. It was also apparent from Mr Gell's observations, which I accept, that wires were connected to, and were running off. the hot water tank. Those wires have since been identified to be electrical wires. Mr Gell said, and I accept, that when he took the opportunity to feel the pipes of the solar hot water system on the occasion of his inspection, he saw that the pipes were connected to the apparatus and he detected that the pipes were hot to his touch.
I infer from Mr Gell's evidence and from the fact that Mr Harley was subsequently electrocuted, that the heat and steam that Mr Gell had observed to be present was due to a continued active and live electrical connection that remained between the electricity supply to the premises and the redundant solar hot water system on the premises. There was no evidence called to suggest that this electrical connection had ever been disconnected from the electricity supply after the time of Mr Gell's observations and before the time when Mr Harley was electrocuted. In these circumstances I consider that it is reasonable to draw the inference to support the finding that the electricity continued to remain connected to the solar hot water system in the interim, and that this connection was live and active at the time Mr Harley died.
I therefore find that after the new gas hot water system had been installed at Mr Dick's premises the electricity had remained connected to the water storage unit of the redundant solar hot water system on the roof of the premises. I also find that this position had remained so when Mr Harley commenced working on the roof on the day he died. The responsibility for this continued electrical connection remains to be analysed.
Issue 2 - first defendant's awareness of continued electrical connection to the redundant solar hot water system
The first defendant, Mr Dick, submitted that he was not aware, nor should he be taken to have been aware, that the electricity supply had remained connected to the redundant solar hot water storage system after the gas hot water system had been installed. I do not accept that submission for the reasons that follow.
Mr Dick was aware that plumbing work was being carried out to install a new gas hot water system because of problems due to previous hail damage occasioned to the older roof mounted solar hot water system that was found to be not working properly. Mr Dick was aware that the new installation required plumbing work to be carried out to disconnect the plumbing to the old system. This is evident from the terms of the quotation comprising Exhibit "C" which the plumber, Mr Stephens, addressed to Mr Dick.
In my view there is no evidence, from within that quotation prepared by Mr Stephens, or otherwise, that would reasonably suggest that in the circumstances, electrical disconnection work would be legitimately carried out by a plumber at the same time as he did plumbing work to disconnect the water pipes leading to and from the solar hot water system unless he was duly licensed to carry out electrical work. Further, the invoice from Mr Stephens, which was prepared after the plumbing work had been carried out, gave no indication that could reasonably suggest that any electrical work would, or had been, carried out by Mr Stephens at the time of the changeover of hot water systems.
In my view it cannot be reasonably inferred, without evidence, that the carrying out of plumbing work on the premises to connect a new gas hot water system, including work to disconnect the water pipes to the redundant system, as was specified in the quotation and later confirmed by the invoice from Mr Stephens, necessarily gives rise to a reasonable belief on the part of Mr Dick that electrical work had also been carried out on the redundant solar hot water system at the same time as the plumbing work so as to disconnect the solar hot water system from the electricity supply.
Mr Stephens has stated, and I accept, consistent with the documents that came from him, that he did not speak to Mr Dick about the electrical issues that might have arisen in connection with the work he was required to carry out with the installation of the new gas hot water system. I accept the explanation proffered by Mr Stephens for his stance in this regard, namely, that he was a plumber and not an electrician.
From the foregoing it is apparent that there was nothing within the communications between Mr Stephens and Mr Dick that would have reasonably led Mr Dick to believe there was no live and active electrical connection to the redundant solar hot water system. It is therefore relevant to examine Mr Dick's state of knowledge of an electrical connection having regard to other relevant considerations.
Mr Dick claimed that in 2004 he was unaware that the solar hot water system on his property had an electrical connection. He said he assumed that the way the system worked was a result of heating from the sun. Mr Dick acknowledged that from his past experience as a motor mechanic, and from his own experience with activities of day-to-day living, he had some experience with electricity. He stated that before Mr Harley's death he did not give a moment's thought to the question of whether or not a solar hot water system had something within it, which I take from the context to refer to electrical power connections and electrical heating elements, as a backup to the heating effect from the sun. I consider that his evidence in this regard was disingenuous and structured to seek to avoid liability in this case. I take that view because it is inconsistent with his earlier inspection where he saw wires on the roof relating to the solar hot water system. It was also inconsistent with his "nosey" interest in matters concerning the state of the property and the work required to be done on the property.
Mr Dick stated that Mr Stephens had told him in November 2001, following his inspection, that the solar hot water system was beyond repair. This led to Mr Stephens' recommendation for a replacement system for which a quotation was prepared and accepted. Mr Dick stated that he understood that by replacing the existing system with a new gas hot water system, the rooftop unit would become redundant.
Consistent with the evidence given by Mr Stephens, Mr Dick stated that Mr Stephens had not advised him of the need for an electrical disconnection to be arranged in respect of the redundant system. Mr Dick agreed that in his discussions with Mr Harley regarding the scope of the work that he wanted Mr Harley to carry out, they discussed the possibility that the whole of the roof mounted hot water system may have to be pulled down in order to effect the required repairs to the leaking roof because of the siting of the mounting bolts on the roof. Mr Dick also stated that he did not give the question of the scope of the work much thought.
In my view this evidence did not sit comfortable with his evidence that he did not authorise Mr Harley to remove the unit. In my view the arrangement Mr Dick had with Mr Harley was one in which he entrusted Mr Harley to do whatever handyman work Mr Harley considered was necessary, without consultation or supervision, unless significant expense was involved. I infer this from the follow-up telephone call he made to Mr Harley to enquire of progress of the work after some weeks of leaving Mr Harley to attend to the job whenever he found the time to do so.
Mr Dick stated that he spoke to the plumber directly regarding the changeover of the system from solar to gas and he thought the plumber was co-ordinating the job.
Mr Dick denied having had a conversation with Mr Harley shortly before the incident in question wherein Mr Harley suggested that it was necessary to obtain the services of an electrician. In this regard, his evidence was: "Q. There wasn't a conversation where he suggested that it was necessary to get an electrician out? A. No.
Q. You never supplied him with any reassurance that an electrician wasn't necessary and the system wasn't electrified? A. No, I wouldn't know."
In order to support a finding that Mr Dick held a reasonable belief that the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system was not connected or had been disconnected at the time of, or around the time of the installation of the new gas hot water system, the burden is on him to prove the proposition upon which he relies.
As to whether there was a disconnection of the system, proof of that proposition could be in the form of an invoice or a payment record detailing the work involved that could support such an inference, or evidence of having sighted such records, or it could be in the form of admissible oral evidence as to conversations that could give rise to the contended inference, if not evidence from someone who had observed the work being carried out, or from someone who had in fact carried it out. Instead, all of these elements were absent. Accordingly, on the state of the evidence, I do not draw the inference sought by Mr Dick.
The version of Invoice 92 from Mr Stephens addressed to Mr Dick refers amongst other things, to "existing hot water service disconnected and drained - all work done as required by quote No 13". Mr Dick did not say that he interpreted that invoice as including an electrical disconnection of the redundant solar hot water system. The quotation to which this invoice referred made it quite clear that the disconnection work to be undertaken by Mr Stephens was to be limited to disconnecting the water supply to the redundant system. In any event, Mr Dick did not say he was misled by this invoice.
Mr Dick conceded that he had never supplied Mr Harley with any reassurance that the services of an electrician was not necessary, or that the system was not electrified. I consider that if Mr Dick had given the matter proper consideration he should have realised, there may be, at the very least, or there was in fact, an electrical connection, evidenced by the presence of electrical wires connected to the system, such that the circumstances merited advice from an electrician in the interests of safety.
There is evidence that Mr Joe Sama, an electrician who was sometimes engaged by Mr Dick's agent L J Hooker, had been seen on the site by Mr Stephens at some time prior to Mr Harley's death. Without evidence being called from Mr Sama, or without evidence called from someone who had observed Mr Sama carry out electrical work to effect a relevant disconnection, I am not prepared to draw an inference that Mr Sama in fact carried out any electrical work, including any work on the redundant solar hot water system on the occasion that he was seen there. I take this view because such an inference is inconsistent with the observations of Mr Gell and it is inconsistent with the fact of the electrocution of Mr Harley. In the circumstances, such an inference would in my view amount to unwarranted mere speculation : Luxton v Vines [1952] HCA 19 at [8]; (1952) 85 CLR 352 at p 358. I consider that the evidence placing Mr Sama on the site is consistent with Mr Sama being asked to provide a quote for a replacement electrical hot water service rather than to carry out electrical work.
In assessing the credibility of Mr Dick's denial of any knowledge as to an electrical connection between the solar hot water system and the domestic electricity supply, I find that denial difficult to accept for a number of reasons.
First, on Mr Dick's description of his observations of the roof of the premises after the 1997 hailstorm, consistent with his self-description of him being "nosey" and checking on details of the probity of the insurance claim, I consider that on that occasion Mr Dick must have seen the presence of the wires described by Mr Gell. It must have been plain to him that these wires were electrical wires. In my view those circumstances ought to have reasonably raised in Mr Dick's mind that there was an electrical connection to the system. If in fact he did not see the wires, in my view he ought to have seen them and he should have noted their significance.
Secondly, even allowing for some scope for variations within the seasonal Sydney climatic conditions from year to year, I consider that a reasonable person in Mr Dick's position would have known that a significant number of rainy, cloudy and overcast days inevitably occur within those climatic variations. In this regard I consider that with even modest daily rates of use of domestic hot water in the residential setting, Mr Dick must have known that the solar hot water unit required and in fact had an electrical connection for backup of solar heating.
Thirdly, I found Mr Dick's evidence wherein he claimed an absence of such knowledge as to the existence of an electrical connection between the electricity supply and the roof mounted redundant hot water system to be simply unconvincing and designed to try and deflect legal liability away from himself. Evidence of this motivation is the claimed recollection of a telephone conversation with Mr Harley which he recalled some months before the trial yet he only raised it with his legal advisers on the day before he gave his evidence, some four years after Mr Harley's death, knowing that his evidence concerning this call could not be contradicted due to the death of Mr Harley.
Accordingly, for the reasons I have outlined, I reject Mr Dick's evidence to the effect that he was unaware that there was an electrical connection to the solar hot water system at the time of Mr Harley's death. I also reject his evidence that he thought the solar hot water system was powered only by the sun.
I find that at the time Mr Dick arranged for the plumbing work to be done by Mr Stephens for the installation of the new gas hot water system, and after that installation work had been completed, Mr Dick knew and must be taken to have known that there was a remaining live and active electricity connection to the redundant hot water system on the premises. I find that Mr Dick had no reasonable basis for believing that the electricity supply to the redundant electrical hot water system had been disconnected simply by reason of the fact that a new gas hot water system had been installed by the plumber, Mr Stephens.
Furthermore, I consider that a reasonable person in the position of Mr Dick ought to have known that the electrical supply to the redundant solar hot water system had remained live and active following the installation of the new gas hot water system.
Issue 3 - whether the first defendant had a legal duty to ensure the electricity supply to the redundant system was disconnected
The question arises as to whether Mr Dick was under a legal duty to ensure that the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system was disconnected.
The starting point of the analysis is Mr Dick's knowledge of the events of the installation of the gas hot water system. In my view, within those events, and on the evidence describing Mr Dick's involvement in those events, there was no reasonable basis upon which Mr Dick could have rationally thought, other than as a result of carelessness in his thinking, that the installation of a new gas hot water system by a plumber at ground level on the premises, necessarily meant that the electricity supply to the roof mounted solar hot water system had been disconnected.
I consider that at the time the replacement hot water system was being discussed between Mr Dick and Mr Stephens, Mr Dick either knew or ought to have realised that he had never been told of, or had never seen evidence of, the disconnection of the electricity supply to the redundant roof mounted system. I infer from the format and the terms of the statements he received from his letting agents that if his agents had arranged for this type of electrical work to be carried out, he would have seen evidence of it.
Mr Dick did not himself take any steps to disconnect the electricity to the redundant hot water system. There is no evidence that Mr Dick had paid an electrician to disconnect the unit from the electricity supply. It is plain that only a licensed electrician could have legally carried out such a disconnection for simply pulling out a fuse from the fuse board, if that was considered to be an option, would have been an unsatisfactory arrangement because someone could unwittingly reinsert the fuse and by inadvertence, create a situation of potential danger. In my view, there was nothing in the documentation Mr Dick received from Mr Stephens, as understood by Mr Dick that would have reasonably led him to believe the electricity to the redundant hot water system had or would have been disconnected.
Once it is recognised that Mr Dick was never in a position to believe, reasonably, that the electricity supply in question had been disconnected, I consider that it follows that he was under a legal duty to do something about achieving a permanent disconnection of that electrical connection as it was on his property and he was the responsible occupier. This could only be legally achieved by employing an electrical contractor : Electricity Safety (Electrical Installations) Regulations 1998.
It was against that background that Mr Dick engaged the services of Mr Harley. He knew Mr Harley would be working on the rooftop on or around the bolts that attached the redundant hot water system to the roof in order to stop a leak. He also knew that Mr Harley was not qualified to deal with an electrified hot water system. He also knew, using the words of s 5B(1)(b) of the Civil Liability Act 2002, that the prospect the frame or base mounting of the system may require some manipulation of some of its parts, at least at the mounting points where a leak was detected, was not an insignificant one.
In my view it was foreseeable that to some degree, the stability of the roof mounted solar hot water system may have needed to be altered by removing and working around the mounting bolts and related structures in order to seal the leak. If the redundant system remained electrified, this could create the risk of electrocution. It was foreseeable that if the mounting bolts were moved or removed for the purposes of Mr Harley's work, a part or parts of the redundant solar hot water system might become unstable and collapse thereby creating the risk of electrocution if the power remained connected.
The precise mechanism of electrocution need not have been foreseen in all its details. It was not necessary to show that the particular manner of occurrence of the incident and the electrocution were probable. It is sufficient to demonstrate that the incident was of a class of possible occurrences that might well be anticipated as one of the reasonable and probable results of a wrongful act : Chapman v Hearse [1961] HCA 46 at [6]; (1961) 106 CLR 112 at p 120, citing Haynes v Harwood (1935) 1KB 146.
I find that from Mr Dick's perspective and state of knowledge he ought to have had of the wiring to the redundant solar hot water system, the possibility of electrocution of Mr Harley was a not an insignificant risk. It was therefore a foreseeable risk associated with the work Mr Dick had requested be undertaken by Mr Harley.
In these circumstances I consider that according to general law principles a duty of care arguably arose on the part of Mr Dick.
In those circumstances, Mr Dick's options appear to have been, first, to enquire of Mr Stephens, or someone with the requisite knowledge, as to what should be done about the electricity connection to the redundant hot water system; secondly, engage an electrician, either by himself or through his managing agents, to arrange for an inspection of the electrical installations on the premises in order to obtain advice and to have any required disconnection work both identified and attended to; or thirdly, to do nothing.
The third option of doing nothing, knowing that Mr Dick could not reasonably be satisfied that the electricity supply to the redundant hot water system had been disconnected, was in my view an unacceptable option to adopt in the circumstances.
I take that view because Mr Dick did not use the subject premises as his own residence. Instead, he used them for commercial purposes, namely he rented them out to tenants. I consider that in those circumstances a threshold duty of care arose on his part to take reasonable steps to ensure all the electrical connections to installations on the premises were safe, particularly since modifications had been made by Mr Stephens to the system of hot water supply to the premises because of the reported ineffective operation of the solar hot water system. In such circumstances I consider that a threshold argument has been established to demonstrate the existence of a duty of care that was owed by Mr Dick to a range of persons who were foreseeably likely to carry out a variety of kinds of work in the vicinity of electrically connected installations on the premises, wherever situated, but especially on the roof of the premises.
In my view such a duty derives from a well recognised, refined and restated historical line of authorities concerning the applicable general law principles : Donoghue v Stevenson [1931] UKHL 3; (1932) AC 562 per Atkin LJ at [3], p 580; Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40 per Mason J at [1], p 44.
In addition to these general law principles, considerations arising from the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 must also be taken into account in determining the question of the existence of a duty of care.
The Act provides that a risk is foreseeable if an ordinary person either knew or ought to have known of it and that such risk was not insignificant : s 5B(1)(a) and (b) of the Act.
In the context of this case I do not consider this statutory requirement to be materially different to the test propounded by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt at [15], p 48, namely: "The considerations to which I have referred indicate that a risk of injury which is remote in the sense that it is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless constitute a foreseeable risk. A risk which is not far-fetched or fanciful is real and therefore foreseeable. But, as we have seen, the existence of a foreseeable risk of injury does not in itself dispose of the question of breach of duty. The magnitude of the risk and its degree of probability remain to be considered with other relevant factors."
On behalf of Mr Dick it was argued, citing Fleming, Law of Torts, 9th Ed, that in circumstances where a homeowner employed an independent contractor to carry out work on premises, the homeowner may expect the contractor to guard against special risks involved in the job : Fleming pp 510 - 511. Whilst that general statement is correct, it has no blanket application in this case because Mr Dick was not just a homeowner. He was a commercial lessor of residential premises who ought to have foreseen the risk and in my view he should have done something about it. In this case it is no answer for Mr Dick to say he engaged Mr Harley as an independent contractor as Mr Harley was not an electrician and there is no evidence that Mr Dick gave Mr Harley any relevant warnings or information. Instead Mr Dick proceeded upon the basis of erroneous assumptions concerning the status of the electrical connection to the redundant solar hot water system.
In arguing that he owed Mr Harley no duty of care, Mr Dick also relied upon the proposition that he was entitled to entrust to Mr Harley the task of making appropriate provision for his own safety : Kolodziejczyk v Grandview Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 267; per Heydon J at [52], and also Papatonakis v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1985] HCA 3; (1985) 156 CLR 7 per Brennan and Dawson JJ at p30. In my view the argument advanced on behalf of Mr Dick overlooks an important difference between this case and the position in Kolodziejczyk, namely, in that case Heydon JA emphasised that the danger was "the reverse of hidden", that is, it was plain : Kolodziejczyk at [52]. Furthermore, in Papatonakis the following tellingly distinguishing statement relevant to this case was made by Brennan and Dawson JJ at [30]: "… It is one thing to leave it to an independent contractor to decide for himself how to do his work, it is another thing to leave him in ignorance of a fact that is material to his decision, if he, using reasonable care, might not discover that fact."
Here, Mr Harley was in that same position. He was not an electrician. He was working on and about what he reasonably thought was a redundant solar hot water system. Implicit in that description is the reasonable assumption that, because the system was defunct, it was not connected to the electricity supply. In those circumstances the existence of the active electrical connection was not discoverable by Mr Harley yet its existence was in the actual and imputed knowledge of Mr Dick. In those circumstances, it defies commonsense and accepted legal principle, to suggest that Mr Harley was owed no duty of care by Mr Dick.
Papatonakis was a case where the occupier had created a hidden hazard. In any event I consider that the circumstances in this case are materially different to those cited in Kolodziejczyk and Papatonakis because, in scoping Mr Harley's work, Mr Dick's thinking did not allow for the prospect of electrical work being necessary when it was reasonably foreseeable that it was necessary. Furthermore, Mr Dick gave Mr Harley no warnings or information concerning electrical matters upon which Mr Harley could make informed judgments concerning his own safety, especially where he did not have electrical qualifications. It could not therefore be reasonably said that Mr Harley was accustomed to meeting and safeguarding himself from risk of the kind contemplated here and which was encountered in the course of his work for Mr Dick on this occasion. The position is also very different to that of an owner builder, as was referred to by Mr Dick in citing Bhambra v Roet [2003] NSWCA 393. This was so especially where Mr Dick must be taken to have known of the existence of the electrical connection.
I therefore reject the arguments raised on behalf of Mr Dick concerning the assertion that he had no relevant duty of care.
For the foregoing reasons I therefore conclude that Mr Dick had a legal duty of care in connection with the changeover from a solar hot water system which was to become redundant, to a new gas hot water system. The scope and content of that duty of care requires further examination. Before undertaking that examination I will address the question of whether a relevant duty of care also applied to Mr Stephens in the circumstances.
Issue 4 - whether after installing the new gas hot water system, the second defendant was under a legal duty to advise the first defendant of the need to disconnect the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system
I consider that the question of whether, after 21 November 2001, following the installation of the gas hot water system, Mr Stephens was under a legal duty to advise Mr Dick of the need to disconnect the electricity to the redundant solar hot water system, should be approached by first looking at the available evidence concerning the terms of engagement by which Mr Stephens was contracted to carry out the work required by Mr Dick and the knowledge Mr Stephens had concerning the possible consequences of him not giving Mr Dick advice on this issue. This evaluation must also take into account the considerations required by s 5B of the Civil Liability Act 2002.
Exhibit "C", which was the quotation dated 21 November 2001 that was prepared by Mr Stephens for Mr Dick, specified the particular plumbing work that was envisaged to be carried out at premises by Mr Stephens. After describing details of the supply and installation of the new gas hot water system, the quotation went on to include the following description: "Disconnect hot and cold water only to existing H.W.S. and drain".
It is plain from the clear language used in the specifications to that quotation, that insofar as Mr Stephens was concerned, the plumbing work that he understood he would be carrying out on the redundant solar hot water system would be limited to only disconnecting the hot and cold water pipes and to the draining of the storage tank of the unit. There is no mention in the quotation from Mr Stephens of any form of electrical work whatsoever. From the terms of the quotation alone, it would be inappropriate to find that the carrying out of associated electrical work to disconnect the system from the electricity supply should be implied into the arrangements.
I am reinforced in that view following a consideration of the evidence given by Mr Stephens to the effect that as a plumber, and because he was not an electrician, he made no effort to speak to Mr Dick about the remaining electrical connections to the redundant solar hot water system. I consider his evidence in that regard to have a practical ring of truth about it and I accept it as the fact of what occurred, or more accurately, what did not occur.
However, a consideration of the terms of the engagement of Mr Stephens is only the starting point of the evaluation of whether or not a duty of care was owed by Mr Stephens to advise Mr Dick of the need to disconnect the electrical supply to the redundant solar hot water system.
Mr Stephens was a licensed plumber and as such, he must be taken to have possessed the requisite skills for assessing and carrying out the plumbing work required in the course of replacing electrical hot water systems, including electrically connected solar hot water systems. I find this to be so even though he said that his experience in solar hot water systems was limited. I infer this from the circumstances of his quotation and I find that otherwise, he would not have quoted for the plumbing disconnection of the solar hot water system in the terms within Exhibit "C" which incorporated his view of the extent of the work required to only disconnect the plumbing from the redundant system. In my view this implies that he recognised that there was electrical work involved as well, but he was not including that work in his quotation.
I also infer that from the quotation from Mr Stephens, and his use of the word "only" to refer to the disconnection of the water connections to the system, it would have been apparent to him that the solar hot water system that was intended to be made redundant was in fact still actively connected to the live electricity supply by the presence of wiring. I also infer from his qualification as a plumber that he would have also known that a solar hot water system operated by being connected to an electricity supply. In his evidence he in effect acknowledged these matters. I consider that in these circumstances he would have realised that after the quoted plumbing work was completed, an active and live electrical connection would remain unless steps were taken to disconnect the electricity supply to the system.
Mr Stephens has argued that because he was a plumber, and because he had been engaged to fit a new gas hot water heater to the premises, and his only other specified work was to disconnect the hot and cold water pipes to the redundant system and to drain that system, he was not under a legal duty to advise as to the need for electrical work to be carried out on the redundant solar hot water system. Mr Stephens also argued that he did nothing on the premises that increased the risk of injury to Mr Harley.
In my view these arguments are flawed because it was and must have been plain to Mr Stephens that the redundant solar unit remained connected to the electricity supply and he had not been given any basis upon which to assume that an electrician was engaged to decommission any electrically connected part of the redundant solar installation. It must have also been obvious to Mr Stephens that more than just "only" plumbing work was required on this job otherwise he would not have used the qualifying word "only" in his quotation. I consider that in these circumstances Mr Stephens must have known that it was foreseeably unsafe and unwise to leave a live and active electrical connection in place after disconnecting the plumbing to the redundant solar hot water system.
I consider that the fact that Mr Stephens clearly understood that he was to decommission the redundant system by disconnecting only water pipes and draining the redundant water tank carried with it a concomitant obligation on his part to advise either his customer Mr Dick, or Mr Dick's agent, of the need for a licensed electrician to complete the decommissioning process by disconnecting the electricity supply to the unit, notwithstanding that he had specifically refrained from giving such advice.
I consider that a prime reason for the existence of that concomitant obligation is immediately apparent : a redundant system, supposedly disconnected from its water supply but still remaining connected to the electricity supply, could at the very least foreseeably pose a domestic electrical fire hazard. It could also represent a safety hazard to anyone who, whilst working on or around the decommissioned unit, was unaware of the live and active status of the electrical connections to the unit. This included someone who carried out work in the vicinity of the unit in the mistaken belief that the electricity supply to the unit had been disconnected.
I consider that such persons could foreseeably come from a diverse range of occupations, for example, painters, roofers, plumbers, demolishers or general handymen carrying out a broad range of odd tasks that fell between the trade demarcations, as was the case with Mr Harley in this instance.
I come to these views based on the same analysis of the general law and Civil Liability Act factors as outlined in my consideration of Issue 3. In this regard, in addressing the required statutory analysis of foreseeability from the perspective of Mr Stephens, I consider that the potential for injury or death from electrocution was a risk that was liable to affect a diverse range of potential workers on the site. I consider that an ordinary person in the position of Mr Stephens would have considered it to be a reasonable foreseeable and not insignificant risk in the circumstances : s 5B(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. I also consider that this should have been apparent to Mr Stephens at the time he installed the new gas hot water system and at the time he sent his invoice to Mr Dick upon the completion of his involvement in the project.
I come to this view notwithstanding the evidence given by Mr Stephens to the effect that on the occasion of his visit to the site and before he issued his quotation, he said he saw that the electrician he knew to be Mr Sama, had also attended the site.
Mr Stephens described seeing Mr Sama at the switchboard. Mr Stephens did not himself take a look at the switchboard. Properly understood, his evidence concerning a fuse being pulled out of the fuse box was based on an assumption and was not based on something within his own direct knowledge and accordingly I consider that it had no probative value. In this context Mr Stephens ultimately conceded he did not notice anything about the fuse.
Mr Sama was not called to give evidence to clarify what might have been the case with the fuse or with the electrical connection in question. In those circumstances I am not prepared to draw an inference that something was done to disconnect the power supply to the redundant solar hot water system on the date that Mr Stephens saw Mr Sama on the site. I consider that on the evidence in this case, it would be wrong and speculative to draw such an inference : Luxton v Vines. In my view, without specific evidence on the issue of any disconnection activity carried out by Mr Sama, the argument Mr Stephens seeks to make gains no assistance from the evidence concerning the presence of Mr Sama at the site.
I am satisfied that the nature and extent of the involvement of Mr Stephens in the events gave rise to a duty of care on his part. I find that Mr Stephens was under a legal duty to advise Mr Dick of the need to disconnect the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system. I consider this to be so because he could not have himself legally carried out electricity disconnection work and for him to deliberately do or say nothing about the continued electrical connection in the face of knowledge on his part that the connection remained live and active posed a significant risk to the safety of others. These circumstances necessarily required that a qualified electrician be consulted for advice and assistance with that task. I consider that in these circumstances it was the duty of Mr Stephens to draw that fact to the attention of Mr Dick. This view is supported by the opinion of Mr Armstrong, who thought it was the plumber's duty to advise in this regard : Exhibit "A" page 92. Mr Armstrong's opinion was also supported by the opinion of Mr Carmody who stated that it would have been prudent for the installing plumber to call in a qualified electrician to ensure that the hot water system was properly disconnected from the electrical power : Exhibit A p 106 at [535]. Ultimately, in hindsight, Mr Stephens conceded he should have given such advice in clear and unambiguous terms. I consider that he should have also realised this in exercising reasonable foresight as well.
In coming to the view that Mr Stephens owed a duty of care to advise Mr Dick to attend to the electrical side of the disconnection, I have not ignored the contrary opinions of Mr Blacker and Associate Professor Blackburn, however I have discounted their contrary views because their analysis proceeded upon the basis of false and unproven assumptions which generally afflicted their opinions. Ultimately, their expert opinions are not determinative. They are of guidance value only.
Issue 5 - the scope and extent of the first defendant's duty to Mr Harley
The answer to the question of whether or not the scope of the duty of care owed to Mr Harley by Mr Dick extended to give rise to an obligation on the part of Mr Dick to ensure that the water storage unit of the redundant solar hot water system did not unnecessarily continue to be electrically connected, is dependent upon the nature of the activities that the owner of the property would be expected to consider to be reasonably foreseeable as being activities likely to be undertaken on or in the immediate vicinity of the redundant solar hot water system.
In my view there was a range of foreseeably likely activities to be undertaken on the roof of the premises by a number of different and non-electrical tradespeople. This category of persons would necessarily include, amongst others, handymen who had maintenance tasks to carry out on the roof. This is an important issue because, unless such persons possessed special skills or equipment, the task of discerning whether or not electricity remained connected to an appliance, such as the one in question here, was not capable of being readily tested, such as by switching on a light.
If the redundant solar hot water system was no longer required because it had been damaged and its functions were replaced by a new gas system, as was known to Mr Dick, it follows that the continued electrical connection of the redundant system became unnecessary. I consider that this circumstance required Mr Dick to arrange for the electricity to be properly and safely disconnected by a person qualified to do so. This is because persons such as Mr Harley were in a category of persons who were proximate to the risk of injury from the continued connection of electricity to the redundant unit in the circumstances in which it had been left.
The issue of whether or not the duty that I have found to have been owed by Mr Dick extended to ensuring that the solar hot water system was safe for Mr Harley to work upon and around, is also dependent upon an analysis of the respective levels of skills and knowledge, possessed by each of these persons.
In Mr Harley's case, even though he was a handyman, without specific evidence, I do not consider that he should be taken to have possessed skills, knowledge and experience with electrical work much if at all beyond that level that would be expected of a lay person. I come to this view because without the requisite trade qualifications to certify relevant electrical skills on his part, he was not permitted to work with live electricity other than to carry out simple tasks such as operating a switch for a light fitting or an appliance, as would a lay person when ensuring that a light or an appliance was switched off before for example, commencing to change a globe or before changing a simple part of a machine or an appliance.
However, in Mr Dick's circumstances, in contrast, I consider that he was invested with the knowledge that there must have been a live and functioning electrical connection to the redundant hot water system up until the time the new gas system was installed at the premises and there was nothing that occurred thereafter that gave him reason to assume anything different.
The extent of Mr Dick's duty of care was founded upon his control of what work was carried out in the premises : Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris [1997] HCA 39; (1997) 188 CLR 313. Mr Dick engaged Mr Harley and gave him a virtual free hand to go about the work of finding and fixing the leak. This was a free hand of a handyman, not a skilled tradesman electrician who would have been expected to have been able to recognise and deal with this particular and unusual electrical hazard.
In those circumstances I consider Mr Dick was duty-bound to either have the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system disconnected or, alternatively, to advise Mr Harley that there was a live and active electricity supply still connected to that system so that he was aware of it in the interests of his own safety.
I consider that a duty to this effect arose because it was foreseeable to an ordinary person in the circumstances, that others could be placed at risk if he did not take steps to satisfy himself, through personal knowledge, or by advice taken from those who would be expected to know such things, or to instruct some qualified or licensed person to take steps on his behalf to ensure that the premises were either safe or would be made safe in this regard : s 5B(1)(a) and (b) of the Act.
In these circumstances, where Mr Dick could not have reasonably assumed that the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system had been disconnected, I consider that when he engaged Mr Harley to perform work on the roof of the premises, the duty of care that Mr Dick had to Mr Harley in those circumstances extended to ensuring that the redundant solar hot water system was in a sufficiently safe condition for a handyman who was not a qualified electrician, to work upon it, or to work in the vicinity of where the solar unit was located.
I find this to be so because Mr Harley was not qualified to undertake electrical testing on Mr Dick's behalf at the time of his engagement and because Mr Dick could not have reasonably formed a benign view about the electrical safety of the site. He was not qualified to test the connections in the manner that could be achieved by an electrician. Accordingly, I consider that Mr Dick's duty of care extended to ensuring that the unnecessary connection of electricity to the redundant hot water system did not continue to remain live and active.
Issue 6 - whether the first defendant was in breach of his duty of care to Mr Harley and did this constitute negligence on his part
Mr Dick submitted that there was no breach of duty of care on his part. Having analysed the elements of his argument in that regard, for the reasons that follow, I reject that submission.
Mr Dick's submission proceeded upon the premise that if the solar hot water system had been left in the state in which Mr Harley encountered it on the roof, it was safe and was in a no different state to any like installation on any roof. I consider that argument to be flawed for several reasons.
First, the system in question was not just a solar hot water system like any other on any roof, it was assumed by Mr Dick to be a redundant hot water system. Secondly, both Mr Dick and Mr Harley were each contemplating circumstances in which the redundant system might possibly have to be taken down from the roof if this was thought to be necessary once the investigatory work in relation to the roof leak had proceeded to a point where removal was considered to be the most appropriate solution to the problem. This was in circumstances where Mr Dick did not micro-manage or control the work that Mr Harley was to undertake in this regard. Thirdly, the system had mounting bolts beneath it that were found to have rusted and it was reasonably assumed that the site of these rusted bolts were at the site that was probably causing a leak into the premises at their base or point of connection with the roof surface and its underlying structures. Accordingly, this was no ordinary installation like on any other roof as was submitted by Mr Dick.
There were inherently problematic aspects to the redundant solar hot water system. It was in need of unusual maintenance work, at least at its point of connection with the roof. This was the experienced opinion of Mr Harley, as was related though the evidence of Mr Dick and this opinion was not in relevant contest in the proceedings. Another, most remarkable and extra-ordinary aspect of the redundant solar hot water installation was, contrary to the expectation of Mr Dick and Mr Harley, that the so-called redundant system was still connected to a live electric current and it had not been decommissioned in the appropriate manner by disconnecting it from the electricity supply to the premises following Mr Dick's decision, for whatever reason, not to take the redundant system down off the roof at the time of its declared redundancy.
In light of the continued residual electricity connection whilst the system was in a supposed state of redundancy, I consider that the system was far from safe as has been submitted. It was not only left in an undesirable and inefficient state, as was stated by Associate Professor Blackburn, but I consider it was unsafe because, in the mind of a reasonable person in Mr Dick's circumstances, he ought to have had in mind the not insignificant and therefore reasonably foreseeable risk that persons working on the roof and in particular, persons such as Mr Harley, who were likely to work on the structure or supporting parts of the system, could be liable to be injured if they came in contact with a live electric current from an installation that was supposed to be, but was not, in a redundant state.
In the context, there is an inherent tension and mismatch between the notions of redundancy of the old and damaged solar hot water system and a continued connection of that system to a live and active electricity supply. In my view, the state of the system, by reason of its presence on the roof and its live and active connection to the electricity supply, meant that it was plainly and inherently unsafe.
In advancing his no negligence argument, Mr Dick also submitted that the risk that materialised, namely the electrocution death of Mr Harley, did not relate to any aspect of the redundant installation itself, but rather, arose from Mr Harley's own actions in removing the terminal cover and in exposing and contacting the live wires. I reject that submission for a number of reasons.
First, the electrocution death would not have occurred if the installation had not remained connected to a live and active electricity supply. It was that inherent electrically connected aspect of the redundant installation that created the potential for danger and risk that ultimately materialised when Mr Harley was electrocuted. Secondly, I do not regard there to be any evidence, other than by way of a suggested inference based on mere conjectural suspicion, that could satisfy me on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Harley had in fact removed the terminal cover to expose live wires, as has been asserted by Mr Dick : Luxton v Vines. I will set out my reasoning for this view in more detail when outlining my consideration of the submissions made by the defendants on the issue of alleged contributory negligence on the part of Mr Harley.
In my view, on the evidence, there were a number of conjectural possibilities that could explain the removed terminal cover. Mr Harley may have removed the terminal cover in the manner submitted by the defendants, but this may have been on the assumption there was no live connection. The cover may have been removed earlier by someone else on the site, such as by an electrician engaged by Mr Dick or his agents. It may have fallen from its position of covering the terminals at the time the component parts of the tank became dislodged and when the tank fell from its mounting frame support onto the roof around the time Mr Harley was working on or around the rusted mounting bolts. A number of competing conjectural possibilities arise in these circumstances and these remain unproven because the evidence in favour of each of them rises no higher than conjecture and merely remain as speculation. This does not, in my mind, constitute proof on the balance of probabilities concerning the proposition relied upon by Mr Dick : Luxton v Vines.
Mr Dick also relied upon s 5B(2) of the Act to support a submission that there was no reasonable precaution against the risk of electrocution that ought reasonably have been taken by him, and therefore, there was no relevant breach of duty of care or any negligence on his part. In my view a close examination of that submission reveals it to be flawed.
Mr Dick said he had made no relevant inquiry concerning an electrical connection. I consider that in the circumstances such inquiries were mandated in the interests of safety, both to his tenants, and to persons such as Mr Harley who were liable to come onto the premises to carry out some work at his request.
Having established that it was inappropriate for Mr Dick to do nothing about the electrical connection to the redundant hot water system, it is material to examine what it was that he ought reasonably have been required to have done in the circumstances.
I consider that the first two options of either engaging an electrician or seeking advice as to what should be done in the interests of safety were both reasonable and prudent steps that presented themselves for consideration by Mr Dick. I take this view because unless Mr Dick was in the position of being reasonably satisfied that the electrical connection to the redundant system had been made safe and did not pose a danger to persons such as Mr Harley, it was unreasonable for him to either do nothing or to refrain from enquiring of Mr Stephens or from some other suitably qualified person to obtain reassurance that the electrical system and its connections were safe, or if such reassurance was not forthcoming, to take the next reasonably prudent step of rectifying the situation by engaging an electrician to carry out the required work to effect a safe disconnection.
Mr Dick simply failed to arrange and ensure disconnection of the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system. He failed to seek advice, either from Mr Stephens or from an electrician, as to what as required to decommission and to render safe the redundant hot water system on the roof in circumstances where the terms of the quotation from Mr Stephens should have alerted his mind to the likelihood that there was electrical work to be done to decommission the redundant system not just plumbing work "only". Mr Dick also failed to carry out or arrange any checks to determine whether it was electrically safe for Mr Harley to carry out maintenance work on and around the solar hot water system on the roof. All of these failures could justifiably support a negligence finding against Mr Dick.
However, before a finding of negligence can be made against Mr Dick, the requirements of Part 1A Division 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 need to be satisfied.
In this regard, the first matter that needs to be stated is that in assessing whether an occurrence is reasonably foreseeable, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the precise manner of the occurrence of harm was predictable. The second matter that needs to be stated is that the engagement of a handyman such as Mr Harley to work around the vicinity of an electrically connected solar hot water system involves an element of risk. The precise nature by which such risk could materialise into harm is an infinite calculus that is impossible to foresee with precision. This is why tort law does not require the precise method or mechanism of potential harm to be foreseen.
It is against this background that the Civil Liability Act analysis must proceed.
In the context of this case, to establish foreseeability of the harm, the plaintiff must show that the risk of electrocution to Mr Harley was a matter of which Mr Dick either knew or ought to have known, that the risk of the harm in question was not insignificant, and that a reasonable person in the position of Mr Dick would have taken precautions against the materialisation of the risk of electrocution: s 5B(1) of the Act.
In reviewing these statutory requirements I consider that Mr Dick ought to have foreseen that manipulating the fixing or mounting points of the stand of the redundant solar hot water system by Mr Harley could foreseeably lead to instability of the stand, the possible falling of the redundant storage unit, a resultant interference with the protection of any internal electrical wiring within the unit which could in turn create an electrical hazard. This in turn could foreseeably cause interference with the insulation of the electrical wiring so as to create an electrocution hazard to persons such as Mr Harley working nearby and not just in direct physical contact. For example, as was explained by Associate Professor Blackburn, persons working in a wet area in and around an exposed and un-insulated electrical installation were at risk of increased intensity of electric shock. In my view this analysis applied to the situation in which Mr Harley found himself immediately before his electrocution death as can be inferred from the live electrical connection and the spread of water on the roof, even though the precise events and sequences leading to Mr Harley's death remain unknown.
In my view, the potential risk outlined above was not an insignificant matter. I consider that it therefore justified a reasonable person in the position of Mr Dick to take precautions against the potential for harm to Mr Harley by electrocution. The relevant precaution in this instance would have been to disconnect the electricity supply to the redundant solar hot water system. The justification for the taking of such a precaution is that if disconnection had been implemented, or indeed the lesser step of the appropriate placement of a warning sign, the serious harm of electrocution death to Mr Harley would in all likelihood not have occurred.
A reasonable response was required to address a foreseeable risk : Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer & Anor [2007] HCA 42; (2007) 234 CLR 330 per Gummow J at [69] p 354. The relevant precaution required of Mr Dick in the circumstances was to consult an electrician and to request him to complete the decommissioning of the redundant solar hot water system by disconnecting it from the electricity supply. In the context of a commercial residential letting, this was not a burdensome or unduly expensive task when balanced against the potential harm and lack of social utility in causing an electrocution death due to inattention to detail in circumstances where the relevant avoiding action simply involved the engagement of an electrician to cut off the electricity supply. The expense involved in such a course, whilst not a matter of direct evidence in this case, is something that I consider could not have been very costly to implement. This Shirt calculus demonstrates the relative ease with which the electrocution of Mr Harley could have been prevented by Mr Dick.
Instead, the evidence shows that Mr Dick had a non-pro-active attitude to maintenance in that he permitted a cracked and damaged solar hot water panel to remain on the roof for a considerable period of time without repairing it. He also allowed a water leak into the ceiling to remain for a long time without taking remedial action. He also permitted a seemingly disused and redundant solar hot water tank to remain on the roof with rusting mounting bolts. This was in circumstances where the electricity supply remained connected to the unit and where it was likely that workmen in a variety of non-electrically skilled categories, including handymen like Mr Harley, would be foreseeably likely to be working in the vicinity of the redundant system and could become exposed to an electric shock. In my view these circumstances permit an inference of inadequate attention to maintenance issues. I infer from this that Mr Dick was not concerned by a residual electrical connection to the redundant solar hot water system although I find he should have been.
In my view these circumstances satisfy the requirements of the statute to base a negligence finding against Mr Dick,
I therefore find that not only was Mr Dick in breach of his duty of care to Mr Harley but I also find that the evidence in support of that finding also satisfies the requirements of s 5B of the Act and for the reasons I have outlined above, I find that Mr Dick was negligent.
Issue 7 - should the second defendant have foreseen the risk of injury and if so did this give rise to a duty of care
It is necessary to determine whether, in installing the new gas hot water system, Mr Stephens ought to have foreseen that persons such as Mr Harley, who were likely to work upon the roof, or at least around the base of the solar hot water system on the roof, were at risk of injury and if so, whether in the circumstances Mr Stephens owed a relevant duty of care to such persons.
I consider that an ordinary person in the position of Mr Stephens should have foreseen the risk of injury to a range of persons, including Mr Harley, for a number of reasons.
First, Mr Stephens was aware that the scope of his own work was limited to plumbing work in the nature of disconnecting water pipes leading to and from the solar hot water system and he was aware that after his work was completed, a live and active electrical supply would still remain connected to the redundant system unless someone took steps to arrange an authorised and safe disconnection.
Secondly, through a deliberate process of reasoning on his part, Mr Stephens chose not to raise with Mr Dick, or to explore with Mr Dick, his plans or understanding with regard to the continued live and active electrical connection to the redundant system.
Thirdly, Mr Stephens knew that it was intended that the solar hot water system was to be left in a redundant state, thus raising the prospect of its removal by workmen at some later stage. This meant that unless a warning sign was left on the structure, or alternatively, that Mr Dick was advised that he needed to do something about disconnecting the electricity supply beforehand, workmen would, in the future, be placed at risk of electrocution injury.
Fourthly, in combination, all of these factors impacted on the safety of the premises, if not from the perspective of tenant safety then with regard to the safety of other tradesmen or workmen who were likely to be required to carry out work on the roof near or on or around the redundant hot water system in the future.
In my view all of these matters would have raised questions in the mind of an ordinary person in the situation of Mr Stephens as to the potential risk to the safety of a wide range of persons. The relevant risk was one of injury to such persons from somehow coming into contact with live electricity. This risk was not one that could reasonably be characterised as being insignificant : s 5B(1) of the Act.
In these circumstances I consider that on an application of the general law and Civil Liability Act principles already identified in the analysis of Issue 3, a relevant duty of care arose on the part of Mr Stephens.
Issue 8 - scope and extent of duty owed by the second defendant
Having found that Mr Stephens owed a relevant duty of care it is necessary to examine the scope and content of that duty.
Mr Stephens made the alternative submission that his actions or his alleged inactions in this case did nothing to increase the risk of injury to Mr Harley. That submission continued, drawing broadly upon the words of Hayne J in Modbury Triangle v Anzil [2000] HCA 61; (2000) 205 CLR 254 at [99]-[112], namely, that since Mr Stephens did not control what occurred in the events in question, it was not enough to say that he had power to act in a way that made the occurrence, namely the electrocution death of Mr Harley, less likely, that is, by taking appropriate action which would have been likely to result in achieving disconnection of the electricity supply to the redundant hot water system.
I reject the applicability of that submission to this case because the passages cited from the decision in Modbury Triangle related to a discussion of the inability of the appellant in that case to control the illegal actions of strangers. That is a quite different scenario to the one under evaluation in this case where there was no illegal activity shown. I therefore consider that the applicability of the passages cited in Modbury Triangle are distinguishable from the facts in the present case.
I consider that the duty of care that applied to Mr Stephens in his case extended to wider circumstances than those contemplated in Modbury Triangle. I consider that in the circumstances of this case it was incumbent on Mr Stephens to point out to Mr Dick that which was obvious to himself, namely, that once the plumbing work had been carried out as specified in his quotation, the interests of safety required that an electrician be engaged to disconnect the redundant solar hot water system, or that at least Mr Dick be informed that the advice of an electrician should be obtained in that regard, in the interests of safety.
In testing the foregoing view of the scope and content of the duty owed by Mr Stephens, it is relevant to examine what would be likely to happen if Mr Stephens did not anticipate a concern over the continued supply of electricity to a redundant system.
It is clear that there was a risk of a short circuit or a fire occurring if the water supply was cut off without disconnecting the electricity because a heating element remained within the redundant solar hot water system and it would have been exposed if the system had been drained as envisaged in the quotation and in the invoice prepared by Mr Stephens. Also, there was a risk of electrocution to anyone carrying out any dismantling work on electrified parts if a live and active electrical connection was not made safe by disconnection.
In these circumstances I do not consider that it could be reasonably or safely assumed by Mr Stephens that, without the intervention of an electrician, the redundant system was in a safe state for either being left to stand disused and idle on the roof or for later dismantling if the electricity supply to it had not been disconnected. Also, I do not consider that it could be reasonably assumed that, an apparently disused and redundant roof mounted solar hot water system would only ever be dismantled by a qualified electrician, rather than by someone such as Mr Harley or a semi-skilled demolition labourer.
For these reasons, I consider that the scope of the duty on Mr Stephens extended to drawing the attention of Mr Dick to the above considerations and to the fact that he needed the advice and assistance of a qualified electrician.
Issue 9 - whether the second defendant was in breach of his duty of care and if so did this constitute negligence on his part
The second defendant, Mr Stephens has submitted that by installing the new gas hot water system in the premises he had not done anything to increase the risk of injury from the solar hot water system and it was further submitted that therefore, Mr Stephens was not negligent. In my view this is an overly simplistic submission and does not fully address the issues that arise.
I do not accept that submission as I consider that at the time of the installation of the gas hot water system Mr Stephens, as a plumber, knowing that the electrically connected solar hot water system was to become redundant, ought to have known that it was incumbent on him to do his part to ensure that the required redundancy was effectively and safely achieved. This involved at least two critical steps, given that it was obviously within the contemplation of both Mr Stephens and Mr Dick that the redundant structure would remain in idle disuse on the roof, as no arrangements were discussed with Mr Stephens for its dismantling and removal.
The first of these steps required to achieve redundancy involved terminating or capping the water supply to the system. This step was within the ambit of the scope of work quoted for by Mr Stephens. The second such step involved disconnecting the electricity from the redundant system to ensure it was effectively decommissioned, and by implication, made safe from the risk of persons becoming electrocuted in the event that for any reason, they might come into contact with the structures or parts of the redundant system. This second step, whilst outside the scope of Mr Stephen's work as a plumber, was nevertheless still a matter that was well within his knowledge and contemplation. He simply avoided discussing this second step with Mr Dick.
A convenient starting point of the examination of whether or not Mr Stephens was in breach of his duty of care is to evaluate whether in fact Mr Stephens carried out the work he undertook to perform, and for which he rendered an invoice and was paid.
The quotation proposed by Mr Stephens, Exhibit "C", which was his quotation numbered 13, included a quotation for the work of not only disconnecting water pipes, but also the work of draining the tank. It was in the following terms: "… Disconnect hot and cold water only to existing H.W.S and drain."
The internal business records of Mr Stephen's plumbing business, which comprised a record of work performed, and which later were used by Mr Stephens to prepare an invoice to be sent to Mr Dick for the work carried out was in the following terms: "( Invoice 92) Property 364 Abercrombie St Newtown. - Supply & install gas 170 litre Rheen (sic) external hot water tank. - Connect to hot & cold water and gass (sic) supply as required. - Existing hot water service disconnected and drained. - All work done as required by quote No 13 $1220.00 + GST. ( Invoiced 26/11/01 )"
The above cited business record of Mr Stephens had the potential to create an element of confusion as to the nature and the extent of the disconnection work that was carried out in that it referred to the existing water service being disconnected and drained as required by quotation numbered 13. A superficial reading of that record could perhaps convey the impression that all elements or components of the system had been disconnected, including the electrical components, unless recourse was had to the scoping terms of invoice numbered 13.
After the new gas water system had been installed in the premises, on 26 November 2001 Mr Stephens sent an invoice to Mr Dick that replicated a part of his business record and included the following text: "- EXISTING HOT WATER SERVICE DISCONNECTED AND DRAINED - ALL WORK DONE AS REQUIRED BY QUOTE NO. 13"
In any event, Mr Dick did not claim that he was misled by the terms of that first invoice concerning any electrical disconnection.
That invoice was not paid immediately by Mr Dick. Later, on 11 January 2002, Mr Stephens sent another invoice, in similar but not identical terms, to Mr Dick's managing agents, LJ Hooker - Newtown in the same amount. This second invoice stated: "Redundant solarhart H.W.S on roof drained & cut off from water supply."
Mr Stephens stated that this invoice was paid on 28 January 2002. Mr Dick said he paid the invoice and the agent's copy is endorsed as having been paid by the landlord.
The clear inference that arises from those records is that Mr Stephens was representing to Mr Dick that the work for which he had quoted had in fact been completed. This representation requires evaluation for an assessment of its accuracy.
Mr Stephens said that when he attended the site to prepare for the installation of the new gas hot water system he terminated the water pipes to the redundant system by disconnecting the hot water pipe from the redundant storage tank and he then capped it off with a screw and a nut at its disconnected end to prevent water feeding back into the tank. He then described disconnecting and capping the cold water pipe to the tank in the same manner to prevent the tank from filling. He said that this process left a quantity of water in the tank which he thought would drain itself.
In cross-examination, Mr Stephens acknowledged that he did not have a clear recollection of having personally carried out this capping work. During his cross-examination it ultimately transpired that his evidence, which stated that the described capping had been carried out, was in fact based on an assumption that such work was done because it was required to be carried out. It became clear that whilst Mr Stephens initially turned off the water tap supplying water to the solar hot water system he did not personally carry out the described work of cutting and capping the water pipes. It appears that he left this work to be carried out by his employee, Mr Harders.
When Mr Stephens was shown the photographic evidence of the rooftop structures he was unable to point to any evidence of the capping of the pipes having taken place.
The evidence given by Mr Stephens concerning whether or not the tank had been drained was to the effect that he did not drain the tank, he just left it to "leak itself out". This indicated that his invoice was to some extent misleading concerning the work that was described as having been carried out. He justified that approach in the following evidence: "Q. So that we all understand, as well as capping the system, did you empty out the tank? A. The tank was emptying itself out because it was leaking.
Q. So did you just leave it to leak itself out? A. Yes.
Q. So you didn't actually drain the tank? A. No.
Q. Again is that an estimate as to what you would have done or is that an actual recollection? A. We definitely didn't drain it. Well, yes well the tank was leaking so and we weren't - the quote was to put the new gas hot water system in. There was no quote of disconnect and remove the solar off the roof.
Q. Let me show you the quote in the very last item on it - if the witness could have exhibit C. Could you just read to yourself the very last line of the quote? A. Yes.
Q. We can agree that you quoted that you were going to drain it? A. Yes."
With regard to the drainage set up Mr Stephens said: "Q. What other possible connections would there have been apart from water and electricity? A. As far as I believe there'd be a drain off a valve. That's probably why there's another pipe floating around the roof there, an open end. That would be a drain, like a temperature drain off the tank. But as far as plumbing there'd be only three pipes running to - like coming off that tank."
It became clear from this evidence that not all the work, for which Mr Stephens had invoiced Mr Dick, had in fact been carried out as represented in the invoice. It was also clear that Mr Stephens based much of his evidence on assumptions rather than recalled facts.
I consider that it is plain from the evidence of Mr Gell that the water pipe connection to the supposedly redundant solar hot water system still remained connected. This was evident both from the leak he observed, from the presence of water in the undrained tank and from the fact that there was unevaporated hot water in the tank and steam rising from the piping. This was in 2004 and in circumstances where the tank had supposedly been disconnected from the water supply 3 years earlier in 2001. This gives rise to the inference that any evaporation of the water level in the storage unit of the system due to heat, was being replenished by a piped water supply, that is, by plumbing connections that had not been terminated.
Were it to be otherwise, it would have been improbable that Mr Gell could have made his observations as to the presence of dripping water and steam rising from the hot water system at the time of his inspection with Mr Harley a few weeks before Mr Harley's death. It is highly improbable that over a period of 3 years, a stagnant, contained and unreplenished water reservoir within the leaking redundant solar hot water system would have remained at a sufficient volume to permit the dripping of water and the steaming of water as was observed by Mr Gell several weeks before the death of Mr Harley.
I consider the explanation proffered by Mr Stephens for the continued presence of water in the tank 3 years after disconnection from the water supply, namely a water supply coming from the coils in the solar panels was highly improbable. This is so especially where his invoice referred to the whole system as having been drained. These observations lead me to find that the disconnection work quoted by Mr Stephens and claimed to have been carried out had not been completely carried out. I consider that if the work had been completely carried out as was invoiced, the tank would not have had a significant amount of water in it when Mr Gell made his observations as to dripping water and steam coming from the pipes. In coming to this conclusion I have ignored the flowing water seen by Ms Sams because, as Associate Professor Blackburn explained, this could have been as a result of Mr Harley turning on the tap to fill the tank.
This analysis leads me to an evaluation of whether I could place reliance on the stated recollections of Mr Stephens.
I have given careful consideration to the whole of the evidence of Mr Stephens, including the context of the evidence concerning alleged disconnection of the water supply. I have concluded that he did not have an actual recollection of performing the work of cutting off the water supply as he initially asserted, conceding that evidence was based on assumption. I find that his evidence concerning the capping of the pipes was based on a mistaken assumption. I consider his evidence on these vital matters to be unreliable, evidenced by the terms of his invoices certifying that the tank was disconnected and drained when it was not. He conceded in evidence that the tank had not been drained and this has caused me to entertain doubts as to his evidence that he capped the pipes as he described. Those doubts have caused me to reject his evidence as to the capping of the pipes as I find I cannot rely on the accuracy of his testimony in that regard. That conclusion is reinforced by absence of confirmatory photographic evidence of the capped pipes. Mr Harders, his employee was not called as a witness to further clarify this evidence.
The absence of evidence from Mr Harders was not explained in circumstances where it was said that it was Mr Harders who had carried out the work. However, although Mr Harders was not called to give evidence, I do not draw the inference that any evidence he could give would not have assisted the case sought to be made by Mr Stephens as there was no evidence that Mr Harders was available to be called to give evidence.
However, on the evidence that was given, I find that the water pipes connected to the redundant system were not disconnected and capped as was claimed by Mr Stephens. I therefore find that the necessary steps had not been taken to effectively decommission the redundant solar hot water system from the plumbing perspective as was claimed by Mr Stephens.
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the submission made by Mr Stephens that he had done nothing to increase the risk of electrocution was factually incorrect. I find this to be so for three reasons.
First, by not disconnecting the water supply to the redundant solar hot water system he created a situation where, 3 years after he had invoiced Mr Dick for disconnecting the water supply to the system and draining the system, water was still present in the system and in significant quantities to permit it to drip and send off steam. Secondly, the system was left in a faulty state in that it had a rusted hole in its tank. As a plumber, Mr Stephens expected that water would continue to leak onto the roof from that rusted hole after his work was completed. Thirdly, these matters primed a potential situation of danger that was identified by Associate Professor Blackburn in that these matters created the possibility of water spreading over an indeterminate area on the roof and this could serve to intensify the electrocuting power of electricity at the site if a person such as Mr Harley came into contact with an electric current from the system in the presence of water on the roof. This was more than just undesirable and inefficient. It was dangerous.
The only ways water could wet the roof would have been first, either from recent or current rainfall, secondly, water leaking from the pipes as was observed by Mr Gell, thirdly, from incompletely terminated water pipes on the roof or fourthly, from water coming from the rusted hole in the storage tank.
Confining the analysis to the known surrounding circumstances, the first possibility of wetness due to rainfall can be ruled out as a potential causative factor as it was not raining at the relevant time. The second possibility could have been present because, apart from the evidence of plumbing work claimed to have been carried out by Mr Stephens, no other work on the pipes was carried out between the time Mr Gell made his observations and the time Mr Harley was electrocuted. The third possibility could have pertained in that Mr Stephens could have turned off the water supply tap on the pipes, as he said he did, and then either he or Mr Harders then failed to terminate one or more of the two pipes after cutting them thus leaving the piping open ended. That scenario, in combination with the possibility that Mr Harley could have turned on the tap to wet the roof, for example, to test for the location and the course of flow of the leak, could explain why the roof became wet and why, on the morning of 26 October 2001, as appears in paragraphs 5 and 6 of her statement, Ms Sams saw a significant quantity of water flowing from the roof. The fourth possibility for the presence of water on the roof could have been the dirty water that had spilt onto the roof from the storage tank after it fell from its mounting. This is a distinct possibility because the water stain observed on the roof after Mr Harley's death was seen to be dirty and the storage tank was rusted. There is a fifth possibility, namely a combination of the third and fourth scenarios. There is a sixth possibility, namely, the filling of the tank scenario identified by Associate Professor Blackburn.
Having considered the presence of the water stain on the roof I find the most likely explanation for its presence was either a combination of the third and fourth scenarios or the sixth scenario. The fourth possibility definitely occurred, as is evidenced by the presence of stains from dirty water and the fallen storage tank. The third scenario is also a distinct possibility because of the amount of water Ms Sams observed to be flowing from the roof in the morning, that is, over "a long time". I infer from this evidence that such water flow seen in the morning must have been from a different source to the water that stained the ceiling after the tank fell over some time after 2.00pm on 26 October 2001 when Ms Sams heard Mr Harley "thumping about on the roof a bit more". I consider that the water from within the redundant system was of an insufficient quantity to account for all the water seen by Ms Sams earlier in the morning, unless perhaps Mr Harley was running the water through the tank in order to test for the location of, or successful repair of, the leak that he was engaged to fix. The significance of these scenarios is that absent the live electrical connection, Mr Harley would not have been fatally injured in carrying out any of these activities.
The foregoing analysis is relevant to first determining the probable mechanism by which Mr Harley was electrocuted, and secondly, to demonstrate a flawed aspect of the factual foundation for the submission made by Mr Stephens by which he claimed he did nothing to increase the risk of electrocution.
A further flaw in the argument made by Mr Stephens concerns his admitted deliberate stance of deciding not to inform Mr Dick that an active and live electricity supply remained connected to the redundant solar hot water system. Given the foreseeable potential dangers from an electricity supply to a redundant hot water system, I consider that Mr Stephens should have said something to Mr Dick in order to draw his attention to the risk of mishap. All he needed to say was something to the effect that the electricity was still connected to the redundant system and it needed to be disconnected by a licensed electrician, or alternatively, that Mr Dick should seek out the advice of an electrician on the issue in the interests of safety. In the result, Mr Stephens said nothing about these matters. I consider that in the circumstances it was incumbent upon him to broach this subject with Mr Dick in either of these two ways. Instead he did neither. I consider that his silence in this regard amounted to a breach of duty of care on his part.
I consider that it is clear that Mr Stephens was in breach of his duty of care because he failed to draw the attention of Mr Dick to the fact that, to his knowledge, no electrician had been engaged to take part in the decommissioning process. This was in circumstances where, if no electrician was engaged, there was a significant risk to others that an electrical injury could occur. In my view the decision by Mr Stephens to withhold comment on electrical issues, knowing that a connection to the electricity supply would remain, constituted a material breach of his duty of care in the circumstances.
The question that remains in whether the foregoing analysis of breach of duty of care on the part of Mr Stephens should be characterised as negligence. That requires a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002.
I consider that in the circumstances outlined above, the risk of electrocution to someone working on or around the redundant solar hot water system was foreseeable in that Mr Stephens knew or ought to have known of that risk : s 5B(1)(a) of the Act.
In the circumstances I have outlined, I consider that the risk of electrocution was not insignificant : s5B(1)(b) of the Act.
I also consider that a reasonable person in the position of Mr Stephens would have taken the precautions of drawing the attention of Mr Dick to the fact that the solar hot water system remained connected to a live and active electric current notwithstanding the fact that a new gas hot water system had been installed, and that this required disconnection and advice and intervention by a qualified electrician. I also consider that at the very least, as an interim measure, it would have been prudent for Mr Stephens to have placed a warning sign of some kind, even of a makeshift kind, on the tank to draw attention to the fact that it was connected to a live and active electric current. I consider that this was required because he believed he had disconnected the water supply to the system, thereby materially altering it : s 5B(1)(c) of the Act.
I consider that a reasonable person in the position of Mr Stephens could not have been satisfied that by leaving the redundant solar hot water system disconnected from the water supply but still connected to the electricity supply, that there was a low or insignificant probability of harm that might later arise. I consider that the probability of harm to either a handyman, roofer, renovator, builder or demolisher and like tradesmen was high due to the manner in which Mr Stephens left the apparatus without any relevant discussion with Mr Dick drawing attention to the electricity issue : s 5B(2)(a) of the Act.
In considering the likely seriousness of possible harm arising, I consider that a responsible person in the position of Mr Stephens would have recognised possible electrocution to be a very serious category of potential harm that should be guarded against.
Against these considerations, I consider that the burden of taking precautions against the risk of harm was negligible. All that was required was a conversation with Mr Dick and the placement of a waterproofed sign, which, if not ready made and capable of being obtained from a tradesmen's supply outlet, it could easily have been painted on a board and securely attached by a tradesman with the skills of a plumber : s 5B(2)(c) of the Act. In my view this review of the Shirt calculus in the context of the actions of Mr Stephens also demonstrates the relative ease with which he could have taken steps by way of a reasonable response to address a foreseeable risk which would have prevented Mr Harley from being fatally injured : Dederer [69], p 354.
I am required to consider the social utility of the activity on the premises that created the risk of harm : s 5B(2)(d) of the Act. In my view this consideration does not relevantly arise. The activity in question was undertaken in the course of every day dealings of a commercial nature with regard the maintenance and repair of rented domestic premises. That activity does not justify any participant in the process to refrain from taking reasonable care in the circumstances. On the contrary, safety and the avoidance of reasonably foreseeable harm is a matter of significant importance and social utility.
Having considered the actions and inactions of Mr Stephens from the perspective of a general legal analysis I have arrived at the conclusion that there was a breach of duty of care on his part. For the reasons outlined above, having regard to the requirements of Part 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002, I have reached the same conclusion. I therefore find that Mr Stephens was negligent in the manner described above.
Issue 10 - whether the death of Mr Harley was caused by the negligence of the defendants, or either of them
The defendants have submitted that Mr Harley's death was not caused by any breach of duty of care or negligence on the part of either of them. For the reasons that follow, I do not accept either of those submissions.
On the question of causation, there are two factors that arise for consideration. The first is the matter of factual causation. In some cases, the "but for" test whilst not exclusive or comprehensive, is nevertheless appropriate : Chappell v Hart [1998] HCA 55; (1998) 195 CLR 232 per Gummow J at [62]. In this case, I consider that a simple logical analysis clearly demonstrates that but for the continued connection of the redundant solar hot water system to the electricity supply of the premises, it is more probable than not that Mr Harley would have entirely avoided any electrocution injury and death : March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506. The events that caused his death were the negligence of Mr Dick in not giving proper and prudent attention to the electric connections that remained to the redundant system. The negligence of Mr Stephens in not saying anything to Mr Dick about the residual electrical connection was also causative of Mr Harley's death.
The foregoing general law causation analysis is only the starting point because the plaintiff must also satisfy the requirements of s 5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 for proof of legal causation which involves a specific consideration.
Having regard to the statutory requirements of s 5D of the Act for establishing causation the following matters are clear:
(a) The negligence of the defendants was a necessary condition for setting the scene for the death of Mr Harley so that factual causation has been established : s 5D(1)(a) of the Act. Mr Harley would not have been electrocuted if the electricity supply to the apparatus had been disconnected. In the different ways already reviewed, it was within the power of each defendant to achieve this on reasoned analysis;
(b) The scope of the liability of the defendants is appropriately extended to the circumstances of Mr Harley's electrocution : s 5D(1)(b) of the Act. This is apparent from the fact that the defendants, in their respective ways, had a controlling influence on whether or not the electricity connection to the solar hot water system remained live and active before Mr Harley came to the site and became exposed to the risk of electrocution;
(c) This is not an exceptional case that merits on application of the exclusionary provisions of s 5D(2) of the Act. There are no exceptional reasons shown on the evidence that would merit a finding that either of the defendants should not be held responsible for their negligence;
(d) In subjectively determining what Mr Harley would most probably have done in the course of his work if the defendants had not been negligent, there is no relevant factor that undermines or breaks a causal connection between the negligence of the defendants and Mr Harley's death : s 5D(3) of the Act. It is abundantly clear that Mr Harley would have carried out his work on fixing the leak. In those events, even if the redundant hot water storage tank had fallen in the course of such works, he would not have been electrocuted if the electricity supply had been disconnected. There is no evidence, medical or otherwise, to indicate that the falling tank would have injured him fatally or would have caused him to suffer other significant injuries.
Section 5D(4) of the Act requires a consideration of whether or not, and why, responsibility for Mr Harley's electrocution death should be imposed on the defendants. This involves a consideration of whether there had been any disentitling conduct on Mr Harley's part or other disentitling events.
The first consideration is the assertion by the defendants that Mr Harley had voluntarily assumed the risk of electrocution because it was an obvious or inherent risk in the circumstances : Div 4 of Pt 1A of the Act.
An obvious risk in this context is one which a person in the position of Mr Harley would consider to be obvious : s 5F(1) of the Act. This could also involve conditions or circumstances that are not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable : s 5F(4) of the Act.
There is a rebuttable statutory presumption that a person in the position of Mr Harley was aware of the risk of harm if the risk was obvious : s 5G(1) of the Act.
For the purposes of s 5G of the Act I do not consider that Mr Harley should be taken to have been aware of the risk of electrocution injury as an obvious risk in the circumstances. I have come to this view on two bases, one basis being statutory construction and the other basis being factual.
First, s 5G(1) refers to a person suffering harm. That could be construed as a general reference to include a plaintiff. However, here, because of the terms of the proviso within s 5(1), which requires the person suffering harm to prove that he or she was not aware of the risk, I consider that the reference to person in that context is a reference to the person who died or suffered personal injury and does not refer to a plaintiff who brings proceedings for economic loss under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897.
The Act does not define plaintiff or person injured. These terms, which are sometimes synonymous, are not synonymous in this case. The terms must therefore be given their ordinary and natural meaning.
On the construction approach, if in s 5G(1) the terms plaintiff and person were to be regarded as interchangeable terms, then clearly, Miss Giovenco was not aware of the risk and as a person who has suffered harm and on that construction, she has, in my view, on the balance of probabilities, satisfied the proviso of s 5G(1) of the Act and s 5G does not operate to defeat her claim.
On a factual approach I do not consider that Mr Harley should be taken to have been aware of an obvious risk, namely, the risk of harm from electrocution. I have come to this view because, like Mr Dick, he was under the impression, given to him by Mr Dick, that the solar hot water system was redundant and had no live electrical connection. The difference in the state of knowledge between Mr Harley and Mr Dick is that Mr Dick ought to have known differently whereas, for the reasons outlined in my analysis of the defendant's contributory negligence arguments, Mr Harley did not know of the residual electrical connection.
There is no duty on a defendant to warn a plaintiff of a risk that was obvious to the plaintiff : s 5H(1) of the Act. I consider that this provision is of no application to this case as Mr Harley, the person harmed, and who should have been warned, and whom it is argued, should have realised the risk of electrocution was obvious, is not and could not be the plaintiff in the proceedings. I therefore construe s 5H(1) as not applying to claims of this kind brought under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897. The position would be different if s 5H(1) referred to "the person injured or put in peril" or words to like effect.
Mr Harley was on the roof to fix a leak. Whilst it could be argued that a possible inference arises from the occasion of the joint inspection of the rooftop by Mr Harley and Mr Gell some weeks earlier, that it should have been obvious to Mr Harley that there was a live electricity connection on the day he was working on the roof, I consider that drawing such an inference would be unreasonable on the state of the evidence, particularly in the light of the phone call made by Mr Harley in the presence of Mr Gell.
There was no evidence that on the day of his death, Mr Harley was confronted with the same observations that he saw some weeks earlier, namely the presence of leaking water from a water pipe and of rising steam from a hot water system. In my view it cannot be reasonably inferred that these conditions that were earlier seen were still present on the occasion Mr Harley was electrocuted.
The fact that the electrical connection to the redundant system remained live and active and was therefore not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable does not necessarily mean that s 5F(4) applies to categorise the risk of electrocution as obvious so as to defeat the claim. This was because the context of Mr Dick's commission to Mr Harley was to work around a disused or redundant solar hot water system, not an electrified one. In these circumstances I consider that Mr Harley was entitled to assume from the very nature of the scope of his work on a redundant and disused system, that there was no live and active electrical connection. In my view, this must necessarily mean that there was no obvious risk of harm from electricity discernable by Mr Harley.
This is not a case where liability is excluded because of the materialisation of an inherent risk of something occurring that could not be avoided by the exercise of reasonable skill and care : s 5I of the Act. Mr Harley was not electrocuted by a strike of lightning. Instead he was electrocuted by the presence of a live and active electrical connection that reasonable skill and care required it should be disconnected for reasons of safety.
The second consideration is the argument raised by Mr Dick that there was a novus actus interveniens which served to sever any causal connection between any acts or omissions of the defendants and Mr Harley's death. In this regard Mr Dick sought to rely on a qualified concession made by counsel for the plaintiff in his opening address wherein it was conceded that Mr Harley ought to have sought assurances that there was no live and active electrical connection. That concession was made on the basis there may be a finding made that Mr Harley somehow directly dealt with the electrical system as part of a process of effecting a disconnection. I have not made such a finding and I consider that other than mere and impermissible unreasoned speculation, there is no proper basis for making such a finding. In these circumstances the conditional concession made by counsel for the plaintiff in his opening address does not operate to support an argument that there was an intervening act that severed any causal connection between the negligence of the defendants and the death of Mr Harley. I therefore reject that argument.
The above argument unsuccessfully mounted by Mr Dick depended upon it being established or conceded that Mr Harley came into contact with a live electric current as a result of a "free, informed and voluntary act" on his part to constitute a causally independent event : Nominal Defendant v Gardikiotis [1996] HCA 53; (1996) 186 CLR 49 per McHugh J at [8]; p55, approving Haber v Walker [1963] VR 339 at p 358 per Smith J. In my view Mr Dick, and for that matter, Mr Stephens, have failed to prove these necessary ingredients. I therefore reject the novus actus interveniens argument.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that each of the defendants were in breach of their duty of care to Mr Harley and I am satisfied that as a consequence they were each negligent. I am also satisfied that on a consideration of the applicable general law and statutory tests for causation, the plaintiff has demonstrated that the negligence of each of the two defendants was a material cause of Mr Harley's electrocution death : ss 5D and 5E of the Act.
Each defendant has submitted that the evidence establishes that there was contributory negligence on the part of Mr Harley and that such contributory negligence operated as a defence in this case : s 5T of the Civil Liability Act 2002. The burden of proving a defence of contributory negligence rests with the defendants. Both defendants have argued that there should be a finding of 100 per cent contributory negligence on the part of Mr Harley. It is therefore necessary to examine the evidence against the nature and extent of the contributory negligence allegations pleaded in this regard.
On behalf of Mr Dick, the following summarised allegations of contributory negligence concerning Mr Harley were relied upon: · Failing to ensure electrical supply to the hot water system had been decommissioned; · Failing to disconnect the electrical supply to the premises prior to attempting to remove the hot water system; · Failing to have any or any adequate regard for his own safety.
On behalf of Mr Stephens, the following summarised allegations of contributory negligence concerning Mr Harley were relied upon: · Failing to ascertain whether the hot water system was connected to the electrical supply before working on it. · Working on the hot water system while it was so connected. · Failing to remove the appropriate fuse from the electrical supply box, so as to disconnect supply to the hot water system, before working on it.
The evaluation of these arguments should commence with the insights provided by the terms upon which Mr Dick engaged Mr Harley to carry out the work of investigating the cause of the leak in the ceiling of the premises and to carry out the work of attempting to fix that leak.
Mr Dick's statement to the investigating police revealed that Mr Harley was engaged on an informal arrangement to investigate and fix the cause of a water stain on the ceiling of the upstairs hallway of the premises. Mr Dick's statement included the following detail: "9. On this particular visit, I discussed with Allan over the phone the fact that there was a water stain along the ceiling in the upstairs hallway. Allan told me that he thought this may have been caused by a water leak through the roof capping which runs between the adjoining roof sections of my house and the neighbouring terrace. I remember Allan saying to me 'I'll fix that for you one day'.
It is clear from these cited passages that Mr Dick had engaged the plaintiff to carry out work according to a loose but wide arrangement without warnings and by leaving Mr Harley to conceptualise the scope of the work and carry out the work he considered to be necessary to fix the leak.
Mr Dick gave an interview to inspectors from Workcover concerning the incident. In that interview it is recorded that he told them that he retained a measure of control over repair and maintenance work on the property even though there were managing agents looking after his property. It was in that capacity that he engaged Mr Harley to try and fix the leak by initially placing some sealant around the rusting mounting bolts of the roof mounted redundant solar hot water system.
Mr Dick stated that in the course of their discussions Mr Harley had foreshadowed to him that it might be necessary to remove the unit from the roof. Mr Dick acquiesced to the scope of work and it was left to Mr Harley to organise the work for a time that suited him. Mr Dick gave no instructions to Mr Harley in relation to this work. In his interview with the Workcover inspectors Mr Dick denied giving instructions to Mr Harley to remove the hot water system from the roof. Notwithstanding that denial it is clear that Mr Dick acquiesced with Mr Harley's suggestion that consideration may have to be given to pulling down the entire hot water system from the roof to fix the problem. It is clear that the terms of the engagement of Mr Harley were was loose and it is also clear that Mr Dick left Mr Harley to do the work unsupervised according to what he felt was necessary, short of at the outset, removing the unit from the rooftop.
Within these arrangements there was no evidence of any discussion in which Mr Dick had told Mr Harley of the need to be wary of matters electrical in connection with the solar hot water system. It was clear that Mr Dick had assumed, incorrectly, that there was no live or active electrical connection to the solar hot water system.
There is evidence that on the day of Mr Harley's death, whilst he was at his home for lunch, he had told the plaintiff that he had to call an electrician. Although Mr Harley had been working at Mr Dick's premises on that morning, there is no evidence other than unreasoned speculation that the discussion about needing to call an electrician had anything to do with the job at Mr Dick's premises, although a possible inference to that effect could, amongst others, arise. I will evaluate these possibilities in analysing the evidence that relates to the arguments concerning alleged contributory negligence on the part of Mr Harley.
I now turn to an evaluation of the specific particulars of contributory negligence that are relied upon by the defendants.
Alleged failure to ensure the system had been decommissioned
I do not accept there was a failure on the part of Mr Harley to ensure that the solar hot water system had been decommissioned. The scope of Mr Harley's work did not involve decommissioning the redundant system. It was clear from Mr Dick's version of events that it was his understanding that he thought, incorrectly as it turned out, as has been proven by the fact that Mr Harley was electrocuted, that the system had been decommissioned by the work that was performed by Mr Stephens. There is no evidence that Mr Dick informed Mr Harley of the need to check the system for the presence of a live electrical connection. I consider that in these circumstances Mr Harley was entitled to assume that as the system was redundant, in disuse and was not connected to the electricity supply. I find this to be especially so in the context of a discussion between Mr Harley and Mr Dick to the effect that the unit may have to be taken down. In that discussion Mr Dick's concerns were not about the safety aspect of the electrical connections, but rather, he was concerned about the cost of the removal.
Accordingly, I reject the notion that Mr Harley failed to ensure that the electrical supply to the solar hot water system had been decommissioned. I find that Mr Dick has failed to show that Mr Harley was aware that there was a live electrical connection to the system so as to support the contention that Mr Harley would have been placed on enquiry to ensure the system was electrically decommissioned before he commenced his work.
Alleged failure to disconnect the electrical supply to the premises
I do not accept the correctness of submission that there was a failure on the part of Mr Harley to disconnect the electricity supply to the premises. I make this finding because Mr Harley was not an electrician. For him to have done what is now suggested would constitute electrical work contrary to regulatory requirements for carrying out electrical work and as such, to do so would be a criminal offence. I reject the notion that a failure to do something that, if performed would constitute a criminal offence, should be nevertheless characterised as contributory negligence.
There is no pleaded allegation that Mr Harley failed to call upon the assistance of an electrician to carry out a disconnection of the electricity supply to the premises. Even if that allegation was pleaded, there is no evidence that arranging a disconnection of the electricity supply to the premises was within the scope of the work that Mr Harley was required to undertake. Disconnecting the premises from the electricity supply seems to be a drastic step to be required of an unqualified person. In my view this allegation demonstrates the allegation relied upon to amount to a call by the first defendant for a counsel of perfection to be applied to Mr Harley's conduct rather than adherence to the standard of reasonable care for his own safety in the circumstances.
Alleged failure to ascertain whether the hot water system was electrically connected
As the allegation of failure to ascertain whether electricity was connected to the system also involves some overlap with the related particular allegation of contributory negligence that follows concerning the carrying out of work on an electrically connected hot water system, I will analyse these two allegations together and in detail in the following paragraphs.
Working on the hot water whilst it was electrically connected
The pivotal inquiry involves identifying whether, on the day of the incident, there was any evidence that serves to establish, to the requisite standard, knowledge on Mr Harley's part, that the solar hot water system was electrically connected to a live and active current. As there is no direct evidence that on the day in question Mr Harley actually knew there was an active live electrical connection to the solar hot water system, the contributory negligence arguments therefore rely upon inferences that the defendants submit should be drawn from the evidence. Whilst such an approach is permitted by s 5R(2) (b) of the Act, it is for the defendants to prove such assertions by evidence and reasoned inferences drawn from the available evidence.
In view of this, the approach I take to this question is to examine each significant piece of evidence relating to possible contributory negligence, individually, and then with all of the evidence taken together as a whole. This enquiry must be undertaken with caution to ensure that it proceeds according to a prospective analysis, as with any allegation of breach of duty of care, and to ensure that the analysis does not become contaminated with knowledge that has been gained with the benefit of hindsight : Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] HCA 62; (2005) 223 CLR 442, as was identified and explained by Hayne J at [126].
Having undertaken that analysis, for the reasons set out in the paragraphs that follow, I have concluded that these two particular allegations of contributory negligence that are relied upon by the defendants should be rejected.
A convenient starting point is the evidence of Mr Gell, which was to the effect that about three weeks before Mr Harley's death both he and Mr Harley were on the roof and he, and by inference, Mr Harley saw steam coming from pipes associated with the solar hot water system on the roof and that the related water pipes were felt to be hot. Also relevant is Mr Gell's summarised discussion about electricity and the need for an electrician. Assuming that this evidence compels a conclusion that the electricity was connected, the fact that this inspection occurred weeks earlier, does not of itself necessarily require the conclusion that to Mr Harley's knowledge, the system had remained electrically connected up until the time he commenced working on the roof the fateful day that he met his death.
When the submission of the defendants concerning this evidence is considered, the submission is revealed to be reliant upon a supposition that Mr Harley made no relevant enquiry of his own, either of Mr Dick or otherwise, and that he was given no reason to be reassured that there was no relevant connection of the solar hot water system to the electricity supply of the premises. The submission also assumes, without justification on the evidence, that some kind of a presumption of continuance applies in the circumstances and that no electrical work was done on the connections between the date of Mr Gell's inspection with Mr Harley, and the date Mr Harley was electrocuted. That conclusion is not open on the evidence without specific evidence to support it, particularly since there is some evidence that Mr Harley made a call about an electrician. Although there was some evidence to that effect from Mr Dick, who said no other work was done, he was not in a position to definitively state that this was so as such evidence was based on an unproven assumption on his part.
Another relevant passage in the evidence that could be argued to be supportive of a basis of knowledge in Mr Harley that the solar system was electrified was the summarised conversation between Mr Harley and Mr Gell to the effect that they were concerned, that on the occasion of their joint inspection, that the apparatus looked dangerous, and that a discussion took place about an electrician. That evidence was as follows: "CHENEY
Q. Sir in paragraph 4 of your statement to the police you spoke of what you detected in the pipes; you said that you felt the pipes on the tank and they were hot? A. Yeah.
Q. You go on to say that you decided that it was best to leave it, "We decided that it was best to leave it and get an electrician to look at it"? A. Yeah.
Q. There was a discussion between you and Mr Harley on the roof about the merits of getting an electrician to look at the problem, is that right? A. Yes I obviously viewed the panels with Alan and came to the conclusion that the solar hot water panel wasn't working and it looked broken and there must be some other form of electricity running through the system to enable it to sort of heat the water to the temperature it was. So I basically told him that I wasn't going to touch it and we both agreed that it looked dangerous, so.
Q. You told him that you weren't going to touch it because you were concerned about the possibility of electrical shock? A. Safety, exactly.
Q. After the discussion that you had with him about the need to get an electrician to look at it he went off to make a phone call, is that right? A. Yeah we obviously discussed the electrician as well as the landlord, and then he proceeded to make a phone call; as I said in my statements at the time it was the landlord, but now I can't be a hundred per cent certain whether it was a landlord or the electrician. But he made a phone call, I can't recall what was said, I wish I could but unfortunately I can't.
Q. Is one of the reasons that you can't recall what was said because you didn't overhear the conversation between-- A. That's correct I didn't hear the conversation word for word, but Alan was on the phone. Whether it was a voice message or a conversation I can't recall either, but I can recall he was on the phone, immediately after we came to the conclusion that we weren't going to touch the system.
Q. After coming to the conclusion that you weren't going to touch it and seeing Mr Harley make a call on his mobile phone, the two of you left the roof is it? A. Yeah we hopped off the roof, yep.
Q. You heard nothing more from Mr Harley about that project or anything, or indeed at all? A. No.
Q. Until you learned of his death? A. That's correct yep.
I consider the probative value of the foregoing evidence is problematic. The answers relied upon by the defendants were to questions that were leading. Whilst leading questions were legitimate in the context, because it was cross-examination, it was nevertheless not possible to explore and test the detail of the summarised conversations with Mr Harley. I consider that in this context, leading questions, without exploration of the detail, sometimes leads to a somewhat skewed analysis and can sometimes fail to elucidate relevant probative detail, especially when the answers are given in a form that is in effect a summary without exposing the underpinning detail of the facts, or in this case, the actual words used : Container Terminals Australia Ltd v Huseyin [2008] NSWCA 320; Mason v Demasi [2009] NSWCA 227 at [2] per Basten JA. For this reason I approach the summary or conclusion evidence with caution.
Although Huseyin and Mason were decided in the context of the evidentiary utility and fairness of summarised conversations appearing in medical reports, I consider that similar considerations afflict the probative value of this part of the evidence of Mr Gell that I have cited and which is relied upon by the defendants as to alleged imputed knowledge on Mr Harley's part that the solar hot water system had an active and live electricity supply. Without more, I therefore consider Mr Gell's concessions to lack probative value on the issue of Mr Harley's alleged state of knowledge of a likely electrical connection. In any event, the knowledge concerning live electricity said to be had by Mr Harley at that time cannot in my view be presumed to have continued in the absence of evidence bringing that knowledge forward and current to the time of the event.
The problematic nature of the probative value of this evidence is further illustrated by Mr Gell's concession that he didn't hear the critical telephone conversation word for word, he could not recall what was said and there was confusion in his mind as to parts of the reported conversation. Those qualifications related to Mr Gell's recollection as at the time of the trial. This in my view demonstrates the inadequate foundation for the defendants' contributory negligence argument. The oral evidence in this regard was left in a vague state and I cannot view it insolation from Mr Gell's earlier and more contemporaneous statement to the investigating police, which was more concrete and specific, and which did not support the position contended for by the defendants at the hearing.
I therefore consider the cited evidence of Mr Gell anchored in a time some weeks before the incident to have no probative value to the issue of alleged contributory negligence on the day Mr Harley died. That assessment is not a criticism of Mr Gell, whom I felt was doing his best to relate the events as best he could recall them at the time of the trial. However, the probative value of this aspect of his evidence was limited by his lack of recall at the trial, by the necessarily summarised perceptions of what he concluded had been said, and was based on an incomplete hearing of the actual words used.
Another piece of evidence relevant to a contributory negligence argument is that which was recorded in the plaintiff's statement to the effect that part way through Mr Harley's working day on the premises, on the day he died, whilst at home at lunch time, Mr Harley told the plaintiff that he needed to speak to an electrician. The inference sought to be drawn by the defendants concerning this piece of evidence is that Mr Harley's stated need to speak to an electrician must have related to the work required to be carried out at Mr Dick's premises. The plaintiff's statement was tendered. She was not called or cross-examined on this point and in the circumstances, given the limited and non-particular nature of the evidence, I decline to draw the inference sought because I consider it to be unwarrantedly speculative since it does not follow that this particular job he was carrying out for Mr Dick was the only job that Mr Harley was involved in or was planning at the time. The connection between the call and the timing of Mr Dick's job may have been entirely co-incidental. The evidence does not permit a reasoned conclusion that does not involved unwarranted speculation on this point.
Without some evidence to establish a link I consider that it would be unreasonable and unfair to draw the inference sought to be drawn by the defendants. It was open to the defendants, if they chose to do so, between them, to call the plaintiff and question her, both in chief and by cross-examination, in order to seek to clarify this issue and this was not done. The evidence in this regard was therefore, left in a speculative state by the defendants.
Another piece of possibly relevant evidence to the issue of contributory negligence is the statement of Ms Sams. She said that at about 9.30 am on the morning of Mr Harley's death, she saw overflowing water that was flowing over the roof guttering of the premises. It was described as being a considerable quantity because Ms Sams had observed that the water was flowing for a considerable period of time and was flowing over the guttering in circumstances where there was no evidence of the guttering having been blocked. There was no description of the colouring of the water that flowed in this way, namely whether it was dirty or clear. Later, at about 2pm Ms Sams saw Mr Harley on the roof of the premises and "heard him thumping around the roof a bit more." She then paid no further attention to Mr Harley and she became engrossed in her work. The presence of water on the roof at the time Mr Harley was there is consistent with testing for a leak he was there to fix. The thumping about perceived by Ms Sams was consistent with a variety of types of repair work involving, for example, manipulation of rusted mounting bolts and/or trying to move the redundant tank or its supporting frame or both, or even the falling of the tank. In my view there is nothing that emerges from this evidence to support electricity based inferences as to contributory negligence on the part of Mr Harley.
Then there are the matters arising from the evidence of Mr Dick. Mr Dick stated that he had not authorised Mr Harley to remove the redundant hot water system from the roof. This based the suggestion that Mr Harley had embarked "on a frolic of his own" which was outside the scope of the work he had been engaged to perform. I do not regard that evidence as constituting a proper basis for finding contributory negligence on Mr Harley's part since some form of dismantling of the frame or stand was envisaged along with the screws or bolts at its base, as the appropriate method of fixing the leak in the roof, as was confirmed by the evidence of Mr Stephens who said that this was the proper way of doing the job. In view of this evidence, I do not accept that Mr Harley was "on a frolic of his own" or that the partial dismantling of the structure of the system, such as the mounting bolts was outside the scope of his work, which was otherwise unspecified by Mr Dick.
Apart from the evidence of Mr Dick, whose credibility has in my view been damaged on critical issues, there is no justifiably reasonable or adequate basis on the evidence for the inferences sought to be drawn by the defendants.
Also requiring consideration as part of the evaluation of the contributory negligence submissions are the objectively described facts that were found to be apparent at the scene following the electrocution of Mr Harley. In the paragraphs that follow I will enumerate and examine these objective facts to ascertain whether there is a reasonable basis of support for a contributory negligence finding based on those facts.
First, the electrical panel at the side of the redundant hot water system was found to have been in an uncovered state with exposed and burnt electrical wiring and the cover of that panel was found to be laying separate and a little distant from the panel, namely on the corrugated iron sheeting that was covering the roof. The timing and cause of that burnt wiring has not been determined by expert evidence. It could have been as a result of deterioration with time, earlier shorting due to the heating element having been exposed for a time or it could have been caused by contact when Mr Harley was electrocuted there may have been some other cause. Since the experts with specialised knowledge cannot resolve the question it is inappropriate for me to speculate on a resolution as a commonsense analysis is not open on matters involving specialised expertise. Second, the screws that would normally have held that covering plate in-situ on the housing structure of the unit were later said to be located in a neat pile on the roof. Thirdly, a screwdriver and other tools belonging to Mr Harley were located nearby on the roof. Fourthly, The water storage component of the unit was observed to have fallen over from its stand and that fall was thought to have been recent as was indicated by the location, distribution and dirty colour of the nearby water stains that had spread on the roof. Each of these matters bear analysis.
Whilst there is evidence that the roof mounted water storage unit had fallen over onto the roof, one can only speculate as to how this was likely to have occurred. It is unlikely to have fallen spontaneously, and there is no evidence that wind forces were at play. Coincidence is also an unlikely explanation for the falling of the tank. The mounting bolts, which were affected by rust, could have failed whilst Mr Harley was attempting to manipulate the screwed in bolts to investigate the leakage site. The fall could have happened when the structure may have been touched, leaned upon or perhaps pulled to one side to expose the holes in the roof at the site of the mounting bolts. The tank could have fallen when filled with water as postulated by Associate Professor Blackburn. Mr Stephens, who was also a roof plumber, said that removing the bolted structure was the proper way to address the leak. In the light of that evidence, suggesting that removal of the mounting bolts was the correct way to do the job, I do not consider this to be a proper basis for sustaining a contributory negligence argument in the absence of proof of knowledge on Mr Harley's part of the existence of a live and active electrical connection to the redundant system.
The matter of the fallen water storage unit is of some relevance to the found location of the separated cover of the electrical panel of the unit. There is no direct evidence as to how the panel cover became separated. This may or may not have become dislodged at the time the storage unit fell. It may have been removed by someone else. It may have been removed by Mr Harley, as was suggested by the defendants. The latter conclusion was based on a speculation that was raised by Associate Professor Blackburn. Either way, these alternatives possibilities could potentially explain the uncovered state of the electrical panel on the unit. The argument in favour of it having been removed by Mr Harley, in the course of touching the electrified components of the structure, as was identified by Associate Professor Blackburn, is a deficient analysis in the absence of evidence of the pathway of flow of the electrocution current in Mr Harley's body.
Associate Professor Blackburn also made the observation that the removed screws for the cover were located in a neat pile, suggesting this was done by Mr Harley. One the other hand, Mr Harley may have simply gathered the screws that may have been scattered and piled them neatly as they were later observed. Alternatively, these screws may have been removed and piled in that fashion by someone else on some other occasion. There is no evidence that would enable a satisfactorily reasoned and non-speculative preference to be made from amongst these alternative matters of speculation.
Even if it is assumed that it was Mr Harley who had removed the cover of the electrical panel and had neatly piled the screws as postulated by Associate Professor Blackburn, without more, this does not compel a finding that there was contributory negligence on the part of Mr Harley because, amongst other things, there is no evidence as to whether the removal of screws took place before or after the tank fell. Once the unit had fallen, absent a reasonable basis for belief on his part that there were live wires within the unit, I consider that it would have been reasonable in such circumstances for a handyman to have removed the cover plate to see what was inside the structure as a precautionary preparation for taking the next reasonable step, namely giving consideration to dismantling the unit for its removal as it was no longer appropriate to just leave it there after it had fallen.
In these circumstances, if that is what occurred, Mr Harley would have acted reasonably in investigating the situation. It may well be that in the course of such events, the wiring attached to the water storage unit may have stretched, it may have become unprotected in part and may have come into contact with other parts of the structure possibly also in the presence of water so that it became electrified, thus causing the electrocution of Mr Harley. These are matters of obvious speculation that cannot be satisfactorily resolved. In my view these matters of speculation serve as insurmountable obstacles to a reasoned conclusion that there was contributory negligence on the part of Mr Harley.
The defendants relied upon the conclusions of the experts to the effect that Mr Harley removed the cover of the electrical panel and was working directly on the active connections. That evidence, whilst admissible on the ultimate issue because of the operation of ss 79-80 of the Evidence Act 1995, is of no probative weight or value on the issue of contributory negligence because these conclusions are based on unproven and speculative assumptions.
The presence of Mr Harley's screwdriver at the site could serve as a possible explanation for the observation of neatly piled screws on the roof but then again it would not be unexpected for a handyman to have a screwdriver with him on any kind of outdoor or rooftop job, as would be the case with other tools that were found on the roof. After all, it was known that Mr Harley was attempting to seal the roof at the base of the mounting bolts of the storage unit in order to fix a leak. It would be unreasonable to assume that a handyman would only use a screwdriver to turn screws when common knowledge and experience suggests that a sturdy screwdriver can also serve as a lever, wedge, prodding and probing implement for clearing blockages, for poking holes in some materials and a host of other possible tasks.
In my view the foregoing analysis does not support the contributory negligence contentions relied upon by the defendants. Instead, it creates barriers for the success of such an argument. I therefore reject the contributory negligence submissions based on alleged failures to ascertain the status of any electrical connection to the solar hot water system.
Alleged failure to remove the fuse from the electrical supply "box"
I find that the contributory negligence allegation that Mr Harley had failed to remove the fuse from the electricity supply board is problematic as a particular of contributory negligence in this case. I reject that argument because it assumes, without evidence or any reasoned inference based on evidence, that Mr Harley had reason to believe that the electricity had remained connected to the redundant solar hot water system when there is no such evidence to support that view.
Further, it appears from the photograph of the fuse board to the premises (photograph 4A being part of Exhibit "A") that apart from the identified spare fuse, the fuses located there were not labelled so as to indicate which appliances or fittings were supplied with electricity by particular fuses. I consider the defendants' argument in this regard is unreasonable because without the fuses being labelled, Mr Harley would not have had the skill or knowledge to enable him to identify which fuse was connected to which device. He was not an electrician. Accordingly, I reject the contributory negligence submission that invokes the notion that there was a failure on the part of Mr Harley to remove a fuse from the fuse board. There is no evidence that would permit identification of the particular fuse that ought to have been removed to achieve such an identification. The defendants do not argue that Mr Harley should have tried to achieve this through a process of trial and error. I consider that such a process would have been unreasonable because Mr Harley was not electrically qualified to test the redundant hot water system to determine whether such efforts were successful.
In my view the general omnibus submission that Mr Harley failed to have any or any adequate regard for his own safety has not been made out on the evidence. It is a general allegation that is made in the face of uncertainty within the evidence as to precisely how the electrocution occurred and it therefore lacks the specific particularity that is required to sustain a finding of contributory negligence. Instead, the submission in effect involves an amorphous assertion that there must have been a failure on the part of Mr Harley to take care for his own safety, for otherwise he would not have been electrocuted. This is a flawed submission where the party bearing the onus of proving the assertion cannot point to any identifiable or specified act, neglect or default on the part of Mr Harley that would, on the balance of probabilities sustain such a submission.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis I reject the arguments raised by the defendants that there was contributory negligence on the part of Mr Harley. I consider that each of the defendants have failed to discharge the onus of proof for a defence of contributory negligence.
Issue 12 - apportionment of liability between defendants
Having found that each of the defendants were negligent and having found that it was their negligence that caused the death of Mr Harley, it becomes necessary to apportion responsibility for Mr Harley's death between the two defendants on a just and equitable basis by weighing and assessing their respective culpabilities for the death of Mr Harley. These respective culpabilities can be summarised as follows.
First, there were failures on the part of Mr Dick, on his own version of events, to give the matter of electrical safety any consideration whatsoever. It did not occur to him that the redundant solar hot water system would be, and was still supplied, by an active and live electric current in circumstances where he should have had the matter of risk of electrical safety within his reasonable contemplation. These failures occurred both at a time from when the solar hot water supply to the premises was made redundant and changed over to a new gas hot water supply in November 2001, and also in 2004 when Mr Dick engaged Mr Harley to carry out work on the roof.
Secondly, there were successive failures on the part of Mr Stephens to not only inform Mr Dick that the effect of making the solar hot water system redundant through the contemplated plumbing work that he was contracted to carry out, would still leave the electrical connections to the system intact. In these circumstances Mr Stephens deliberately refrained from advising Mr Dick to obtain the advice and assistance of an electrician. Not only did Mr Stephens fail to inform Mr Dick on these matters which, from a plumber's perspective, involved obvious considerations of risk and safety, but he made a conscious decision not to raise the subject with Mr Dick because he considered that as a plumber, a discussion on electrical matters was not within his purview or was not within the scope of his professional concern to say something on the subject.
In my assessment, when weighing a just and equitable apportionment between these two sources of failure to take reasonable care as contributing causes to the death of Mr Harley, I consider that they operate in unequal measure.
I consider that Mr Stephen's inactions, particularly his decision not to draw Mr Dick's attention to the need to obtain the services of, or at least the advice from an electrician, carries with it a much higher degree of blame than that which attaches to the failures of Mr Dick in the circumstances. I consider this to be so because Mr Stephens was in the position of drawing the electrical issues to the attention of Mr Dick at successive stages of the work, namely when he quoted on the job, when he took his care not to mention the need to address electrical part of the disconnection process which Mr Carmody confirmed was necessary, when the plumbing redundancy work was commenced and again before he commissioned the new gas hot water service into working order. Then there was the additional opportunity to say something when he sent his invoice for payment. At each of these stages of his involvement I consider that the actions and failures on the part of Mr Stephens carry a far greater degree of responsibility than Mr Dick for the death of Mr Harley.
Whilst recognising that minds may differ on an appropriate apportionment in such circumstances, doing the best I can do be fair and reasonable to each of the defendants, I consider that Mr Dick should bear 20 per cent responsibility for the plaintiff's damages and Mr Stephens should bear 80 per cent responsibility for such damages.
I have found that the plaintiff has succeeded on all issues that call for determination in the proceedings. As between defendants I have found that the defendants should bear responsibility for the plaintiff's damages in the proportion 20 per cent to be borne by the first defendant, Mr Dick and 80 percent to be borne by the second defendant, Mr Stephens.
Since the plaintiff has succeeded in her claim against each of the defendants, I consider that she is also entitled to an order for the payment of her costs by the defendants.
I make the following orders:- (a) Verdict and judgment for the Plaintiff against each defendant in the agreed amount of $350,000; (b) The defendants are to pay the plaintiff's costs on the ordinary basis unless otherwise ordered; (c) On the cross claims the defendants are to bear responsibility for the plaintiff's verdict and judgment in the proportion 20 per cent to be borne by the first defendant and 80 per cent to be borne by the second defendant; (d) No order as to costs in respect of the cross claims; (e) The exhibits may be returned; (f) Liberty to apply on 7 days notice if further orders are required.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Giovenco
Dick
[1998] HCA 55
(1961) 106 CLR 112
(1998) 195 CLR 232
(1952) 85 CLR 353
(1991) 171 CLR 506
(2000) 205 CLR 254
(1996) 186 CLR 49
(1997) 188 CLR 313
(1985) 156 CLR 7
(2005) 223 CLR 442
(1980) 146 CLR 40
(1952) 85 CLR 352
(2007) 234 CLR 330