imputation (b):
The plaintiff abused his position as a member of Parliament by not attending a series of meetings which he should have gone to while on a taxpayer funded study tour of the United Kingdom, Russia and South Africa.
26 An objection similar to the second taken in relation to imputation (a) was taken in relation to this imputation. That is, it was argued that the acts alleged against the plaintiff - the failure to attend the meetings - cannot amount to abuse of the plaintiff's position as a member of Parliament. I have hesitated over this argument. The imputation could, in my view, have been better drafted. However, its meaning is clear enough and I have concluded that failure to attend meetings that the plaintiff should have attended, in his capacity as a member of Parliament, could amount to abuse of his position as a member of Parliament. I reject this objection.
27 In relation to imputations (a) and (b), a further objection was taken based upon my own decision in Jarratt v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 547. At [19] and [20] I said:
"When regard is had only to the imputations themselves, and reference to the matter complained of is excluded, I am of the view that the plaintiff's argument should be accepted. The imputations do differ in substance as the plaintiff contends. The difference is one of degree. In truth, imputation 4(c) would wholly incorporate imputation 4(b); imputation 4(b) asserts a lesser degree of misconduct than imputation 4(c). The imputations differ in substance to this extent, and to this extent only. Thus, if the plaintiff were to go to the jury, and succeed, on imputation 4(c), he should not be able to go to the jury also on imputation 4(b).
In considering these questions it is relevant to bear in mind that each imputation is itself a separate cause of action; and that, therefore, if the plaintiff were successful in establishing that the imputations were conveyed, and defamed him (and the defendant failed in any of its defences), he would be entitled to an award of damages in relation to each separate imputation. It would not be right in principle for him to recover damages for both imputations 4(b) and 4(c) (unless it could be seen, from the matter complained of, that there were in fact allegations of different conduct on different occasions, giving rise to the two imputations as quite separate matters). I accept, therefore, that there is a difference in substance (that is, of degree) between the two imputations, but it is not such a difference as would entitle the plaintiff to a verdict on both imputations."