7 As to the present regulation, the question was whether the prosecution was obliged to prove that the respondents knew at the relevant time that the land in question was reserved land, in order to establish a prima facie case against them, respectively. Both judicial determinations in the case so far have held that this is necessary, and so there has been no need to make a determination whether an honest and reasonable belief on the part of the respondents in a state of fact which if true would make their actions innocent (eg, a mistaken belief that the land was not reserved land) would afford them a defence. The first issue to be considered is whether the language of the regulation is such as to confirm or displace the presumption that proof of mens rea is an essential ingredient. If it is, that ends the matter. The learned Chief Justice took the view that use of the word "permit" in the formulation, "permit the same to be in or remain on any reserved land", on its true interpretation required that the prosecution should prove that the permission extended to and embraced the fact that the land was reserved land. That is to say, his Honour held that the offender must be shown to have voluntarily and intentionally countenanced the animal being on land which he then knew was reserved land. He distinguished the case of Proudman v Dayman (supra), principally upon the basis that the formulation in the present case indicated the opposite result, from that indicated therein. With great respect, I am not able to agree with that view. In my opinion, the formulation under review, properly interpreted, should lead to the same result as in that case.