Sec. 74 (4) of the Distillation Act 1901-1931 makes the following provision: - "No person shall - (4) Receive, carry, convey, or conceal, or have upon his premises or in his custody or under his control any illicit spirit." The respondent, who is a chemist, was charged under this provision for that he did have in his custody illicit spirits, namely, about one half-gallon of rectified spirit. It appeared from the evidence given on the hearing of the charge that some spirit was stolen from a licensed distillery by an employee, who handed it over to an accomplice to sell. The latter called at a chemist's shop and offered to sell two gallons. The chemist, who required no more than one gallon, telephoned to the respondent and asked him whether he could do with a gallon of spirit. The respondent asked the price and was told 32s. 6d. The price usually charged by the wholesale chemist with whom he dealt was 51s. a gallon. The respondent asked whether the spirit was "all right," and, on receiving an affirmative answer, asked that it should be sent down to look at. This was done, and the respondent then paid the other chemist for it. He swore that he did not suspect that the spirit was illicit, that he referred to its quality when he asked whether it was "all right," and that he knew the chemist well who sold it to him and had no reason to suspect that he was concerned with illicit spirit or any goods improperly come by. The magistrate appears to have accepted the view that the respondent had no guilty knowledge, and he dismissed the charge, but not on the ground that the absence of guilty knowledge was an answer to a charge under sec. 74 (4), which he construed as imposing an absolute responsibility. In answer to an inquiry by the Court, he has informed it that he did not act as under sec. 556A of the Crimes Act 1900 N.S.W. as had been suggested. Upon the case stated it is not clear why he dismissed the information, but, whatever his reason may have been, it seems clear that the charge was fully established unless the defendant's ignorance that the spirits were illicit affords an answer. Spirits are illicit if they have been distilled, moved, altered, or interfered with, in contravention of the Act (sec. 6). The Act contains many provisions for the control of distillation, and the illicit character of spirits may arise from all kinds of violations of the Act of which persons may know nothing who, during the subsequent history of the spirits, receive, carry or convey them or have them upon their premises or in their custody or control. But the terms in which clause 4 of sec. 74 is expressed do not make knowledge of the illicit character of the spirits an essential element of the offence. To imply such a requirement would no doubt be possible, but in the case of a revenue statute of the tenor of that now in question, no presumption appears to arise in favour of that implication. Nevertheless, in the case alike of an offence at common law and, unless expressly or impliedly excluded by the enactment, of a statutory offence, it is a good defence that the accused held an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances, which, if true, would make innocent the act for which he is charged (per Cave J., R. v. Tolson[4]). What grounds may exist for excluding this exception as a defence are discussed more at large by Wills J. in that case[5], and by Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen[6], and it is clear that inference from subject matter may readily be made a ground of implied exclusion. But, although in the present case the subject matter is revenue, I do not think this defence should be treated as excluded. The provision relates not to any act or omission which is directly connected with the machinery for collecting or safeguarding revenue. It relates to possession, custody or other physical relation to an article. Its nefarious character is not intrinsic, but arises from antecedent breaches of the law generally by other persons. The very description "illicit" means that the spirits have previously been illegally dealt with. It seems natural to treat ignorance upon reasonable grounds of their unlawful history as an exculpation. The legislative power, upon which the provision rests, is that to make laws with respect to taxation, and it may be suggested that an extreme construction would take the provision to the verge of the power. Further, "If the words are not conclusive in themselves, the reasonableness or otherwise of the construction contended for has always been recognized as a matter fairly to be taken into account" (per Wills J.[7]). But, in any event, authority appears to me to support the view that the absolute language of the statute should be treated as doing no more than throwing upon the defendant the burden of exculpating himself by showing that he reasonably thought the spirits were not illicit. In the case of an enactment making possession of marked government stores an offence, the interpretation adopted by Lord Kenyon in R. v. Banks[8] was, as Wills J. says[9]: "Prima facie the statute was satisfied when the case was brought within its terms, and it then lay upon the defendant to prove that the violation of the law which had taken place had been committed accidentally or innocently so far as he was concerned." Indeed, in R. v. Sleep[10], actual proof by the prosecution of the accused's knowledge was insisted upon; see the jury's answers[11]. Lord Kenyon's view is approved by Wills J. in Tolson's Case[12]. I do not think such a case as R. v. Woodrow[13], although decided on an excise statute, is opposed to this conclusion, because the provisions were directed against trading in adulterated articles, and forbade possession of an article the adulterated character of which was not unascertainable. Such enactments are always considered to cast a special responsibility upon the trader to ensure that the goods are pure. (See Blaker v. Tillstone[14]).