Ghosh v Scott Newtown trading as Shaw Gidley

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

There was no dispute concerning the relevant legal principles as to the application of r 36.16. Ms Ghosh primarily relied on the proposition that it was appropriate for a party to make an application under r 36.16 to the trial judge if she or he had not dealt with a significant submission made by that party: Consolidated Lawyers Limited v Abu-Mahmoud [2016] NSWCA 4 per Macfarlan J (Bathurst CJ and Tobias AJA agreeing) at [39-41].
Ms Ghosh also relied on the oft-cited dictum of Mason J (as his Honour then was) in Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300, 302-303; [1993] HCA 6. These examples indicate that the public interest in the finality of litigation will not preclude the exceptional step of reviewing or rehearing an issue when a court has good reason to consider that, in its earlier judgment, it has proceeded on a misapprehension as to the facts or the law. As this Court is a final court of appeal, there is no reason for it to confine the exercise of its jurisdiction in a way that would inhibit its capacity to rectify what it perceives to be an apparent error arising from some miscarriage in its judgment. However, it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction is not to be exercised for the purpose of re-agitating arguments already considered by the Court; nor is it to be exercised simply because the party seeking a rehearing has failed to present the argument in all its aspects or as well as it might have been put. What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to reargue their cases.

CONSIDERATION

Ms Ghosh's primary submission was that the Court had failed to deal with her submission relying on s 6 of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (NSW) that the Court should have considered whether or not the proposed ASC raised a special federal matter and, if it did, whether the Court should make an order under s 6(3) of that legislation: 6 Special federal matters (1) If - (a) a matter for determination in a proceeding that is pending in the Supreme Court is a special federal matter, and (b) the court does not make an order under subsection (3) in respect of the matter, the court must transfer the proceeding in accordance with this section to the Federal Court or a court mentioned in subsection (2) (b). …. (3) The Supreme Court may order that the proceeding be determined by that court if it is satisfied that there are special reasons for doing so in the particular circumstances of the proceeding other than reasons relevant to the convenience of the parties.
That submission is, with respect, unsustainable in the face of the judgment. In the judgment at [36] I said: 36 In making these observations, I have not overlooked Ms Ghosh's detailed eight-page submission in relation to jurisdiction. Navigating the jurisdictional division between courts in relation to bankruptcy matters can be difficult even for qualified lawyers. It is unnecessary for me to deal with her submissions on jurisdiction and transfer for the reasons I have set out in paragraph [28] above. In the result, even if the Court were minded to transfer anything to the FCA or had to transfer anything to the FCA, there will be nothing to transfer to that court.
That paragraph then must be read in conjunction with the judgment at [28] (emphasis added): 28 The Court's general conclusions may be summarised as: (1) The pleading remains extremely prolix and is far from straightforward. It is difficult and in places, with respect, impossible to understand. It co-mingles allegations and makes no attempt to satisfy the requirements of the rules to the effect that the material facts for each cause of action be pleaded as briefly as possible and as intelligibly as possible. (2) It makes numerous unparticularised and rolled up allegations, including very serious matters such as theft and fraud. (3) It fails to plead causes of action known to law. (4) Insofar as it makes allegations against Mr Newton and his firm, and in relation to the conduct of her bankruptcy generally, there is much to be said for the conclusion that these are complaints in bankruptcy for which this Court lacks jurisdiction. However, the more fundamental vice is that the form of the pleading makes it very difficult to determine one way or the other whether there are clearly complaints in relation to which this Court would have jurisdiction. (5) The same pleading difficulty attends the question of what causes of action may have properly vested in Ms Ghosh's trustee. It will be apparent from what follows that I accept the submission from some of the proposed defendants that the relevant causes of action, if they are being properly understood, are matters that have vested in Mr Newton. But it must be acknowledged that there are other parts of the pleading where the obscurity of the drafting makes it very difficult to determine whether it is something that could still be a matter that Ms Ghosh has standing to advance notwithstanding her bankruptcy.
In short, the position was that, before the Court could determine whether or not there was a special federal matter among the various causes of action pleaded in the proposed ASC, it was necessary for that document to be in a form where, whatever the causes of action were, they could be clearly discerned in accordance with the rules of pleading. It was because of the form of the pleading that the Court had to deal with the matter in the way it did, namely to determine first whether the pleading should be allowed to be filed. It might also be observed that because there was no extant pleading, until the Court had granted leave to file the proposed ASC there was no "matter for determination in a proceeding pending" (emphasis added) in the Court that could be identified as a special federal matter to engage s 6(1)(a).
I therefore reject Ms Ghosh's primary submission that the Court failed to deal with a significant submission that she had made.
Her next submission contained in her written submissions and emphasised from the bar table was put in several ways. However, it may be fairly summarised in the proposition that summary dismissal cannot occur if the plaintiff has a cause of action. She submitted that both the proposed ASC and evidence upon which she proposed to rely (including in relation to her case against her ex-husband) demonstrated that she did have a cause of action. Ms Ghosh's reference to summary dismissal was apposite because, in effect, leave to file her proposed ASC was refused because it would have been liable to be struck out for the reasons set out in the judgment.
In support of her submission, Ms Ghosh drew attention to what was said by Adamson JA in GR v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2023] NSWCA 239 (Griffiths AJA agreeing with separate reasons) at [122] and [123]. 122 The second basis for summary dismissal (in (2) above) was that there was a substantial overlap between the allegations and relief claimed in both the Equity Proceedings and Common Law Proceedings. So much may be accepted, in that in both proceedings GR purported to challenge the guardianship and financial management orders. However, other relief was also claimed. She invoked the parens patriae jurisdiction in the Equity Proceedings and sought damages in the Common Law Proceedings. While a rationalisation of the proceedings was called for to reconcile the relief claimed in each, the overlap (which was not complete) did not constitute a proper basis to dismiss both proceedings. 123 The third basis (in (3) above) for the order for summary dismissal was that there was no proper basis in the material before the Court to substantiate the allegations made by GR. The positing of this criterion was erroneous. A plaintiff is not obliged to substantiate the allegations made in support of the claim in order to resist summary dismissal of the proceedings. Issues of fact are pre-eminently matters for final hearing. Summary dismissal will be refused if there is a triable issue: Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 at 11 (Handley and Cripps JJA); [1992] NSWCA 272.
Two things may be said about this submission and her reliance on what was said by Adamson JA: 1. The submission is, in my respectful view, an attempt to reargue matters that were put in the course of the hearing. That is not a basis for relief under r 36.16. There is no doubt that Ms Ghosh may, if she wishes, appeal from the judgment. 2. In any event, there was no issue of overlap in proceedings that informed the judgment. Furthermore, the question before the Court at the hearing was not whether she had a cause of action, but whether the proposed ASC satisfied the Court's pleading rules. What was said by her Honour in the Court of Appeal is, with respect, plainly correct, but there was no issue at the hearing before me about whether or not Ms Ghosh could substantiate the allegations made, or being attempted to be made, by her in the proposed ASC. The issue was the adequacy of the document as a pleading.
For these two reasons, the submission set out in [18] above is rejected.
I next record that Ms Ghosh made a number of submissions about why the Court should, under r 36.16, set aside the costs order that was made as part of the orders. This was an alternative prayer for relief in the motion. There is no basis for the Court to make such an order if, as I have determined, the orders and judgment are not to be set aside.
I also note a section of Ms Ghosh's written submissions entitled "Discretionary Considerations in Setting Aside the Summary Dismissal Order and Costs Order". This sets out a number of complaints which, with respect, generally fall within the category of her "complaints against the world" referred to in the judgment at [27]. I am unable to see how any of the matters raised in that section are relevant to the question of whether or not relief should be granted to Ms Ghosh under r 36.16.
This brings me to the one other matter of potential significance from her written submissions which Ms Ghosh emphasised in the course of argument. Ms Ghosh submitted that she was prejudiced by the orders because the dismissal of the proceedings meant that any claims that she sought to bring in fresh proceedings against the defendants for breach of trust would be statute barred by s 48 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW).
She further submitted that, whether or not she had in fact made that submission at the hearing, she was entitled to raise that consideration on the present application. In support of this submission, she drew the Court's attention to the Court of Appeal's decision in Ghosh v Miller (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 212. In that case she had succeeded in an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Common Law Division in circumstances where she had raised before the Court of Appeal an argument concerning the statute of limitations which had not been raised before the primary judge at a time when she was unrepresented.
The submission of prejudice by reason of the application of the limitations legislation to any fresh proceedings was not put in terms at the hearing. However, the transcript of that occasion records these submissions made by Ms Ghosh in answer to submissions made by Ms Z Hillman of Counsel who appeared for the proposed ninth defendant, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (Tcpt, 13 June 2024, p14(49)-15(32)): PLAINTIFF: What I want to say is that the course that Ms Hillman proposes would require her to approach the Trustee in Bankruptcy to make a formal nomination to the Court as to whether he wants to continue these proceedings, and he has had her submissions since 16 May and he hasn't done that, your Honour, in one month. So in the circumstances where this court has the power to override any nomination by the Trustee, in circumstances where the annulment application is listed on 1 August in Federal Court and my bankruptcy will be discharged in October, I would say the final hearing in this court won't be before that, it won't be before November/December and the Court could set a timetable in the meantime. The legal advice I got from a number of New South Wales and Queensland lawyers is that the claim should be filed to protect my interests because of the Statue of Limitations Act because all of these parties have caused me massive financial loss. The Commonwealth Bank forced under sale below cost price of a prime double lot riverfront and creek front property with a deep water mooring on Norman Creek, East Brisbane adjacent to Kangaroo Point on two registered titles. They overcharged me interest since 2002 for some 17 years, charged interest at investment rates, then they sold it at less than cost price. They allowed the Trustee in Bankruptcy to take over all control of the sale and cut off all communication with the two mortgages with Pashka and myself, despite tender of full payment of the outstanding mortgage, which was very nominal, which I think by that time it was around $300,000 by my late father in 2019. So their actions were not according to the law. The legal advice I have obtained is that the claim against them should be filed because of the statute of limitations and the need to protect my rights against all of the parties, your Honour. And, in any case, the bankruptcy will discharge in a matter of four months. This court can list the final hearing for November or December of this year with a timetable.
Mr Neggo properly accepted that there was at least some reference to the statute of limitations in the passage which I have just set out. He submitted that it was not clear which of the causes of action that were sought to be raised in the proposed ASC might be statute barred and that the position could be different as between the various proposed defendants. Nevertheless, he also fairly indicated that, were fresh proceedings to be commenced, his client would plead the statute of limitations in answer to any causes of action to which that defence was properly available.
I propose to deal with Ms Ghosh's submissions as to limitation (including that it can be raised now even if it had not been raised at the hearing) in this way. To use the language of Mason J (see [12] above) I will assume in her favour that the Court misapprehended that she was in fact making a submission that she would be potentially prejudiced by the limitation legislation if the proceedings were dismissed, and that the misapprehension was through no fault of her own as a litigant in person. Mr Neggo acknowledged that would be sufficient to enliven the Court's discretion under r 36.16. I will also assume in Ms Ghosh's favour that her submission was correct, at least in relation to some cause of action for breach of trust that she sought to plead in the proposed ASC against at least the first defendant.
Based on those assumptions in Ms Ghosh's favour, I proceed on the basis that the Court's discretion under r 36.16 has been enlivened, but it must be recalled that it is a discretion. In this case, I decline to exercise the Court's discretion under r 36.16 because the assumptions that I have made would have made no difference to the outcome had those matters been considered at the hearing. In other words, given all of the other circumstances outlined in the judgment, I would still have reached the same conclusion as to the inadequacy of the proposed ASC and as to refusing leave to replead, with the consequence of dismissal. Even if that would have caused the prejudice to Ms Ghosh that I have assumed for the purposes of the present argument, unlike the cases to which Ms Ghosh referred, the present case was decided against the background of multiple attempts by Ms Ghosh to plead her case, and an indication by Schmidt AJ with which I respectfully agreed, and still agree, that Ms Ghosh should only be given one more chance to plead her case.
There is an additional reason why I have reached this conclusion. In accordance with directions I made on an earlier occasion, Ms Ghosh has provided the Court with a form of pleading which she says is what she would rely on if either leave to replead were granted or she were to commence fresh proceedings. It is sufficient for me to observe for present purposes that the latest iteration of her proposed draft pleading suffers from the same kinds of deficiencies from which the proposed ASC suffered, and which led to the judgment and orders.
It follows that for the reasons I have given, Ms Ghosh's application fails.

At a glance

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Judgment (7 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (3)

Cases Cited (8)

Cited By (1)