1 4 large concrete pipes 1-4 1 dog shelter, 2 shells for pod
2 Steel girder and beams 5-8 stringer for repairing staircase
3 Treated timber poles 5-8 mainly for dwelling elsewhere
4 Metal sheeting 9-10 dog barrier for gate
5 Sheet and corrugated iron 9-10 renovation, not an exhibit
6 Unused bricks and masonry 11-14 hobbies, small quantity
7 Water pipes 1-4 non-existent
8 Window frames 15, 16 flyscreen removed from house
9 Scaffolding 4, 17 art/hobby use, not as scaffolding
10 Timber 18-23 renovation, firewood"
23 He summarised his contentions as follows (in par 17):
"(a) there is a clear line of demarcation between items derived from legal construction that Her Honour Justice Pain required removal and the items actually found as depicted in the photographs taken on 22 February 2010;
(b) again there is a clear line of demarcation between the actual items present on the property and the alleged items described by the respondent as being there on 22 February 2010;
(c) again, there is a clear line of demarcation between 'building materials purchased for house extensions' and the actual items depicted on the property;
(d) again as aforementioned, the presence of items on the property is a dynamic situation and cannot be the same as those found on 31 July 2007 or any other day thereafter."
24 As Mr Warren notes in his submissions, what the appellant actually wants me to do on this motion is to exempt from removal some of the materials Pain J clearly listed in her order, and to allow, in particular, the treated poles to remain, because of the history of their placement, in the context of "some action of the respondent".
25 Mr Warren says that the poles issue as now framed should have been argued out before the local court magistrate, and/or before Pain J on appeal. In respect of other items listed, Mr Warren says (at par 7):
"The ground that the Applicant seeks to agitate under 6(a) appears to be on the basis that the material described in the Order was not purchased for the purpose house extensions. It is submitted that Her Honour has clearly formed the view that the materials in question were purchased for house extensions, being extensions that the Applicant has never obtained development consent for in over 16 years, and which was a matter the subject of considerable evidence in the Local Court. It is submitted that the applicant now is simply seeking to re-agitate that issue which has already been determined by the Court".
26 Mr Warren refers quite appropriately to leading authorities on the power of the court to set aside or vary an order that has been made, but not entered (see his par 11 relying on Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No.2); Carelli v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No.2) [2008] NSWCA 205 and Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No.2) (1993) 176 CLR 300).
Consideration
27 Essentially, for the appellant to succeed in achieving a variation of orders, the court must find that in making them in the first place the court proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or relevant law, not attributable solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the variation.
28 The court does not make orders such as Pain J's Order 3 without careful consideration. A perusal of Her Honour's reserved judgment shows the depth of her consideration of all items about which evidence was given by both the appellant and the prosecuting Council, before both she and the Magistrate formulated their respective s 245 orders. Essentially, what Mr Cumming asserted was "waste" in statutory terms, is regarded by the appellant as useful material acquired by his wife and himself, at least some of it from Council's own recycling facility, for purposes such as construction, restoration, artwork, and general household purposes, and used, not only stored, for such purposes.
29 Her Honour observed (at [50]) that although there was "a lot of material" on this normal house block around the appellant's house, "and it would be considered unsightly by many, the material is largely of a domestic nature and could readily be found in lesser quantities around many homes throughout the State", and there were no suggestions of environmental harm, fire risk, or human health concerns.
30 Her Honour said (at [54]), relevant to her subsequently framing Order 3(ii):
" I consider the Appellant should be required to remove … the specified building material said to be required for a house extension as there has been no progress in the applicant's pursuit of a development application for 14 years and no indication of when it might be pursued to finality. The other items concerning his hobbies and other household pursuits can remain ".
31 Her Honour then formulated the list (which appeared in [56]), and ordered, in clear terms, that Mr Gerondal had to remove "building materials purchased for house extensions". They were certainly not exempted from the order, and Mr Gerondal's submissions concede that some items of concern to him (timber and pipes) are not, or even could not be, "for house extensions" (as distinct for some other building project, including on Mrs Gerondal's land).
32 Mr Gerondal says that he was not adequately heard on all these materials when the matter was before the local court. However, Pain J surveyed all the appellant's evidence at length (especially in pars [10]-[16]) and entertained his submissions. Her Honour then examined the Magistrate's order which was far wider in impact than that made by her on the appeal. Mrs Gerondal conceded before me that she and the appellant were invited by Her Honour to make a list of what they wanted to keep.
33 The matters put to me today should certainly have been put to Her Honour on 1 September 2009.
34 Applications such as that before me now are essentially applications to reopen completed proceedings. Mr Gerondal says that that is not so, and that, as a result, the authorities relied upon by Mr Warren are irrelevant, and do not apply to this matter.
35 In Dillon, Kevin & Anor v Gosford City Council (No.2) [2010] NSWLEC 44 and Teoh v Hunters Hill Council and Another ("Teoh") [2008] NSWLEC 263 I had to review and apply the relevant authorities, albeit in both cases the orders had been entered before the application was made. See, especially, Teoh at [43]-[57].
36 The orders made by Pain J in determining the appeal in this case are "final" in form and effect, even if not formally entered before the Notice of Motion was filed. They have none of the attributes of orders that are properly seen to be "interlocutory, conditional, or procedural". See Pittwater Council v Brown Brothers Waste Contractors Pty Ltd [2009] NSWLEC 50. Her Honour did not, for example, ask the parties to bring in short minutes to reflect her reasoning.
37 They are not now open to be "interpreted", unless the appellant succeeds in meeting the correct principles for the court to apply.
38 No grounds have been advanced for the court to now intervene - in accordance with the High Court's formulation of the relevant principles in Smith v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256, at 265-267 - other than the appellant's personal dissatisfaction with the outcome of the s 245 element of his appeal. See also Mir Bros Unit Constructions Pty Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2005] NSWLEC 419.
39 As the High Court said in Metwally v University of Wollongong (No.2) (1985) 60 ALR 68, at [71]:
" It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so."
(See also the authorities surveyed by Biscoe J in Bankstown City Council v El Dana [2009] NSWLEC 68).
Conclusion
40 The Notice of Motion must be dismissed.
41 That leaves the issues of costs and timetable.
42 Pain J ordered each party to pay its own costs of the appeal. No order was made by Biscoe J on 12 February 2010. I made a costs order on 26 February 2010, but Biscoe J set that aside on 12 March 2010, and reserved the costs of 26 February 2010. His Honour made no order in respect of the hearing of 12 March 2010.
43 I believe the most appropriate and just order is that each party pay its own costs up to and including 18 April 2010, but that the appellant should pay the Council's costs of and incidental to today's hearing.
44 On the question of timetable, there are approximately six weeks left before we reach the date set by Biscoe J, 1 June 2010. That should, after all this time, be sufficient. However, having some concern about the personal circumstances of the appellant and his wife, I have decided to further extend the time for compliance to 30 June 2010.
Orders
45 The orders of the court on the appellant's Notice of Motion of 1 February 2010 will be as follows: