Genova International Soccer Academy v Suranyi Holdings
[2022] FCA 1580
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2022-12-23
Before
Thawley J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (31 paragraphs)
INTRODUCTION 1 The Genova International School of Soccer (GISS) is a soccer academy in Spain. In August 2018, it was wholly owned by Mr Maurizio ("Morris") Pagniello. Mr Phillip Gorman was living in Spain, whilst his son attended GISS and played for a local team. Mr Gorman had been lending money to Mr Pagniello since January 2018 when the two began a business relationship. This proceeding concerns a failed business venture intended to run youth soccer training camps in China, branded GISS or Genova. The applicant is Genova International Soccer Academy Pty Ltd (GISA) which was incorporated in Australia on 4 February 2019 as the vehicle through which Mr Gorman and Mr Pagniello would conduct the venture. Mr Gorman was and remains the sole director and shareholder of GISA. 2 The first respondent is Suranyi Holdings Pty Ltd as trustee for the Cantara Global Australia New Zealand Trust. Suranyi Holdings Pty Ltd (CGANZ) was incorporated in Australia on 9 September 2016. The second respondent is Ms Julianna Suranyi. Ms Suranyi was at the relevant time the sole director and secretary of CGANZ. Ms Suranyi holds a 72% shareholding in CGANZ. The third respondent is Mr Salvatore Sottile, Mr Suranyi's de facto partner. He was an employee of CGANZ, being its Director of Football. 3 GISA and CGANZ entered into a "Consulting Agreement" on 5 February 2019. The Consulting Agreement contemplated that soccer camps would be held in China under the GISS or Genova brand and provided for the respective responsibilities of GISA and CGANZ. The Consulting Agreement also contemplated the involvement of Cantara Global International (CGI) in the venture, but CGI was not a party to the Consulting Agreement. CGI was incorporated in Hong Kong and owned Cantara Football. CGI's director was Mr Chau "Charlie" Wu. 4 On 18 February 2019, GISA paid CGANZ a "Service Fee" of US$280,000 plus GST (US$308,000) as required by the Consulting Agreement. No point was made about the amount being paid late. Mr Gorman funded the Service Fee. 5 The GISS or Genova brand or concept was launched in China on 30 April 2019 at a press conference arranged and promoted by Cantara Football (CGI) and CGANZ. 6 Soccer camps were held at 5 locations in China between 25 May 2019 and 2 June 2019. A total of 750 participants attended the camps. In terms of the quality of the training provided, and the attendance by participants, the camps were successful. 7 The Consulting Agreement contemplated that each participant at a soccer camp would be charged US$150 and that the gross revenue would be split between GISA (60%) and CGANZ (40%). Mr Gorman anticipated recouping the Service Fee out of this revenue. The Consulting Agreement provided for an increase in profit split to 70% to GISA if this was not achieved in Year 1 or Year 2. In fact, no fees were apparently collected from any of the 750 participants. 8 Relationships, some of which had already been strained by earlier events, began to deteriorate. 9 Ultimately, although CGANZ worked towards organising further camps, no such camps were held. In December 2019, Mr Gorman and Mr Pagniello were in China pursuing business opportunities with Mr Wu and others for soccer services under the GISS or Genova brand. CGANZ's position in the proceeding was that an agreement was reached between Mr Gorman, Mr Pagniello and Mr Wu (and others) in breach of the Consulting Agreement and that it automatically terminated in accordance with the terms of the agreement. GISA's position in the proceeding was that the Consulting Agreement had been "abandoned" by the parties during Year 1 of its operation. GISA has never purported to terminate the Consulting Agreement or asserted that CGANZ repudiated the Consulting Agreement. 10 GISA commenced this proceeding on 22 December 2020. The final form of the applicant's pleadings are an amended originating application and an amended statement of claim (ASOC). The applicant's case was narrowed during oral opening submissions. 11 GISA put its case in three ways. First, in contract: (1) GISA claims that CGANZ breached a term of the Consulting Agreement that CGANZ "would ensure that each participant in any football camp paid an amount of US$150": [12] of the ASOC. GISA claims 60% of the gross fees which should have been collected and distributed in relation to the first set of camps held between 25 May 2019 and 2 June 2019 which was in fact held at 5 locations; (2) GISA claims that CGANZ breached a terms that CGANZ "would use all reasonable efforts to arrange" two more sets of camps at 5 locations in Year 1: [15] of the ASOC. GISA claims 60% of the gross fees which, on GISA's case, should have been collected and distributed in relation to these two further sets of camps. 12 During its oral opening, GISA abandoned its previous claim for 60% of all fees in respect of all of the camps which the Consulting Agreement contemplated over the five year term, because it accepted that the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions introduced in China made performance impossible after Year 1. 13 The Consulting Agreement referred to 5 locations, but did not refer to 3 sets of camps. GISA asserted that the lack of reference to 3 sets of camps was a "mistake": [14] of the ASOC. GISA did not seek rectification. CGANZ asserted the lack of reference to 3 sets of camps was intentional. 14 Secondly, GISA claimed that CGANZ engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), being sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). GISA initially relied on five representations made by CGANZ which it contended were misleading. In oral opening, GISA narrowed its case to only two of those representations, namely the fourth and fifth representations pleaded in the ASOC. GISA claims damages from CGANZ under s 236 of the ACL in respect of CGANZ's contravention of s 18. GISA also claims that Ms Suranyi and Mr Sottile were liable in relation to the fourth representation because each was "involved" in the contravention resulting from the representation within the meaning of s 2 of the ACL. GISA claims that Ms Suranyi is liable in relation to the fifth representation because she was "involved" in the relevant contravention resulting from that representation. 15 Thirdly, GISA contended that CGANZ was unjustly enriched in the amount of four fifths of the Service Fee that GISA paid to CGANZ under the Consulting Agreement. At the time of payment, the GST inclusive amount of the Service Fee, being US$308,000, was equivalent to AU$434,864.05. The unjust enrichment claim was said to arise because the services which CGANZ were required to provide to GISA over the five year term of the Consulting Agreement were not provided in Years 2 to 5, because - GISA contended - the parties had mutually abandoned the Consulting Agreement in December 2019. It was contended that there had been "a total failure of a severable part of the consideration", referring to Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] HCA 32; 267 CLR 560 at [168] and David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] HCA 48; 175 CLR 353 at 382-3. 16 The respondents were not represented at the hearing. They had been represented for a time during the course of the proceedings by Razor Legal. The respondents' joint defence was prepared by their previous counsel and certified by their previous solicitor. A number of the affidavits were evidently prepared by and executed before the respondents' previous solicitor. 17 The respondents' joint amended defence, which built on the existing defence, was signed by Ms Suranyi, purportedly on behalf of each of the respondents. At the commencement of the hearing, the Court raised with the parties the fact that CGANZ could not proceed without a lawyer unless an order was made dispensing with r 4.01(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and that Ms Suranyi would require leave to represent either of the other respondents. 18 Razor Legal had been the solicitors on record for the respondents between 21 January 2021 and 11 February 2022. On 11 February 2022, the respondents filed a "Notice of ceasing to act" which stated that Razor Legal had ceased to act as a lawyer for the respondents. On 18 February 2022, the respondents filed a "Notice of address for service" dated 11 February 2022 purportedly in accordance with r 4.03 of the Rules. It provided an address for service, being the address of Ms Suranyi as it appeared on her affidavit affirmed on 5 August 2021. Rule 4.03 did not in fact apply to the respondents' circumstances. It only applies where a party is unrepresented when proceedings commence and later appoints a lawyer. The notice filed by the respondents on 18 February 2022 also does not comply with r 11.02 of the Rules which provides that only a lawyer may file a notice of address for service on behalf of a corporation. 19 Rule 4.01 of the Rules provides: 4.01 Proceeding by lawyer or in person (1) A person may be represented in the Court by a lawyer or may be unrepresented. (2) A corporation must not proceed in the Court other than by a lawyer. Note 1: Corporation and lawyer are defined in the Dictionary. Note 2: A notice of address for service for a corporation must be filed by a lawyer--see rule 11.02. Note 3: The Court may dispense with compliance with this rule--see rule 1.34. 20 Rule 1.34 confers a discretionary power to dispense with compliance with any of the rules, including r 4.01(2). It is a "broad [discretion] to be exercised judicially depending upon the existence of a sufficient cause": Silkearl Pty Ltd v Ainsworth Game Technology Ltd [2006] FCA 949 at [4], cited with approval in Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138; 280 FCR 479 (Markovic, Derrington and Anastassiou JJ) at [23]. 21 The Court is cautious in permitting a non-lawyer to appear and represent a corporation, but the guiding principle is the attainment of justice having regard to the particular circumstances: Southcorp Brands Pty Ltd v Australia Rush Rich Winery Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 720; 369 ALR 299 at [82] (Beach J). Beach J identified the following as relevant at [82] and [83]: the financial capacity of the company and those standing behind it; in this respect, the identity of the shareholders and the spread of the shareholding is relevant; the capacity of the proposed representative to conduct the case effectively having regard to the skills, qualifications and experience of that representative; in assessing the capacity of the proposed representative, whether they have any real understanding of Court processes and whether they have any language difficulties which may impede their effective conduct of the case; the complexities of the case, for example, if the proceeding involves difficult questions of law, leave may not be granted; whether the overarching purpose prescribed by s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) would be promoted by the grant of dispensation; whether a lack of disciplinary measures available against the proposed representative may affect the administration of justice; the manner in which the case has progressed to date and the manner in which it may progress without the company having legal representation; and whether the proposed representative is also a witness and, if so, whether they will properly be able to conduct the case of the company whilst also being a witness. whether the company is a respondent as opposed to being an applicant or a cross-claimant, such that a more liberal approach to dispensation may be warranted concerning the grant of dispensation. 22 Ultimately, the Court must exercise the power in r 1.34 to dispense with the requirement in r 4.01 in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose: s 37M(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). 23 At the hearing, with the consent of all of the parties, the Court dispensed with compliance with r 4.01(2) from 18 February 2020 and the Court granted leave to Ms Suranyi to represent CGANZ. GISA consented to this course. Counsel for GISA agreed that GISA had not had any difficulties to date in conducting the proceedings with the respondents being unrepresented or informally represented by Ms Suranyi. Although it would have been preferable for there to have been evidence on the point, it appeared that CGANZ was unable to fund legal representation. The Court took the view that the orders would facilitate the just resolution of the dispute between the parties as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Leave was not granted for Ms Suranyi to represent Mr Sottile. 24 In setting out the written and oral communications between the parties, and the content of documents, I have extracted verbatim what was written and said, including errors and formatting.