3 GE subsequently, on 21 July 2006, lodged a caveat over property of L&B at Avoca Beach and, on 2 September 2008, over property of L&B at Wadalba. Mr John Robert Holland appears to be the principal both of Blue Haven and of L&B Enterprises.
4 Blue Haven has been in default under the Bailment Agreement, including by failing to pay, when due, amounts owing under that Agreement. On 20 April 2009, solicitors acting for GE wrote to L&B, demanding payment of the sum of $414,016 pursuant to the Guarantee, and execution and delivery of legal mortgages over the Avoca property and the Wadalba property, details of which, including extensive memoranda, were provided. L&B has not provided any such mortgage nor paid the money demanded.
5 The obligation of the guarantor L&B to provide the mortgages in question is said to be imposed by clause 7.1 of the Secured Guarantee. It is plain that part of clause 7.1(a) has been omitted. While clause 7.1(b) clearly enough contemplates that L&B is required to give a registrable legal mortgage containing such terms and conditions as GE may require, that obligation is subject to two important qualifications: first, that the mortgage must contain a covenant to the effect of clause 7.1(a) and, secondly, that the mortgage secures (and I venture to think secures only) the amounts in clause 7.1(a). Similarly, the charge imposed by clause 7.1(c) is limited to the amounts referred to in 7.1(a).
6 In the absence of any meaningful clause 7.1(a), it is impossible to know whether any mortgage would contain a covenant to the effect of that clause, nor whether it would secure the amounts referred to in that clause.
7 Mr Bulley has helpfully drawn my attention to Rein J's judgment in Yuwana Nominees v Ong [2008] NSWSC 156, particularly at [8] where his Honour summarised the principles of construction applicable to commercial contracts, emphasising that the Court should not take a narrow and pedantic view, but should strive to give some meaning and effect to provisions which the parties intended to have some meaning and effect. However, there are a number of difficulties in applying that approach in the present case. The first is that when the Court spoke in that context of commercial agreements, it is unlikely that it had in contemplation what are often called "contracts of adhesion" such as the present finance agreement and Secured Guarantee. Secondly, in the present case, the question is not really one of construction to resolve ambiguity. This is not a case of difficulty in deciding what meaning clause 7.1 should bear, but in giving any meaning at all to it. It is a case of absence of meaning, rather than ambiguity of meaning. Thirdly, even if it were a question of construction, two rules of construction would point in the opposite direction; namely, the contra proferentem rule, and the rule that a guarantee is construed strictly in favour of the guarantor and against the party receiving the benefit of the guarantee.
8 To my mind, it is just impossible specifically to enforce clause 7.1(b), containing as it does a mandatory provision for a covenant to the effect of clause 7.1(a), and a requirement that such mortgage secure the amounts and only the amounts referred to in clause 7.1(a), when the terms of the covenant contemplated by clause 7.1(a) and the amounts referred to in it can in no way be ascertained.
9 Clause 7.1 is therefore void for uncertainty. I am not prepared to grant a decree of specific performance in respect of it.
10 As the plaintiff does not seek a monetary judgment on the guarantee, it follows that the plaintiff's claim fails, and must be dismissed.
11 I order the Summons be dismissed with costs.