Appointment of auditor legally effective - no declarations made
60The resolution of the issues raised in this case requires the construction of s 153(3) of the ALR Act. The purposive approach to statutory interpretation requires a construction that would promote the purposes or objects underlying the Act to be preferred to a construction which would not promote that purpose (Interpretation Act 1987 s 33). The often quoted passage from Project Blue Sky Incorporated v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69] (omitting citations) states:
69 The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined "by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole". In Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos, Dixon CJ pointed out that "the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed". Thus, the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed.
61Recently the Court of Criminal Appeal in Shannongrove Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority [2013] NSWCCA 179 (where the statutory meaning of waste had to be considered in a criminal law context) Basten ACJ (Hall J and Barr AJ concurring) observed in relation to s 33 and s 34 of the Interpretation Act:
19 A difficulty with the application of this provision [s 33], identified in a number of leading authorities, is that it presumes it is possible to identify "the purpose or object underlying the Act", whereas legislation frequently involves conflicting policies and interests which it seeks to balance, one against the other. To identify, at a high level of generality, an underlying purpose or object is unlikely to assist in the construction of a specific provision or even phrase or, as in the present case, word. Furthermore, some provisions may be specifically directed to limiting the effects or consequences of a broad application of the underlying purpose of the legislation, but it does not follow that they should not be given their full effect, in accordance with the language used by the legislature. ...
20 The Interpretation Act also provides for the use of extrinsic material:
34 Use of extrinsic material in the interpretation of Acts and statutory rules
(1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, if any material not forming part of the Act or statutory rule is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision, consideration may be given to that material:
(a) ... or
(b) to determine the meaning of the provision:
(i) if the provision is ambiguous or obscure, or
...
21 As Spigelman CJ has noted, this empowering provision depends upon a somewhat value-laden condition, namely that the extrinsic material is in fact "capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision": Harrison v Melhem [2008] NSWCA 67; 72 NSWLR 380 at [12]. That language leaves unresolved the question of the manner in which such assistance is to be derived.
...
22 Beyond those principles, and subject to matters of emphasis and priority, it is clear that "the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself", as noted in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27 at [47]. The passage in the joint reasons in Alcan further stated:
"The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy."
23 Spigelman CJ, writing extra-judicially, said that that approach is entirely consistent with earlier statements in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; 187 CLR 384 at 408 and Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355 at [69]: see Spigelman JJ, "The Intolerable Wrestle: Developments in Statutory Interpretation" (2010) 84 ALJ 822 at 828-829; ...
62In this case the word requiring construction is "appoint" in s 153(3) and the observations in Shannongrove at [19] and [21] are particularly apposite. The first contention raised is who pays the auditor appointed by the NSWALC pursuant to s 153(3). GLALC's counsel argued that if the NSWALC paid Mr Hickey's fees it would accept his services and that is an obligation which falls on the NSWALC. GLALC's counsel referred to the overall scheme of the ALR Act. A large number of these provisions are identified in the legislation section above. The purpose of doing so was to support its submission that the NSWALC is required by the ALR Act to undertake important oversight functions of the financial affairs of LALCs, as identified in s 106(3)(b) (assistance with LALC accounts), s 158(1) (the NSWALC to approve budget of each LALC), s 158(3) (budget of LALC required to be submitted to NSWALC to include funding details), s 159 (NSWALC quarterly and six months reports to the Minister) and s 160 (NSWALC may give directions to LALC regarding accounting). This was said to support its argument that the appointment of the auditor by the NSWALC was for the purposes of the NSWALC not the GLALC. The responsibility to pay therefore rested on the NSWALC.
63In contrary submissions, the NSWALC emphasised the provisions of the ALR Act which it submitted demonstrated the autonomous nature of LALCs and their responsibilities in meeting their financial obligations imposed under s 153, inter alia. This was to support its submission that payment of the appointed auditor was the GLALC's responsibility.
64The ALR Act establishes a scheme whereby LALCs are autonomous in their day to day operations with substantial responsibilities to acquire land, hold and manage assets, and ensure financial stewardship of those assets is achieved as specified in s 52. The preparation of community, business and land plans is an important responsibility of LALCs under s 82 and s 83. A LALC must establish an account and ensure its proper management as required by s 152 and prepare a budget to be submitted to the NSWALC for approval under s 158. Oversight of and assistance to LALCs by the NSWALC is also required. The functions of the NSWALC in relation to LALCs identified in s 106(3) include managing the affairs of a LALC with its agreement, assisting with compliance with the ALR Act in relation to account keeping, assisting with the preparation of community land and business plans, approving community land and business plans, and assisting in the conduct of elections, inter alia. Section 106(8) specifies functions of the NSWALC relating to financial stewardship. These functions are a mixture of overseeing of and assistance in the activities of LALCs in various areas in relation to financial management and business planning.
65Part of the statutory responsibility of the NSWALC includes in s 153(3) the appointment of an auditor to audit the financial statements of a LALC. Apart from the requirement in cl 95 of the Regulation that an auditor be appointed after a public tender process, as occurred in this case, the ALR Act is silent on how the appointed auditor is to discharge his or her function. The manner envisaged for payment of the auditor by the NSWALC in the instrument of appointment is through a service agreement to be entered into between the auditor and the relevant LALC (cl 23). Other provisions in that document limit the amount of fees the auditor can charge (cl 7.2). Clause 11 identifies the numerous circumstances in which the auditor's appointment can be revoked and include failing to comply with the instrument of appointment and overcharging.
66All further obligations in s 153 fall on the GLALC. Under subsection (1) proper accounts and records of its operations must be maintained. Financial statements complying with statutory standards are required of the GLALC under subsections (2) and (2A). Financial statements must be sent to the appointed auditor for verification under s 153(3) within the time frame specified in subsection (4). Under subsection (5) audited financial statements must be furnished by the GLALC to the NSWALC within a specified timeframe. The content of the audited financial statements to the NSWALC is further spelled out in subsection (6). The auditing services provided are to the GLALC not the NSWALC in that the auditing work is of the GLALC's financial statements and is necessary in order for it to meet its statutory obligations in subsection (5). As the NSWALC submitted the appointment of the auditor is not to conduct an audit on behalf of the NSWALC.
67Before the amendments to the ALR Act in 2001, the GLALC appointed an auditor as required under s 32(3) to audit its accounts from a list approved by the NSWALC prepared in accordance with (then) cl 90 of the Aboriginal Land Rights Regulation 1996. Section 32 also did not spell out who paid the auditor. I was informed that under s 32 of the ALR Act the LALCs paid their respective auditors. The scheme in s 32 is very similar to s 153 but for the change in the manner of appointment of an auditor in s 153(3).
68The change in the statutory scheme in 2001 results in the NSWALC appointing an auditor to a LALC under s 153(3). The provision of auditing services continues to be to the LALC. That the appointment of the auditor is by the NSWALC does not mean that payment follows that event, contrary to the GLALC submission that this would be what is normally expected. Given the specific statutory arrangements under the ALR Act it is hard to say what is a normal arrangement in that any arrangement must be interpreted in light of the ALR Act. A distinction was sought to be drawn by the GLALC with companies required to provide audited financial accounts under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). While it is true that a company appoints an auditor and pays for that service, an important consideration is that it is the company's accounts that are audited. The entity whose accounts are audited pays the auditor. I do not think that in this case the statutory scheme in s 153, which largely imposes requirements on a LALC, breaks that nexus between the auditor and the recipient of the auditing service paying for it. The fact that the audited financial statement must be sent to the NSWALC under s 153(5) also does not give the NSWALC greater ownership of the auditing process suggesting it should pay for a service it does not receive. The obligation to have audited accounts falls squarely on the GLALC under s 153.
69Under s 155 the NSWALC must appoint a special auditor to a LALC upon a request by a LALC. The GLALC submitted that if the LALC is not under an implied duty to pay, this is likely to undermine the request by LALCs that the NSWALC appoint a special auditor. I have to say the purpose of s 155 is not clear to me and I do not find it has any bearing on interpreting the clearly articulated scheme in s 153.
70Nothing in the general oversight functions of the NSWALC in s 106(3) and (8), s 158, s 159 and s 160 suggests a different statutory construction to s 153(3) should be adopted. Section 106 sets out the various functions of the NSWALC and includes financial stewardship in subsection (8). Section 158 concerns the obligation of LALCs to prepare a detailed budget which the NSWALC must approve. The GLALC referred to the quarterly and six monthly reporting obligation of the NSWALC to the Minister under s 159 in relation to grants made to LALCs as supportive of its case. Section 160 provides discretionary power to the NSWALC to give directions to LALCs in relation to accounting, budgeting and the keeping of financial records. These provisions do not suggest at a broad level a greater level of ownership of the NSWALC in the specific function of appointing an auditor under s 153(3) suggesting it should pay the auditor.
71Sections in the ALR Act provide generally for the payment of money by the NSWALC to LALCs usually on a discretionary basis. Under s 106(8)(e) the granting of funds for the payment of costs and expenses of LALCs can be made. Under s 149(3)(b) payments can be made from the NSWALC Account to meet expenditure incurred by the NSWALC in the administration of the ALR Act which could include a payment to a LALC. That there are general powers to grant money to LALCs does not advance the construction of s 153(3). Under s 163(4) despite the NSWALC ceasing to pay funds to a LALC it may in its discretion cover expenses incurred by a LALC. That a specific arrangement for funding by the NSWALC on a discretionary basis exists in s 163 does not support the GLALC's submission that by inference the NSWALC must pay the auditor's fee. If anything, this suggests to the contrary that unless specific provision is made requiring the NSWALC to pay for a particular function the LALC is responsible for its own operations and for the payment of any costs necessarily incurred in the conduct of these.
72A related but separate issue, the second raised by the GLALC, is whether the appointment of Mr Hickey under s 153(3) by the NSWALC can be, and was, conditional. There is nothing expressly to that effect in the section. Different views were expressed about when the appointment occurred and whether the letter of 8 March 2013 and the instrument of appointment constituted the appointment of Mr Hickey in the terms (according to the NSWALC) or conditions (according to the GLALC) identified in the letter. Given the agreement that these documents were sent to Mr Hickey, and in the absence of any other evidence of his appointment, I agree with the GLALC's submissions that this letter and the instrument constitute the appointment of Mr Hickey. Although not strictly necessary to resolve this issue by recourse to authority, I note that GLALC's counsel referred to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQOY [2012] FCAFC 131; (2012) 206 FCR 25 confirming Finn J at first instance in Semunigus v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 422 that a decision is made when it is communicated to someone. That decision was in the context of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal which is likely to have a more formalised system for communicating final decisions than the ALR Act, but supports GLALC's position by analogy. I note that the Interpretation Act Pt 7 titled Exercise of statutory functions identifies in s 46 that appointments may be made by name or office but does not specify a particular form or manner for doing so. Section 47 provides that statutory powers of appointment confer implied powers to remove or suspend an appointed person.
73The letter dated 8 March 2013 states expressly that the appointment is conditional on a services agreement being entered into with the GLALC, as does cl 23 of the instrument of appointment. I consider that these documents were intended to specify how Mr Hickey was to carry out that appointment but do not create a legal precondition to his appointment. This is not mere surplusage contrary to NSWALC's submissions but does not amount to a conditional appointment in the sense identified by the GLALC, namely that the failure to comply with one of the terms of the instrument invalidates the appointment made on 8 March 2013.
74There is no express or implied limit on the appointment power in s 153(3) conferred under the ALR Act. I consider it is within the power of the NSWALC under s 153(3) to appoint an auditor and as part of that process specify how that function is to be discharged through the provision of terms, provided these are consistent with the objects of the ALR Act and the NSWALC's functions. The terms of the statutory appointment sent to Mr Hickey clearly do that as they provide for the exercise of that function in a professional manner. The separate services agreement is functionally necessary to effect the audit of the financial statements as the ALR Act requires of LALCs.
75As a necessary exercise of the appointment function I infer that the ALR Act does permit the NSWALC to appoint an auditor requiring fulfilment of specified terms in the conduct of his or her duties, which the auditor agrees to in accepting an appointment. That agreement is between the NSWALC and the auditor and was effected on 8 March 2013. It does not render the appointment conditional on an event occurring later whether on or after 8 March 2013.
76The NSWALC referred to the previous provision in the ALR Act, s 32, and the recommendations in the ICAC discussion paper "Preventing Corruption in Aboriginal Land Councils" (February 1997) which identified problems with the auditing of finances of LALCs to support its argument that the auditor was not the NSWALC's auditor. The explanatory notes for the Aboriginal Land Rights Amendment Bill 2001 referred to the changes as responding to the recommendations of an ICAC report, which I infer followed this discussion paper as it has a different name. The GLALC identified that there were several concerns expressed in the ICAC discussion paper in relation to auditing arrangements including the quality of auditors appointed from a list required to be kept by the NSWALC. It submitted that the requirement for a public tender process is directed to ensuring the appointment of quality auditors and was directed at problems with the standing list then kept by the NSWALC as required by cl 90 then in force. Assuming I can have regard to such material for the purposes of statutory construction (in the sense recognised in s 34 of the Interpretation Act of determining the meaning of a provision that is ambiguous or obscure), both submissions are supported by the recommendations in the ICAC discussion paper. Although the ICAC discussion paper is capable of assisting in the process of statutory construction, since both submissions are supported by the recommendations in the ICAC discussion paper it did not assist me in determining which of the parties' arguments I should accept.
77From the correspondence and emails attached to the SOAF it is clear that Mr Hickey has attempted to comply with the terms of the instrument of appointment in seeking to enter into a service agreement and attend on the GLALC. There is no evidence or suggestion that any of the bases for revocation of an appointment specified in cl 11 of the instrument of appointment arise.
78I conclude that no basis for making the first declaration sought has been made out by the GLALC.
79That brings me to the alternative (third) argument raised by the GLALC encapsulated in the second declaration sought, that the appointment was ineffective (at the outset) (first part), or no longer has any effect or operation (second part) given that the service agreement has not been executed by the GLALC. It is practically the case that Mr Hickey cannot proceed with carrying out an audit in the absence of the GLALC entering into the services agreement and, indeed, co-operating in the provision of its financial statements to the auditor, inter alia. Declarations can be made in judicial review proceedings where the breach of a statute has been established. The decision to make a declaration is discretionary. Halsbury's Laws of Australia Online, at [10-2497] Declarations states:
While the jurisdiction to grant a declaration in judicial review is a wide and beneficial power, a superior court has a discretion to withhold such relief. The exercise of the discretion depends upon the requirements of justice in the particular case.
(footnotes omitted)
80The first part of the second declaration asks the Court to declare the appointment of Mr Hickey of no effect when on my earlier reasoning that appointment is otherwise valid. The legal basis for making a declaration has not been established. Further, as the NSWALC submitted, the second declaration supposes that the ability of a LALC to refuse to complete the appointment through refusing to enter the service agreement can displace a once effective appointment, possibly even retrospectively. It is unclear to me how the actions of a LALC, after an appointment has been made by the NSWALC in terms I have held are valid and accepted by Mr Hickey, can in effect legally revoke the appointment. As the NSWALC submitted, no authority or explanation is provided for this proposition and I have not been able to locate any either. The same reasoning also applies to the second part of the declaration sought, that the appointment has become inoperative.
81No basis for making the second declaration sought by the GLALC is established. Accordingly the GLALC is unsuccessful in this application to the Court and the Further Amended Summons will be dismissed.
82Costs generally follow the event in judicial review proceedings, as provided in Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 42.1. I have not heard any submissions on costs at this stage. I will make the usual costs order in the NSWALC's favour unless the parties advise me in writing within seven (7) working days of submissions from the parties seeking alternative orders on costs.