[15] Mr Pitman, the member of the firm of solicitors who had carriage of the present application on behalf of Ms Gallagher, deposed that senior counsel who appeared for her at trial and in the appeal informed him, and he believed, that "the contentions at paragraphs 14 and 15 did not become relevant to the appeal until the Court of Appeal granted leave to amend the notice of appeal to argue the s 365(2)(c)(ii) point" and that "these contentions were not drawn to the attention of the Court of Appeal by reason of unintended oversight." Ms Boylan objected that this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Absent objection, the Court might readily act upon the hearsay evidence of a solicitor based upon information given by counsel who had appeared at the original hearing. In this case, however, Ms Boylan pressed the objection because of circumstances which were submitted to cast doubt upon the cogency of the hearsay evidence. Ms Gallagher did not seek to defuse the issue by obtaining direct evidence from her former senior counsel or from a solicitor who had personal knowledge of the suggested oversight. The Court must therefore rule upon the objection. Ms Gallagher argued that hearsay evidence was made admissible by the provision in UCPR r 430(2) that an affidavit "for use in an application because of default or otherwise for relief, other than final relief, may contain statements based on information and belief if the person making it states the sources of the information and the grounds for the belief." The rule's predecessor, O 41, r 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, allowed hearsay in "interlocutory motions or applications". In Ex parte Britt,[9] McPherson J (as he then was) analysed authorities which drew a distinction between "interlocutory" and "final" applications for various purposes and held that an application was final rather than interlocutory for the purposes of O 41, r 3 if "...the decision of the application will finally dispose of the rights of the parties, not merely as to the subject-matter of the particular application in question but also as to the ultimate dispute between the parties ...".[10] The terms of UCPR r 430(2) differ from O 41, r 3 because the former focuses upon the nature of the relief sought in the application, rather than upon the nature of the application itself. Allowing for that textual change, I would state the applicable test as being that hearsay evidence is not made admissible by r 430 if the grant of the relief claimed in the application would finally dispose of the rights of the parties as to the ultimate dispute between the parties, rather than merely as to the subject matter of the application itself. Applying that test, Mr Pitman's evidence is not admissible. Ms Gallagher's application seeks "final relief" because the proposed orders dismissing the appeal and giving judgment in Ms Gallagher's favour would resolve the ultimate dispute as to the parties' rights; the claimed "correction" to the existing final orders would "deal directly with the rights in contest in the action". There is no absolute bar to a further application under r 388, but it would be inconsistent with r 430 itself to hold that, merely because a "corrected" order is amenable to further correction in the exceptional circumstances described in r 388, the order does not amount to "final relief"; if that were the test, no order would amount to "final relief" because all orders are similarly amenable to subsequent "correction". That distinguishes this case from decisions such as Meddings v Council of the City of the Gold Coast, in which an order refusing an application to extend a limitation period was held to be interlocutory on the ground that there remained a right to make a further application of the same kind. In my opinion, an application to "correct" final orders by substituting orders which resolve the underlying dispute in a different way is necessarily an application for "final relief" for the purposes of r 430.