The $69m demand
119 I will turn first to the $69m demand, because in my view the contentions made by the plaintiffs about it are to be accepted, and are dispositive in their favour.
120 It is important to have regard to the specific terms of the liquidators' 30 August 2022 letter of demand.
121 That letter asserted that "[i]n the course of our clients' investigations into the Company's affairs, our clients have identified a number of claims that the Company may have against your clients directly in relation to … [the Business Transfer] … including (without limitation): (a) entering into an unreasonable director-related transaction; (b) entering into an uncommercial transaction; and (c) breaches of directors duties". Having touched on the only single "outstanding debt" that had been identified (the AEMS claim), the letter went on to plead a summary of a case against the directors pursuant to ss 180, 181, 182, 588FDA and 588FB of the Corporations Act.
122 In each case it was asserted that the constituent elements of each cause of action were established.
123 The letter asserted that:
(1) Each of the requirements under s 588FDA had been made out and that accordingly the Business Transfer was an unreasonable director-related transaction.
(2) The Business Transfer was an uncommercial transaction within the meaning of s 588FB and that it was "voidable as against your clients pursuant to [s] 588FE of the Act".
(3) In breach of their duties under ss 180, 181, and 182 of the Act, the directors:
(a) failed to exercise their power as officers of the Company in good faith and in the Company's best interests in entering into the Business Transfer;
(b) failed to prevent their personal interest from conflicting with the duties and obligations that they owed to the Company in entering into the Business Transfer; and
(c) gained a benefit for themselves by the improper use of their position as officers of the Company.
(4) By reason of those breaches, the directors were "personally liable to compensate the Company … pursuant to [ss] 1317H and 1324 of the Act …"
(5) As a result of those contraventions, the liquidators had a claim against the directors in the sum of $69m.
(6) The liquidators reserved their right to report the plaintiffs to ASIC "for contraventions of the Act"
124 As was submitted by the plaintiffs, they were allegations and claims - very serious ones - for which no proper foundation was, or has been, proffered.
125 It has long been the case that "court proceedings may not be used or threatened for the purpose of obtaining for the person so using or threatening them some collateral advantage to himself, and not for the purpose for which such proceedings are properly designed and exist; and a party so using or threatening proceedings will be liable to be held guilty of abusing the process of the court and therefore disqualified from invoking the powers of the court by proceedings he has abused". See In re Majory [1955] Ch 600 at 623-24 (Lord Evershed), cited with approval by Mason CJ and Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ in Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 528.
126 Further, as Ward J (as her Honour then was) said in Accord Pacific Holdings v Accord Pacific Land Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 707 at [53] (a case concerning an application to set aside examination summonses):
There is general authority that the use of court process to secure a collateral advantage by way of a commercial settlement or compromise of a claim before trial, where it can be said that the proceedings are not instituted to vindicate a genuinely asserted right, may be an abuse of process (White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169).
127 Re Sheahan & Lock (as liquidator of Valofo Pty Ltd (in liq)) [2010] NSWSC 1255 at [35] was another examination summons case. Justice Palmer observed that whether or not liquidators have abused the process of an examination summons "depends upon the same considerations as to whether they have abused any other litigious process which they might have commenced in the course of a liquidation: is the liquidator using the process, whatever it is, for a purpose for which it was not intended or designed or does the liquidator propose not to carry that process to its conclusion, but simply to use it as a means of coercion or to achieve a collateral purpose?"
128 His Honour also referred to the decision of Hetyey JR in Re KASO (2018) 133 ACSR 473; [2018] VSC 774 at [22] for the proposition that use of a court's processes to inflict financial or other collateral harm will always be improper.
129 In that case, Hetyey JR also referred to the decision of Gardiner AsJ in Re DW Marketing Pty Ltd (in liq) [2009] VSC 663, where there was an unjustifiable demand for payment of an amount (comprising a specified sum, together with interest, costs and the expenses of the liquidation), coupled with the threat that if such demand was not met examinations would be resumed and directors would be examined about various matters including those going to possible criminal liability.
130 In this case, it seems to me a clear abuse of process to make what was, on any view, an unjustified demand for the payment of $69m, in circumstances where the liquidators insist, even now, that "it would have been quite obvious to [the plaintiffs] that the claim would be limited to the quantum of proven debts at the time of the transfer of the Billi Business" (which they said was $497,723.20). Quite how it is said that a formal demand for $69m, with an accompanying threat of legal proceedings and a reporting of the alleged contraventions to ASIC if the amount was not promptly paid, was supposed to be read as being a demand for $497,723 was not adequately explained.
131 Mr MacKinnon was asked in cross-examination what the justification for demanding $69m was. He replied: "… until I can work out what the creditors are - if I was to claim for a dollar, a creditor might have a go at me and say, 'Well, hold on, why didn't you claim for more. There's - there's $5 million of creditors that turn up'. If there's $20 million of creditors turn up, and I only claim for 500,000 - being the AEMS' debt - they could have criticised me as well."
132 Mr MacKinnon was also asked "So your position was that the demand was the $500,000?" He answered: "No. My demand was for 69 million until I determined the creditors of the company".
133 Those answers, and the submission advanced on behalf of the liquidators in closing submissions, suggest that the liquidators believed and still believe that it is appropriate to issue letters of demand by way of ambit claims. That is assuredly not so.
134 The collateral purpose of the demand is tolerably clear.
135 FAL Lawyers wrote to Hall & Wilcox on 27 September 2022 in response to letters written on behalf of each of the plaintiffs insisting on an explanation of the $69m demand, suggesting that "[i]n the interests [of] minimising the costs of the parties and narrowing the issues in dispute, we are instructed that our client is willing to attend a meeting with your office and your clients … [for] the purpose of … identify[ing] the key issues in dispute and explor[ing] a pathway to resolving matters in the most commercial and efficient manner in the interests of creditors of the Company". That does rather suggest that at least one main purpose of the demand was to facilitate a commercial resolution.
136 Further, Mr MacKinnon deposed that it was his "usual practice" and "common practice in the industry, for liquidators to identify potential claims at an early stage in a liquidation, and issue letters of demand in respect of them" and that in his experience "it is not uncommon for the scope and even the nature of … claims [against directors] to alter between the time of demand and the time that proceedings (if any) are issued, due to discussions with and information and documents received from the directors or other potential defendants, and the development of investigations in the liquidation".
137 The liquidators repeated this position in their counsel's written closing submissions. See paragraph [98] above. They went so far as to contend that such "standard practice" is reflected in IPR s 70-40 (which provides that liquidators are to provide a report to creditors containing, among other things, the estimated amounts of assets and liabilities of the company and possible recovery actions).
138 In my view, the evidence given by Mr MacKinnon at paragraphs [88]-[89] above and the submissions by the liquidators' counsel recorded at paragraph [101] above misconceive the nature of their obligations.
139 Liquidators are officers of the court. They are subject to its supervision. Like legal practitioners, they are bound by certain obligations. They also have special responsibilities under the Corporations Act.
140 Whether liquidators carry the obligations of a model litigant is not clear. In Viscariello v Macks (2014) 103 ASCR 542; [2014] SASC 189 at [641] Kourakis CJ said that they do. In Re St Gregory's Armenian School at [32], Brereton J held that it "goes too far" to call them model litigants within the meaning of relevant Legal Services Directions, because:
Courts expect liquidators to make commercial judgments and to act commercially, and to pursue vigorously the interests of the company. Liquidators have a private interest apart from the public good - not their own personal interest, but that of the creditors or contributories. It adds an unnecessary layer to the inquiry into whether there is "cause shown" to superimpose an expectation that the liquidator be a model litigant.
141 Although his Honour went on to say, "[t]hat is not to say that a liquidator's conduct in litigation may not be relevant to a judgment as to whether there is 'cause shown'".
142 It is not necessary to resolve that debate for the purposes of this application. The question of whether cause is shown is to be addressed by reference to the nature of the impugned conduct.
143 Because liquidators are officers of the court it is axiomatic that they should not make demands for the payment of large sums of monies, founded on asserted causes of action for which there is no proper basis. The litany of matters sought to be invoked now to justify the $69m demand listed at paragraph [101] above only make matters worse, because they do not, individually or collectively, form a proper or sufficient basis for the making of the demands in the 30 August 2022 letter. The obligation to identify "possible recovery actions" required by the IPSC does not, as the liquidators submissions seem to suggest, mean that they can make serious but purely speculative allegations (here, against directors under multiple provisions of the Corporations Act) in the hope that they may bear fruit or drive the directors to the bargaining table.
144 It is of course true, as McPherson and Pincus JJA, and Derrington J said in Re Qintex Group Management Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [1997] 2 Qd R 91 at 94-95, that liquidators "when they are appointed labour under the particular disability of not knowing as much about the affairs of the company as former directors and others, and that they often cannot obtain reliable information about suspicious transactions" and that they may be confronted with information in the books and records of the company that contain "contrived explanations" or "distortion[s] by persons not anxious to disclose what they really know about events that took place when they were in charge of the company's affairs". It is also sometimes the case that directors "are often unwilling and unco-operative witnesses especially in matters in which they are the target of proceedings brought by the liquidator". And as the court also said in that case, "[f]ew other litigants suffer to that disadvantage, or to the same extent, as liquidators". See also Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd v Barber (1994) 48 FCR 301 at 306 (Beaumont, Spender and Cooper JJ).
145 But the fact that liquidators are often placed in that difficult position is a reason that they are conferred with special powers, for example, to summons directors to give evidence. It does not mean that they are excused from compliance with rules applicable to all officers of the court, including rules and standards that govern the threat, initiation and conduct of legal proceedings. And it does not mean, as the cases make clear, that they can act oppressively or harshly, by seeking to exert pressure, with the spectre of legal costs, or causing undue embarrassment and the like (including here, by making a threat to "report" the contraventions to ASIC).
146 The liquidators conceded in counsel's written closing submissions that "they accept that an alternative approach they could fairly have taken would be to cite the interim value of the potential claim as the total of known unrelated creditors to date, with the caveat that that amount could increase if and when more unpaid creditors came to light". But that is not, with great respect, "an alternative approach". If by "potential claim" the liquidators meant a claim which could reasonably and properly be made consistently with a liquidator's duty as an officer of the court, then that is not an "alternative approach" to take. It is the only approach, for reasons which I trust I have adequately explained.
147 I should also say, if it matters, that I also accept the submission made on behalf of the directors that the liquidators did not, and have not, explained how the alleged claims against the directors can be reconciled with the fact that Allibi sold its business as the trustee of the Billi Unit Trust and distributed the proceeds to the beneficiaries of the trust.
148 The next question is whether the conduct by the liquidators identified above warrants their removal.
149 In my view, it does.
150 I have no doubt that Mr MacKinnon's views about the $69m demand, and the "common industry practice" about what I have called "ambit claims" were honestly and sincerely held, and that he answered the questions put to him in the witness box honestly. But his views about the matter, for the reasons I have set out above, were plainly wrong and his actions (and those of Mr Giasoumi) in making and persisting (to this day) with the demand were inconsistent with their obligations as officers of the court.
151 As Neuberger J said in the passage quoted at paragraph [81] above that "… if a liquidator has been generally effective and honest, the court must think carefully before deciding to remove him and replace him" and that "[i]t should not be seen to be easy to remove a liquidator merely because it can be shown that in one, or possibly more than one, respect his conduct has fallen short of ideal". And a judge does, of course, consider - and I have considered - the possible effect that an order for removal may have on the professional reputation of the liquidators.
152 In the circumstances of this case, however, I am satisfied that proper cause for removal has been shown, and that such an order should be made to maintain confidence in the integrity of the administration. I would also found the order on the basis that an order for removal is appropriate because the reasonable bystander would, on reasonable grounds, have lost confidence in the liquidators, in circumstances where their actions, in demanding damages in the sum of $69m founded on causes of action that were without a proper foundation, reveal that they lacked, and still lack, a sufficient understanding about a matter fundamental to their role.
153 The liquidators submitted that "[n]o ground for removal or any relief is shown with respect to the [$69m] demand". They said that "[r]easonable minds can vary amongst professionals as to the course each would take in a particular situation"; that "[t]here is not one single reasonable path to take; that they "have brought an independent, experienced mind to bear in investigating the Company's affairs and evaluating the evidence" and that "[i]t is clear they had a proper basis to form the views that they did, and they acted accordingly and in furtherance of their duties".
154 It will be obvious from what I have said that I emphatically disagree.