Frederick Paval ENRIQUEZ v Regina

Applicant's Submissions on Sentence 20The applicant agreed with the facts to which I have just made reference. On sentence, he gave evidence himself and relied upon the contents of a report from a clinical psychologist, Mr Tim Watson-Munro. As well, submissions were made on his behalf by his counsel. 21The applicant in his evidence accepted his responsibility for what occurred and proffered publicly an apology to TF. He denied any memory of what had happened that night, but accepted that by reason of the fact that his DNA was found in semen detected in swabs taken from TF, that he was the person who had undertaken the assault. 22He gave evidence to the sentencing Judge that he had a drug problem, that for a period of about two years leading up to the offence he had been using ice. However, he made it clear that he was not using his drug taking as a reason for the reduction in his culpability for the offence. 23It would appear from Mr Watson-Munro's report that the applicant had long-standing symptoms of depression, anxiety and low self-esteem and was a person who had, for many year prior to this offence, a long-standing gambling addiction. 24Mr Watson-Munro concluded his report in these terms: "It is clear that he has been suffering from a broad band of symptoms reflective of an Adjustment Disorder according to DSM-IV TR criteria. In addition, he has previous suffered from severe Substance Abuse Disorder involving primarily 'Ice' which is now in partial remission as well as a Gambling Addiction in the past. ... His current situation and his remorse are aggravating his symptoms of depression, anxiety and self-esteem." 25The following subjective matters were before the sentencing Judge. The applicant was born in the Philippines in March 1970. He has two sisters who live in the United States of America. He came to Australia at the beginning of Year 5 at the age of 11 and had difficulty making the necessary cultural adjustment, largely because he spoke no English and he was exposed to a divergent society. He continued his schooling until he completed his HSC at Westfield High School. He was not an academic student but gained employment after completing school and remained employed in a number of jobs over the years until about 6 months prior to his arrest. By that time, he found it impossible to remain at work because of his drug addiction. 26During the sentencing hearing, his former partner, Ms Bell, with whom he had two sons, who were 16 and 15 at the time, gave evidence. Although their relationship had long since ceased, she remained supportive of the applicant and visited him regularly in jail, including taking his mother and his sons to visit him. 27Ms Bell gave compelling evidence about the applicant's remorse, and his continuing attempts to be a father to his teenage children. 28In the course of submissions, the sentencing judge was informed that after his initial arrest, the applicant had been in custody from 28 October 2009 to 15 February 2010, when he was released on bail. He remained on bail until he was rearrested for a breach of conditions of bail on 2 August 2010. He remained in custody at all times after that re-arrest. 29The effect of this broken pre-sentence custodial history was that the sentence was backdated to reflect his time spent in custody. It was for that reason that her Honour, without complaint in this Court or below, fixed the commencement date of the applicant's sentence as being 14 April 2010.

Other Subjective Matters 30The applicant was born on 20 March 1970 and was aged 39 at the time of the offence. 31He had a history of minor crimes. These minor crimes were dealt with by way of fines, an order for compensation, and a bond for a period of 9 months with respect to a motor traffic offence. 32The applicant told Mr Watson-Munro that he had been drug free after he was bailed on 15 February 2010, and claimed to Mr Watson-Munro that he had remained drug free during the time he had been returned to custody.

Remarks on Sentencing 33The sentencing Judge found that the applicant's criminal behaviour was reprehensible. In dealing with the seriousness of the criminality, her Honour noted that the offence had occurred in TF's home, and that, because of the relationship that existed with the applicant as her stepfather, TF was under his authority because he had been a person who had been the head of the household. The sentencing Judge found that ordinarily TF was required to do what she was told by the applicant in the normal course of the family situation. This was an abuse of trust. 34Her Honour found that the applicant knew that there was no adult in the house at the time he visited the house to engage in the conduct that he did. The sentencing Judge found that in all of the circumstances TF was a vulnerable person. 35Her Honour concluded that the offence was carried out for the applicant's own sexual gratification and for no other reason. She concluded that the offence fell within the mid-range of offences. 36Her Honour accepted that the applicant had long-standing symptoms of depression, anxiety and low self-esteem but concluded that these were not matters that would make the applicant a person for whom less weight should be given to the principle of general deterrence. 37Her Honour noted that the applicant was not a person of previous good character by reason of his criminal history. However, she found that that record did not aggravate the offence, but rather tempered any leniency to which the applicant would otherwise be entitled. 38In summary, she said of the applicant's offence: "This appears to be an opportunistic offence to prey upon his step-daughter for his own sexual gratification in circumstances where aid was not readily available to her had she called out for help." 39Her Honour noted that the applicant had entered a plea of guilty, but concluded, in line with the Crown's submissions, that it had not been entered at the first available opportunity but nevertheless still had significant utilitarian value. She allowed a 15 per cent discount to the applicant by reason of that plea. 40She found that the applicant was remorseful and contrite and that he had good prospects of rehabilitation that would require attendance at drug and gambling counselling to ensure the risk of relapse was minimised. 41Her Honour concluded that there was a need to ensure that the penalty imposed reflected not just the offence to which the applicant had pleaded guilty but also to the offence that was placed on the Form 1. 42Finally, her Honour found special circumstances by reason of the applicant's age, the fact that he was being held in custody for the first time and that he would need a lengthier than normal period of supervised parole to assist with his rehabilitation.

Grounds of Appeal 43Four grounds were contained in the Notice of Grounds of Appeal filed by the applicant. They were: (1)that her Honour erred in finding that the sentences were above mid-range in terms of seriousness; (2)that her Honour made findings of fact which were not based on any evidence; (3)that her Honour made a finding that the applicant was not a person of good character and was therefore not entitled to leniency on that basis; (4)that both the head sentence and the non-parole period were excessive.

Ground 1 - Erroneous Finding on Objective Seriousness 44This Ground, which asserted that the learned sentencing Judge had found, erroneously, that the applicant's criminality was above the mid-range of seriousness, was abandoned at the hearing of the appeal. 45This was unsurprising since her Honour made no such finding. 46The Ground requires no further consideration.

Ground 2 - Findings of Fact not based on any Evidence 47The applicant submits that included in her Honour's Remarks on Sentence, are the following remarks, which were not supported by any evidence before the sentencing Judge: "This young girl will suffer for the rest of her life from the vile actions of this offender. ... The impact upon her in later life is likely to be an inability to trust men, to form satisfactory relationships and it may well impact upon her ability to bond with her own children. All through no fault of her own." 48It was submitted that, in short, there was no evidence to support any of these future possibilities. It may be accepted that there was no specific evidence provided with respect to TF that would support these conclusions. 49However, having regard to the nature of this offence, and the well-known effects of an offence of this kind on the development of teenagers and young adults, I think that it was open to her Honour to draw on her general experience of the consequences of an offence of this kind to raise any of these matters as a prospect for TF in the future. 50Her Honour's approach accords with, and is supported by, the judgment of this Court in R v Scott [2003] NSWCCA 28 at [19]. See also R v Allpass (1993) 72 A Crim R 561 at 565. 51I can detect no error in her Honour referring in such terms to the possible outcome of the criminal conduct upon TF's future psychological well being. 52I would not uphold the appeal on this Ground.

Ground 3 - Past Character 53The applicant submitted that the conclusion that the applicant was "not a person of otherwise good character" was not fairly open to the sentencing Judge because such remarks were based on his prior criminal history, which was, it was submitted, a minor one. 54The applicant submitted that the offences of which he had been convicted, in the past, were "... not of such a nature nor of such magnitude as to disentitle him from leniency." The applicant submitted that this was an error in the sentencing process. 55It seems to me that what her Honour was doing in making these remarks, was drawing to attention to the fact that under s 21A(3)(f) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, a matter to be taken into account in mitigation of penalty is the previous good character of any offender. What her Honour was remarking was that, because the applicant was not of previous good character because he had a criminal record, there was no basis upon which there could be any mitigation of penalty by reason of this feature. She specifically noted that his past criminal history did not aggravate the offence. 56I can detect no error in her Honour's dealing with this issue. 57I would not uphold the appeal on this Ground.

Ground 4 - Manifest Excess 58It was submitted that both the non-parole period and the balance of term were manifestly excessive. This submission in large part relied upon statistics from the Judicial Commission of NSW. 59Considerable circumspection is necessary in taking into account and relying upon, statistics of the kind that the applicant provides. In particular, with offences against s 61J of the Crimes Act, there is, commonly, a significant variation between the facts and objective criminality of each offence. 60It is necessary for this Court when considering a particular sentence to have specific regard to the individual features which underpin the particular sentence. Obviously, the objective seriousness of the criminality involved and the culpability of the offender assume principal importance. 61As the sentencing Judge correctly noted, this was a serious offence. There were a number of aggravating factors relating to TF's age, the fact that she was in her own home, the fact that the applicant knew that there would be no adult present and that accordingly, TF was vulnerable at the time. The previous familial relationship of stepfather and stepdaughter also placed TF in a vulnerable position when compared with the applicant. The conduct of the applicant amounted to a breach of trust. 62The offence that the sentencing Judge was asked to take into account on the Form 1 was similarly a very serious attempt at an aggravated sexual assault. If nothing else, TF's response to this attempt would have placed the applicant fairly on notice that what he was doing was wrong and that TF was having no part in any of it. 63But the applicant was not deterred, he returned and then perpetrated what is, on the agreed facts, a violent attack and sexual assault on TF. 64Accepting that the applicant has good prospects of rehabilitation, I am unable to conclude that the sentence imposed by the learned sentencing Judge was so far outside the appropriate range as to justify the description "manifestly excessive" and that there must therefore have been a failure to correctly exercise the sentencing discretion. 65Nor am I persuaded that any lesser sentence is warranted as a matter of law: s 6(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1912. 66I would not uphold the appeal on this Ground.

Orders 67I propose the following orders: (1)Leave to appeal granted (2)Appeal dismissed.

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