Issues on the application
22 Mr Foti's application is made under s 447A of the Act. That section is in the following terms:
"(1) The Court may make such order as it thinks appropriate about how this Part is to operate in relation to a particular company.
(2) For example, if the Court is satisfied that the administration of a company should end:
(a) because the company is solvent; or
(b) because provisions of this Part are being abused; or
(c) for some other reason;
the Court may order under subsection (1) that the administration is to end.
(3) An order may be made subject to conditions.
(4) An order may be made on the application of:
(a) the company; or
(b) a creditor of the company; or
(c) in the case of a company under administration - the administrator of the company; or
(d) in the case of a company that has executed a deed of company arrangement - the deed's administrator; or
(e) ASIC; or
(f) any other interested person."
23 The power in s 447A(1) is a broad power. I refer to Cawthorn v Keira Constructions Pty Ltd (1994) 33 NSWLR 607; Milankov Nominees Pty Ltd v Roycol Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 378 which cases dealt with s 447A as it was in the Corporations Law.
24 Section 447A(2) provides an example of an order that may be made under s 447A(1). The Court may order that the administration of a company is to end, and the circumstances in which the Court may make such an order are set out in s 447A(2). One such case is where the Court is satisfied that a provision of Part 5.3A of the Act is being abused. In this case, Mr Foti claims that the provision of Part 5.3A which is being abused is the provision which gives a chargee the power to appoint an administrator (s 436C). Mr Foti claims that that provision is being abused because Mr Salisbury exercised the power for an improper purpose. Mr Foti claims that an improper purpose is one which is foreign to the purposes which lie behind the appointment of an administrator under Part 5.3A.
25 The purposes which lie behind the appointment of an administrator are to be gleaned from a consideration of Part 5.3A as a whole. Section 435A is of particular importance. That section is in the following terms:
"The object of this Part is to provide for the business, property and affairs of an insolvent company to be administered in a way that:
(a) maximises the chances of the company, or as much as possible of its business, continuing in existence; or
(b) if it is not possible for the company or its business to continue in existence - results in a better return for the company's creditors and members than would result from an immediate winding up of the company."
26 It should also be borne in mind that the effect of an administration is to place the fate of the company in the hands of the company's creditors. They may decide that the company will enter into a deed of company arrangement or that the administration will end or that the company will be wound up (s 439C). Voting by related creditors may be supervised by the Court (s 600A).
27 Mr Foti accepts that he carries the onus of establishing that Mr Salisbury had an improper purpose in appointing the administrators. He acknowledges that there is no direct evidence of that fact and he asks the Court to draw an inference of an improper purpose. Both parties referred to the decision of the High Court in Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 ("Williams v Spautz"). The case is not directly on point, but it does contain an analysis of the common law doctrine of abuse of process where the abuse is said to be the bringing of proceedings for a collateral purpose. Mr Foti accepts that he must show not only that Mr Salisbury had an improper purpose, but also that it was his predominant purpose.
28 Before examining the evidence, it is convenient to consider some of the cases which have addressed the circumstances in which the Court will find that an administrator was appointed for an improper purpose.
29 In Aloridge Pty Ltd (prov liq apptd) v Christianos (1994) 13 ACSR 99, Burchett J made an order under s 447A of the Act that the administration of a company end. A provisional liquidator had been appointed to the company and he was actively pursuing a number of disputes on behalf of the company, including a dispute about the charge held by the person who had appointed the administrator. In light of the facts, Burchett J drew the inference that the appointment of an administrator was made not for the purposes for which the Act makes provision, "but in order to wrest control of the affairs of the company away from the provisional liquidator in the hope that the administrator might prove more compliant" (at 102). In determining the purposes for the appointment of an administrator, Burchett J had regard to the object of Part 5.3A set out in s 435A.
30 In Spacorp Australia Pty Ltd v Fitzgerald (2001) 19 ACLC 979, Beach J made an order bringing the administration of a company to an end. He concluded that the action of a creditor of the company in appointing administrators was an abuse of process. The creditor had served a statutory demand on the company pursuant to s 459E of the Corporations Law. On an application by the company, the statutory demand was set aside. The creditor appealed and was successful. The company appealed to the Court of Appeal, and the time for compliance with the statutory demand was extended pending the determination of the appeal. At that point, the creditor appointed administrators to the company. Beach J found that, in the circumstances, the appointment of administrators was an abuse of process. His Honour said (at 982 [28]):
"Having chosen to serve a statutory notice on Spacorp with a view to having it wound up and been thwarted in the way it has, I think that it was totally inappropriate for Myer to seek then to attain its objective by appointing administrators. All the more so when it was well aware of the fact that the appeal was on foot and that the Court of Appeal had stayed the time for compliance with the statutory notice until after the hearing and determination of the appeal."
31 In Blacktown City Council v Macarthur Telecommunications Pty Ltd (admins apptd) (2004) 47 ACSR 391, Barrett J made an order that the administration of a company end forthwith. Barrett J referred to the decision of the High Court in Williams v Spautz and said that a consideration of purpose meant that it was appropriate to examine first the proper purposes of Part 5.3A of the Act. He referred to s 435A and said (at 396 [19]):
"But that is a broad statement only. Examination of Part 5.3A as a whole shows that there are several purposes which together contribute to the widely stated object. The provisions imposing the various moratoriums show that there is a purpose of allowing time for unpressured but reasonably prompt consideration of possible reconstruction possibilities. The provisions as to creditors meetings and creditor decision-making, including those concerning deeds of company arrangement, show that there is a purpose of allowing reconstruction possibilities to be pursued in such a way that, if creditors so desire, a legacy of debt may be left behind and winding up, which would normally be the product of an intolerable debt burden, may be avoided. Implicit in that, of course, is the proposition that the company will thereby be permitted to return to the mainstream of commercial life. Another purpose is that if the company is not capable of returning to the mainstream of commercial life, there will be some better outcome for creditors than that available in an immediate winding up. The importance of keeping that purpose in mind, in a case such as the present, was emphasised by Sundberg J in Dallinger v Halcha Holdings Pty Ltd (1995) 60 FCR 594; 134 ALR 178; 18 ACSR 835."
32 Barrett J's reasons for making the order he did in that case are set out in the following passage (at 397 [21]):
"My assessment of matters is that the administration in general and the deed proposal in particular were engineered by Mr Cullen in a clear and deliberate, but not subtle, attempt to stave off the District Court hearing by bringing the statutory stay of proceedings under s 440D into play and to provide a legal framework into which he, his accountant and his solicitor would become the sole effective decision-makers in a process which, while ostensibly holding out some theoretical benefit of modest proportions to creditors, is really designed to forestall the obvious and inevitable fate of insolvent winding up, in which the conduct of Mr Cullen will come under scrutiny by reference to the insolvent trading provisions. There is, at best, mere lip service to the purposes of Part 5.3A, the overriding purpose and motivation being the avoidance technique to which I have referred. In particular, there is not and could not be any real purpose of rehabilitating the company as a commercial concern. Nor can improved returns to creditors through the proposed deed of company arrangement be regarded as anything but purely speculative."
33 In St Leonards Property Pty Ltd v Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd (admins apptd) (2004) 50 ACSR 443, Barrett J made an order bringing the administration of a company to an end. The improper purpose of the director and appointor in that case was to manipulate the "relation-back day" to his benefit. I should say at this point that counsel for Mr Foti did not seek to argue that Mr Salisbury's purpose was one involving the manipulation of the relation-back day.
34 Mr Foti claims that Mr Salisbury had two improper purposes in appointing the administrators. As I have said, he acknowledges that, if one is made out, it must be the predominant purpose, and, if both are made out, then they must be the predominant purposes.
35 First, it is alleged by Mr Foti that Mr Salisbury's purpose in appointing the administrators was to gain control of the company. He submitted that Mr Salisbury seeks to gain control by the share issue which forms part of Mr Salisbury's proposal for a deed of company arrangement. He pointed to the fact that if the share issue proceeds, Mr Salisbury will hold 242,002 of the 242,004 shares forming the issued share capital of the company. I asked counsel for Mr Foti to identify the benefit which would enure to Mr Salisbury if he put himself in this position. He said that Mr Salisbury would then be in a position to take the lion's share of any residual equity in the two apartments.
36 It seems to me that this is a case in which there is no one circumstance which points to a proper or improper purpose. All the circumstances of the case must be considered. I have considered all of the circumstances and I do not think they support a conclusion that Mr Salisbury's purpose in appointing the administrators was to gain control of the company. There is evidence before me that Mr Salisbury considered that the two apartments would not realise anywhere near their true value if they are sold by a liquidator or secured creditor. Experience suggests that there is a reasonable basis for that belief. To purchase the secured debt and to place the company in administration was one way of avoiding that result. Mr Salisbury's proposal for a deed of company arrangement involves him providing funds to the company which would see a return to creditors. Although the proposed return is modest, it has the advantage of being certain in terms of amount and time of payment. As far as the share issue is concerned, it does not seem to me to be at all surprising that Mr Salisbury would insist on some consideration for the money he proposes to advance. On the evidence before me, a share in the company would not be worth the one dollar he proposes to subscribe and, in fact, the shares may prove to be utterly worthless. Furthermore, on the evidence before me, it is highly speculative to say that there will be net equity in the two apartments available to shareholders. At the moment, there are appraisals which are not formal valuations and which were conducted on a "sight unseen" basis and there is uncertainty as to whether Built Environs will establish its claim. In all these circumstances, it seems to me that the evidence does not support a conclusion that Mr Salisbury's purpose, let alone his predominant purpose, in appointing the administrators was to gain control of the company through the issue of shares.
37 Secondly, it is alleged by Mr Foti that Mr Salisbury's purpose in appointing the administrators was to avoid investigations and possible actions by a liquidator in relation to transactions in which he was involved and, in particular, the transaction involving the King William Street property and the transaction involving the Wallaroo land. As I have said, the report of the administrators suggests that there are transactions involving Mr Foti's interests and transactions involving Mr Salisbury's interests which call for further investigation. The possibility of claims by a liquidator against Mr Salisbury calls for careful consideration of his purpose in appointing the administrators.
38 There is no doubt that Mr Salisbury's action in paying out the substantial debt owed to the Bank was a significant step and it was followed by the appointment of the administrators. Mr Foti points to Mr Salisbury's secret negotiations with the bank and the fact that the mediation was occurring at about the same time and submitted that I should draw an inference adverse to Mr Salisbury from these facts. It is not clear to me what precise inference Mr Foti is asking me to draw and without more I am not prepared to draw any inference from these facts. It may be that Mr Salisbury simply decided to keep his options open in case (as happened) the mediation failed. Of course, I do not know what happened at the mediation.
39 Mr Foti also points to the fact that the creditors may receive a greater return on a liquidation than they may receive under Mr Salisbury's proposal. He points to the administrator's report in this respect. There are two answers to this submission. First, the administrators' views are provisional and are based on information not necessarily available to Mr Salisbury at the time he exercised the power of appointment. Secondly, and this is perhaps related to the first point, Mr Salisbury's proposal (if it proceeds) has the advantage to creditors of certainty as to payment and amount.
40 Mr Salisbury's purpose is to be determined according to all the circumstances. There is evidence that he wished to provide a return to creditors and to secure an orderly sale of the company's remaining assets, namely, the two apartments. Even if it is proper to infer that he was aware of the possibility of claims being made against him should the company be placed in liquidation, I do not think the evidence supports a conclusion that his purpose in appointing the administrators was to avoid claims against him by a liquidator. Certainly, the evidence does not rise to the level of supporting a conclusion that, if that was his purpose, it was his predominant purpose.