Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited v Tallevine Pty Ltd
[2018] NSWSC 136
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2017-11-29
Before
Harrison J
Catchwords
- [1986] HCA 80 Bailey v Department of Land and Water Conservation (2009) 74 NSWLR 333
- [2009] NSWCA 100 Banksia Mortgages Ltd v Croker [2010] NSWSC 535 Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 249
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (5 paragraphs)
Judgment
- HIS HONOUR: I published my principal judgment in this matter on 8 December 2017: see Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited v Tallevine Pty Ltd (as trustee for the Thornleigh Trading Trust) [2017] NSWSC 1703. During the course of the hearing I indicated that I considered that privilege had been waived by the defendant with respect to a document, part of which had been annexed to an affidavit that was read in the proceedings. With the agreement of the parties at that time, I indicated that I would provide reasons for my decision at a later time. These reasons deal with that issue.
- On 8 August 2014, the defendant received a letter from F B Rice, patent and trade mark attorneys in Sydney. The letter and its attachments were provided to me and marked MFI 1. The letter commences with the following sentence: "Dear Mr Creak, Thank you for your instructions of 22 July 2014 requesting a full availability search for the trade mark RAPTOR (word and logo) which is intended to be used and registered in relation to vehicles parts and accessories including grill panels, car lights, mouldings, sport and nudge bar, carbon fibre wraps, leather door trims."
- Page 2 of the letter has been annexed to an affidavit sworn by Ian David Charles Creak and served on the plaintiff. A copy of that page is attached to these reasons.
- The plaintiff has called for production to it of the letter in full. That call is resisted by the defendant upon the basis of client legal privilege. The letter purports to be an advice from the defendant's patent attorneys concerning the availability of the trade mark referred to in the first sentence of the 8 August 2014 letter. The plaintiff contends that the production of page 2 of the letter, not being unintentional or inadvertent, has operated to waive any privilege that might otherwise attach to it.