22 The respondent submits that even if the first ground of appeal is successful, the appeal should nevertheless be dismissed on the basis that there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice. The respondent points to the various circumstances to which I have already referred as indicating that the intended destination of the vessel was Australia, and submits that they overwhelmingly established that, even in the absence of the evidence of Gray, that was the only conclusion open to a reasonable jury properly instructed. However, there was evidence, and particularly from Silva, tending to explain a large number of those circumstances. For example, in relation to the absence of food and water, Silva's evidence was that there had been water in bottles and big tanks of water and that the people on the vessel either had fished or would be able to fish to sustain themselves. In relation to the absence of fuel, Silva said that while there was not a sail at the time of arrival at Cocos, that there had been one and that it had been usable. In relation to the GPS, there was some evidence which suggested that one could plot a trip on a GPS "map by map" - that is, one portion at a time - and there was also some evidence that the most expeditious way of getting to New Zealand would be by following the Leeuwin current down the Australian coast and from there sailing east to New Zealand. Whether any of this evidence was accepted, and the effect which it would have upon the circumstantial case built up by the respondent, would be matters for the jury. However, I am unable to form the view that the Crown case was so strong that the success of the first ground of appeal should not result in the success of the appeal overall and the quashing of the appellant's conviction.