Fletcher v Furnance [2008] NSWSC 132 | Case summary

2441 of 2006 JUNE FLETCHER -v- JACK GRAHAM FURNANCE JUDGMENT 1 HIS HONOUR: These are proceedings under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984. 2 The proceedings were instituted by statement of claim filed by the Plaintiff, June Fletcher, on 2 May 2006. By that pleading the Plaintiff claims against the Defendant, Jack Graham Furnance, orders adjusting the interests of the parties in property and also, as prayer 6, an order in the following terms, That the Defendant indemnify the Plaintiff and pay to her the sum necessary to meet one half of any Centrelink liability that the Plaintiff has arising from payments made to the Plaintiff during the period of cohabitation by Centrelink. 3 The Defendant filed a defence and a cross-claim on 1 June 2006. The Plaintiff filed a defence to the cross-claim on 3 July 2006. I shall later return to the nature of the relief which is sought by the respective parties. 4 It was not in dispute that the parties were in a de facto relationship from the early 1980s until early 2005. However, the parties did not agree on the date of commencement of the relationship. The Plaintiff asserted that the relationship commenced in late 1980, when the Defendant moved into rental accommodation in Darkwood Road, Auburn where the Plaintiff was then residing. The Defendant asserted that it commenced in December 1981. The Plaintiff asserted that the relationship came to an end in early 2005, and the Defendant admitted that that was the date of the termination of the relationship. Thus it was the case for the Plaintiff that the de facto relationship between the parties obtained for a period of somewhat above 24 years, whilst it was the case for the Defendant that the relationship lasted for about a year less. 5 The Plaintiff was born was on 20 July 1938, and is presently aged 69. The Defendant was born on 12 February 1949, and is presently aged 59. Each of the parties had previously been married and subsequently divorced. The Plaintiff married Arthur William Fletcher on 6 September 1958. Of that marriage was born one child, a daughter Debbie (who was born on 11 March 1959). The Defendant married Robyn on 4 April 1970. Of that marriage were born two daughters, Deborah Anne (born on 4 February 1971) and Tracey Margaret (born on 27 July 1973). 6 At the time when the de facto relationship commenced (be it in 1980 or in 1981) the Defendant, who was then separated from his wife, was residing with his father at Westmead. He was paying child maintenance of $33 a week to his wife for their two children and was paying $25 a week towards mortgage payments on their former matrimonial home at Greystanes, as well as paying board of $60 a week to his father. When the Defendant moved into residence with the Plaintiff at Auburn, he still continued to spend each weekend at his father's residence at Westmead, in order to facilitate his rights of access to his children at those times. 7 The parties met when they were each employed by Arnotts Biscuits. The Plaintiff commenced her employment there in 1963. By the time she ceased working for that employer, when she was made redundant in 1991, the Plaintiff had progressed to the position of supervisor of the housekeeping department. In December 1965, the Defendant, then aged 16, commenced work for the same employer. At the outset, the Defendant worked as a sweeper, but ultimately rose to the position of a manager. 8 At the commencement of the relationship the Plaintiff had little by the way of assets, other than furniture, furnishings and personal possessions. The Defendant, however, said that her assets also included a Holden Kingswood motor vehicle, to which he attributed a value of about $600. 9 According to the Defendant, his assets at the commencement of co-habitation consisted of the following, Bank account at St George Bank (approximate) $3500 Holden Statesman motor vehicle, 1972 model, valued at $3000 Furniture and household contents, valued at $500 One half share in a house property at 76A Greystanes Road, Greystanes, valued at about $30,000 10 The house property at Greystanes had been the matrimonial home of the Defendant and his estranged wife, Mrs Robyn Furnance, and was the subject of an agreement between them. Mrs Robyn Furnance and their two children occupied that house property, and the Defendant continued to meet one half of the mortgage payments. The agreement provided that the house property would be sold when their youngest child became self supporting. Ultimately, at that time (the Defendant and his former wife having divorced in June 1983) the Defendant transferred his interest in that house property to his daughter Deborah and her husband Richard Thomas Slevin, the Defendant receiving, not one half of the value of the property (which value he estimated to have been about $200,000), but $10,000. He said that he effected that transfer and accepted that amount in order to promote harmony and avoid further proceedings in the Family Court of Australia. 11 Throughout the period of their relationship the parties kept their finances separate. The Plaintiff and the Defendant each maintained a separate bank account and at no stage during the relationship did the parties operate a joint bank account. According to the Plaintiff, she used her income from her employment essentially for housekeeping for herself and the Defendant. During her last full year of employment with Arnotts (the year ended 30 June 1991) the Plaintiff received a gross income of $33,614. It should also here be recorded that throughout the period of the relationship the Defendant regularly gave to the Plaintiff amounts of money for housekeeping and for household expenses, paying to her a weekly sum of at first $80, later $100. 12 In 1983 the Defendant purchased a vacant block of land at 20 Jindabyne Street, Bossley Park for of $27,750. That purchase was funded by the Defendant himself providing the deposit of 10 percent ($2,775), apparently from the proceeds of the sale of his motor vehicle, and the balance being provided by a loan, secured by mortgage, from the St George Bank for $23,500. The Defendant made the regular mortgage payments on that loan. 13 In 1986 construction commenced of a dwelling house on the Bossley Park land. That residence was financed by a further mortgage loan, in an amount of $50,000, which the Defendant obtained from the St George Bank. Upon its completion the parties moved into the residence upon the Bossley Park property, and remained there until November 2004. When the parties moved into the Bossley Park residence in 1986 the Plaintiff gave up the casual work which she had been performing at weekends for a catering service since before the commencement of the de facto relationship. 14 It was at the hearing agreed between the parties that in September 2006 the Bossley Park property had a value of $370,000. 15 According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant's younger daughter Tracey, resided with the parties at Bossley Park for a period of about two years when she was aged in her early teens. The Defendant said that Tracey had lived with them for only about six months or so, certainly less than twelve months, in 1989. 16 In early 1992 the Plaintiff gave to the Defendant the sum of $19,500, to enable him to discharge the outstanding mortgage indebtedness on the Bossley Park property. The source of that sum was the redundancy payment which the Plaintiff had received when her employment at Arnotts was terminated in early 1992. The Plaintiff also from that redundancy payment gave to her daughter Debbie an amount of $54,500, to enable Debbie to discharge a mortgage upon her residence. The Plaintiff invested the balance of her funds in what was described as a "bridges investment (portfolio services)" and also in an investment with NRMA. 17 At about the same time the Plaintiff also redeemed a policy which she held with the National Mutual for an amount of almost $41,000. 18 From about March 1992 the Plaintiff was in receipt of a NewStart allowance until the end of the relationship. For part of that period, the Plaintiff was not entitled to receive the NewStart allowance, either at all, or at least in part. It would appear that in continuing to receive that allowance the Plaintiff has become liable for repayment of at least part of the sum which she received and that also she may, in consequence, be subject to criminal sanctions. 19 At the commencement of her oral evidence, the Plaintiff, by leave, gave some additional evidence concerning the receipt by her of what she referred to as "the pension", to which she was not entitled. The Plaintiff said that in 2006 she visited the Centrelink office at Nowra and attempted, without success, to ascertain how much she owed to Centrelink. As to the amount of her indebtedness to Centrelink, the Plaintiff said that she had no idea whatsoever. 20 In April 1993 the Plaintiff and the Defendant as tenants in common purchased a residential property at 107 Leumeah Street, Sanctuary Point for $75,000. That purchase was funded by a loan of $62,000, secured by mortgage, taken out in the joint names of the parties from the St George bank. That property was originally purchased as a holiday home for the parties, but in about November 2004 after the Defendant's retirement from employment, they commenced to reside there on a full-time and permanent basis. According to the Plaintiff, she contributed a sum of $40,000 towards that purchase price (that sum being sourced from her redundancy repayment at the termination of her employment). However, the Defendant asserted that the amount of the Plaintiff's contribution towards that purchase was only $28,500, that sum being paid by the Plaintiff, upon her retirement from employment, in reduction of the mortgage debt on the Sanctuary Point property (the balance of that mortgage debt being paid by the Defendant over a period of about three years). The Defendant agreed that the Plaintiff also paid $19,500 in reduction of the mortgage debt on the Bossley Park property. 21 It was the evidence of the Plaintiff that between 1993 and 2004 she and the Defendant conjointly renovated the Sanctuary Point property. The residence upon that property at the time of its purchase in 1993 consisted of a two bedroom cottage. It was the Plaintiff's evidence that she and the Defendant effected extensions to that property by the addition of a front veranda, a back veranda, and a carport/garage, and that they performed renovation and restoration work on the property. Much of that work was performed by the parties personally, although they engaged a building contractor to perform specific activities (such as the construction of a double garage). The extent of the respective contributions of the parties towards that restoration and renovation work was in dispute between them. 22 It was at the hearing agreed between the parties that in September 2006 the Sanctuary Point property had a value of $220,000. 23 In August 2004 the Defendant went on long service leave preceding his retirement from employment with Arnotts. When that retirement took effect in March 2005, he received by way of superannuation entitlements and an ex gratia payment amounts totalling about $937,000. 24 The Defendant during the course of the relationship had built up a share portfolio, those shares being purchased from the Defendant's own earnings. 25 Also during the course of the relationship the Defendant purchased sequentially for the Plaintiff a number of motor vehicles, being in 1992 a Holden Commodore, 1970 model, for which he paid (after a trade in of the Plaintiff's own motor vehicle) the sum of $7,000; in 1996 a Holden Rodeo, 1993 model, for which he paid $15,490; and in 2001 a Holden Barina, for which he paid $13,284. 26 The parties separated in early 2005, at which time the de facto relationship came to an end. 27 At the termination of the relationship the Plaintiff's assets consisted of: One half interest as tenant in common in the Sanctuary Point property $110,000 Shares in ING $4,000 Commonwealth Bank term deposit account, about $29,000 Holden Barina motor vehicle, estimated value $5000 28 At that time the Defendant's assets consisted of: House property at Bossley Park $370,000 Half interest as tenant in common in the Sanctuary Point property $110,000 Cash savings, held in various accounts, totalling about $150,000 Share portfolio, valued at about $320,000 Holden Commodore motor vehicle, estimated value $5000 Superannuation benefits, consisting of Summit Super Plan, roll over fund $330,000 29 The Defendant had invested a considerable part of the superannuation moneys which he had received on retirement in the Campbells Arnott Super Plan, which produces for him a present monthly income of $3651. 30 It is relevant to the claim of the Plaintiff that during the course of the de facto relationship between the parties they went on several overseas trips, on two of which they were accompanied by the Plaintiff's grandson (the son of her daughter Debbie). Those trips were largely paid for by the Defendant. There was also evidence of various monetary advances made by the Plaintiff to her daughter Debbie during the course of the relationship. 31 It was the case for the Plaintiff that throughout the period of the de facto relationship she had been the primary homemaker, and had been principally responsible for such domestic activities as cooking, cleaning, washing, ironing. In addition, she said that she had been principally responsible for maintaining the two residential properties, and assisting with renovations, and assisting the Defendant in construction work. 32 It was also part of the case for the Plaintiff that she had made substantial direct financial contributions towards the acquisition, conservation and improvement of both properties, in that she had assisted with mortgage payments and especially with the discharge of the mortgage over the Bossley Park property, and that she had made a significant contribution, about half, towards the purchase price of the Sanctuary Point property. Further, that she had made mortgage repayments on that latter property, and that she had paid other costs associated with both properties. 33 The Defendant disputed the Plaintiff's assertion that she was primarily responsible for the major part of all the domestic activities throughout the period of the relationship (although the Defendant conceded that the Plaintiff was a good housewife). Those areas of conflict related mainly to details, whilst the parties were in substantial agreement concerning the major financial events during the course of their de facto relationship. It is appropriate, nevertheless, that I should express my views concerning the reliance to be placed upon the evidence of the parties concerning those matters where they were in dispute and where the evidence consisted solely of the testimony of one or other of the parties. 34 In a number of areas (for example, regarding the acquisition of curtains for the Bossley Park residence) the Plaintiff conceded a lack of concise memory. It will be appreciated, further, that the admitted dishonesty on the part of the Plaintiff in obtaining from Centrelink payments to which she was not entitled must reflect poorly upon her credit. I did not regard the Plaintiff as being as reliable a witness as the Defendant. Where the evidence concerning any significant matter in dispute consisted solely of the unsupported oral testimony of one or other of the parties, I generally preferred that of the Defendant to the evidence of the Plaintiff. 35 It will be recalled that the parties were in dispute as to the date of the commencement of the de facto relationship, the Plaintiff asserting that it commenced in late 1980, whilst the defendant asserted that it commenced about a year later, in December 1981. Since on either version the relationship obtained for a lengthy period, more than 23 years, little turns upon whether its precise duration was 23 years and some months or 24 years and some months. However, I regarded the evidence of the Defendant to be more reliable than that of the Plaintiff, and I am satisfied that the de facto relationship between the parties commenced in December 1991. 36 What was essentially in dispute in this case was the extent of the non-financial contributions of each of the parties. The Plaintiff asserted a greater role than the Defendant was prepared to concede in respect of the home improvement and renovation work effected at the Bossley Park property; whilst the Defendant asserted a greater role than the Plaintiff was prepared to concede in respect of his contributions as a homemaker. The Defendant said that he shared the household chores with the Plaintiff, and that, whilst the Plaintiff did the majority of the cooking and washing, the Defendant attended to the maintenance of the residential dwelling and its grounds. 37 The relief claimed by the Plaintiff (apart from that in respect to any moneys repayable by her to Centrelink) was that the Defendant transfer to the Plaintiff his interest in the Sanctuary Point property; that the Plaintiff disclaim any interest in the Bossley Park property; that the Defendant pay to the Plaintiff $75,000, representing one half of the Defendant's cash savings in various accounts; that the Defendant transfer to the Plaintiff one half of his share portfolio; that the Defendant pay to the Plaintiff his superannuation interest with the Summit Personal Superannuation Plan (that interest having a value of $330,000). 38 The Defendant's share portfolio is worth presently about $320,000. Thus, in cash terms, what is being sought by the Plaintiff from the Defendant is: $75,000, representing one half of the Defendant's cash savings $160,000, representing one half of the Defendant's share portfolio $330,000, representing the Defendant's superannuation interest with Summit Personal Superannuation Plan 39 That is, the Plaintiff is seeking from the Defendant amounts which have cash values totalling about $565,000. 40 By his cross-claim the Defendant seeks an order that he transfer to the Plaintiff his interest in the Sanctuary Point property, and an order that he pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $200,000. 41 It will be appreciated, therefore, that the parties are in agreement that the Plaintiff should receive the Defendant's interest in the Sanctuary Point property. However, the parties are in dispute concerning the monetary value of the other payments to be made by the Defendant to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff claiming a total of about $565,000 and the Defendant conceding an amount of $200,000. 42 It is in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances that the Court must proceed to a consideration of the claim of the Plaintiff and the cross-claim of the Defendant. 43 I have had the benefit of receiving a written outline of submissions and a chronology from the legal representatives of the respective parties. Those documents will be retained in the Court file. 44 The jurisdiction invoked by each of the parties in the present proceedings is grounded upon section 20 of the Property (Relationships) Act, subsection (1) whereof, provides, On an application by a party to a domestic relationship for an order under this Part to adjust interests with respect to the property of the parties to the relationship or either of them, a court may make such order adjusting the interests of the parties in the property as to it seems just and equitable having regard to: (a) the financial and non-financial contributions made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of the parties to the relationship to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties or either of them or to the financial resources of the parties or either of them, and (b) the contributions, including any contributions made in the capacity of homemaker or parent, made by either of the parties to the relationship to the welfare of the other party to the relationship or to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties and one or more of the following, namely: (i) a child of the parties, (ii) a child accepted by the parties or either of them into the household of the parties, whether or not the child is a child of either of the parties. 45 I have already referred to the somewhat curious nature of the relief which the Plaintiff has claimed as prayer 6 in the statement of claim. In effect, the Plaintiff is thereby seeking that the Defendant should bear one half of the Plaintiff's liability to repay Centrelink for the money which she dishonestly obtained from the public purse. 46 That claim can be disposed of at the outset. I totally reject the bold submission of the Plaintiff that any liability which she might have to repay Centrelink for moneys improperly obtained by her should be borne, as to one half of the amount of those moneys, by the Defendant. For the Court to grant to the Plaintiff such relief would be merely to reward her for her dishonesty. 47 It is appropriate here to refer to the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio. People who deliberately set out to breach the law cannot expect to be aided by a court. The Plaintiff has deliberately obtained from Centrelink moneys to which she is not entitled. She cannot use her own dishonesty as a ground for attempting to recover from the Defendant one half of the moneys which in due course she will be required to repay to Centrelink. 48 In the celebrated words of Lord Mansfield in Hollman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 at 343; 98 ER 1120 at 1121, The principle of public policy is this… no Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. 49 (See Everet v Williams (the Highwayman's Case) (1725), set forth in (1893) LQR 197, cited in Burrows v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 816 at 826 (a case arising out of the Jameson Raid); see R.E. Megarry, Miscellany-at-Law (London, 1955); see also Beattie v Reid [2002] NSWSC 1088, (2003) DFC 95-264 at 77,643-77,644, and cases there cited.) 50 I consider it to be highly offensive to public policy if the Court were to make an order the effect of which would be to award to the Plaintiff one half of the spoils of her dishonesty. I will not take into account, to the benefit of the Plaintiff or to the detriment of the Defendant, the Plaintiff's illegal conduct in defrauding Centrelink. I propose, therefore, totally to disregard the claim of the Plaintiff that the Defendant should be ordered to pay to her one half of any amount which she might be liable to repay to Centrelink. 51 In approaching a claim for the adjustment of the interests of the parties in property pursuant to section 20 (1) of the Property (Relationship) Act, the Court must make a wholistic judgment and should not attempt to evaluate the respective contributions of the parties as if it were undertaking a reductionist process analogous to the taking of partnership accounts (notoriously one of the most time consuming of litigious exercises). (See Davey v Lee (1990) 13 FamLR 688; see also Bilous v Mudaliar [2006] NSWCA 38 at 43, where Ipp JA said that some situations do not lend themselves to either a pure global approach or a pure asset by asset approach in determining what orders should be made). 52 In considering the claim of the Plaintiff (and also the cross-claim of the Defendant) the Court should not be diverted from the clear words of the statute, where by section 20 (1) the Court is required to have regard to the respective contributions of the parties of the nature described in that subsection. The Court is not required to proceed upon the basis that the Defendant might have made greater contributions than he in fact made, if he had done other than he in fact did. 53 Each of the parties submitted that I should approach the matter upon the basis of what was described as the asset pool of the parties. (Indeed, the Defendant even went so far as to adopt what was referred to as a "three pool approach".) I would here interpolate that I do not find the phrase "asset pool", or even such a concept, as being particularly helpful in a claim under the Property (Relationships) Act. As I have already observed, the Court should not be diverted from the clear wording of the statute, which looks to past contributions that have been actually made by the parties. 54 The Plaintiff based her claim in part upon what was referred to as "a premature distribution" from the asset pool, and sought what was referred to as a "notional restoration" of certain assets to the asset pool. I consider such concepts, howsoever they may be appropriate to claims under the Family Law Act 1975 (Commonwealth), to be quite inappropriate to a claim under the Property (Relationships) Act, a statute of New South Wales. The State Act looks only to past contributions, whereas the Commonwealth Act looks also to present and future needs. 55 To the extent that the claim of the Plaintiff is grounded in some way upon the failure of the Defendant to contribute more than he actually did contribute to the relationship, I reject that claim. The Court is required to look to the contributions of the nature set forth in section 20 (1) which were actually made by each of the parties. The Court cannot proceed upon some conjectural basis. Such concepts as a "premature distribution" from the asset pool or a "notional restoration" to that asset pool seem to me to be incompatible with the task imposed upon the Court, to exercise its discretion to "make such order adjusting the interests of the parties in the property as to it seems just and equitable having regard to" the contributions of the nature set forth in section 20 (1) of the Act. Moneys which were invested by one of the parties (as, for example, in the instant case, in superannuation funds by the Defendant) do not constitute such contributions. I do not see how those funds can be characterised in the fashion in which they have been in the written submissions of the parties (especially those of the Plaintiff, for the purpose of performing a detailed, and somewhat convoluted, arithmetical exercise, in order to establish a monetary entitlement to the Plaintiff). 56 In the instant case it is quite clear that throughout the period of more than 23 years during which the de facto relationship between the parties obtained, the Plaintiff was the principal homemaker (although the Defendant performed certain domestic activities). Further, while she was in employment the Plaintiff made not insignificant financial contributions to the relationship. After the Plaintiff ceased employment she made further financial contributions, which were sourced from her superannuation and redundancy payments. For the remainder of the de facto relationship the Defendant was the breadwinner for the parties, and it was his contributions which financially supported the parties. 57 The Defendant by his cross-claim does not dispute an entitlement of the Plaintiff to receive the Defendant's interest in the Sanctuary Point property. The parties own that property as tenants in common. The Plaintiff made direct financial contributions towards the purchase of the property and by way of contributing to the conservation and improvement of that property. As has already been recorded, the agreed value of the Sanctuary Point property in September 2006 was $220,000. 58 The Plaintiff in addition claims orders that the Defendant pay to her a significant amount of money and transfer to her one half of his share portfolio and a significant part of his superannuation entitlements. In this latter regard I would observe that a large part of the superannuation moneys which the Defendant received upon his retirement were invested by him in a superannuation fund which provides for him not a lump sum, but weekly payments. As Bryson JA observed in Chanter v Catts [2005] NSWCA 411, (2005) 64 NSWLR 360 at 384, such superannuation entitlements cannot be readily valued, and they are "like fairy gold in that they may diminish or disappear if an attempt is made to seize them". 59 It seems to me that the Plaintiff has established an entitlement to receive from the Defendant a lump sum payment which would recognise the significant contributions made by the Plaintiff as homemaker for the Defendant (and for the relatively short period whilst the Defendant's younger daughter Tracey was a part of the household, a period of between 6 and 12 months), and the direct financial contributions, totalling $48,000, towards repayment of the Bossley Park mortgage debt and towards the purchase of Sanctuary Point, made at a time when the Plaintiff herself was not affluent circumstances and when the Defendant had not yet received the very significant amounts of money which came to him upon his ceasing employment in early 2004. 60 The Plaintiff made direct financial contributions of at least $27,500 towards the Bossley Park property (the purchase price of the land and the construction of the dwelling house thereon totalling $77,750). That is, the Plaintiff's direct financial contribution towards that property was no less than 25 percent thereof. Since the agreed value of that property is presently $370,000, the Plaintiff's direct financial contribution can be regarded as being represented by a present amount of about $92,500. 61 The Plaintiff's direct contributions towards the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the Sanctuary Point property are conceded by the Defendant to be appropriately recognised by the transfer to the Plaintiff of his interest in that property. 62 The non-financial contributions of the Plaintiff towards the Bossley Park property, although probably not as great as those of the Defendant, were in my conclusion significantly greater than the Defendant was prepared to concede. 63 The relief sought by the Defendant in his cross-claim would give to the Plaintiff a sum of $200,000 in recognition of her non-financial contributions towards the conservation and improvement of the Bossley Park property and in recognition of her contributions as homemaker throughout the period of the relationship. I have already observed that, upon an arithmetical calculation, the Plaintiff's direct financial contributions towards Bossley Park can be represented by a present amount of about $92,500. Her indirect and non-financial contributions towards that property should be recognised, in my conclusion, by a further amount of $100,000. In addition, the Plaintiff's contributions as a homemaker during a relationship which obtained for almost a quarter of century should be recognised by a monetary payment of no less than $200,000. 64 In my conclusion, it is appropriate that in recognition of the foregoing direct and indirect contributions of the Plaintiff towards the Bossley Park property and the contributions of the Plaintiff as a homemaker, the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff a lump sum of $400,000. 65 Accordingly, I propose to make an order that the Defendant transfer to the Plaintiff his interest in the Sanctuary Point property and pay to the Plaintiff within a specified period the sum of $400,000. I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff has established an entitlement to any of the other items of relief claimed by her. 66 It follows that the Plaintiff will receive considerably less than she has claimed, but considerably more than was conceded by the Defendant. I have not heard any submissions as to costs. If either party wishes to make such submissions, an opportunity will be given to that party to do so. 67 Accordingly, I stand the matter over to a date to be fixed by arrangement with my Associate for the bringing of short minutes to reflect my foregoing conclusions, and, if desired, for argument as to costs. 68 The short minutes should also provide for the return of the exhibits.

Fletcher v Furnance

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Judgment (11 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (1)

Cases Cited (5)

Cited By (8)