FJB v Children's Guardian

The Hearing

1. The parties appeared before the Tribunal in person. The applicant's expert Dr Kim Dilati appeared by telephone.

The Evidence

1. The applicant's evidence consists of:

• Application filed 25 March 2022 and annexed documents;
• TAFE NSW certificate and academic record - A1;
• Expert report Dr Kim Dilati 1 June 2022 -A2; and
• Half page statement (undated) - A3.

1. The evidence of the respondent included:

• Bundle filed: 3 May 2022 - R1; and
• Bundle filed: 10 June 2022 - R2.

1. The Tribunal received and was assisted by written submissions from the respondent.

Application for adjournment

1. After the applicant's oral evidence closed, we requested that arrangements be made for Dr Dilati to telephone into the hearing to give her evidence. The applicant said that there was a problem with Dr Dilati because she had only just received the respondent's material (R1 and R2) and her opinion expressed in her report could not be maintained.
2. In preparation of her report, Dr Dilati had not considered the respondents material because the applicant had not given the same to her. The applicant was given some time to speak with Dr Dilati about her report and evidence. The applicant, after taking a short time to do so, said that Dr Dilati's opinion would need to be changed.
3. The applicant made an application for an adjournment to enable either one, that Dr Dilati provide an updated report, or, two that the applicant retain a new expert. The application was opposed by the respondent.
4. We refused the application for an adjournment on the basis that the applicant had sufficient time before briefing Dr Dilati to provide to her the respondents documents (R1). He chose not to do so, probably because he was unaware that it may have been required. The substance of the documents in (R2) had been provided to Dr Dilati by the respondent and is referred to in her report.
5. We considered the fact that the applicant was not represented. However, granting an adjournment would not have furthered the guiding principle set out in s 36 of the Civil and administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) and moreover, Dr Dilati's report was before the Tribunal and had been tendered in the applicant's case. Dr Dilati is an expert witness and we were satisfied that she could provide her further opinion, if there was any change to that opinion, during the hearing.

Legislative Provisions

1. The object of the Act is to protect children by requiring those persons engaged in child-related work to obtain a WWCCC, or an enabling order declaring that the person is not to be treated as a disqualified person for the purposes of granting such a clearance: see ss 3, 28 (1) of the Act.
2. The safety, welfare and well-being of children and, in particular, protecting children from child abuse, is the paramount consideration when making any decisions under the Act: see s 4 of the Act.
3. There is no relevant definition of "child abuse" contained in the Act.
4. However, as has been observed by the Tribunal in previous decisions, and in particular BFX v Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 115 at [19]- [30], an offence of "child and young person abuse" has been included in s 227 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998. The offence is as follows: "Child and young person abuse

A person who intentionally takes action that has resulted in or appears likely to result in: (a) the physical injury or sexual abuse of a child or young person, or

(b) a child or young person suffering emotional or psychological harm of such a kind that the emotional or intellectual development of the child or young person is, or is likely to be, significantly damaged, or

(c) the physical development or health of a child or young person being significantly harmed, is guilty of an offence.

Maximum penalty: 200 penalty units"

1. In BFX v Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 115 at [29], the Tribunal stated as follows: "The ordinary meaning of "child abuse" in section 4 of the Act taking into account its context in the Act and the protective purpose or objects underlying the Act is therefore considered to be aptly described as maltreatment of a child consisting of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, neglect, or any combination of these, and includes exposure to harm caused by or being subjected to family violence: section 34, Interpretation Act 1987."
2. The offence with which the applicant was charged committing an act of indecency with a person 16 years or above pursuant to s 61N(2) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), in the circumstances referred to in [4] above. The offence with which the applicant was charged and 'convicted' is one which falls within Schedule 2 cl.1(1)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the applicant is treated as a "disqualified person". By reason of section 18 (1)(a) of the Act the Children's Guardian must not grant a WWCCC to a person convicted as an adult of such an offence, and such a person belongs to a group of people referred to as "disqualified persons", in the same section of the Act. The applicant is, relevantly for the purposes of the Act, an adult and was an adult, aged over 18 years, at the time of the offence.
3. An enabling order is sought by the applicant pursuant to section 28 of the Act, which provides: "28 Orders relating to disqualified and ineligible persons

(1) The Tribunal may, on the application of a disqualified person, make an order declaring that the person is not to be treated as a disqualified person for the purposes of this Act in respect of an offence specified in the order (an "enabling order"). Any such order has effect according to its tenor.

(2) The Tribunal may, on the application of a person who is not eligible to apply for a clearance because the person has been previously refused a clearance, make an order declaring that the person is to be treated as a person who is eligible to apply for a clearance (an "enabling order"). Any such order has effect according to its tenor.

(3) A disqualified person may make an application under this section only if:

(a) the person has been refused a Working with Children Check clearance, or

(4) The Children's Guardian is to be a party to any proceedings for an order under this section and may make submissions in opposition to or support of the making of the order.

(5) An applicant must fully disclose to the Tribunal any matters relevant to the application.

(6) If the Tribunal makes an enabling order, the Tribunal may order the Children's Guardian to revoke an interim bar or to grant the person a clearance.

(7) In any proceedings where an enabling order is sought, it is to be presumed, unless the applicant proves to the contrary, that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children.

(8) An enabling order may not be made subject to conditions."

1. The respondent is a party to the proceedings pursuant to section 28 (4) of the Act.
2. The applicant submits that he is unable to enrol in a course of studies to obtain a qualification in social work unless he holds a WWCCC. There is no issue in this matter that the applicant wishes to obtain a WWCCC to enrol in further tertiary studies.

Standard of Proof

1. It is to be presumed, unless the applicant proves to the contrary, that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children (s 28(7) of the Act). It is well established that the standard of proof applied is the civil standard, that is, on the balance of probabilities: see s 140 Evidence Act 1995; BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523 per Beech-Jones J at [33]; Children's Guardian v BQJ [2016] NSWSC 869, per Button J at [63]; CJT v Office of the Children's Guardian [2016] NSWSC 738, per Fullerton J at [34].

Relevant considerations

1. In making a determination under s 28 of the Act, the Tribunal must consider the matters under s 30 of the Act. Those matters are: "30 Determination of applications and other matters

(1) The Tribunal must consider the following in determining an application under this Part:

(a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar,

(b) the period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred,

(c) the age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred,

(d) the age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim,

(e) the difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person,

(f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child,

(h) the seriousness of the person's total criminal record and the conduct of the person since the offences occurred,

(i) the likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition, (i1) any order of a court or tribunal that is in force in relation to the person,

(j) any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application, (j1) any relevant information in relation to the person that was obtained in accordance with section 36A,

(k) any other matters that the Children's Guardian considers necessary. (1A) The Tribunal may not make an order under this Part which has the effect of enabling a person (the "affected person" ) to work with children in accordance with this Act unless the Tribunal is satisfied that: (a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the affected person that was not directly supervised by another person while the affected person was engaged in any child-related work, and (b) it is in the public interest to make the order. (2) On an application under section 28 or 29, the Tribunal may, by order, stay the operation of a determination by the Children's Guardian under this Act relating to the applicant pending the determination of the matter."

What must be determined

1. The Tribunal is to determine whether the applicant has discharged the onus identified in s 28(7) of the Act and whether there is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he poses a risk the safety of children: s 28 (7) of the Act; BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523, at [25]. We are to consider the totality of the evidence before us to assess whether the onus of proof has been discharged to rebut the presumption. Such evidence to be considered will include the evidence provided by the respondent as well as the evidence provided by the applicant.
2. In determining whether the applicant does pose a risk to children it is accepted that the risk must be "a real and appreciable risk": see BYR v Children's Guardian [2013] NSWADT 310, at [38], [39]; AYU v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 69, at [37], [38]; Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949; 56 NSWLR 476, at [42] per Young CJ in Eq (as he then was); BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523 per Beech-Jones J esp at [26], [27].
3. In BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523, His Honour Justice Beech-Jones referred to the issue of risk in the context of an application under s 28 of the Act as follows at [29], and [31]-[33]: [29] In Commissioner for Children and Young People v FZ [2001] NSWCA 111, Young JA (with whom Hodgson JA and Handley AJA agreed) expressed some concern about the reference to Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336 ("Briginshaw") in the above passage from IK (at [68]). I share his Honour's misgivings. Briginshaw warns about the use of "inexact proofs" in the context of making serious findings of fact (at p 362 per Dixon J). It is difficult to envisage how it applies to a party seeking to disprove a negative assessment of the risk they pose to children in the future. Further, the principles in Briginshaw were enunciated in the context of civil proceedings in a court, not administrative review proceedings in a body that is not required to apply the rules of evidence (CAT Act, s 38(2); see [63]). It is not necessary to decide whether a failure by NCAT to have regard to Briginshaw's admonitions might give rise to an appeal on a "question of law". It suffices to state that NCAT would be well advised to have regard to them if it was considering making a positive finding that an applicant sexually abused a child in circumstances where they were not convicted of doing so (see R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Bott [1933] HCA 30; 50 CLR 228 at p 256 per Evatt J).

[31] In M v M the High Court accepted that a positive finding that an allegation of sexual abuse is true should not be made "unless the court is so satisfied according to the civil standard of proof, with due regard to the factors mentioned in Briginshaw" (M v M at p 76). The Court also stated (at p 77 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ): "It does not follow that if an allegation of sexual abuse has not been made out, according to the civil onus as stated in Briginshaw, that conclusion determines the wider issue which confronts the court when it is called upon to decide what is in the best interests of the child.

No doubt there will be some cases in which the court is able to come to a positive finding that the allegation is well founded. In all but the most extraordinary cases, that finding will have a decisive impact on the order to be made respecting custody and access. There will be cases also in which the court has no hesitation in rejecting the allegation as groundless. Again, in the nature of things there will be very many cases, such as the present case, in which the court cannot confidently make a finding that sexual abuse has taken place. And there are strong practical family reasons why the court should refrain from making a positive finding that sexual abuse has actually taken place unless it is impelled by the particular circumstances of the case to do so.

In resolving the wider issue the court must determine whether on the evidence there is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if custody or access be granted and assess the magnitude of that risk. After all, in deciding what is in the best interests of a child, the Family Court is frequently called upon to assess and evaluate the likelihood or possibility of events or occurrences which, if they come about, will have a detrimental impact on the child's welfare. The existence and magnitude of the risk of sexual abuse, as with other risks of harm to the welfare of a child, is a fundamental matter to be taken into account in deciding issues of custody and access. In access cases, the magnitude of the risk may be less if the order in contemplation is supervised access. Even in such a case, however, there may be a risk of disturbance to a child who is compulsorily brought into contact with a parent who has sexually abused her or whom the child believes to have sexually abused her. But that is not the issue in this case." [32] The Court held that the relevant test was that access to a child by a parent will be denied if there exists "an unacceptable risk that the child would be exposed to sexual abuse if the husband were awarded custody or access" (M v M at p 78).

[33] The above passage from M v M contemplates a court finding that a risk of abuse exists but that the possibility of it materialising can be mitigated by measures such as supervised access, with the result that the risk is not unacceptable and the parent is not denied access. As I have observed no such mechanism is proffered by the Working with Children Act. It is not concerned with "unacceptable risks" but "real and appreciable" risks (V supra). Further, in cases such as this the onus is upon the plaintiff. However subject to those two matters and the caveat about the applicability of Briginshaw noted in [29], the reasoning in M v M is applicable to fact finding and the process of risk assessment that NCAT undertakes. Thus in such cases it may be that NCAT can be satisfied that an allegation of sexual abuse against an applicant is established. Equally, NCAT may be affirmatively satisfied that the relevant incident did not occur, in which case it can be put aside. However, in a context where the welfare of the child is paramount and the question being posed concerns the risk of harm to children, NCAT may not be satisfied that an allegation of abuse has been made out, but nevertheless conclude that the circumstances surrounding a particular incident or course of conduct means that there is a risk to a child or, more correctly, that the existence of a risk has not been disproven.

1. Most recently, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in CXZ v Children's Guardian [2020] NSWCA 338 has affirmed the decision of Beech-Jones J in BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523 at [33] concerning the method to be used in assessing risk.
2. The Court of Appeal in CXZ describes the assessment of risk as being a single process, instead of what was incorrectly described previously as, a mandatory three-step process (see CXZ at [55]). Simpson JA, describes that process in CXZ at [57], as: "…The task of the Tribunal is, to expand on what Beech-Jones J said in BKE, to determine, even if it is unable to be satisfied one way or the other as to the truth of all or any of the allegations, whether, by reason of the possibility that the alleged conduct occurred, the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children. If so, the Tribunal must refuse to grant a clearance. Of course, in that process the Tribunal will give consideration to the strength of the evidence supporting the allegations and will, inevitably, reach conclusions about the truth or falsity of some. If it finds any allegation to be without foundation it will discard it from further consideration. If it is satisfied that the allegation is well-founded, it will assign to it such weight as it sees fit, in the consideration (inter alia) of the circumstances listed in s 30. It is the allegations between those two extremes, those that are neither proved nor disproved, that the Tribunal must address in determining whether the applicant for a clearance poses a risk to children."
3. Where there are multiple considerations, the Tribunal is to evaluate the accumulated weight of the allegations in terms of risk. This will include consideration of factors including the seriousness of the allegations, the strength of any evidentiary support, and the relevance of the conduct to the risk to the safety of children.
4. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under s 28 of the Act is protective and not punitive in nature: AYU v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 69, at [34]; Commission for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111, per Young JA at [61], and R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIR Comm 101 at [130].

Discussion of the evidence

1. The evidence received by the Tribunal is required to be considered under each of the eleven subsections of s 30(1) of the Act: BCS v NSW Civil & Administrative Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 126. Some of the subsections may be thought less relevant and may be given less weight than others, however each of the subsections is to be considered. That evidence is now set out below.
2. In addition, if the Tribunal concludes that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety of children, it must also consider the remaining criteria as set out in s 30(1A) of the Act.

The seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar

1. Committing an act of indecency with a person 16 years or above is a serious offence. Objectively, the circumstances surrounding the applicant's arrest and conviction, in that he masturbated in public and towards a female police officer are in the mid-range of seriousness. While they do not involve a child, they were highly sexualised and committed in public, albeit at about 3.00am. The offending of the applicant occurred in the context of being under the influence of drugs and which led to him assaulting police.

The period of time since those matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred

1. The disqualifying offence occurred approximately twelve years ago. The applicant's criminal history also includes the Northern Territory conviction.

The age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred

1. The applicant was 22 years of age at the time of the disqualifying offence.

The age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim

1. The police officer was 24 years old.

The difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person

1. There was a 2 years age gap between the applicant and the police officer at the time of the disqualifying offence. The police officer was acting in execution of her duty.

Whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child

1. The police officer was not a child.

The person's present age

1. The applicant was 34 years of age at the time of hearing.

The seriousness of the person's total criminal record and the conduct of the person since the offences occurred

1. The applicants total criminal history is towards the high mid to serious range. As set out above, the 2011 offences involve mid-range serious offending. We find that the violence related behaviour surrounding his arrest was relatively minor.
2. More concerning is the applicant's record which reveals that in 2009 he was convicted of serious violence related offences when he was serving in the Australian Army, in the Northern Territory. The applicant was at a BBQ when he stabbed a fellow army officer in the neck and head with a screw driver. This was a serious violent attack which the applicant was convicted and served three months imprisonment. He was later discharged from the army because of the assault.
3. In the report of Dr Dilati, she finds that the applicant perceived his offending behaviour to have damaged his career and that he displayed limited empathy for the victim. The applicant in cross-examination said that he knew what he did was wrong, however, he acted as he did after months of harassment and abuse from the victim as well as on the night of the attack. He described being called a terrorist and other racially motivated names by the victim. We accept that the applicant expresses sorrow for his offending but note the following exchange in his evidence: "Q: You displayed limited empathy for the victim. A: To some degree, it is hard to have empathy for a person who was bullying me. But I would never do this again. …" Whether he is truly remorseful, we are not so convinced.
4. We also note there were some inconsistencies in the applicant's version of events that he gave to Dr Dilati about the incident. In cross-examination the applicant said that the victim approached him. In the version he gave to Dr Dilati he said that he approached the victim. While the incident occurred many years ago, we find on balance that the applicant may have been attempting to minimise his conduct to benefit the outcome in these proceedings.
5. In cross-examination and in the explanations he provided to Dr Dilati about the 2009 and 2011 offending, the applicant blamed his behaviour on excessive alcohol intake and being affected by drugs. We accept the respondents submission that the applicant appears to take less responsibility for his offending and may not appreciate the seriousness of his wrongdoing, particularly the serious aggravated assault. When considered in conjunction with Dr Dilati's findings, this does not support the applicant in rebutting the presumption.

The likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition

1. Dr Dilati opines that she is concerned about: "[The Applicant's] lack of motivation for treatment, for what appears to be a history of mental health symptoms including depression, trauma, anger, aggression, hostility, interpersonal sensitivity, employment difficulties, and drug and alcohol use which has led to criminal behaviours on two occasions".
2. Dr Dilati's opinion in this regard is particularly significant in circumstances where she also finds that the Applicant "remains vulnerable to future episodes of violence due to his historical risk factors and lack of treatment for his mental health difficulties."
3. Dr Dilati finds that the Applicant falls within the moderate range of risk of future violence and moderate range of risk of future serious physical harm. Dr Dilati identifies a number of factors as relevant to the chances of the Applicant committing future acts of violence, including: a history of violence, antisocial behaviour, traumatic experiences and violent attitudes.
4. In Dr Dilati's opinion, the Applicant requires regular psychological services with a psychologist who has experience working with offenders, domestic violence, substance use and trauma, on a fortnightly basis for at least two years to address a number of issues, including, anger management skills, substance use treatment and violence minimisation.
5. In addition, it is Dr Dilati's opinion that to reduce the risk of the Applicant reoffending he will require regular mental health and treatment for depression.
6. The applicant said that he was not aware that he required the treatment as set out by Dr Dilati. He also said that if he had the funds to pay for the proposed treatment, he would. However, he and his wife are not financially able to pay for the proposed treatment set out by Dr Dilati because of a very tight financial situation.
7. We place significant weight on the evidence of Dr Dilati. Based on her evidence, we find the Applicant remains at risk of future episodes of violence. To reduce the risk, the Applicant requires treatment, including fortnightly attendance with a psychologist who has experience working with violent offenders. However, due to the Applicants precarious financial position he is not able to seek such treatment and does not envisage he will be able to do so in the near future.
8. We also place significant weight on Dr Dilati's evidence during cross-examination. Armed with the entirety of the documents (R1) she said that the applicant's risk of future violent offending may be higher than what she has set out in her report. This is because the version of the Northern Territory behaviour occurred in a different context to what the applicant told her during the assessment. Also, Dr Dilati said that on becoming aware of the full facts relating the sexual nature of the 2011 offending, the applicant is a risk of future sexual violence. Dr Dilati could also not rule out potential risk of harm to children. In our view this evidence is significant in terms of the weight we have given to it.
9. We accept to some extent the applicant's evidence that the likelihood of him repeating the disqualifying offence is low due to the time which has elapsed, he has not offended further, he has maintained stable employment and is in a stable relationship with a young son. However, without the kind of treatment proposed by Dr Dilati being undertaken by the applicant, we are not satisfied that he has discharged the onus as required by 28(7) of the Act.
10. We conclude that there is a likelihood of repetition of serious violent and sexualised behaviour which means the applicant has not rebutted the presumption that he is a risk to the safety of children.

Any order of a court or tribunal that is in force in relation to the person

1. There is no evidence of an order of a court or Tribunal in force in relation to the applicant.

Any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application

1. The applicant relies upon the report of Dr Dilati, the TAFE documents and his academic transcript. We have also taken into consideration the half page statement he provided. We accept the applicant recognises that his offending was inappropriate. However, he has not demonstrated a commitment to the treatment set out by Dr Dilati, sadly because of a lack of financial resources to do so. We can not be satisfied that he does not pose a risk to the safety of children.

Any relevant information in relation to the person that was obtained in accordance with section 36A

1. No information was obtained in accordance with the section.

Any other matters that the Children's Guardian considers necessary

1. The respondent submits that the applicant's different versions he gave to Dr Dilati and the recorded events in (R2) are matters that diminish the reliability of his evidence. We accept that the applicant appears to have been selective in what he told Dr Dilati. However, with the greatest of respect to the applicant, and despite our best efforts to explain to him the matters which are before us to be determined, he had a very limited understating of the same and of how and why Dr Dilati was retained. This was evident in the fact that he was unaware he should have provided a copy of the respondents documents to her. He also appeared not to have read Dr Dilati's report before he tendered it as part of his case in this hearing.
2. Overall, we find the applicant to be an honest witness. However, he has limited insight into the matters concerning risk which are set out by Dr Dilati and how those risk factors can be overcome. As we attempted to explain to the applicant during the hearing, if he successfully undertakes the treatment and counselling as proposed by Dr Dilati, the outcome of this application, should it be made again in the future, could be very different.
3. We reject the respondents submission that the applicant lacks motivation to obtain professional assistance to address his risk of committing future violence. We find that his lack of motivation might be more aptly described as not having the financial means to seek such help. However, the outcome is the same.

Consideration of the section 30(1A) matters

1. Given our findings we are not required to consider section 30(1A) of the Act.

Consideration of the facts and determination

1. At the time in which the disqualifying offences occurred the applicant was 22 years of age. He is now approximately 34 years of age. There is no evidence that the applicant has come to the attention of the police or other authorities since the time of the disqualifying offence.
2. We have considered the applicant's explanation of his offending.
3. We have considered and accept the respondent's submissions which support a conclusion that the applicant has not satisfied the onus as required by s 28(7) of the Act. We find that he has not rebutted the presumption that he does pose a real and appreciable risk to the safety of children.
4. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Act is protective, not punitive, and an assessment of risk should err on the side of caution whilst balancing all of the risks that may be posed to children. The paramount principle under the Act requires that the protection of children, particularly from child abuse, is the main focus, however it is not the only factor that must be considered.
5. In all the circumstances, on the balance of probabilities, taking into account all the considerations required under s 30(1) of the Act, and having regard to the material before the Tribunal, we conclude that the applicant does pose a risk to the safety of children. The evidence establishes that the applicant has not discharged the onus of proof as set out in s 28(7) of the Act.
6. The application for an enabling order is refused. The order of the Tribunal is that: 1. The application for an enabling order under s 28 of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (NSW) is refused.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 21 September 2022