Issue One: the proper application of s 6A of the Valuation Act
16It will be apparent that the first issue between the parties focuses upon the proper meaning and application of s 6A of the Valuation Act. That section is the sole statutory provision addressing the concept of "land value". Relevant to the present issue between the parties, the section provides:
"6A Land value
(1) The land value of land is the capital sum which the fee-simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona-fide seller would require, assuming that the improvements, if any, thereon or appertaining thereto, other than land improvements, and made or required by the owner or the owner's predecessor in title had not been made.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1), in determining the land value of any land it shall be assumed that:
(a) the land may be used, or may continue to be used, for any purpose for which it was being used or for which it could be used, at the date to which the valuation relates, and
(b) such improvements may be continued or made on the land as may be required in order to enable the land to continue to be so used,
but nothing in this subsection prevents regard being had, in determining that value, to any other purpose for which the land may be used on the assumption that the improvements, if any, other than land improvements, referred to in subsection (1) had not been made."
17Expressed succinctly, Fivex submits that where use of the Land for the purpose of retail and commercial development was permissible under the LEP at each base date, that being the purpose for which the Land was then being used, the assumptions identified in s 6A(2) were not engaged. Expressing the submission of the Valuer-General in summary form, he contends that for the purpose of determining land value, the assumptions identified in s 6A(2) must be made, it being assumed that the present building and its existing floor space can be continued, as it is only by so doing that the Land can continue to be used in the manner in which it was being used at each base date.
18Although not expressed in definitional terms, the provisions of s 6A(1) identify the manner in which "land value" is to be determined. The subsection discloses two elements that are involved in the process of determination. Reading the subsection as a whole, it is apparent that the first element to be considered, at least in a temporal sense, is that identified in the second part of the subsection. As applied to the circumstances of the present case, that element necessitates the assumption that at each base date there were no improvements upon the Land. (In the present case, it is accepted that there were no "land improvements" within the meaning of the Valuation Act that had been effected upon or to the Land.)
19Having made the assumption that the land is devoid of improvements, the second element requires that a transaction be hypothesised whereby a sum of money is realised upon a sale of the fee simple in the Land. In determining the sum that would be realised from the hypothetical or notional sale, it is assumed that the transaction is upon "such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona-fide seller would require" and, it must be interpolated, being such terms that a prudent purchaser would accept (Federal Commissioner of Land Tax v Duncan [1915] HCA 12; 19 CLR 551 per Isaacs J at 558-559).
20Reference in s 6A(1) to a notional sale on terms that a bona fide seller would require, implicitly assumes that the amount realised on that "sale" would reflect the highest price that a vendor could reasonably expect to obtain on the date on which the land value was being determined (Trust Company of Australia Limited v Valuer-General [2007] NSWCA 181; 154 LGERA 437 at [32]). For the purpose of determining "the capital sum which the fee-simple of the land might be expected to realise", s 6A(1) clearly requires that a determination of the "highest and best use" of the land be made only after all improvements, other than land improvements (if applicable) are notionally removed from consideration. In that context, Campbell JA (Beazley and Ipp JJA agreeing) observed in Trust Company of Australia v Valuer-General at [33]:
"It is particularly important, for present purposes, that there is a particular order of operations that section 6A requires to occur in ascertaining the "land value". In carrying out the thought-task that section 6A(1) calls for, first, the "improvements" ... are notionally removed. Only then does the notional sale occur. And it is by reference to that notional sale that the highest and best use is determined. Thus, it is necessary to determine the identity of the improvements that are to be removed before the highest and best use can be ascertained." (Original emphasis.)
21It is in the context of determining the "highest and best use" of land that s 6A(2) is potentially engaged. Clearly, the subsection does not negate the element of subsection (1) requiring that a notional sale of the land, devoid of improvements, be the object of consideration. Rather, the subsection is directed to the use of the hypothetically vacant land for the purpose of deriving the highest price that the seller might reasonably expect to receive upon the notional sale of that land. So much is apparent from the terms of the subsection when one considers the assumptions identified in paragraphs (a) and (b) in the context of the concluding words of the subsection. Not only do those provisions allow a determination of value by reference to a purpose of use differing from that use contemplated by paragraphs (a) and (b), they also reiterate that improvements on the land are to be treated as having not been made for the purpose of determining land value.
22The fact that s 6A(2) allows an assumption of use for any lawful purpose when addressing the notional sale required by subsection (1), gainsays a submission that present use of existing improvements must be assumed for the purpose of determining land value. That assumption is only required and permitted if the present use, having been lawfully commenced, represents a higher order of use in attaching value to the land than would be achieved by reason of a legal constraint imposed upon the present use subsequent to its commencement.
23The conclusions that I have expressed as to the manner in which the inter-action between subsections (1) and (2) is to be interpreted is consistent with authority. Subsections (1) and (2) of s 6A replicate, in substance, the provisions of s 6 as it was prior to its repeal and replacement in 1981 by s 6A. The history of amendment whereby subsection (2) was added to s 6 in 1959 is the subject of extensive consideration by Campbell JA in Trust Company of Australia v Valuer-General and by Tobias JA (Santow JA agreeing) in Commonwealth Custodial Services Ltd v Valuer-General [2007] NSWCA 365; 156 LGERA 186. As each of their Honours accepted, the purpose of the amendment was to address the decision of Hardie J in Wunderlich Ltd v Valuer-General (1959) 5 LGRA 50. In that case, Hardie J said (at 66):
"Further, the anomalous position is created under which municipal rates and land tax, being assessed on unimproved capital value, are based upon a value determined, not by present user or by likely future user, but on a form of user having no relation to reality. The result is that industrial concerns established in residential areas which the town planning legislation seeks to transfer ultimately to areas reserved for industry would appear to be encouraged to remain residential areas, because of the favourable basis on which valuations are made and rates and land tax are assessed. The position thus arises that valuation and rating legislation operate in one direction and town planning legislation in the other."
24When introducing the Bill in 1959 that resulted in subsection (2) being added to s 6 of the Valuation Act, the Minister, in his Second Reading Speech, identified the need "to remove an anomaly relating to unimproved valuations that has been disclosed by a recent decision of the Land and Valuation Court." It is accepted that the reference there made was to the decision in Wunderlich.
25Both Campbell and Tobias JJA in their respective judgments reviewed various decisions of the Land and Valuation Court in which judges of that Court had considered the purpose of what is now s 6A(2) and the change that it effected in determining what was then the "unimproved value of land" and what is now "land value". I do not repeat the review of those decisions by their Honours. It is sufficient for present purposes to refer to the observations of Campbell JA in Trust Company of Australia v Valuer-General where his Honour said at [83]:
"There has also been judicial recognition that that the purpose of the former section 6(2) is to ensure that if land could not be newly developed for its present use under the relevant planning scheme, but can continue to be used for its present use by virtue of an existing use provision in the planning scheme, it can be valued on the basis of its existing use."
26In Commonwealth Custodial Services v Valuer-General, Tobias JA determined at [111] that the assumption in s 6A(2)(b) refers to the continuance of improvements existing upon land at the date of valuation "only for the purpose of enabling the land to be valued upon the basis, if it be the case, that its highest and best use is the continuation of its existing use as permitted by s 6A(2)(a)". His Honour continued at [112]:
"The foregoing propositions are not only supported by the dicta of Campbell JA in the Trust Company case but also by the observations of Sugarman J in Ritchie ... that s 6A(2) was introduced into the Act to overcome the difficulty illustrated by the decision of Hardie J in Wunderlich that the assumption required to be made by s 6(1) as to the absence of existing improvements could result in the land being valued on the footing that it was not available to be used for the very purpose for which it was in fact being used where that use, where it was an existing use, was its highest and best use."
The reference by his Honour to Ritchie is a reference to the decision in Ritchie v Valuer-General (1961) 21 LGRA 296; 92 WN (NSW) 960. The reliance by Tobias JA upon the observations of Sugarman J in Ritchie are repeated at [128]. His Honour there says that the continuance of improvements under s 6A(2)(b) is to be assumed only for the limited statutory purpose of ascertaining the highest and best use to which land may be put when determining its land value.
27While the Valuer-General accepts that land value is to be determined in the present case by first assuming the Land to be devoid of its present improvements, he submits that for the purpose of determining the result of the notional sale required by s 6A(1), the assumption identified in s 6A(2)(b) must be made. That assumption is required, so it is submitted, because "a more intense use" than is otherwise permitted under the LEP was taking place on the Land at each base date. The more intense use is said to be represented by the excess of floor space achieved in the building on the Land than would be the case if the Land was developed to a maximum floor space ratio of 3:1 in accordance with cl 11 of the LEP (Respondent's written submissions at [22]).
28The required assumption has the consequence, so it is further submitted, that the parties to the notional sale effected pursuant to s 6A(1) would agree on a "capital sum" that reflected the floor space of the existing building. The Valuer-General contends that to do otherwise would "fail the test" articulated by Isaacs J in Spencer v Commonwealth [1907] HCA 82; 5 CLR 418 at 441 where his Honour said:
"To arrive at the value of the land at that date, we have, as I conceive, to suppose it sold then, not by means of forced sale, but by voluntary bargaining between the plaintiff and a purchaser, willing to trade, but neither of them so anxious to do so that he would overlook any ordinary business consideration."
29While the test articulated in Spencer v Commonwealth is accepted as laying down the general principle by which a notional sale is to be determined, the application of that principle must necessarily take account both of the statutory provisions being considered and the circumstances of the particular case that bear upon the notional sale. For reasons earlier stated, the provisions of s 6A do not mandate application in all cases of the assumptions identified in subs (2).
30In the present case, the valuers agreed that the highest and best use of the Land at each base date was that use to which the Land was, in fact, being put, namely a use for retail and commercial office purposes. While Mr Hill opined in the valuers' joint statement (Exhibit D) that, in the alternative, ground floor retail with residential apartment development above would equally reflect the highest and best use of the Land, in oral evidence he accepted that use for retail/commercial development was to be preferred as the highest and best use. This was so, given the location of the Land at the busy New South Head Road and Knox Street intersection; the fact that the Land was in the centre of the Double Bay retail and commercial precinct together with the observation that there were no adjoining premises reflecting a retail/residential use.
31Having considered the totality of the evidence, I find that the highest and best use of the Land at each base date was for retail and commercial office space purposes. As a consequence of that finding, the assumptions identified in s 6A(2) are not engaged. The use that I have determined was the permissible form of land use under the LEP at each base date. No assumption is therefore required to be made as to the continuance of that use when determining its land value under s 6A(1). The provisions of s 6A(1) together with the judicial recognition given to the legislative purpose of s 6A(2) support that conclusion.
32For these reasons, I do not accept the submission of the Valuer-General that the assumptions identified in s 6A(2) are to be applied in the present case. Land value should be determined conformably with s 6A(1) on the basis that the highest and best use of the Land, assuming that the existing building had not been erected, is use for retail and commercial purposes. Although not determinative of the issue, I note that no evidence was given by either valuer stating that the highest and best use of retail/commercial was confined to the existing building. Their focus, conformably with subs (2), was upon the use of the Land.