FITZGERALD v POLICE No. SCGRG-00-327 [2000] SASC 168
[2000] SASC 168
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of SA
Decision date
2000-06-22
Before
Mullighan J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
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[2000] SASC 168
Supreme Court of SA
2000-06-22
Mullighan J
Original judgment source is linked above.
"Taking into account all the matters put by both prosecution and Ms Johnson for the defendant and taking into account the relevant medical reports and references and indicating as I already have that I regard these matters as particularly serious given the remoteness of the area and the unlikely event that assistance could have been rendered immediately by any other person, I record convictions with respect to both counts and a fine of $1,750. Court fees and costs of $175. $1925 in all. Time to pay 9 months. Section 43 of the Road Traffic Act licence disqualified for a period of 2 years."
"Failure to stop and report in case of accident 43(1) In this section - "accident" includes a collision, whether caused intentionally or otherwise; "animal" includes a dog. (2) This section applies only to accidents in which-- (a) any person or animal is injured or killed; or (b) any real or personal property (other than an animal) is destroyed or damaged. (3) If owing to the presence of a vehicle on a road an accident occurs, the driver of every vehicle concerned in the accident must--
(a) stop the vehicle forthwith; (b) if a person has been injured in the accident, immediately render all possible assistance; (c) if requested to do so by any person having reasonable grounds for such request, state his or her name and address and the registered number (if any) of his or her vehicle and any other information necessary to identify it; (d) as soon as reasonably practicable and in any case within 24 hours after the occurrence of the accident, report the accident to a member of the police force or at a police station.
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(3a) The penalty for an offence against subsection (3) is as follows: (a) (i) where the offence arises from the defendant's failure to stop the vehicle forthwith and a person was injured or killed in the accident; or (ii) where the offence arises from the defendant's failure to render assistance, a fine not exceeding $5 000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year (or both) and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for one year or for such longer period as the court orders; (b) in any other case--a fine of $2 000. (3b) Where a disqualification is, or is to be, imposed under subsection (3a)-- (a) the disqualification cannot be reduced or mitigated in any way or be substituted by any other penalty or sentence unless, in the case of a first offence, the court is satisfied, by evidence given on oath, that the offence is trifling, in which case it may order a period of disqualification that is less than the prescribed minimum but not less than one month;
* * * * * *
(c) if the offender is the holder of a driver's licence--the disqualification operates to cancel the licence as from the commencement of the period of disqualification."
Sections 43(3aa) and (4)-(6) inclusive are not relevant for present purposes. S43 was amended on 1st December 1999 but those amendments are not relevant to any issues raised on this appeal.
"169A Where, pursuant to this Act or any other Act, a court orders that a convicted person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence, the court may, if it is satisfied that reasonable cause exists for doing so, order that the disqualification take effect from a day or hour subsequent to the making of the order."
"31(1) Subject to subsection (2), the court by which a sentence of imprisonment is imposed may direct that the sentence be cumulative upon any other sentence, or sentences, of imprisonment then being served, or to be served, by the defendant."
Subsection (2) has no relevance for present purposes. Ms Lee-Justine argued that without s31(1), any sentence would operate as from the time it is imposed. I do not think it is necessary to draw any analogy with s31(1) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act. The interpretation of s169A in Boehm v Milham and Nowak establishes that there is power to order cumulative periods of licence disqualification.
"It seems to me that in most cases the provisions of s47B(3)(b) will constitute 'reasonable cause' for the purpose of s169A for making licence disqualifications cumulative, in the ordinary course, for repeat offences under s47B. In my opinion, that would be sufficient to require the Court in this case to make the periods of disqualification cumulative, unless there were special circumstances applicable to the respondent which require that they be concurrent."
With respect, I do not accept that there should be some qualification of the words "reasonable cause" in s169A. They give a wide discretion to the court and the discretion should not be circumscribed by notions that it may only be exercised in favour of concurrency only in an "unusual case" or where there are "special circumstances".
"It is both impracticable and undesirable to attempt to lay down comprehensive principles according to which a sentencing judge may determine, in every case, whether sentences should be ordered to be served concurrently or consecutively. According to an inflexible Draconian logic, all sentences should be consecutive, because every offence, as a separate case of criminal liability, would justify the exaction of a separate penalty. But such a logic could never hold. When an accused is on trial it is part of the procedural privilege to which he is entitled that he should be made aware of precisely what charges he is to meet. But the practice and principles of sentencing owe little to such procedure; what is fitting is that a convicted prisoner should be sentenced, not simply and indiscriminately for every act that can be singled out and brought within the compass of a technically identifiable conviction, but for what, viewing the circumstances broadly and reasonably, can be characterised as his criminal conduct. Sometimes, a single act of criminal conduct will comprise two or more technically identified crimes. Sometimes, two or more technically identified crimes will comprise two or more courses of criminal conduct that, reasonably characterized, are really separate invasions of the community's right to peace and order, notwithstanding that they are historically interdependent; the courses of criminal conduct may coincide with the technical offences or they may not. Sometimes, the process of characterization rests upon an analysis of fact and degree leading to two possible answers, each of which, in the hands of the trial judge, could be made to work justice. The practice of imposing either concurrent or consecutive sentences cannot avoid creating anomalies, or apparent anomalies, from time to time. What must be done is to use the various tools of analysis to mould a just sentence for the conduct of which the prisoner has been guilty. Where there are truly two or more incursions into criminal conduct, consecutive sentences will generally be appropriate. Where, whatever the number of technically identifiable offences committed, the prisoner was truly engaged upon one multi-faceted course of criminal conduct, the judge is likely to find concurrent sentences just and convenient. There are dangers in each course. Where consecutive sentences are imposed it may be thought that they are kept artificially apart where they should, to some extent, overlap. Where concurrent sentences are imposed, there is the danger that the primary term does not adequately reflect the aggravated nature of each important feature of the criminal conduct under consideration."
# FITZGERALD
POLICE No. SCGRG-00-327 \[2000\] SASC 168
(1977) 16 SASR 266
(1980) 24 SASR 98
(1982) 30 SASR 84