14 It is against those observations that the costs argument here before the Court must be considered. The basis upon which it was argued that the public interest questions raised by Mr Field's application, provided a proper footing for a departure from the usual costs order, was not dealt with in any detail.
15 What must be considered, nevertheless, in resolving that issue, it seems to me, is that what was dealt with in the June judgment was firstly, the question of whether the application had been brought within time, given when the alleged arrangement in question had come to an end; and secondly, the application for extension of time to bring the proceedings, as provided for by s 108B(3) of the Act, given the conclusion that the proceedings had been brought out of time.
16 I concluded that the application for an extension of time had to be refused, because the necessary 'exceptional circumstances justifying the making of the late application', required by s 108B(3) had not been established on the evidence.
17 In support of the out of time application, it had been argued for Mr Field, amongst other things, that '[s]erious points of public law were raised by the application, which it was in the public interest for a court of superior record to determine. Questions of the validity of the appointment of an administrator under the National Parks and Wildlife Amendment (Jenolan Caves Reserves) Act 2005 arose. There had been a hiatus in the way the Jenolan Caves and Jenolan Caves House had been administered' (at [25]).
18 That argument was also relied upon in relation to the question of costs, to make good the submission that these proceedings raised public interest questions, which would lead to the exercise of a discretion against the making of the usual costs order.
19 I am unable to accept that argument. While Mr Field wished to argue that the administrator had been invalidly appointed, that argument was to be advanced in the context of a claim brought under s 106 of the Act, for orders of avoidance and variation of the arrangement which Mr Field claimed he had entered with various of the respondents, and under which he performed work in the conduct and operation of Jenolan Caves House. That claim provided the foundation for money orders sought in his favour, of over $46 million.
20 Undoubtedly, the operation of Jenolan Caves is a matter in which the public interest arises, as is the validity of the appointment of an administrator of the Trust operating the Caves. Unlike Oshlack, however, the public interest in such matters was not the purpose for which they were sought to be raised in these proceedings. Rather, they were raised in order to support Mr Field's personal interest in the claims he wished to advance in the proceedings, in relation to the arrangement under which he claimed to have performed work for the respondents.
21 There is nothing wrong with Mr Field making and pursuing such an application, indeed, unlike the circumstances dealt with in Oshlack, having such a personal interest in the arrangement which he sought to attack, was fundamental to Mr Field's standing to bring the proceedings. It follows, nevertheless, that the proceedings which Mr Field wished to pursue under s 106 were quite different to the application dealt with in Oshlack. Mr Field sought to pursue matters of personal, not public concern. In Oshlack the legislation being dealt with permitted persons who had no personal interest in the development application in question, to bring the proceedings which had been initiated in the Land and Environment Court. That legislation had at its heart, important public interest considerations, reflected in the wide class of persons empowered to bring the proceedings in question. This legislative scheme, by way of contrast, restricts those who might initiate proceedings under s 106 of the Act, in quite a different way (see s 108).
22 That does not mean that s 106 proceedings may not raise public interest considerations. The statutory scheme itself points to such a possibility. The orders contemplated by s 107 of the Act for instance, show that a wider class of persons than the parties to the immediate proceedings, may be affected by, or interested in the proceedings in question. Section 146 of the Act also requires that the Court must take the public interest into account, when exercising its functions, including those arising under s 106. Nevertheless, it must be concluded that questions touching upon the public interest were not before the Court to be dealt with in the June judgment. Then, the Court was concerned with the time at which the alleged arrangement between the parties had come to an end; whether the proceedings had been brought within the time fixed by the Act for the commencement of s 106 proceedings and whether the evidence permitted the granting of an extension of time, given the provisions made in s 108B(3). None of those matters raised public interest questions.
23 In those circumstances, I am unable to conclude that Mr Field established any basis for a discretionary departure from the usual costs order. No different conclusion could flow from the time at which the costs order was sought, given the provision made in Rule 203.