Principles
7 The principles applicable to determining whether to order security are uncontroversial.
8 In All Class Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Chubb Insurance Australia Limited [2020] FCA 840 (All Class Insurance), Allsop CJ stated at [42]-[44]:
The Court's discretion to require the provision of security for costs is broad and the factors informing the exercise of that discretion cannot be stated exhaustively. The only limitation is that the discretion be exercised judicially: Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation [1984] FCAFC 29; 2 FCR 1 at 3. The matter which lies at the heart of the discretion is one of fairness, both in terms of whether security should be granted, and if so, in what amount: Madgwick v Kelly [2013] FCAFC 61; 212 FCR 1 at 21 [92]. The Court aims to achieve a "balance between ensuring that adequate and fair protection is provided to the defendants, and avoiding injustice to an impecunious plaintiff by unnecessarily shutting it out or prejudicing it in the conduct of the proceedings": Rosenfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bain & Co (1988) 14 ACLR 467 at 470 (Giles J).
The Court's discretion should be exercised having regard to all of the circumstances of the case (see Merribee Pastoral Industries Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1998] HCA 41; 193 CLR 502 at 513 [26] (Kirby J)). There are a number of well-established factors relevant to the Court's exercise. These include (see KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 76; 56 FCR 189 at 197-198 per Beazley J): whether the application for security for costs has been brought promptly; the strength and bona fides of the applicant's case; whether the applicant's impecuniosity was caused by the respondent's conduct subject of the claim; whether the respondent's application for security is oppressive, in the sense that it is being used merely to deny an impecunious applicant a right to litigate; and whether there are any persons standing behind the company who are likely to benefit from the litigation and who are willing to provide the necessary security.
An additional factor to add to this list is whether there are aspects of public interest which weigh in the balance against the making of an order (see Equity Access Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1989] FCA 520; ATPR 40-972 at 50,635 per Hill J).
9 Similar statements of principle are set out in Kayler-Thomson v Colonial First State Investments Ltd [2020] FCA 1867 at [8] (per Beach J), Abbott v Zoetis Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019] FCA 462; 369 ALR 512 at [15] (per Lee J) and Concrete Mining Structures Pty Ltd v Cellcrete Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 360 at [13] (per Edelman J).
10 In Hardingham v RP Data Pty Limited [2020] FCA 1062, Burley J stated at [9]:
Whilst courts are reluctant to order that an impecunious applicant, being a natural person, provide security where the effect would be to stifle that person's access to the courts, where such a person has already obtained access to a court and has received a decision dismissing the claim, the position is different. That is because at the appellant level, there has already been a determination adverse to the person against whom security for costs is sought: see Tran v The Commonwealth [2009] FCA 921 at [3] - [6]; Frigger v Kitay [2019] FCA 624 at [35] and the authorities cited there.
11 In Etnyre v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 610 (Etnyre), Abraham J stated at [11]:
It has been recognised that, although courts are disinclined to order security against natural persons, as Lindgren J observed in Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 764 at [32]-[33], being a natural person is no bar to an order for security for costs particularly when coupled with other factors. Lindgren J in [33] referred to circumstances … which might lead to an order for a natural person to provide security, particularly when in combination with impecuniosity.