Dishonesty in the commission of the offence
34Having come to that conclusion Abadee J did not need to address an alternative submission that if conduct or behaviour answering the description of fraud or dishonesty was involved in the commission of the offence, it would be an "offence involving dishonesty". Abadee J dealt with that alternative submission in the following way at 663:
The offence under s 227(2)(b) is concerned with the conviction of the person charged, of an offence, 'involving fraud or dishonesty'. The inquiry is directed towards ascertaining whether fraud or dishonesty was 'involved' in the offence. The word used in the section is 'involving' and not 'of'. In my view 'involving' is a word that should be given its ordinary meaning. Were it necessary for me to finally determine Mr Farmer's alternative submission, I would be disposed to the view that if conduct or behaviour answering the description of fraud or dishonesty was involved in commission of the earlier offence, then, the offence under s 227(2)(b) would be established.' (Emphasis added)
35In RTA v Sharp Towing Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADTAP 49 the Appeal Panel applied the dicta in Pollard. The relevant provision in that case was s 58 of the Tow Truck Industry Act 1998 (NSW) which makes it an offence for a licensee to contravene a condition of the licence. The condition which had been contravened was that the licensee "must not charge a fee for the towing, salvage or storage of motor vehicle that exceeds any maximum fees determined by [the administrator]. . ." Any offence "involving fraud, dishonesty or stealing" was a prescribed offence under the statutory scheme: Tow Truck Industry Regulation 1999 (NSW), Reg 7.
36The Appeal Panel concluded at [51] that, "[W]hile there can be innocent explanations for excessive charging, sometimes the explanations will only be consistent with dishonesty on the part of the person engaging in excessive charging. It may be possible to form a view based on the court material that such is the case. . . The word 'involving' can, it seems to me, be interpreted as allowing reference to the circumstances of an offence, not merely the terms of the offence provisions."
37The Tribunal at first instance in this case followed the Appeal Panel's decision in RTA v Sharp Towing Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADTAP 49 and an earlier decision of the Tribunal in Joyce v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2000] NSWADT 17. In Joyce, the Tribunal decided at [18] that the offence of "goods in custody reasonably suspected of being stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained" (Crimes Act 1900, s 527C) was an offence "involving dishonesty" because:
A person would be acting dishonestly or deceitfully where that person fails to disclose to police that goods have come into his or her custody in circumstances where that person has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the goods have been stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained.
38There are several reasons why we now prefer the narrower approach of confining the Tribunal's consideration to the offence itself.
39Firstly, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the provision refers to a conviction for an offence involving dishonesty. The provision does not permit an inquiry into the conduct or state of mind of the person concerned when committing the offence. The applicant's counsel gave an extreme example to illustrate the consequences of adopting that interpretation. If a person is convicted of murder but dishonestly lured the person to a remote location before killing that person, the offence would be one involving dishonesty.
40Secondly, if the broader interpretation is applied, there would be a practical onus on the person to prove that he had not acted in a dishonest manner or did not have a dishonest state of mind. In relation to the factual situation in Sharp Towing, the applicant would have to prove that he did not act dishonestly in charging a particular fee. That would require a separate factual inquiry and decision on the part of the decision maker. It is unlikely that the legislature intended that such an inquiry be carried out in circumstances where disqualification is mandatory upon conviction of a particular kind of offence.
41Thirdly, for the reasons we have given, the phrase should not be given a broad interpretation because the effect of disqualification is that a person will lose their livelihood.
42Our conclusion is that it is the offence itself that must 'involve dishonesty.' It is not permissible to look behind the conviction for that offence to consider the particular facts of the case. The agreed facts on which a guilty plea is based, the findings of the court in relation to a contested hearing and the sentencing remarks are not relevant. Those matters cannot be relied on to find that the person has engaged in dishonest conduct or behaviour or had a particular state of mind which was dishonest. In the words of Bell J, the offence must be one which involves dishonesty "without further inquiry".
43Having come to that view we extend the appeal to the merits of the Tribunal's decision to consider whether the offence in this case is an "offence involving dishonesty".