Consideration
20 The MCI proposition is that, in the circumstances, it has a sufficient interest to be joined as a party. It asserts both a legal or equitable estate or interest in the land or waters the subject of the present claim, or some other right, charge, power or privilege over or in connection with that land or waters, so as to enliven either subcl (a) or (b) of the definition of "interest" in s 253 of the NT Act. Its submissions assert that it is an appropriate and necessary party because -
(1) the detailed agreement to operate intramurally between the Mirning People who constitute part of the claim group and the Far West Coast People who also constitute part of the claim group referred to above was not negotiated, finalised or executed; or
(2) such an agreement, if it was sufficiently established, has not been complied with; and
(3) the role of FWCTLA in conducting and administering the present claim is either inappropriate or invalid because it does not allow sufficient input from, and decision-making having regard to, the interests of the subgroup comprising the Mirning People for consultation with them so that (as I anticipated above) critical relationships may be breaking down.
21 A starting point to determine whether, in those circumstances, MCI has a sufficient interest to be eligible to be joined as a party to the proceeding is provided by the decision in Byron Environment Centre Inc v Arakwal People (1997) 78 FCR 1 (Byron Bay). That case concerned a legislative ancestor of s 84(5), which was introduced by the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth). It is not said in submissions that the principles there expressed are no longer appropriate, because of that amendment, subject to one matter to which I shall refer. The legislative ancestor of s 84(5) was then s 68(2)(a) of the NT Act. In that case, Black CJ said at 7-8:
The nature and content of the right to become a party to proceedings for the determination of native title, with the power as a party in effect to veto the process of mediation and conciliation which the Act favours, suggests that the interests with which s 68(2)(a) and the related sections dealing with parties are concerned are interests that are not indirect, remote or lacking substance. The nature and content of the right also suggests that the interests must be capable of clear definition and, equally importantly, that they are of such a character that they may be affected in a demonstrable way by a determination in relation to the application. …
It does not follow, however, that the objects of the Act would be advanced if s 68(2)(a) and related provisions concerning parties were interpreted as extending to interests and affectations of an emotional, conscientious, ideological or intellectual kind only.
22 Black CJ then continued at 9-10:
The formation of an association or the incorporation of a body with particular objects will not, of itself, create interests that may be affected for the purposes of provisions in the Act relating to parties. … [A] body that represents the interests of others whose members have interests that may be affected, does not, for that reason alone, become a person whose interests are affected; such interests as it thereby has are wholly indirect.
This is not to deny that a corporation may have interests that may be affected by a determination of native title if, for example, its activities might be curtailed or otherwise significantly affected by the determination.
23 Merkel J at 43 made a similar point. His Honour pointed out that the problem arising in respect of an organisation representing members who have interests that may be affected by a determination is that the interests of the organisation are indirect. In other words, it is the interests of the members, rather than those of the incorporated association representing them, that may be affected in the relevant sense. The principles laid down in Byron Bay have been applied in a number of subsequent cases: Woodridge v Minister for Land and Water Conservation for the State of New South Wales [2001] FCA 419; (2001) 108 FCR 527; Dann on behalf of the Amangu People v Western Australia [2006] FCA 1249; Budby on behalf of the Barada Barna People v Queensland [2010] FCA 1017; Adnyamathanha People No 1 v South Australia [2003] FCA 1377; (2003) 133 FCR 242; Harrington-Smith on behalf of The Wongatha People v Western Australia [2002] FCA 184; Bisset v Minister for Land and Water Conservation for the State of New South Wales [2002] FCA 365; Davis-Hurst v New South Wales Minister for Land and Water Conservation [2003] FCA 541; Woodridge v Minister for Land and Water Conservation for the State of New South Wales [2002] FCA 1109; (2002) 122 FCR 190.
24 Counsel for MCI suggested that the High Court decision in Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591 had qualified that position. The appellant in that case had brought proceedings in this Court relying upon s 80 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TP Act) seeking an order declaring that certain statements of the respondent, about anticipated traffic volumes in a prospectus inviting the public to subscribe for securities in unit trusts ultimately involving an investment in a proposed toll road, were misleading and deceptive. The appellant had relied upon s 80 for its standing. That section authorised the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission "or any person" to seek injunctive relief in respect of a contravention of the TP Act. The point specifically decided by the High Court, relevant to the present proceeding, is that s 80 and s 163A of the TP Act, insofar as those provisions authorise the making of applications for injunctive and declaratory relief were not invalid insofar as they purport to confer standing on an entity such as the present applicant to bring the proceeding.
25 The unsuccessful contention was that Chapter III of the Constitution was an exhaustive statement of the jurisdiction of the High Court and of other Federal Courts, so that the Commonwealth was not empowered to make laws which might extend the capacity of individuals or corporate entities to make application where there was no justiciable controversy except in the circumstances referred to, and of a general nature.
26 To state the nature of that case is to indicate why, in my view, it does not inform in any relevant way the resolution of the present issue. More particularly, I do not consider that it qualifies the jurisprudence which has developed around the meaning of the word "interests", or the scope of the word "interests", in s 84(5) of the NT Act. There was no issue in that particular proceeding as to whether it was in fact in the public interest to enable the appellant, or more generally an individual entity or person, to seek to enforce the performance of the statutory obligations imposed by the TP Act. It did not discuss in any detail the nature or circumstances in which an individual might or might not be permitted to bring such a proceeding under that Act.
27 Accordingly, I propose to apply the test expressed in Byron Bay, as applied in the other cases referred to. Before doing so, I note that there are circumstances in which a member of the native title claim group may be joined as a respondent party under s 84(5) of the NT Act. That was implicitly recognised in Kokatha Native Title Claim v South Australia (2005) 143 FCR 544 at [26] where it was said:
The power in s 84(5) is discretionary. It can be exercised to prevent a flood of individuals, as members of a communal group who claim to have native title rights and interests over all or part of a claim area and whose rights and interests may be affected by a determination, from becoming parties. In circumstances where there are a number of such individuals, it would not necessarily be the first such individual who would be the appropriate party. It will often be a matter for evidence as to whether any one individual has either a particular status or a particular perspective or particular circumstances which warrant that person's joinder as a party, including that person's status within the putative or competing claim group. It may be relevant to know the extent to which that person or persons has the support of, or is entitled to represent, the interests of the putative or competing claim group. No hard and fast rules can be laid down.
In that case, one of a number of proposed respondent parties was joined because those respondent parties thought that their interests would be affected by the determination in the proceedings, and it was in the interests of justice that one rather than all of the individuals should be represented. See also Combined Dulabed Malenbarra/Yidinji Peoples v Queensland (2004) 139 FCR 96 at [45] per Spender J and Combined Dulabed and Malenbarra/Yidinji Peoples v Queensland (2004) 214 ALR 306 per Kiefel J at [12]. See also per French J (as his Honour then was) in Akiba & Others on behalf of the Torres Strait Regional Seas Claim People v State of Queensland (No 2) (2006) 154 FCR 513 at [33]. In that case, French J concluded that the person seeking to be joined as a party did have an interest that may be affected by a determination in the proceedings, but in the exercise of his discretion he should not be joined as a party.
28 This application is not one in which individual members of the native title claim group, for the reasons of dissent or concern which they have expressed in their affidavits, are seeking to be joined as respondent parties. Nor is it one where a person or persons who claim to be members of a different native title claim group, having interests over some part of the claim area, seek to be joined as respondent to the claim. If any such application is made, it will need to be considered. (I note that, separately, by motion, Michael Laing has applied for an order that he be recognised as a member of the native title claim group and for other orders. That motion is shortly to be heard.) MCI is a step removed from such individual or collective interests. To the extent to which the material demonstrates that the interests of a particular subgroup of the native title claim group, or of some persons who are members of such a subgroup, may be affected by a determination in the proceedings, those persons who are members of the native title claim group, who assert that intramurally their interests are not being protected adequately (a matter which might be addressed following the establishment of an appropriate prescribed body corporate) or possibly because they are persons who assert that native title rights and interests over or in respect of some of the claim area presently the subject of the combined claim is, in fact, held by a limited or more confined claim group of which they are members. In either event, those persons might apply to be joined as respondents, although clearly they would not be given leave to be joined as a respondent without identifying clearly what status they claim. It is not appropriate to anticipate such an application, nor to finally determine whether those persons or some of them may have an interest recognised by s 84(5).
29 However, in my view, MCI does not itself have a sufficient interest for the purposes of s 84(5) to be joined as a respondent party to the present application. The objects of MCI as set out above do not include any basis upon which it, itself, could assert a direct entitlement to interests in the land or waters which constitute the present claim area. That is so whether one refers to those interests as native title rights and interests or other legal or equitable rights and interests in the claim area. Its constitution does not contemplate that it would hold any interests. Its purposes as described in its Rules are defined and discrete and their fulfilment will not be impeded by a determination of native title rights and interests. To the extent to which interests of its members may be affected by a determination, they are presently members of the native title claim group and they are not as individuals either collectively or individually seeking to be joined as respondents. Nor are they collectively or individually seeking to assert that the claim itself should not proceed (subject to any comments above).
30 In my view, MCI is simply intended to act as a mouthpiece for those whose interests arguably may be affected by a determination in the proceedings. It cannot convert that role into interests in the claim area which it itself asserts in terms of s 253, or s 84(5) of the NT Act.
31 I conclude that the particular ways in which the MCI asserts that its interests may be affected, when stated baldly, demonstrate that it does not have an interest or interests which will be affected by a determination in the proceedings. It will still be able to function. It will still be able to pursue its objectives. Its concerns about how the conduct of the claim presently being conducted is being pursued and managed are not interests which it itself has and which may be affected by a determination in the proceedings. As I have indicated, to the extent to which there may be such valid consensus (or interests) on the part of some or all of its members, they are the interests of those persons and not the interests of MCI. It may continue to protect and preserve Mirning culture, language and heritage. Such role as it is permitted under the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (SA) is not impaired by the determination. It is not necessary to decide whether MCI itself is qualified to play a role under that Act.
32 For those reasons, in my judgment the application should be refused.
I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Mansfield.