Therefore I believe this patient had a breach of duty of care to recognise the severity of his illness and to allow such a person to undergo such a severe weight loss, that metabolic and neurological complications including psychotic depression, which eventually left him with chronic ill-health and which at this stage is likely to be irreversible. There is a clear causal relationship between acute cholecystitis, the delay for surgery and the secondary long term disabilities."
18 It is unnecessary to refer in any detail to Dr Smith's final report dated 30 July 2009.
19 At my request, counsel for the defendant prepared an extremely helpful chronology of the medical and legal events that arguably bear upon the present inquiry. It is clear from the detail of that chronology that the defendant will maintain that much of what befell the plaintiff stemmed from his own conduct, including the fact that he discharged himself from hospitals under the control of the defendant without informing the medical staff of his intention to do so and in circumstances where it was patently against his best medical interests. The defendant has also sought to emphasise that the medical reports served by the plaintiff do not speak with one voice on the issues that are called up for consideration by rule 31.36. In this respect the defendant made the following submission:
"9. The plaintiff's medical evidence when read in total can point to no breach of any duty of care by any of the hospitals that the plaintiff has presented to. Furthermore, the plaintiff's medical evidence (despite the volume of evidence obtained and referred to in the attached chronology) can point to no causal relationship between any such alleged breach of duty and any alleged damage suffered by the plaintiff. With respect, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the necessary requirements of the UCPR."
20 As earlier indicated, one of the problems in analysing the issue of whether or not the plaintiff has complied with the rule flows from the wholly inadequate nature of the pleadings. Far from being able to compare the medical evidence with a properly pleaded and recognisable cause of action, the expert opinions are to some extent without any proper legal framework or structure within the context of which they can meaningfully be analysed or considered.
21 It is reasonably apparent that the plaintiff wishes to allege that he presented to the hospital with an acute condition for which he should have been, but was not, treated in a timely way. He suffered longer than he should have as a result and arguably went on to sustain additional complicating conditions. Undoubtedly there will be a significant debate in due course about the legal and medical issues of causation in these circumstances and about the nature and the extent of any loss for which the defendant might arguably be liable. The approach to the issues referred to in rule 31.36 taken by Dr Smith is slightly ambiguous in some respects but the overall thrust of his analysis leads me to conclude that the opinions he expresses are sufficiently clear to satisfy the rule.
22 Moreover, despite the difficulties with the case as pleaded, or on one view in the absence of a pleaded case, I consider that there are insufficient grounds to dismiss the proceedings pursuant to rule 31.36(3). In Salzke v Khoury [2009] NSWCA 195, Basten JA made some particular remarks at [113] - [114], and also at [122] - [123], which are pertinent in the circumstances of this case and bear repeating:
"[113] I agree with the orders proposed by Ipp JA, and with his Honour's reasons. Some further comments are apposite in relation to the underlying purpose of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (NSW), r 31.36 and hence the considerations which should inform its application.