Operation of the FW Act and the Award upon an employment relationship
73 As the extracts from the amended statement of claim set out earlier reveal, the applicant's case was focussed almost entirely on the nature of the work done by the cabin crew in question, coupled with a concentration on the place where some work was done. The applicant argued that, as the Award applied in terms to the work of cabin crew, when "domestic" flying was carried out in Australia the Award should be taken to apply to the employment relationship in question, and the relevant employer and employees were to be regarded as a national system employer and national system employees.
74 The respondents argued that in order for the FW Act to apply the applicant must show that the employment relationship itself, between TET and Valuair and their cabin crew employees supplied to Jetstar, may be said to be "in and of Australia".
75 I accept the respondents' contention that the FW Act and the Award apply to employment relationships rather than simply to particular work, so that it is necessary first to identify an appropriate connection linking the employment relationship sufficiently with Australia. In my view, the applicant's approach ignored the overall employment relationship and the contractual setting which underpinned it and should not be accepted.
76 The Award, those parts of the FW Act which give it force and those parts of the FW Act which enact National Employment Standards all depend in the first instance upon a relationship of employment - that is, a relationship based upon and arising from a contract of employment; not a relationship arising from a contract of a different kind. Under a contract of employment, the performance of work is usually part of the consideration provided by an employee, just as the payment of wages or salary is usually part of the consideration provided by an employer. However, those circumstances (performance of work and financial reward in return) are not themselves sufficient to identify a contract of employment. They are also hallmarks of a contract "for services" of an individual kind which is a common method for the provision of labour in Australia. It is therefore important, at the outset, to establish the existence of a contract of employment. It is upon that legal circumstance, not just the performance of work, that awards operate.
77 As the majority judgment in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 ("Byrne") pointed out (at 420):
A right to the payment of award rates is imported by statute into the employment relationship, which is contractual in origin, and, express promise apart, it is only in that sense that it can be said that award rates are imported into the contract of employment. The award regulates what would otherwise be governed by the contract [of employment].
(Emphasis added.)
78 In the same case McHugh and Gummow JJ referred (at 462) with apparent approval to observations by Beaumont and Heerey JJ that:
… awards will always operate alongside employment contracts, or in a contractual milieu, …
79 As these passages illustrate, it is the contract of employment, and the employment relationship thereby established, upon which awards (given legal force and effect by the FW Act) traditionally operate.
80 Since at least the Work Choices Case (New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1), the exercise of power by the Commonwealth Parliament about industrial matters, and terms and conditions of employment, has depended primarily on the corporations power in s 51(xx) of the Constitution rather than primarily on the conciliation and arbitration power in s 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the award system remains directed at employment; not simply at work. Before any occasion arises to consider what an award (or the FW Act) may say about particular work and how it may be rewarded or regulated, it is first necessary to be satisfied that the award or statutory provisions in question are directed to the particular contract of employment and employment relationship.
81 In Barnett v Territory Insurance Office (2011) 196 FCR 116, Mansfield J put it thus (at [24]):
24 … underpinning every employment relationship is a common law contract of employment that is a contract under which a person agrees to work for another person in return for remuneration. The existence, for example, of an award does not create the relationship of employer and employee. That arises from the agreement between the employer to engage, and the employee to be engaged in employment. The contract of employment may, subject to the law, specify the detailed terms and conditions of that employment relationship. If relevant statutory provisions or instruments such as an award or enterprise agreement sourced from a workplace law or the NES, are superimposed over that contract of employment, the agreed terms of the contract are either suppressed or unlawful to that extent. But the contract of employment itself stands. The legislative structures are built upon the premise of an agreement to employ and to be employed.
and (at [40]):
40 It is plain enough from the FW Act that it operates within a framework of a series of relationships between employers and employees. Within that relationship it prescribes minimum terms and conditions through the NES, modern awards and national minimal wage orders: s 3(d) and (f) including reference to the NES in Pt 2.2 of the Act which prescribes minimum terms and conditions that apply to all national system employees.
82 Moreover, it is not usually the case that an award applies to a contract of employment in some partial or fragmented way. It is not necessary to dwell in this case on the exceptional circumstance where that might possibly happen.
83 Normally, in keeping with the statutory scheme, an award applies to, and supplements, a contract of employment in a comprehensive way. That basic notion found no reflection in the pleaded case which sought to establish some form of partial award application to a minority of duties. In my view, that approach was artificial and unsatisfactory. If accepted, it would have introduced considerable complexity and uncertainty into the legal relationships between the parties to each of the contracts of employment.
84 TET and Valuair are foreign corporations. Their cabin crew employees are not resident in Australia. The contracts of employment in the present case were made outside Australia and they are regulated by the laws and practices of either Singapore or Thailand. Payment of wages is made and tax, social security and other liabilities on both employer and employee are acquitted outside Australia. Tours of duty commence and finish at the home base outside Australia. The time on duty in Australia of any of the cabin crew represents only a small proportion of overall working time, and is transient.
85 It is, in my respectful view, incorrect to postulate that the contracts of employment, or the employment relationships, are in and of Australia in any respect. It is also incorrect to postulate that the Award operates on those (overseas) contracts of employment.
86 Leaving the Award aside altogether, the opposite conclusion would mean that, whatever might be the effect of the Award, many other provisions of the FW Act would also apply to the employment by Valuair and TET of the eight cabin crew in the present case. Section 60 of the FW Act has the effect that s 61 and the provisions establishing National Employment Standards apply to national system employers and national systems employees. Section 61 of the FW Act provides:
61 The National Employment Standards are minimum standards applying to employment of employees
(1) This Part sets minimum standards that apply to the employment of employees which cannot be displaced, even if an enterprise agreement includes terms of the kind referred to in subsection 55(5).
Note: Subsection 55(5) allows enterprise agreements to include terms that have the same (or substantially the same) effect as provisions of the National Employment Standards.
(2) The minimum standards relate to the following matters:
(a) maximum weekly hours (Division 3);
(b) requests for flexible working arrangements (Division 4);
(c) parental leave and related entitlements (Division 5);
(d) annual leave (Division 6);
(e) personal/carer's leave and compassionate leave (Division 7);
(f) community service leave (Division 8);
(g) long service leave (Division 9);
(h) public holidays (Division 10);
(i) notice of termination and redundancy pay (Division 11);
(j) Fair Work Information Statement (Division 12).
(3) Divisions 3 to 12 constitute the National Employment Standards.
(Emphasis in original.)
87 Section 61 makes it clear that the National Employment Standards apply to "employment", rather than just to particular work. If Valuair and TET are national system employers, and if the National Employment Standards apply to those of their employees who are national system employees, there would be no apparent reason to confine those standards to work done in Australia. They would apply to the whole of the employment and purport, under Australian law, to override the contracts of employment. That would appear an odd result to a Singaporean or Thai national, and no doubt also to the courts and regulatory authorities in those countries if asked to deal with any contractual or other disputes. I am satisfied that the FW Act does not operate in that way. It does not so operate because the operation of the FW Act is not at large. Apart from the international understanding about extra-territorial operation of domestic legislation, s 21(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act declares the general intention of Parliament that its Acts not apply in that way unless such an intention appears. In the FW Act itself such a contrary intention does appear, in precisely specified respects, in ss 33 and 34 (which are not relevant to the present case). But there is no apparent intent that, for matters relevant to the present case, such a result, departing from the generally understood position, should be imputed.
88 Additionally, each of the respondents also relied upon ss 47(3) and 48(5) of the FW Act, to which should be added a reference to ss 45, 46 and 47(1). Those various provisions are as follows:
45 Contravening a modern award
A person must not contravene a term of a modern award.
Note 1: This section is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).
Note 2: A person does not contravene a term of a modern award unless the award applies to the person: see subsection 46(1).
46 The significance of a modern award applying to a person
(1) A modern award does not impose obligations on a person, and a person does not contravene a term of a modern award, unless the award applies to the person.
(2) A modern award does not give a person an entitlement unless the award applies to the person.
Note: Subsection (2) does not affect the ability of outworker terms in a modern award to be enforced under Part 4-1 in relation to outworkers who are not employees.
47 When a modern award applies to an employer, employee, organisation or outworker entity
When a modern award applies to an employee, employer, organisation or outworker entity
(1) A modern award applies to an employee, employer, organisation or outworker entity if:
(a) the modern award covers the employee, employer, organisation or outworker entity; and
(b) the modern award is in operation; and
(c) no other provision of this Act provides, or has the effect, that the modern award does not apply to the employee, employer, organisation or outworker entity.
Note 1: Section 57 provides that a modern award does not apply to an employee (or to an employer, or an employee organisation, in relation to the employee) in relation to particular employment at a time when an enterprise agreement applies to the employee in relation to that employment.
Note 2: In a modern award, coverage of an outworker entity must be expressed to relate only to outworker terms: see subsection 143(4).
…
Modern awards apply to employees in relation to particular employment
(3) A reference in this Act to a modern award applying to an employee is a reference to the award applying to the employee in relation to particular employment.
48 When a modern award covers an employer, employee, organisation or outworker entity
…
Modern awards cover employees in relation to particular employment
(5) A reference to a modern award covering an employee is a reference to the award covering the employee in relation to particular employment.
(Emphasis in original.)
89 It is clear from ss 47(3) and 48(5), in particular, that by virtue of the FW Act awards apply to and cover "particular employment". That is not the same thing as particular work. The particular employment must be judged by reference to all the circumstances. In the present case, it is quite insufficient to isolate a minority of duties and working time and inappropriate to divorce those matters from the employment relationship as a whole.
90 I am satisfied, as I have said, that the FW Act does not apply to the employment of the cabin crew in question, that TET and Valuair are not national system employers, and that the eight cabin crew are not national system employees. The employment to which the present proceedings relate (i.e. employment by Valuair and TET) is not "in and of Australia". The FW Act does not apply the Award to that employment, or to a minority of the duties performed in that employment.