Consideration
17 Accordingly, I am satisfied on the evidence that there is a prima facie case, for the purposes of r 10.43(4)(c), that the chief engineer was underpaid wages while engaged on the voyage of Turmoil between Port Botany and Brisbane commencing on 25 February 2013.
18 It is safe to infer for the purposes of r 10.43(4)(c) that Turmoil sailed on that voyage within the extended jurisdictional area provided in reg 1.15E(1), namely, the exclusive economic zone or the waters above the continental shelf, to the extent she sailed outside the territorial sea.
19 I am satisfied that the maritime labour certificate, dated 7 August 2013, issued by the Republic of Panama established a prima facie case that Turmoil had been flagged in Panama from 8 August 2011 as an oil or chemical tanker and that she was owned by Transpetrol.
20 I am also satisfied by the evidence of the solicitor for the Ombudsman, Kerry O'Brien, that Norway is a party to the Hague Convention and that Transpetrol's address is Knud Askers vei 20B, 1383 Asker, Norway.
21 The objections to jurisdiction raised by Transpetrol's solicitors in their letter of 14 December 2016 sought to address whether the Court had power under r 10.43(4)(a) to order service out and, so far as it may bear on the question of discretion to do so, the strength of any prima facie case that the Ombudsman demonstrated under subr (c). It is convenient to note that the proceeding satisfies r 10.43(4)(b) because it is of a kind mentioned in each of items 14 and 15 of the table to r 10.42, namely it is a proceeding "in relation to the construction, effect or enforcement of an Act, regulations or any other instrument having, or purporting to have, effect under an Act" (item 14) and "seeking any relief or remedy under an Act", namely the Fair Work Act and the pecuniary penalty sought (item 15).
22 The determination of a question as to the validity of the extended jurisdiction created by regs 1.15B and 1.15E under s 33(3) of the Fair Work Act appears to be within the contemplation of a proceeding covered by item 14. That is because Transpetrol has raised an issue as to whether Div 3 of Pt 1-3 of the Regulations is valid to the extent that it purported to extend the operation of the Act to Turmoil on each of the 10 voyages in question. Taking Transpetrol's objection at its highest, the Regulations "purport … to have effect" under the Fair Work Act. If, of course, the Regulations are valid, they have that effect. However, item 14 in the table to r 10.42 extends to a proceeding in which part of the justiciable controversy or matter includes a question about whether a regulation is intra or ultra vires. Moreover, under s 562 of the Fair Work Act, the Parliament conferred jurisdiction on this Court "in relation to any matter (whether civil or criminal) arising under this Act".
23 As Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ explained in Residual Assco Group Limited v Spalvins (2000) 202 CLR 629 at 639-640 [14], this Court has authority to make binding orders that proceedings are not within its jurisdiction. Their Honours pointed out that, under s 19(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (which provides that the Court has such original jurisdiction as is vested in it by laws made by the Parliament), this Court also has vested in it power to dismiss proceedings, for want of jurisdiction, over which it does not have jurisdiction.
24 Part of the controversy which Transpetrol claims to exist between it and the Ombudsman is whether it is amenable to this Court's jurisdiction by force of the Fair Work Act and the extension, pursuant to s 33(3), of the relevant provisions of that Act to Transpetrol's activities as an employer of crew on a ship engaged in coastal trading, as defined under the Regulations, that sails on voyages under the authority of a temporary licence under the Coastal Trading Act.
25 I am satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction to determine that controversy, namely, whether, in fact, the Court's jurisdiction has been validly extended, as reg 1.15E(1)(c) "purports" to do and as the Ombudsman alleges. That raises a similar issue to that decided in Pocomwell 218 FCR 94.
26 For these reasons, I am satisfied that there is a sufficient basis before me that the Court has jurisdiction for the purposes of r 10.43(4)(a).
27 As I have explained, the evidence of underpayment of the chief engineer on Turmoil during the voyage commencing on 25 February 2013 satisfies me that there is a prima facie case for some of the relief claimed in the proceedings, namely, relief by way of the award of a pecuniary penalty based on a contravention of s 45 of the Fair Work Act by Transpetrol in failing to pay the chief engineer his minimum rate of pay in accordance with cl 24 of the Award. I am also satisfied that, if that case is made out, there is a prima facie case that Transpetrol is liable to have an order made against it that it pay a pecuniary penalty for that contravention under s 546 of the Act.