Utility
182 The Primary Judge concluded, for the reasons described at [126] to [142] of these reasons, that none of the claims of the Patent Application are claims for a useful invention and thus the invention is not a "patentable invention": s 60(4); s 59(b) and s 18(1)(c). Section 18(1) of the Act, at the relevant date was, in relation to utility, in these terms:
18 Patentable inventions
Patentable inventions for the purposes of a standard patent
(1) Subject to subsection (2), an invention is a patentable invention for the purposes of a standard patent if the invention, so far as claimed in any claim:
…
(c) is useful;
…
183 Subsection (2) of s 18 is not relevant for present purposes. It should also be noted that for the reasons identified at [3] of these reasons, the definition of the term "useful" introduced into the Act on 15 April 2013 as s 7A formed no part of the legal framework at the relevant time.
184 The important thing to note about s 18(1)(c) of the Act is that an invention is rendered a patentable invention if the invention, so far as claimed in any claim, is useful.
185 It is now necessary to examine some aspects of the evolution of that statutory formulation. The statutory notion of a relationship between the invention "so far as claimed in any claim" and utility was first introduced into Commonwealth statutory patent law by the Patents Act 1952 (the "1952 Act"). The first Commonwealth Act relating to patents was the Patents Act 1903 (the "1903 Act"). That Act was amended in 1921 with further amending Acts passed in 1930, 1932, 1933 and 1935. The Statute Law Revision Act 1934 (Cth) repealed a number of provisions of the 1903 Act said by the Knowles Committee in its Report to be "obsolete provisions of the law". The Knowles Committee was established in 1935 by the then Attorney-General for the Commonwealth, the Rt Hon R G Menzies KC, to "consider what alterations were desirable in the patent law of the Commonwealth". The Chairman, Mr G S Knowles, was the then Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth. The Committee presented four reports and a draft Bill to give effect to its recommendations. The draft Bill was introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament. However, the outbreak of war in 1939 prevented the enactment of the Bill.
186 On 10 October 1950, Senator the Hon J A Spicer QC, the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth, established a Committee chaired by a Judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, the Hon Arthur Dean (the Dean Committee), to further consider what alterations might be desirable in the patent law of the Commonwealth. The Committee submitted a report on 17 April 1952 with a draft Bill which, in substance, became the 1952 Act.
187 The 1903 Act immediately prior to the enactment of the 1952 Act was cited as the Patents Act 1903-1950 (Cth). That Act contained provisions, among other things, relating to provisional and complete specifications. Section 36 provided that a complete specification "must end with a distinct statement of the invention claimed" [emphasis added]. Section 56 set out the grounds on which a person might oppose the grant of a patent accepted by the Commissioner. Those grounds did not include any ground that the invention was not useful.
188 Section 65 provided that a patent shall be granted for one invention only "but may contain more than one claim". Section 61 provided that "where the complete specification contains two or more claims in respect of the invention, the invalidity of any one shall not affect the validity of any other claim or the validity of the patent so far as it relates to any valid claim". At common law, the invalidity of any claim would avoid the patent and afford a good ground for its revocation. However, s 61 enabled the Court to revoke letters patent "as to claims that are bad, and to allow claims that are good, or are not attacked, to stand": Dabscheck v Hecla Electrics Pty Ltd (1936) 57 CLR 418 at 422, Starke J. Section 61 formed part of the 1903 Act (as s 61 although s 61 was cl 57 in the Bill) upon its enactment. As to cl 57, Senator Drake said this in the Senate Debate of 15 July 1903: "Clause 57 deals with a point about which there has been a difference of opinion, and that is that where there are two or more claims in the complete specification one claim may [by this Bill/Act] be held to be bad, without affecting the validity of the other claim or the patent".
189 Section 86 made provision for petitions to a relevant Court (the High Court or the Supreme Court of a State) for revocation of a patent on every ground "on which a patent might be repealed at common law by [the writ of] scire facias". The conventional view (and that of the Knowles Committee; see para 97 of the Knowles Report) was that the extensive British consolidating Act of 1932 which became cited as the Patents and Designs Act 1907-1932 (the "UK 1932 Act") had, by s 25, sought to define "exhaustively the grounds upon which a patent might at common law be repealed by scire facias" and those common law grounds included a ground "that the invention is not useful". Thus, the Patents Act 1903-1950 (Cth) also made provision (by way of petition to the relevant court) for revocation of a patent on the ground that the invention is not useful, as a subsisting common law ground of revocation by scire facias.
190 In May 1929, the United Kingdom Board of Trade established the Sargant Committee to consider changes that might be made to the Patent Law of the United Kingdom. The relevant foundation Act was The Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883 (UK) (the "UK 1883 Act"). The requirement that a complete specification must end with a distinct statement of the invention claimed was introduced by the UK 1883 Act: s 5(5) of that Act. There was, however, no provision like s 61 of the 1903 Act in the UK 1883 Act. The UK 1883 Act had been amended in 1907 and 1919. The Sargant Committee submitted its report in 1931 which led to the enactment of the UK 1932 Act which, by s 25, sought to, in effect, codify all of the common law grounds of revocation contemplated by scire facias. The Sargant Committee in its report said that the proposed s 25(2) sought to "enact every ground" at common law immediately before 1 January 1884 upon which a patent might be revoked by scire facias. Those were the grounds contemplated by s 86 of the Patents Act 1903-1950 (Cth) immediately before the enactment of the 1952 Act.
191 In 1944, the United Kingdom Board of Trade established the Swan Committee to consider what changes might be thought desirable to the UK 1932 Act. The Swan Committee submitted its Final Report in September 1947. That report led to the enactment of the Patents Act 1949 (UK) (the "UK 1949 Act"). The Swan Committee Report and the UK 1949 Act were very influential instruments leading to the draft Bill formulated by the Dean Committee for the 1952 Act. Section 4 of the UK 1949 Act provides, among other things, that every complete specification shall describe the invention with particularity, the best method of performing it known to the applicant and "shall end with a claim or claims defining the scope of the invention claimed". The UK 1932 Act also required the complete specification to end with a "distinct statement of the invention claimed": s 2(4).
192 Although s 25 of the UK 1932 Act sought to exhaustively set out the pre-existing common law grounds of revocation, it also, in a cautionary way, added the words "and any other ground upon which a patent might immediately before [1 January 1884] have been repealed by scire facias. Section 32(1) of the UK 1949 Act sets out exhaustively (without cautionary reservation) 12 grounds on which a patent may be revoked on petition to the Court. Section 32(1)(g) introduced the ground that "the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, is not useful". The earlier ground contained in s 25(2)(g) of the UK 1932 Act had been simply that "the invention is not useful". No explanation is given by the Swan Committee for the change to the formulation of the ground.
193 The Dean Committee largely adopted the recommendations of the Swan Committee. The procedure adopted to give effect to the recommendations was the repeal of the old Act and substitution of it with the 1952 Act. The 1952 Act adopts at s 100(1)(h) the ground of revocation that "the invention so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, is not useful". Nothing is said in the Dean Committee Report about that ground of revocation specifically. All that is said is that the Committee has "attempted to define the various grounds with precision" based largely on the earlier UK formulations. There is nothing in the second reading speech of the Attorney-General which addresses this question except to say that the Attorney-General observes that many of the provisions of the UK 1949 Act have been adopted. By s 115 of the 1952 Act, the same grounds of revocation were available to a cross-claimant in an infringement proceeding. The "patent" might be revoked "either wholly or in so far as it relates to any claim of the complete specification": s 100(1); s 119(1). Section 157 of the 1952 Act is essentially in the same terms of s 61 of the previous Act, mentioned earlier. The UK 1932 Act and the UK 1949 Act did not contain provisions like s 61 of the amended 1903 Act (see [188] of these reasons) or s 157 of the 1952 Act. However, s 32A of the 1932 Act and s 62 of the 1949 Act in the context of infringement proceedings and cross-claims for revocation provided that invalidity in one claim did not deprive the court of power to make orders in respect of a valid claim.
194 The relevant provision in issue in these proceedings is s 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and, in particular, s 18(1)(c) as set out at [182]. Section 18(1) provides that an invention is a patentable invention for the purposes of a standard patent if, so far as claimed in any claim, it cumulatively satisfies the four elements of the section. One of those elements is the notion that the invention, so far as claimed at any claim, is a manner of manufacture within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies, 1624 (the Statute of James I). Although we are now, of course, and have been in the relatively recent history of patent statutes, concerned expressly with utility, it should be recognised that utility (usefulness) has been a central conception of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies because that Statute made plain that letters patent must not be "mischievous to the State" or "generally inconvenient". Lindley LJ put it this way in Elias v Grovesend Tinplate Company 7 R.P.C. 455 at 467:
It is very singular that the Statute of James says nothing whatever about utility, but utility has been engrafted into it because of the words to which I have called attention [quoted above]; that is to say, it has been found by experience to be mischievous to the State to grant patents which are not useful as well as new.
195 As to the particular relationship between what the High Court called "the broad sweep of the concept" of "manner of manufacture" and that which is not only "new" but new "and useful" (utility) see also National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 264, 265, 268, 270, 271 and 275-276.
196 After the UK 1949 Act and the Commonwealth 1952 Act, the statutory question was not whether the patent ought to be revoked because the invention is not useful but rather whether the patent ought to be revoked because the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, is not useful. This change was almost certainly designed to recognise that the boundaries of the monopoly conferred in respect of an invention had come to be marked out by the claim or claims at the end of the complete specification and although a claim marking out the scope of a patentee's monopoly might be shown to be bad on any one of a number of possible grounds (including utility), other claims were not rendered invalid by that consideration (and other claims may not have been called into question). Thus, so far as invalidity of a claim rested upon a successful challenge to utility, the invention was not useful, so far as claimed in that claim, but only that claim (unless other claims were also shown to be invalid on the ground of inutility).
197 In Lane-Fox v Kensington and Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Co (1892) 9 RPC 413; ("Lane-Fox"), the complete specification contained nine claims all of which but one were abandoned. The remaining claim concerned a claim for an invention described as the "use of secondary batteries in conjunction with dynamos for the purpose of keeping the electro-motive force constant in mains [supply] at about 100 volts". The claim itself was in these terms: "Employment as described of secondary batteries as reservoirs of electricity in combination with a mode or system of distribution such as herein before explained". That claim was said to be inutile and as to that, Lindley L.J. (Lopes L.J. agreeing) said this at RPC 417:
I pass … to the utility of the alleged invention … The utility of the alleged invention depends not on whether by following the directions in the complete specification all the results now necessary for commercial success can be obtained, but on whether by such directions the effects which the Patentee professed to produce could be produced, and on the practical utility of those effects. Can it be said that the invention as described in the amended specification was, in 1878, a practically useful addition to the then stock of inventions? To judge … utility the directions in the amended specification must be followed, and, if the result is that the object sought to be attained by the Patentee can be attained and is practically useful at the time when the patent is granted, the test of utility is satisfied. Utility is often a question of degree, and always has reference to some object. "Useful for what?" is a question which must be always asked, and the answer must be useful for the purposes indicated, by the patentee.
[emphasis added]
198 Four years later, Lindley LJ also said this in Fawcett v Homan (1896) 13 RPC 398 at 405 of the invention then in question:
The utility of this invention is beyond controversy. [T]he evidence shows that the invention attains the ends aimed at, and those ends are useful. … If an invention does what it is intended by the patentee to do, and the end attained is itself useful, the invention is a useful invention.
[emphasis added]
199 Thus, a question of construction of the Specification and the relevant claim or claims arises so as to identify what the patentee "intended to do" by his or her invention. The answer comes from the whole of the Specification. Gummow J in Rehm Pty Ltd v Websters Security Systems (International) Pty Ltd (1988) 11 IPR 289 ("Rehm") at 293 (35-39) and 306 (10-25) describes this construction question as the search for the "promise of the invention", adopting the formulation of Lindley L.J. in Fawcett v Homan quoted at [198] of these reasons as "the basic principle". The analytical process involves identifying the promise of the invention and (Gummow J at 306):
… it is in the light of this that one has to consider the question of utility, and the question is whether in the sense of patent law the device is useless for that purpose.
[emphasis added]
200 In that case, the device was a security device for particular keyboards which randomly scrambled the designated values of the keys so as to prevent an observer from detecting a code (or password) by simply noting the order of the keystrokes. The "circumstance" that greater security might be obtained by adding additional features (such as the further viewing restrictions of the rival product making it even more difficult for the observer) did not mean that the invention as claimed was "useless" for the "purpose" of the "promise of the invention" or that "it does not attain the object of the invention": Rehm, Gummow J at 306. Inutility in Australia "means that the invention as claimed in the patent does not attain the result promised for it" (Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 IPR 385 at 394, Lockhart J) or put another way by the plurality, citing Lane-Fox "its [the invention as claimed] utility depends upon whether, by following the teaching of the complete specification, the result claimed is produced": Advanced Building System Pty Ltd v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 171 at [24] ("Advanced Building System"), Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
201 In Lane-Fox, Lindley L.J. at 417 observed that utility depends upon whether by following the directions "the effects the Patentee has professed to be produced can be produced" (and the "practical" utility of those effects). That might suggest that all of the professed effects must be capable of being produced. Advanced Building System suggests that the teaching of the Specification is to be followed to see whether "the result claimed" is produced. In Vidal Dyes Syndicate Ltd v Levinstein Ld (1912) 29 RPC 245 at 268, Fletcher Moulton L.J. said this:
By his specification, and the claim with which it concludes, the patentee delimits the area of his monopoly. If the validity of his patent is challenged, he has to show that all within that area is novel and useful, and if he does so his Patent is valid, assuming, of course, that he has duly performed his other obligations.
[emphasis added]
202 In Rehm, Gummow J identified "the promise" of the invention. Mr Bodkin, the author of Patent Law in Australia (Lawbook Co., 2008; 2nd Edition 2014) observes in both editions at [6040] that where a patent promises more than one result, "it is somewhat unclear whether what is claimed must attain all of them". In addressing that contended lack of clarity, the starting point is the decision of Parker J in Re Alsop's Patent (1907) 24 RPC 733 ("Re Alsop's Patent"). In that case, a rival petitioned for revocation of Alsop's Patent on a number of grounds including want of utility. On the question of the "construction of the Specification" and the "claiming clauses" Parker J was satisfied (at 754) that:
… the process [for the treatment of flour] referred to in each clause is a process resulting in the bleaching of the flour and in increasing its proteids and diminishing its carbohydrates as suggested in the title and detailed and emphasised in the body of the Specification.
[emphasis added]
203 Parker J considered that these statements were not simply "laudatory" of the results obtained by the process. Rather, they were "themselves the results of the process for which protection is claimed": at 755. However, the treatment of flour in the manner described did not, and could not, "increase its proteids or diminish its carbohydrates": at 755. Thus, two of the three results said to be obtained by the process could not be obtained. Applying the "principles of law already referred to", Parker J held the patent invalid for want of utility. Those principles were these (at 752 and 753):
In considering the validity of a Patent for a process, it is therefore material to ascertain precisely what the patentee claims to be the result of the process for which the Patent has been granted; the real consideration which he gives for the grant is the disclosure of a process which produces a result, and not the disclosure of a process which may or may not produce any result at all. If the patentee claims protection for a process for producing a result, and that result cannot be produced by the process, in my opinion the consideration fails. Similarly, if the patentee claims for a process producing two results combined and only one of these results is in fact produced by the process, there is a partial failure of consideration, just as there is in the case of a Patent containing one valid and one invalid Claim; and such partial failure of consideration is sufficient to avoid the patent. If [adopting an earlier authority] "the Patentee says that by one process he can produce three things and he fails in any one, the consideration of his merit, and for which the Patent was granted, fails and the Crown has been deceived in the grant".
…
Objections to Patents on the grounds above referred to are sometimes treated as objections for want of utility, and when so treated the well-known rule is that the utility of an invention depends upon whether, by following the directions of the patentee, the result which the patentee professed to produce can in fact be produced [Lane-Fox at 417].
[emphasis added]
204 So, on that view (at least so far as a process is concerned), a failure to produce the result claimed or a failure to produce one of two or more results claimed as combined results, brings about invalidity. Partial failure of the combined promise is sufficient to avoid the patent.
205 It should be noted, however, that Parker J (deciding the matter in 1907) seemed to proceed on the basis that a failure to produce all of the results claimed by the patentee fell into the same class of case as that where the grant of a patent would fail on the ground of partial failure of consideration where one of a number of claims were shown to be invalid notwithstanding that other claims were valid.
206 The passages quoted at [203] of these reasons formed the basis of the decision on invalidity when applied to the facts. Parker J also observed that want of utility has two senses. One is the sense described at [203] and the other is want of utility "in the sense of the invention being useless for any purpose whatsoever" [emphasis added]. In the second sense, the invention is said to fail as mischievous to the State under s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies: at 753. Although the first sense described by Parker J is clear enough, the authority has also been cited, based on the description of the second sense, as authority for the proposition that an invention may be useful as producing at least "some result". That seems to have arisen out of two further observations of Parker J at 753 in these terms:
But it may well be that an invention, which is void because it does not produce the result, or one of the results, as claimed, may nevertheless be useful as producing other results.
Further, there may be cases in which the result which the patentee claims to have produced can in fact be produced, but the patentee has gone on to detail the useful purposes to which such result can be applied, and that in fact the result produced cannot be applied to one or more of such purposes. In such a case I do not think the Patent is necessarily void, provided there are purposes for which the result is useful. If it be avoided it can only be because it contains a misrepresentation so material that it can be said that the Crown has been deceived.
[emphasis added]
207 The first statement, however, continues to recognise invalidity for want of utility in the first sense earlier described by Parker J and the remark seems to be a further reference to the notion that even though the claimed invention fails for want of utility, such an invention may be useful in the sense contemplated by the Statute of Monopolies as producing "other results". The second statement contemplates "results" that can actually be produced as claimed, but there is nevertheless a failure to be able to apply those results to "one or more" of the "useful purposes" asserted or recited by the patentee as purposes to which the results can be applied. In such a case, the patent would not be "necessarily void" provided there are "purposes for which the result is useful": at 753.
208 The statements at [206] do not seem to support a broad notion that provided there is a purpose which is useful for the invention as claimed, the claimed invention does not fail for want of utility. These two statements seem to be directed to the particular relationship between claimed results that can be produced and purposes that cannot. The idea inherent in the observations of Parker J set out at [206] of these reasons is that, first, provided the results promised by the specification can, on the evidence, be achieved and, second, provided that those results can be applied to at least one useful purpose, the patent for the claimed invention does not fail for inutility. If, however, the promised results are unfulfilled or unrealised, the patent for the claimed invention will be bad for inutility. This is consistent with the views of Mr Bodkin at [6050]. The real question, as Gummow J identifies in Rehm at 306 and the plurality identifies at [24] in Advanced Building System, is this: "Is the claimed invention useless in light of the promise of the invention for that purpose, determined by following the teaching to identify whether the result claimed is produced? [emphasis added]"
209 In Hatmaker v Joseph Nathan & Co. Ld. (1919) 36 RPC 231, Lord Birkenhead at 237 (Viscount Cave, Lord Buckmaster and Lord Wrenbury agreeing at 238), described the remarks of Parker J (set out at [203] of these reasons) as "well settled" and "never more clearly stated" and added: "In other words, protection is purchased by the promise of result. It does not and ought not to survive the proved failure of the promise to produce the results".
210 Since, in that case, there were two promised results in relation to dry milk solids (and on the factual findings one promised result was "probably not fully and sufficiently borne out by the result" and the other promised result was not achieved), the observations of Lord Birkenhead ought probably be taken to mean, for the House of Lords, that all of the promised results must be achieved: see also Kraft, Kraft Cheese Company (Incorporated) v McAnulty (1931) 48 RPC 536, Lord Hanworth M.R. for the Privy Council at 550 (43-50) and 551 (1-2).
211 In Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205, Gummow J in the course of considering a challenge to the validity of claims on the ground of inutility (among others) concerning an apparatus for use upon patients suffering from conditions characterised by occlusion of the upper air passage and which respond to the administration of continuous positive airway pressure, observed at 230 that it is "important to bear in mind" that "a claim may have utility even though the promised advantage is not achieved in all cases".
212 This, however, was not a departure from the proposition that a claim is bad on the ground of inutility if the invention as claimed does not attain the result promised for it nor is it support for the proposition that so long as one of a number of promised results are attained, the invention as claimed is useful. The point being made by Gummow J was simply this (at 232):
One looks at the claim to see whether there is a failure to fulfil the promise. It is not necessary, to show utility, that the promise be fulfilled in every case [that is, in the case of every patient]. On the evidence, the claimed invention plainly is of considerable practical utility in the treatment of substantial numbers of persons who are "patients" within the meaning of claim 1.
213 It is convenient at this point to note the observations of the four authors of the 13th Edition of Terrell on the Law of Patents upon which ESCO places particular emphasis. At para 5.39, the authors say this:
5.39 The test of utility
Inutility in the sense in which that word is used in modern patent law and practice, is concerned solely with the scope of the claim, and means that the claim covers a mechanism or a process which is useless for the purposes indicated by the patentee i.e. which does not produce the result or one of the results claimed in the specification. A patent would also be void for inutility if the invention was useless for any purpose whatsoever, but this is a circumstance which is unlikely to occur in practice.
[bold emphasis added in the text]
214 Thus, ESCO says that provided that the claim produces at least one of the results identified (promised) in the Specification, the claim under challenge is useful.
215 In Townsend Controls Pty Ltd v Gilead (1989) 16 IPR 469 ("Townsend"), von Doussa J was concerned with a patent (the "Gilead patent") which consisted of three classes of claims. The claims included claims for a product (Claims 1, 9 to 17); claims for an apparatus to manufacture the product (Claims 2 to 8); and claims for a process of manufacture (Claims 18 to 20). The questions in issue arose this way. Mr Gilead and his son were the proprietors of an Australian patent for a drip irrigation tube. Townsend Controls claimed to have developed a drip irrigation tube in Australia and a patent application had been made. A product had been made and marketed in accordance with the patent application. The Gileads threatened action for infringement of their patent. Townsend Controls brought proceedings for unjustified threats and the Gileads cross-claimed for infringement. Townsend Controls filed a defence and cross-claim for revocation relying upon a number of grounds including a contention that the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, was not useful. That challenge was made to "every claim in the specification in suit" although, in truth, the ground was "really directed" to only the "apparatus and process claims": at 490. The Gileads were citizens and residents of Israel. They had been ordered to provide security for costs and failed to do so. They did not appear in the proceedings. Townsend Controls was called upon to prove its case.
216 The Primary Judge (in the present proceedings) observes that all claims were in contest on the ground of inutility before von Doussa J in Townsend. However, that seems not to be so because the challenge on the ground of utility was ultimately only "really directed" to two of the three classes of claims, namely the apparatus claims and the process claims but not the product claims. The Primary Judge also notes that, in the proceedings before von Doussa J, there was no contradictor. For these two reasons, Jessup J elected not to attribute particular weight to the observations of von Doussa J so far as they might inform a principled approach to the resolution of the primary proceedings now under appeal. Von Doussa J said this at 490:
Inutility in this context [of apparatus claims and process claims] is concerned solely with the scope of each claim, and means that the claim covers an apparatus or a process which is useless for the purposes indicated by the patentee, ie which does not produce the result or one of the results claimed in the specification.
[emphasis added]
217 Von Doussa J cites para 5.39 of the 13th Edition of Terrell as authority for that proposition. Thus, von Doussa J seems to be accepting that a claim for an apparatus or a process which produces one of the results claimed in the specification is useful. However, von Doussa J seems to also cite the observations of Parker J at 752-3 in Re Alsop's Patent for that proposition (although not that section of the reasoning which focuses upon the consequences for a patentee who claims on the basis of a composite promise of producing two results but, in fact, only produces one of those results). Von Doussa J then said this:
The evidence, as I have already held, establishes that the apparatus and process disclosed by the specification will not work and cannot achieve the promised result. The invention, so far as it might be claimed in any of the claims of the completed specification [the apparatus and process claims], is not useful within the meaning of s 100(1)(h).
218 However, there is no deliberative discussion by von Doussa J of the question now in issue.
219 Nor was there any controversy between the parties in Pracdes v Stanilite (1995) 35 IPR 259 before Windeyer J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on the question of whether the patent in question would be susceptible of revocation for inutility if the Court found, on the facts, that any one of a number of claims failed to attain all the promises claimed for them even though other claims might do so. Rather, that conclusion as a matter of law seemed to be common ground and the controversy turned upon whether a particular promise was attained or not. The Primary Judge relied upon Pracdes v Stanilite as largely determinative of the question of law.
220 Pracdes v Stanilite concerned a patent held by Pracdes for an invention entitled "control circuit for gas discharge lamps". The specification recited that in the prior art, almost invariably, in this type of circuit, an "inductive ballast" is used in conjunction with a starter switch or circuit. Components are then described. The ballast acts to stabilise the current. The prior art systems are said to suffer from six disadvantages one of which is "heat generated in the ballast". The invention sought to eliminate the conventional form of inductive ballast (and related components) and overcome the "lagging effect" of the current due to the inductive ballast and thereby "largely avoid" all six disadvantages. The invention was said by Stanilite to lack utility because two of the six promises were not secured. Those two promises were: the avoidance of heat generation in the ballast; and the avoidance of the need of "power factor correction". As it turned out, no contention was advanced, as to utility, on the second matter: at 272 and 273. As to the first matter, Windeyer J said this at 273:
I deal with the question of heat generation, which is by far the most difficult matter for decision in this case. … As this is not a case where it can be said the invention does not work at all, the question, which is appropriately raised in the particulars, is whether the claimed invention achieves the promised useful result: [citing Rescare at 231; Re Alsop's Patent; Terrell, 13th Ed, 5.39]. The promised result here (there being no suggestion that four of the six promised results are not obtained by the invention) is that the disadvantage in the prior circuitry using an inductive ballast alone of "heat generated in the ballast" would be "largely avoided". There was a considerable body of evidence adduced on the question of heat generation and power loss and the question whether or not the promise made was fulfilled. If it were not then there was a partial failure of the consideration given for the patent and the claim for revocation would succeed.
[emphasis added]
221 Windeyer J found that the evidence established that all ballasts, inductive, capacitive or resistive, will generate heat. Stanilite accepted that the patent did not promise elimination of heat generation but rather an improvement on the heat generated by mainly inductive ballasts and that there was no promise to "avoid heat generation". The advantage claimed, as a matter of construction, was "comparative", not "absolute". On the footing of that construction, Windeyer J found that it could not be said that the disadvantage of heat generation was "largely avoided" and therefore his Honour concluded that "the invention does not deliver the promise made that the disadvantage of heat generation would be largely avoided": at 275. That being so, it followed that there was a partial failure of consideration given for the patent and the claim for revocation succeeded.
222 Pracdes v Stanilite is a case in which it was common ground that, first, there was a composite promise of six promised results; second, a failure to deliver any one of those six promised results would amount to partial failure (and thus, a failure) of the promise, leading to revocation of the patent; and, third, the question in issue was whether, on the facts, the heat generation promise was attained or fulfilled. There is no deliberative discussion of whether fulfilling one or more of six promises, but not all promises, is sufficient or insufficient to establish utility, largely because that question was not in contest and there is no deliberative discussion of the legal principle to be applied in the case of either composite or non-composite promises which are shown to be unfulfilled. However, notwithstanding that, Windeyer J stated the law as he understood it to be.
223 One further authority should be mentioned. In Horville Engineering Company Limited v Clares (Engineering) Limited (1975) FSR 196 at 210, Whitford J observed that it was "well established" that if a claim includes a mechanism or a process which "does not produce one of the results promised, that is to say, it is of no use for the purpose indicated by the patentee" [emphasis added], the claim is bad for inutility. The words after the phrase "that is to say" make clear that Whitford J had in mind that it was well-established that if a relevant claim does not produce any one of the results promised, the claim is bad for reasons of inutility. This observation suggests that utility is made out by demonstrating some use by making good at least one of the results promised.
224 Mr Bodkin expresses this view at [6040] (in both Editions):
In view of the origins of the utility requirement in the prohibition of inventions that are "mischievous to the State" [the language of the Statute of James I], it is difficult to see why an invention that in fact provides some benefit should not be regarded as useful, even if it does not provide all of the benefits that the patentee promises.
[emphasis added]
225 There are a number of things that should be noted.
226 First, there is no decisive authority in Australia put to us in which the two competing views have been expressly in controversy between parties leading to a deliberative consideration by the Court of the two positions.
227 Second, Re Alsop's Patent is concerned with a "composite promise" where one element of the promise is not attained rather than several or distributive promises where only one of those promises might find expression in a particular claim, that is to say, where a particular claim is concerned with only that promise or perhaps one or more of the promises but not all of the several promises.
228 Third, the reasoning in Re Alsop's Patent (in 1907) suggests that Parker J treated the failure to deliver upon one element of a composite promise as analogically in the same class of case as that case where a patent would be rendered invalid by the failure of a claim notwithstanding that other claims might be valid: that is, the common law position.
229 Section 7A of the Act addresses the topic of the "meaning" of the term "useful". Section 7A was introduced into the Act by the Raising the Bar Act and commenced operation on 15 April 2013. Even though s 7A formed no part of the legal framework relevant to these proceedings, it is nevertheless worth noting that the Parliament chose to amend the Act to say something about the Parliament's view of the meaning of the term as it would apply going forward. Was the Parliament trying to solve a perceived problem? By s 7A(1), the Parliament chose these words:
For the purposes of the Act, an invention is taken not to be useful unless a specific, substantial and credible use for the invention (so far as claimed) is disclosed in the complete specification.
230 Section 7A(2) provides that the disclosure must be sufficient for that specific, substantial and credible use to be appreciated by a person skilled in the relevant art, and s 7A(3) provides that ss (1) does not "otherwise" affect the meaning of the word useful in the Act.
231 The Parliament chose by s 7A to enact the recommendation of the Australian Law Reform Commission (contained in the Report entitled Review of Gene Patenting and Human Health, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health, 2004; the "ALRC Report") to not only "clarify" the meaning of "useful" to "accord more closely" with its meaning in United States patent law (a recommendation contained in the earlier Report of The Intellectual Property Competition Review Committee (the "Ergas Report")) but also to "provide that an invention will satisfy the requirement of usefulness only if the patent application describes a specific, substantial and credible use": Explanatory Memorandum ("EM"), Intellectual Property Law Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011, p 44. The EM also suggests that another concern was that "in some fields [claims relating to DNA; para 6.100, ALRC Report] the uses claimed are often speculative and the current provision does not effectively prevent the claiming of such speculative inventions": EM, p 44. The amendment was said to "strengthen" the test for usefulness and "prevent" the "speculative claiming" of inventions that would require further experimental effort before they could be put into practice: EM, p 45. However, the new meaning of "useful" was not "intended to displace the existing Australian case law on usefulness" (EM, p 44) as found in Rescare; Rehm; Fawcett v Homan; and Lane-Fox (EM, fn 49) to the effect that "broadly speaking the claimed invention must achieve what is promised by the patentee": EM, pp 43, 44. Rather, the invention must meet the new test and meet the requirements of the existing law: EM, p 44.
232 To the extent that the new test was designed to "prevent" the claiming of "speculative" inventions, an approach apparently thought to be accommodated by the law as it stood prior to the enactment of s 7A, the law governed by what Gummow J described in Rehm, 11 IPR 289 at 306, as the "basic principle", as drawn from Fawcett v Homan, did not accommodate claims for speculative inventions (although, plainly enough, the ALRC understood that an undesirable unchecked practice may have evolved in relation to gene patents along the lines of seeking to claim for speculative inventions (at least in part)).
233 The proper course then is to recognise, as the plurality said in Advanced Building System at [24] (see [200] of these reasons), that utility "depends upon" whether, by following the teaching of, in this case, the Patent Application, the result claimed is produced. That involves identifying, as a matter of construction, the promise of the invention and asking whether the invention as claimed does what it is intended by the patentee to do.
234 This is a case in which each claim of the Patent Application is said to lack utility because each claim fails to attain all of the six elements of the contended composite promise of the Specification said to be found in para 6 of the Specification, read in conjunction with the claims. So far as the principles of construction focused upon the question of utility are concerned, this case is not that class of case where it is said that the invention as claimed achieves the result promised but the result itself is not useful (Britax v Infa-Secure (No 4) (2015) 113 IPR 280 at [553] and [555]; Ranbaxy Australia Pty Ltd v Warner-Lambert Co LLC (2008) 77 IPR 449 at [141]).
235 Nor is it a case where each claim is said to lack utility because each claim asserts a monopoly over the useful and the non-useful thus offending the "rule" that all that is within the scope of a claim must be useful: H Lundbeck A/S v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2009) 177 FCR 151, Bennett J at [217]; Middleton J at [249]; Austal Ships Pty Ltd v Stena Rederi Aktiebolag (2005) 66 IPR 420 at [235] ("Austal Ships"); Martin Engineering Co v Trison Holdings Pty Ltd (1989) 14 IPR 330 at 337 (30-35) citing Blanco White, Patents for Inventions, 5th Ed, 1983, sections 4-408 to 4-412. As to that, of course, the "rule" is tempered by the consideration that the specification and claims should not "be construed in a way that any sensible person would appreciate would lead to unworkability when by construction it could be given a more limited meaning": Welch Perrin v Worrel (1961) 106 CLR 588, Menzies J at 602; Austal Ships at [240].
236 Nor is it that class of case where each claim is said to be invalid because it contains "something that will not produce the desired result even [though] a skilled person would know which means to avoid [that something]": Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v MDS Diagnostics Pty Ltd (2010) 85 IPR 525 at [117].
237 Austal Ships is a case in which it was contended that all of the vessels which could be built within the monopoly of Claim 1 (and all dependent claims) must have the promised advantages set out in the Patent Application, that is, a "promised hull structure [having] the beneficial combination of [five] characteristics". Bennett J seemed to accept that the Patent Application contained a composite promise in that regard although the question of whether all vessels so built "must have the promised [five] advantages" was ultimately to be "understood with the same limitations on claim construction [described by Bennett J], [that is], ... the necessity to consider the claims as would the person skilled in the art desirous of making use of the invention [including] 'limitations' dictated by common sense after a perusal of the whole of the specification including the claims": Austal Ships [241], [242] and [237] (at 10-14).
238 Bennett J accepted the proposition of law (which did not seem to be contested although the facts as to whether the promises were fulfilled were in issue) that the "test for utility is whether the subject matter of the claims fulfils the 'promises' [a composite promise of five things] of the Patent Specification", as construed, that is, all the promises as construed applying the principles of construction adopted by her Honour as described above. However, there is a hint of reservation in her Honour's acceptance of the proposition as her Honour puts it this way: "To the extent that a test for utility is whether the subject matter of the claims fulfils the 'promises" of the patent specification, etc". Although the question of whether an invention as described in the Specification is rendered inutile due to the failure of a claim to attain an element of a composite promise was not expressly in controversy in the cases described above, in Re Alsop's Patent, the Court proceeded on the basis that a failure to attain an element of a "combined promise" rendered the invention, as claimed, inutile and in at least Pracdes v Stanilite and Austal Ships, the Court understood the law to be that a failure to attain an element of a composite promise in any claim rendered the invention inutile so far as claimed in any claim.
239 We therefore accept that if para 6 of the Patent Application, properly understood having regard to the whole of the Specification including the claims, contains a "composite" promise for the described invention, a failure to attain any one of the elements of the composite promise in any claim defining the invention renders the invention so far as claimed in any claim, inutile. The question then is - what is the promise for the invention?