58 At the time of the Incident, Wambo did not have hand held anemometers to measure the weather conditions at blasting sites.
59 Mr Perry noted that the wind readings were "varying a fair bit up and down" from 1.30pm to 3.15pm, after which time it "all dropped back well and truly inside the guidelines". Mr Perry described the wind on the day as ranging from a "mild wind down to a very, very slight breeze".
60 Typically, if Mr Perry observes variable wind conditions throughout the day prior to a shot his procedure is to take a string of readings from the Meteorological Station close together and a couple spaced out, to see if they are consistent. If Mr Perry receives a bad weather reading around 10 minutes before a shot is due to go off and there have been consistently bad readings in the lead-up, he will cancel the shot.
61 At 3.30pm, the scheduled time for detonation, Mr Perry took a final reading of the weather and cross-checked it against the BMP. Mr Perry entered this data onto the Blast Management Plan Checklist. Although he inadvertently entered the wind direction data against the 'wind speed' field and vice versa, the figures are otherwise correct and nothing of substance turns on this clerical error. The readings were "in the green section [of Figure 5], which means we're right to fire", so he called [Lewis Waight, Dyno Nobel's shot firer] and directed him to detonate the Blast. Mr Waight also completed a Blast Management Plan Checklist around this time, which is included in [Exhibit P1, tab] L ...
62 At 3.31pm Mr Perry checked the weather data at the Meteorological Station, to make sure that it was still within the green section of Figure 5. He noted that it was.
63 Mr Waight detonated the blast at 3:32pm.
64 Following detonation, the Blast generated an amount of fume which appeared to emanate mainly from the north western corner of the bench as well as from the south eastern corner. The fume travelled in a plume in a north to north westerly direction and was seen by employees at the Premises.
65 The Code requires site personnel to identify and rate post-blast NOx gases using a scale from 1A to 5C (where 1A signifies the lowest intensity and 5C the highest intensity), for the purposes of improving industry standardisation of the reporting and recording of the visual characteristics of such gases. ...
- The SAF then records (at 66 - 75):
66 Mr Perry, from his location in the immediate vicinity of the Blast, rated the fume generated by the Blast as "3C: Orange Gas, Extensive" in accordance with the above scale and noted this on the Blast Management Plan Checklist. This rating was according to the Code.
67 Employees of [a Peabody company] took videos of the Blast from three different locations ... [Exhibit P1, tab] N.
68 Still images taken from the beginning, middle and end of each of these videos are [in Exhibit P1, tab] O.
69 Following the Blast, the fume dispersed and would have been less concentrated by the time it left the Licensed Premises.
70 Shortly after the Blast, Mr Carter [an employee and neighbour], who saw the shot and fume and noted the wind was blowing to the north, said words to the following effect over the radio communications system:
"We should notify the residents that there is something wrong, the dust is coming."
71 Mr Carter's words were heard by Mr [Kevin] Pitcher [Wambo's Drill and Blast Engineer], Mr Perry and Mr Jaeger. As Mr [Troy] Favell [then Wambo's Manager Environment & Community] was in or around Newcastle at the time, Mr Jaeger assumed his responsibilities as the Environment and Community Manager.
72 Following the statement made over the radio by Mr Carter, Mr Perry responded to Mr Carter and then made a call to Mr Jaeger and said words to the following effect over the radio communication system:
"Check the ridge, we are getting some drift".
73 In response, Mr Jaeger activated the PIRMP by contacting Mr Favell at about 3:47pm. Mr Favell directed Mr Jaeger to download the video footage and to get information together, which he did.
74 At approximately 4:00pm Mr Favell called Mr Jaeger. During their telephone calls, Mr Favell informed Mr Jaeger that complaints have been received from members of the public.
75 Mr Favell received the following complaints from members of the public:
a. From Mr Wayne Oliver at 3:39pm concerning noise and vibration.
b. From Mr David Thelander on behalf of Mr Reece Thelander and Ms Sharni Herbert at about 3:47pm reporting that they had smelled blast fume.
c. From Gary and Debbie Pevy at 4.14pm who reported having been exposed to fumes while riding their horses.
- Mr Favell (now no longer with Wambo) provided an affidavit, affirmed on 3 December 2015, which was read by Mr J Johnson of counsel, who appeared for the defendant. The locations of relevant nearby residential premises are shown in Exhibit P1 (at tab B - see SAF 30). Mr Johnson pointed out that many of Wambo's neighbours were its employees and tenants (Tp45, LL14 - 26). Favell deposed (par 6) that "minimising blast fume impact on neighbouring land owners was a priority issue for Wambo".
- Mr Johnson also relied on an affidavit, and supplementary oral evidence (Tpp10 - 13), from Geoffrey Charles Moore, Wambo's Open Cut Mine Manager, whose local knowledge and coal mine experience is illustrated by Exhibit D3. Moore returned from leave to attend Court in person to acknowledge Wambo's responsibility and apologize for the subject incident. He too deposed (par 15) that "minimising blast fume and mitigating its impact on our neighbours has been a priority focus for several years".
- The objective of trialling newer explosives between June and December 2014, and then using them, was to "achieve zero NOx emissions" (Moore par 23, and annexure GM-4).