3
Section 120(1) of the PEO Act provides as follows:
120 Prohibition of pollution of waters
(1) A person who pollutes any waters is guilty of an offence.
(2) In this section:
"pollute" waters includes cause or permit any waters to be polluted.
4
The terms "pollute" and "waters" are expansively, defined in the Dictionary to the PEO Act.
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Section 123 of the PEO Act prescribes a maximum penalty of $250,000 where the offence is committed by a corporation.
B.
THE RELEVANT FACTS
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The relevant facts are chiefly found in the Agreed Statement of Facts (Exhibit 1) jointly prepared and tendered by the parties. This is a very comprehensive Statement which admirably sets forth the background facts, the circumstances in which the admitted offence was committed and the nature and extent of the pollution incident, the resulting clean up operations and the immediate follow up action taken by the Defendant.
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The Statement is far too lengthy to recite and it will be sufficient if I merely extract in these reasons a very abbreviated summary. The facts included in the Agreed Statement substantially emanate from the evidence of Mr Dennis Dogger who up to February 2005 had been for 18 years employed by the Defendant as its Maintenance Manager at the Defendant's factory situate at 29 Davis Road Wetherill Park. He had reported the pollution incident to the Prosecutor's "Pollution Line" in the afternoon of the pollution incident (which had occurred about 9.30 that morning) and he had provided a written incident report to the Prosecutor on 4 February 2004.
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In addition to the Agreed Statement other relevant facts are found in the three affidavits (including that of Mr Dogger) tendered by the Defendant.
9
The Defendant's factory premises at Wetherill Park from which the pollution incident occurred are situate within the Wetherill Park Industrial Estate which is traversed by the Wetherill Park drainage channel in the form of an open concrete lined stormwater canal which a further 1 kilometre downstream of the Defendant's premises connects with Prospect Creek.
10
The Defendant's factory premises were relevantly licensed under the PEO Act but that licence did not authorise any water pollution. Included in the manufacturing activities undertaken at the factory was the manufacture of copper wire. It was in the course of this manufacturing activity that the pollution incident occurred. (In October 2004 the Defendant ceased manufacture at the Wetherill Park premises (which had been undertaken for the previous 18 years) when in relocated its manufacturing operations to new premises in Lilydale, Victoria.) The Defendant's factory premises were relevantly licensed under the PEO Act but that licence did not authorise any water pollution. Included in the manufacturing activities undertaken at the factory was the manufacture of copper wire. It was in the course of this manufacturing activity that the pollution incident occurred. (In October 2004 the Defendant ceased manufacture at the Wetherill Park premises (which had been undertaken for the previous 18 years) when in relocated its manufacturing operations to new premises in Lilydale, Victoria.)
11
On the day the pollution incident occurred the manufacturing processes for the production of copper wire had been operational for at least 2 hours when there was an undetected overflow from the rod breaking machine (RB3) of foaming drawing solution. Normally any overflow would be detected by level sensors which would detonate an alarm and pump which would transfer the drawing solution into a holding tank. However on this occasion the sensors did not detect the overflow because they operated on a light/ dark receptor basis which did not register the foam because of its highly aerated composition.
12
As a consequence of this non-detection the foamed drawing solution overflowed from the pit situate below RB3 into the adjacent waste pit where its presence was detected by the relevant sensor which was triggered by a flotation ball. This sensor sounded the alarm and would normally have activated the waste pit pump (which would in the normal course have transferred the contents from the waste pit into an outside tank). However instead of so operating the pump seized and the drawing solution thereupon overflowed to an adjacent drain which flowed into the stormwater drain constructed in the Defendant's premises and ultimately discharged into the Wetherill Park drainage channel.
13
However the Defendant had installed in this stormwater drainage system an isolation valve which was manually operated which when in the closed position would prevent the discharge of liquids through the drainage system by arresting them in a stormwater pit about 3 metres deep. This valve was manually closed by the Defendant's personnel a short time after the overflow into the dish drain was first noticed by a staff member responsible for the operation of RB3 who had been absent from the plant on a morning tea break from 9am and had returned to duty at approximately 9.25am when he observed the overflow into the dish drain and stormwater drain. At that point he stopped the operation of the RB3 machine and reported the overflow incident to his supervisor.
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When that supervisor informed Mr Dogger of the incident at approximately 9.30 the latter immediately proceeded to the stormwater pit containing the isolation valve to make sure that it was closed. Upon arrival he observed that the valve was already closed and he observed the drawing solution slowly trickling into the pit. However he could not make any observation of the pipe downstream the isolation valve as the system at that point is a closed pipe.
15
At approximately 10am Mr Dogger accompanied a Fire Brigade Officer and a Council Officer (who had arrived at the Defendant's premises) to the point where the stormwater system discharges into the Wetherill Park drainage channel where he observed "evidence that some of the drawing solution had entered the canal and travelled some 150 metres downstream". Mr Dogger, upon making this observation, assumed that some of the overflowing drawing solution had entered the canal before the isolation valve had been closed. He observed that the area of discolouration of the water in the Wetherill Park drainage channel was spreading but this was a property or propensity of the drawing solution when introduced into water which would become milky in colouration. It did not occur to him at the time that the drawing solution was traversing the entire stormwater system to its ultimate discharge point, notwithstanding the isolation valve being in the closed position, being a discovery he made later that day when in consequence of his observation of a trickle of drawing solution discharging from the stormwater drain into the Wetherill Park drainage channel he directed an employee into the stormwater pit to check on the seal of the isolation valve, when the presence of a pebble or piece of blue metal 3-4mm long and wide was found in situ thereby preventing the valve to be properly sealed.
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Before that discovery the Defendant's employees had flushed some 800 litres of water into the drainage system in order to move any remnant drawing solution into the pit so that it could be pumped out. The Defendant's employees had at an earlier stage pumped approximately 100-150 litres of the drawing solution from the pit.
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Unbeknown to the Defendant's employees some of the liquid stored in the pit (both the undiluted drawing solution and the water flushed drawing solution remnant) would have escaped by virtue of the ineffective sealing of the isolation valve.
18
As a major component of its clean up operations the Defendant had called Collex to the premises at approximately 12.15pm on the day of the pollution incident. Collex retrieved (by pumping activity) some 14,000 litres of discoloured water from the Wetherill Park drainage channel. It also collected approximately 1000 litres that had been pumped out of the stormwater pit by the Defendant's employees and any remaining drawing solution stored in the pit. These clean up activities had been directed to be done by the Counci As a major component of its clean up operations the Defendant had called Collex to the premises at approximately 12.15pm on the day of the pollution incident. Collex retrieved (by pumping activity) some 14,000 litres of discoloured water from the Wetherill Park drainage channel. It also collected approximately 1000 litres that had been pumped out of the stormwater pit by the Defendant's employees and any remaining drawing solution stored in the pit. These clean up activities had been directed to be done by the Council Officer when she attended the factory premises earlier that day. (Her oral direction was confirmed by an official clean up notice issued by the Council pursuant to s91 of the PEO Act).
19
Paragraphs 34 to 37 (inclusive) pf the Statement of Agreed Facts record the following facts under the heading "Causes of the Incident":
34. The alarm and pump system in the RB3 pit were not activated due to the failure of the sensors in the RB3 pit to sense the foaming drawing solution due to the level of aeration in the foam. Olex had sought to control the high levels of foam in the drawing solution but had been unsuccessful.