Environment Protection Authority v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd

Land and Environment Court (NSW)|1994-12-15|Before: Lloyd J

For the reasons described in paragraphs 106 to 108 above, I have and continue to entertain a reasonable doubt that the forwarding of the work method statements and job safety analysis to the defendant make the defendant liable for the manner in which the work described therein is carried out and thus liable for the offence under s 16(1) of the Clean Waters Act. Neither am I satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, if it can be said that the defendant tacitly or inferentially approved the work method statements, it thereby became liable for the offence.

The sub-subcontract between McConnell Dowell and Moltoni

It is clear that McConnell Dowell asked Moltoni to remove and dispose of the pipeline and that Moltoni agreed to do so. Moreover, as appears from paragraph 83 above, Moltoni prepared and sent to McConnell Dowell a work method statement which included a description of the manner of removal of the pipes. The work method statement clearly allows for the management or control of " oil spillages from pipe residues ". It is clear that both McConnell Dowell and Moltoni were aware that the pipeline was there and that it may have contained, at the very least, oil residue. There is also evidence to which I later refer (and which I accept) that it is industry practice to treat all pipelines as charged unless it is established to the contrary. There is no evidence that anyone physically checked the pipeline to see whether it contained any oil, in which case the industry practice should have been observed by those who were working on or around the pipeline, namely McConell Dowell and Moltoni. None of the evidence surrounding the sub-subcontract or the work to be performed thereunder implicates the defendant.

The defendant's knowledge of the pipeline and its contents

In the early 1990s - precisely when is not established by the evidence - the Domain bunkers were decommissioned. In early 1997 - again, precisely when is not established by the evidence - the Department of Defence employed TWCA Pty Ltd to carry out the cleaning and remediation of the Domain bunkers. It seems that TWCA Pty Ltd engaged Beralon Pty Ltd as its contractor to carry out the actual work of remediation which, I understand, included the use of high pressure water jets for cleaning out all oil and oil residues. It seems that Beralon Pty Ltd then subcontracted the work to another firm, Gardner Perrott.

In May 1997 Gardner Perrott commenced the work on the Domain bunkers. Mr K Welsh and Mr N Nordstrom were employed by Gardner Perrott. Mr Welsh gave evidence. He recalled seeing work being undertaken across the road (at Wharf 11) and seeing the name "Multiplex" on the fence, on a building and on hard hats and flak jackets worn by workmen on site. On 15 July 1997 Mr Welsh saw that an excavator, which had been digging in Lincoln Crescent, had apparently fractured a large cast iron pipeline under the road. The pipeline appeared to contain bunker oil. The pipeline appeared to come from the bunkers and went in the direction of Cowper Wharf Road. Mr Welsh saw Multiplex employees attend to the broken pipe.

Mr Nordstrom also saw the broken pipe. He thought that the pipe contained a residue of bunker oil and it appeared to have been flushed with kerosene or a cutting stock, which he describes as a derivative of diesel and used to break down heavy oils such as bunker oil. Mr Nordstorm also saw repairs made to the broken pipe.

The defendant called evidence from Mr S Brubaker, a self-employed excavator operator, who had been excavating for sewer trenches in Lincoln Crescent in May, June and July 1997. In the course of doing so Mr Brubaker exposed what he described as a concrete encased steel pipeline, but which was not broken. The presence of the pipeline was reported to the defendant's employees " because they were in charge of the site ". One of those employees was Mr Brett Levy. There is other evidence that Mr Levy was the defendant's foreman on the site. A piece of the concrete encasement to the pipe had, according to Mr Brubaker, flaked off the pipe. Because of the proximity of the pipeline to the location of the sewer trench, the excavation work had to be continued by hand.

Mr Levy's diary was tendered in evidence. It contains entries of who was employed on the project each day and notes of what was done each day. There is no reference in the diary to any broken pipe in Lincoln Crescent.

The prosecutor submits that Mr Brubaker, or some other subcontractor of the defendant, broke the oil pipeline in Lincoln Crescent, being the oil pipeline which runs from the Domain bunkers to the Garden Island fleet base. The prosecutor further submits that the defendant became aware of the break and of the fact that the pipeline contained oil.

The prosecutor also tendered a plan which was in the defendant's site office at Wharf 11 and which shows a number of services in the vicinity, including an " existing underground navy fuel (oil) pipeline " from the pumping station in Lincoln Crescent, along Lincoln Crescent and Cowper Wharf Road to the fleet base, with a branch pipeline along the Finger Wharf. The prosecutor submits that the defendant was thus aware of both the presence of the pipeline and the fact that it contained oil.

I do not have to resolve the disputed evidence between Mr Welsh and Mr Nordstrom, on the one hand, and Mr Brubaker and the evidence contained in Mr Levy's diary, on the other hand. There is other evidence, which is undisputed and which establishes that the defendant was aware of the existence of the pipeline and of the fact that it contained oil.

It seems that possibly as a result of the discovery of the pipeline in Lincoln Crescent the defendant made appropriate inquiries, which resulted in a facsimile sent by TWCA Pty Ltd to the defendant on 28 May 1997. The facsimile reads as follows: Attached is a diagram showing the extent of the current pipeline. It should be assumed that there is still furnace fuel oil remaining in the pipeline.

The position of the Commonwealth regarding the existing oil supply pipeline is as follows:

They have no objection to Multiplex capping off segments of the pipeline under its jurisdiction so long as the following criteria are met: · Multiplex will take full responsibility for any sections to be removed, their content and associated capping, both during and after removal.

· All statutory and EPA requirements relating to any works on the pipeline are to be strictly adhered to.

· Multiplex is to ensure that all caps fitted to the pipeline are fit for purpose and are of a design approved for use in the appropriate petrochemical installations.

· Multiplex is to keep the Commonwealth's agent (GHD/TWCA Pty Ltd) advised of all works relating to the pipeline at all times. In the particular case of the interference with your stormwater line in Lincoln Crescent, the Commonwealth would prefer that the pipeline be removed back to the boundary at the pump room of the Oil tanks site and capped at that location.

Please advised ( sic) of your intentions prior to commencing work on the pipeline.

The diagram referred to in the facsimile shows the pipeline, described as " existing underground navy fuel (oil) pipeline ", extending from the pumping station adjacent to the Domain bunkers along Lincoln Crescent and Cowper Wharf Road to the fleet base and also shows the branch line along the Finger Wharf.

Moreover, there is undisputed evidence that it was industry practice to treat all pipelines as " charged " or " live " unless the contrary was established; that is to say, to treat all pipelines as full. Evidence to this effect was given by Mr D Blair (Moltoni's operations manager), Mr S P King (general manager of Moltoni) and Mr C Manihera (Moltoni's excavator operator). No evidence was led to the contrary, so that all involved parties, namely Moltoni, McConnell Dowell and the defendant must be taken to have been aware of the industry practice. The statement in the facsimile, " it should be assumed that there is still furnace fuel oil remaining in the pipeline ", is itself no more than a statement of the industry practice.

Mr C C Alsop, who is the General Manager Port Services of Sydney Ports Corporation went to the Finger Wharf on being informed of the spill. He described in his evidence the steps taken to contain the spill and to recover the oil from the surface of the water. He estimated that approximately 48 tonnes of oil were recovered from Woolloomooloo Bay and up to about 12 tonnes of the spill had either evaporated or was dispersed. Mr Alsop conceded, however, that the estimation of the amount of oil in an oil spill is an inexact art and in this case the estimate could be plus or minus 50%, that is to say, it could have been as little as 30 tonnes or it could have been as much as 90 tonnes.

Dr I D Doig, an engineer experienced in the engineering of piping systems, calculated the volume of the pipes that fell into the water under the Finger Wharf on 25 February 1998 and the volume of pipes under the wharf which were undisturbed. The total volume of piping of both that which fell and that which remained but which could drain into the break in the piping was 41.370 cubic metres. Based on an assumption that the pipes had been completely filled with oil having the density of Shell marine fuel oil, this equated to a mass of 38.432 tonnes.

Following the spill the undisturbed pipes were purged of oil. Some estimate was made of the quantity of oil which was removed from those pipes still attached to the wharf, but these estimates are necessarily inaccurate since the water used to flush out the pipes was also removed together with the oil, resulting in the removal of oily water which had an average of about 8% by volume of oil. The best estimate seems to be that about 2400 litres of oil was removed in this manner.

I therefore find that, having regard to the concession made by Mr Alsop and the evidence in paragraph 122 and 123 above, the probable amount of oil which spilled into the bay was in the vicinity of about 40,000 litres.

Samples of the oil residue remaining in the pipes after the spill and of the oil slick were analysed by a chemist, Mr D K M Ho, who found that there was a 91-99% certainty of a match in one pair of samples, an inconclusive result with another pair of samples and a non-match with yet another pair of samples. Mr Ho also found, however, the existence of another oil, namely diesel, as well as fuel oil, which is consistent with an attempt at some time in the past to flush the pipeline with diesel.

Evidence allegedly demonstrating control by the defendant

Mr A Hawkins , an environmental protection officer employed by the prosecutor, went to the Finger Wharf on Wednesday, 25 February 1998 after the oil spill had occurred and met two employees of the defendant, Mr A Scionti and Mr R Fadel, (There is other evidence that Mr Scionti was the defendant's construction manager, having overall responsibility for the Finger Wharf project as well as for other projects; and that Mr Fadel was the defendant's site manager, responsible for the day-to-day operations on the Finger Wharf site and also responsible for industrial relations and occupational health and safety.) Mr Hawkins was informed that there had been an oil spill, that Sydney Ports was on the site and " they were containing the spill ". It is not clear to me whether the reference by Mr Hawkins to " they " is a reference to Sydney Ports Authority or to the defendant. Having regard to the context I infer that it is a reference to the Sydney Ports Authority.

Mr Hawkins returned to the Finger Wharf on Friday 27 February 1998 with Mr G Harper, an environment protection officer employed by the prosecutor. Mr Hawkins took some photographs. They met Mr A Stewart. (Other evidence establishes that Mr Stewart was the defendant's project manager, responsible for the construction, programming, subcontracting and procurement for both Wharf 11 and the Finger Wharf.) Mr Stewart showed Mr Hawkins and Mr Harper where the pipe had been broken. Further photographs were taken.

On Saturday 28 February 1998 Mr Hawkins again went to the Finger Wharf and took further photographs. He then attended a meeting on the Finger Wharf at which there were representatives of Sydney Ports Authority including Mr C Alsop, representatives of the defendant including Mr Stewart, representatives from McConnell Dowell and a representative from Gardner Perrott. The latter had been brought onto the site that morning to purge the remaining oil from the pipeline on the Finger Wharf.

On Monday 2 March 1998 Mr Hawkins attended a further meeting at the Finger Wharf at which those present were Mr Pullman and Mr Alsop of Sydney Ports Authority, Mr Stewart and Mr Fadel of the defendant, Mr S Sprattley of Gardner Perrot, a representative of McConnell Dowell, a representative or representatives of Moltoni and a representative of ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd. The latter had been called in to prepare a plan or work method for removing the pipes from the water and from underneath the wharf. Those at the meeting discussed three objectives: first , how to remove oil from the remaining portion of the pipeline under the Finger Wharf; second , how to remove the pipeline itself; and third , how to recover the pipes which were in the water. Mr Hawkins told the meeting that before any pipes were to be removed there had to be a plan in writing for the removal of both the oil and the pipes, which should be reviewed by the prosecutor for comment. Mr Hawkins said that if Mr Stewart obtained the plan for removing the pipes he could send it to the Environment Protection Authority for review.

On Tuesday 3 March 1998 Mr Hawkins, accompanied by Mr W Hicks, who was the manager of the prosecutor's Sydney Region Catchment Section, attended a meeting at the Finger Wharf. Most of those who had been at the meeting on the previous day were present. Mr Hicks told Mr Stewart that the work of removing the remaining pipes from the sea bed and from under the wharf, which pipes contained oil, raised a potential for further pollution and they may need to apply for a licence. However, following discussions within the Environment Protection Authority about the matter, Mr Hawkins subsequently told Mr Stewart that there was no need to apply for a licence.

On Friday 6 March 1998 Mr Hawkins attended a meeting at the Finger Wharf at which Mr Stewart was present, amongst others. Mr Hawkins thinks that there was discussion about the removal of the pipes under the Finger Wharf and that there was discussion about a draft work method statement that had been prepared. On the same day Mr Stewart sent a facsimile to Mr Hawkins on the defendant's letterhead together with a two page method statement or work procedure for stage 1 headed " ABB ". The prosecutor responded by facsimile on the same day setting out in its facsimile to the defendant its response to ABB's work procedure.

On 7 March 1998 Mr Stewart, again on the defendant's cover sheet, sent a facsimile to Mr Hawkins being three pages of work procedure for stage 2, also headed " ABB ".

On 9 March 1998 the prosecutor sent a facsimile to the defendant stating that it agreed in principle with the procedures outlined in the ABB work procedure document. Also on 9 March 1998 Mr Stewart sent a facsimile on the defendant's letterhead to the prosecutor, to the Office of Marine Administration, to Wharf Developments Pty Ltd and to the defendant's head office which included the work procedure for " Stage 2: pipe work section B " for the draining, cleaning and removal of pipe work, section B, from under the eastern side of the Finger Wharf.

On 10 March 1998 Mr Stewart sent a facsimile on the defendant's letterhead to the prosecutor, to the Office of Marine Administration and to Wharf Developments Pty Ltd which states: " Please find following for your review and approval ABB's Stage 2 method statement for pipe sections C, D, E and F ". The facsimile included both text and diagrams of the work procedure, headed " ABB ". On the same day Mr Hawkins sent a facsimile to the defendant setting out the prosecutor's response to ABB's work procedures for stage 2, sections B, C, D, E and F.

On 11 March 1998 Mr Harper received by facsimile from Sydney Ports Corporation a copy of its incident report dated 25 February 1998. The incident report shows that the incident was reported to the Corporation by Mr C Beveridge and Mr D Jones " working for company McDonnell/Dowell [sic]".

137 On 12 March 1998 Mr Stewart sent a facsimile on the defendant's letterhead to the prosecutor, to the Office of Marine Administration, to Wharf Developments Pty Ltd and to the defendant's head office, which facsimile included ABB's work procedure for stage 2 pipe work, sections G and H. On 13 March 1998 the prosecutor sent by facsimile its reply in which it stated that it agreed in principle with the procedures outlined in the document.

On 19 March 1998 Mr Hawkins, Mr Harper and Mr C McElwain (all of the prosecutor) met Mr Stewart at the Finger Wharf and took further photographs. Mr Hawkins asked Mr Stewart for and was given a map showing the location of the pipes under the Finger Wharf. The map was tendered by the prosecutor for the purpose of showing the location of the pipes as known to the defendant after the event.

139 On 26 June 1998 Mr Hawkins and another officer of the prosecutor, Mr K Hardy, went to the Finger Wharf and met Mr Beveridge of McConnell Dowell, who gave them a piece of pipe that had been retrieved. The piece of pipe was about 600 mm in length and had a diameter of 300mm.

In cross examination Mr Hawkins produced his notes of the meeting of 2 March 1998. The notes set out the three-aims or objectives which I have described in paragraph 130 above. The notes then contain the following, attributed to Mr Beveridge: " If you rig it and lift it, we'll spill oil ". The word " you " has been crossed out and the word " we'll " substituted. The note also states: " Overall co-ordination: McConnell Dowell ". It is suggested by the defendant that these notations imply that McConnell Dowell was the overall co-ordinator of at least the cleanup and recovery. It is not clear to me, however, whether an inference may also be made from this that McConnell Dowell was also the co-ordinator of the whole of the substructure works.

In his notes of an interview with Mr Manihera on 1 October 1998, Mr Hawkins recorded Mr Manihera as stating: " We knew pipes were there from the start but McConnell Dowell didn't want to worry about them until we got to them ". Mr Manihera is also recorded as having said, " I didn't take direction from MCD ", meaning McConnell Dowell, and that Mr D Blair was his boss.

I have set out in some detail the evidence of Mr Hawkins because the prosecutor relies upon it (and upon other post-spill conduct on the part of the defendant) as showing that the defendant exercised control over what was happening on the Finger Wharf.

The defendant, however, asserts that the defendant's actions are equally explicable as those of a " good citizen " anxious to effect a cleanup after the event. It also seems to me that the defendant's actions are explicable as those of a contractor anxious to avoid any further interruption or delay to its programme of works. The defendant also asserts that the evidence of Mr Hawkins described in paragraph 140 and 141 above is consistent with the fact of McConnell Dowell being in control of the works and that the defendant's actions in forwarding the work method statements prepared by ABB Engineering to the prosecutor were done by it only at the prosecutor's request.

I make the observation at this stage that I am not satisfied on this evidence that the prosecutor has established beyond a reasonable doubt, or at all, that the defendant was relevantly in control of the work on the sub-structure either before or after the event.

Mr G J Harper , who is employed by the prosecutor as an environment protection officer, went to the Finger Wharf on Friday 27 February 1998 with Mr Scanes and Mr Scott, both of whom are employed by the prosecutor as environmental scientists. They met Mr Stewart, who took them to the section of the wharf where the pipeline had been broken. Mr Harper asked Mr Stewart what had happened. According to Mr Harper, " he said that he understood that some subcontractors to Multiplex had been working on one of the piers when the spill occurred. That seems to be all he knew at that point " . Also according to Mr Harper, Mr Stewart " said that the navy had led him to believe or Multiplex to believe that the pipe was clean and that the tanks around the Botanical Gardens had also been cleaned ". In cross-examination, however, Mr Harper agreed that it was possible that Mr Stewart said that it was " his understanding that the navy had said the pipes had been drained with residual oil remaining therein and the tanks at the Botanical Gardens had been cleaned out ".

Mr Harper took some samples of the oil from the water and took some photographs. He said, " We arranged with Mr Stewart that if any work was done on removing the pipes or any work was done on the pipes over the weekend, that he would contact the EPA's pollution line so that it could be arranged for Andy Hawkins to go out over the weekend and obtain a sample of oil from the pipe network ".

On Friday 13 March 1998 Mr Harper went to the Finger Wharf and had a conversation with Mr Stewart. Mr Harper said in his evidence: " Mr Stewart indicated that Multiplex had written to McConnell Dowell suggesting that McConnell Dowell were responsible for the mishap that had occurred ". On the same day Mr Harper took further photographs and samples of the oil.

On 24 March 1998 Mr Harper received an eight page facsimile from Mr Stewart on the defendant's letterhead. The facsimile contained two pages of a work method statement for the removal of oil from the remaining pipe under the Finger Wharf and the subsequent removal of the pipes when drained of oil. That facsimile cover sheet shows that it was also sent to the Office of Marine Administration, to Wharf Developments Pty Ltd and to the defendant's head office and states that it is forwarded " for your review and approval ". The facsimile includes a hazard identification schedule on a McConnell Dowell letterhead which lists each job step, the potential hazard and the means to be undertaken in relation to each job step. This suggests that McConnell Dowell had identified the potential hazard relating to each job step and was to do the actual work. On 27 March 1998 Mr Harper telephoned Mr Stewart and discussed with him some of the details of the work method statement.

In cross-examination Mr Harper agreed that the defendant's site office was not at the Finger Wharf but was at the end of Lincoln Crescent, near Wharf 11. Mr Harper also agrees that in his conversation with Mr Stewart on 27 March 1998 he understood that the work method statement had been prepared by and would be carried out by McConnell Dowell. A little later in his cross-examination in relation to that conversation the following exchange took place: Q: And he told you in that conversation that the work statement, the method statement, for the removal of bunker oil, pipeline and contents had been prepared by and the work would be conducted by McConnell-Dowell? A: Yes

Q: And you accepted at face value, didn't you? A: Yes.

Q: And you saw nothing from your observations that contradicted that statement? A: No.

Mr M Callaghan , an environmental protection officer employed by the prosecutor, went to the Finger Wharf with Mr Hawkins and Mr McElwain on 9 November 1998, more than eight months after the event. They met Mr Stewart at the defendant's site office, which was then located at the south western corner of the Finger Wharf near Cowper Wharf Road and they then inspected the wharf.

On 13 November 1998 Mr Callaghan conducted a record of interview with Mr Beveridge, the project manager of McConnell Dowell. Mr Callaghan said in his evidence that had he been conducting the investigation of this case " from day one " he would have interviewed or obtained statements from a large number of people involved with the project and with the clean up. Mr Callaghan also gave the following evidence: Mr Lloyd: Q: If McConnell-Dowell was the contractor and Moltoni was the subcontractor employing the workers that actually broke the pipe in performing their duties, you would have tried to speak to all the McConnell-Dowell employees as to their supervision, if I can use that expression, of Moltoni and the way Moltoni did its work? A: Not necessarily speak to all the McConnell-Dowell employees, but speak to those who were in control, had some control.

Q: I suppose a person that would have been useful to have spoken to if there was such a person would have been the demolition foreman of McConnell-Dowell? A: Yes.

Q: Were any statements to your knowledge obtained from Ian Smith, Tony White, Rob East, Andrew Andreou, Neil Jones David Hudson, Dion Jones, John Miow, Russell Faulkner, Michael Petracca, all of - and Ian Stewart, all of McConnell-Dowell? A: Not by me they weren't.

Mr Lloyd: If any statements have been taken from those people, I call for them.

Mr Lloyd: I'll rephrase it, your Honour. Q: Mr Callaghan, is it fair to say that so far as oral evidence that the prosecutor seeks to put before this court in the prosecution of my client, from McConnell-Dowell, as I understand the prosecutor's case, the only oral evidence appears to be some tape recordings of a record of interview that you had with Mr Beveridge? A: I'm not aware of any other evidence, but that's what I obtained, yes.

Q: And you weren't asked to interview anybody else from McConnell-Dowell to take a witness statement or a record of interview? A: I may have been.

Q: But you can't recall now? A: I can't recall who they were. If there were more - probably more than I was actually asked to get through, one reason or another I did.

Mr Callaghan had on 23 December 1998 taken a photocopy of one page of Mr Beveridge's diary, which was tendered in evidence. The document is in handwriting which is difficult to read. It is dated 6 November 1997, that is to say, before the spill. It is headed " Demolition Check list - Moltoni ". Amongst other items the document contains the following statements: " Supply all method statements, risk analysis, permits " and " All disposal to EPA standards ... ". The last item in the document is: " Remove and dispose of CI pipelines either side ". At the foot of the page there is written a sum, " $860,000 ".

Mr Callaghan had also obtained a facsimile from Sydney One Call Service on 8 December 1998 in the course of his investigation in order to see if anyone had made inquiries of that Service as to the presence of any services around the Finger Wharf site or leading to it. The facsimile from Sydney One Call Service states: " Please find a copy of inquiry No 974600293 processed on Friday 14 November 1997. The inquiry was issued in the name of Andrew Andreou of McConnell Dowell ....".

I have previously described some of the evidence of Mr Moltoni (in paragraphs 80-89 above). Mr Moltoni also said: During the course of the work, there were site meetings from time to time. These were not held on a regular basis. We received instructions from day to day or for up to several days to a week. Most of these directions were oral and came from McConnell Dowell supervisors.

In cross-examination Mr Moltoni conceded that he did not receive any instructions from the defendant relating to the works. The instructions came from McConnell Dowell. Moreover, when tendering for works, all his conversations were with Mr Beveridge. Mr Moltoni also said that Moltoni was paid by McConnell Dowell after Moltoni presented an invoice for the completed work to that time.

Mr Moltoni was aware of the existence of the pipeline when tendering for the job. He had seen the plan at the defendant's site office showing the location of the pipeline. In tendering for the job to McConnell Dowell he had submitted with the tender the Moltoni Group Profile which shows ( inter alia ) that Moltoni was a significant company with over 30 permanent employees and a turnover of over $8 million per annum, that it had a reputation for specialist and high risk demolition projects and that it has successfully completed major demolition projects including wharf demolition for the Fremantle Port Authority. Mr Moltoni agreed that he was satisfied in his own mind that in doing this job it conformed to the relevant Australian Standard. He also said that as far as demolition contractors in Australia are concerned, there are probably three or four that operate Australia-wide and Moltoni was in that group.

Mr Moltoni also gave the following evidence relating the inclusion of the pipeline in the tender: Q: When you first tendered for the job you were not told that the job involved the demolition of the oil pipeline under the wharf. This is back in July, August, September? A: No. Specifically the pipelines, any of the pipelines, were excluded from our scope.

Q: Then you said in your affidavit you had a conversation with Mr Beveridge on, I think, 5 or 6 November when you were asked to include that work? A: Mmm.

Q: By that stage you had already agreed a contract price, hadn't you? A: We'd narrowed down a contract price, yes.

Q: What was the price you first quoted? A: 875.

Q: So prior to being told you were doing this, it had gone down to 860? A: That's right.

Q: And when he asked you to include that other work - that is, the removal of the wharf oil pipeline, the pipeline underneath the wharf - did you have any discussion with him about price for the additional work? A: Yes, we did. He indicated that if we wanted the works we were to include the pipelines and the pipelines under the deck as part of our cost.

Q: That is, no extra price? A: No extra price.

Q: 'If you want the job, you have got to do that also'. A: That's right.

Before commencement of the work Mr Moltoni went personally on several occasions to see Mr R Rech of the WorkCover Authority of New South Wales. He did so firstly to touch base with the regulatory authority and secondly to run past him what he proposed to do.

In relation to the pipeline Mr Moltoni gave the following evidence: Q: I understand you at no time checked with Multiplex as to the status of any oil in the pipeline because it was inappropriate for you to do so, given that your contract was with McConnell-Dowell? A: That's right.

Mr Moltoni also said, however, that the defendant had safety officers who would from time to time ask Moltoni to keep the site clean; and that there were from time to time site occupational and health safety meetings at which representatives of the defendant were present, as well as representatives of McConnell-Dowell and any other sub-contractor who was on the site.

Mr D Blair was Moltoni's supervisor at the Finger Wharf. Part of his duties was to supervise Moltoni's workers. Mr Blair's evidence was that Moltoni's workers, including himself, got their day-to-day instructions from Mr John Miow, who he understood to be the supervisor of demolition with McConnell Dowell.

Soon after the pipeline was broken on 25 February 1998, a person who Mr Blair thought was from McConnell Dowell tried to close a valve which was on the main pipeline about half way along the wharf. Mr Blair subsequently, after giving it more thought, agreed that the person who turned the valve off was Russell Faulkner of McConnell Dowell. After a short time a group of people managed to close the valve using a monkey wrench. Over the following days Moltoni workers were involved in attaching a wire rope and bulldog clamp to the pipes that had partially fallen into the water. This was done, according to Mr Blair, to make the site safer because if the holding brackets failed then the wire rope would stop the pipes from falling further.

Mr Blair stated that he was never told that the main oil pipeline or any of the other pipes under the wharf might have been full or partly full of oil. If he had been so told he would not have allowed the Moltoni workers to continue to work near the pipes until they had been drained and removed because of the risk of damaging them. However, Mr Blair also said that he knew that it was industry practice in demolition work to treat all pipes as live. Mr Blair also agreed that the pipeline was not all on the same level and that it had hollows and elbows in it, in which one could always expect to find pools of oil or residual oil even if the pipeline was largely empty.

The pipeline had been exposed before the spill whilst working at the northern end of the wharf. The fact that the pipeline had been exposed was reported by Mr Blair to an employee of McConnell Dowell named Michael, but Moltoni continued to work in the vicinity of the pipes. Mr Blair subsequently identified Michael as being Michael Petracca. Mr Blair had, before the spill, a conversation with Mr Beveridge of McConnell Dowell. According to Mr Blair: " He just basically said the pipeline was empty ". There is no evidence, however, that anyone physically checked the pipeline to see whether it was either empty or charged. In the absence of any such checking I am inclined to the view that the industry practice ought to have been observed. There is no evidence, expert or otherwise, to suggest that under the circumstances the industry practice ought not to have been observed.

As to the question of the involvement of the defendant, Mr Blair gave the following evidence: Q: Personnel from Multiplex did not give you any instructions or directions in relation to what work you were to do or how you went about that work, did they? A: No.

Q: That is, you are agreeing with me? A: Yes.

Q: You received your instructions from McConnell-Dowell through a person by the name of John Meon? [sic] A: That's correct.

Q: And was he, as you understood it, the demolition supervisor from McConnell-Dowell? A: That's correct.

Mr Blair said that he was the sole supervisor of his own staff working under him. Moreover, the area in which Moltoni was working was barricaded to keep out persons other than demolition workers and signage was put up to warn people not to enter the barricaded area.

Mr S P King is Moltoni's general manager. On 14 November 1997 he visited the Finger Wharf with Mr Moltoni and inspected the site. The inspection included an inspection by both persons of the pipes underneath the wharf. Immediately after the inspection a conversation took place with Mr Beveridge in which Mr Beveridge said: " Multiplex have informed us that the pipes have been drained ". Again, this conversation was admitted as to the fact that it occurred but not as to the truth of what was said. Mr King admitted in cross-examination, however, that it was industry practice to treat all pipelines as live.

Mr King acknowledged that he was a signatory to the hazard identification register which had been subsequently forwarded by Mr Beveridge to the defendant with McDonnell Dowell's " work method statement and job safety analysis " on 14 November 1997. Mr King said that the hazard identification register was prepared on the assumption that there was residue oil in the pipeline. He was then asked the following question and gave the following answer: Q: What do you mean by residue oil? A: The inside of the pipeline would be coated with oil. It wouldn't be likely it would have been cleaned out 100 per cent.

Mr C Manihera , to whom I have previously referred, was employed by Moltoni on the Finger Wharf site as an excavator operator. His job was to operate an excavator to pull up the bearers, headstocks and concrete floor from sections of the wharf. He got his instructions from Mr Blair and he understood that Mr Blair got his instructions from McConnell Dowell.

Mr Manihera knew the oil pipeline was there. This is because he and Mr Blair would inspect the underside of the wharf whenever the excavator was moved to ensure that the piles would support the weight of the excavator. Mr Manihera was also aware of the industry practice to which I have previously referred. In this respect he gave the following evidence: Q: You had learned that it was industry practice in demolition to treat all pipelines as live, hadn't you? A: That's correct.

Q: Meaning to treat a pipeline, if it was an oil pipeline, as potentially full? A: That's correct.

Q: And you had learnt that in a course run by WorkCover by TAFE prior to the time of this oil spill? A: That's correct.

Whilst he was working on the day of the spill Mr Manihera saw the pipes. He spoke to an employee of McConnell Dowell and said: " What do I do? " He was told: " Leave them, don't touch them. " Mr Manihera also said to Mr Blair: " What should I do? " Mr Blair said: " Leave them, don't touch them til I get back to you. " Mr Manihera then described in his affidavit what happened as follows: 16. We worked near the pipes and we chained up the last headstock, pulled it, it swung around and it clipped the main pipe. There were little hook brackets holding the main pipe to the timber. When the pipe was knocked, the hook straightened and the pipe went down like dominos. I could hear the pipe falling into the water.

I shut the excavator down straight away. Then I ran along to see what happened. The first thing I was worried about was to make sure no one was hurt. Then I reported it to a bloke named Reg. I think his name was Reg Fidel. After that, I reported it to David Blair.

When I looked at the pipes, there was oil pouring out into the water.

I then went to look for a shut off valve to stop more oil coming out of the pipes. I did this with another man. I think he worked with McConnell Dowell. I saw him shut the valve off. It took a while though because the valve was rusty. It was lucky we turned it off though - it stopped more oil going into the harbour.

David Blair and I got into a boat to see what the damage was underneath the wharf on that day. I saw pipes hanging down under the wharf and I could oil on the water [sic].

Mr Manihera also gave the following evidence: Q: And you say you reported it to a bloke named Reg Fadel. Why did you report it to him? A: I was - after I made sure no one was hurt, I started running down towards the office to report it and Reg was walking back through the main road and I reported it to Reg. I reported it to Reg because he was a higher authority.

Mr Manihera knew Mr Fadel as a person who would do safety inspections " to make sure all of us guys were keeping our safety standards up so just to take away any hazards where anyone might get hurt or anything. They would do it on all the contractor work and if they found something, they would come and approach us so we would have to go and fix it ". Mr Manihera then gave the following evidence: Q: Can you give us an example of what sort of thing Mr Fadel could tell you to do? A. If we had a barricade missing or a sign had fallen over, they would tell us to get the safety gear up to standard.

Q: You said "they". There was Mr Fadel and who else? A: Usually it was Reg Fadel and a couple of union guys.

Mr R Rech is employed by the WorkCover Authority of New South Wales as the Construction Team State Co-ordinator. He was at the time of the oil spill the Acting Co-ordinator. Mr Rech was called by the prosecutor to give evidence as an expert, although there is no evidence that he holds any formal qualifications. The evidence he gave was based, it seems, solely on his experience as an officer of WorkCover since 1986. He said that his evidence " demonstrates the performance that I would require from those involved in demolition ".

Mr Rech said that the holder of a licence under the Occupational Health & Safety (Demolition Licensing) Regulation 1996 who is undertaking demolition activities is responsible for how the demolition activity is conducted. In the present case, since the structure being demolished was less than 4 metres in height, a licence under the Regulation was not required. In Mr Rech's opinion, in the absence of a licence it is the head contractor who has the responsibility for the conduct of the demolition activities. It was his understanding of the situation at the Finger Wharf that the person conducting the demolition, namely Moltoni, was not in complete control of the demolition site, so that primary responsibility rested with the head contractor, here being the defendant, although some responsibility would also rest with the other contractors, being McConnell Dowell and Moltoni.

Mr Rech described what was involved in a proper risk assessment of the pipeline. That would have involved an assessment of whether or not it was securely attached to the underside of the wharf and to establish what are its contents. The former could be assessed, at least initially, by a visual inspection. As to the latter, an initial step would be to tap the pipeline with a hammer. Inspection or drainage points and end caps would enable the contents to be checked. It would also be necessary to identify whether any valves in the pipeline were open or shut or blocked. Mr Rech also said that a pipeline of this size needs to be treated as if it were " live " until it could be shown to be otherwise. He said: Given the size of the pipeline at the Finger Wharf, even if the pipeline was apparently empty, it is my view that it would need to be purged prior to its demolition to ensure that it did not contain inflammable, explosive or toxic gases or liquids. This is similar to the requirements in relation to decommissioning underground fuel tanks at service stations. ... Only after it has been established that the pipeline is not a risk could work commence nearby.

In Mr Rech's opinion, the work method statement and hazard identification of 24 March 1998 (which I have described in paragraph 148 above), which he had seen and which post-dates the spill, should have been in place and executed in the first instance. The method statement and hazard identification of 14 November 1997 (which I have described in paragraph 76 above) did not address the risk of explosion or pollution arising from the possibility of the pipeline being full or nearly full of oil.

Mr Rech had not seen, neither did he want to see, either the contracts or the particular clauses in the contracts which deal with the issue of control. It was put to Mr Rech in cross-examination that as a matter of law and logic, if there were contractual terms that affected who had control of the site (and of what was happening on the site) he would want to see them. Mr Rech said: " Under the Occupational Health & Safety Act they can't contractually contract out of their obligations", so he ignored the contracts. It was also put to Mr Rech in cross-examination that apart from the legal position, contractually it was necessary to know what was occurring on the site. Mr Rech said, " No. .... Under the Occupational Health & Safety Act that doesn't apply ". Mr Rech also said: " The legal contracts are not relevant as far as I am concerned as a WorkCover Inspector ....As far as the Occupational Health & Safety Act is concerned, Multiplex is in charge ". Mr Rech said that he also based his opinion on the fact that Mr McElwain told him that contractually the defendant was in control of the site. He said he took that for granted. He said that he had no reason to doubt it. According to Mr Rech, the defendant provided the site sheds, the facilities, security, chaired safety committee meetings, interacted with the unions, interacted with WorkCover and had a manager on site and accordingly it is responsible under the Occupational Health & Safety Act .

Mr Rech said that it is the custom and practice that where more than 20 people are employed on a construction site and where the majority of them wished to have a safety committee under the Occupational Health & Safety Act " the company must constitute a safety committee ".

Mr C S F McElwain is one of the solicitors having the conduct of these proceedings for the prosecutor and had the primary conduct of the matter. On 18 February 1999 he served notices under s 25 of the Pollution Control Act 1970 on Mr Scionti and on Mr Stewart requiring them to furnish the information specified in a number of questions set out in the notices.

Mr McElwain acknowledged in cross-examination that he could have served similar notices on a number of other persons or obtained witness statements from a number of other persons in addition to Mr Scionti and Mr Stewart, but had not done so. Those other persons included other employees of the defendant, employees of McConnell Dowell, Mr Brubaker, persons connected with TWCA Pty Ltd, persons connected with Gutteridge Haskins and Davey Pty Ltd, persons from ABB Engineering Construction Pty Ltd, persons from Gardner Perrott and persons from the Wharf at Woolloomooloo Pty Ltd. Mr McElwain further agreed that he had not obtained the minutes of safety walk meetings, service co-ordination meetings, occupational health and safety meetings or WorkCover meetings. Mr McElwain also said that he had not made any inquiries as to whether the pipeline on the Finger Wharf had been drained at any time.

The information required under s 25 of the Pollution Control Act is somewhat ambiguous. Many of the questions asked of Mr Scionti are ambiguous so that many of the answers do not necessarily relate to the Finger Wharf but could just as readily relate to Wharf 11. I think it is fair to say that Mr Scionti's answers assert that responsibility for the spill rests with McConnell Dowell. In particular Mr Scionti states that McConnell Dowell were told: " to check all services and make their own arrangements as their contract encompassed all demolition and service disconnections ". I observe that this statement is consistent with clause 24 of the contract between the defendant and McConnell Dowell. It is also consistent with the substructure programme submitted by McConnell Dowell to the defendant and accepted by the defendant on 4 December 1997, in which McConnell Dowell indicates that it will locate services.

Similarly, many of the questions asked by the defendant of Mr Stewart are ambiguous. Although Mr Stewart accepts that his position with the defendant entitled him to give directions to McConnell Dowell, no topic or subject is specified. Again, Mr Stewart's answers appear to throw liability upon McConnell Dowell and he states that he would expect McConnell Dowell to carry out the contract in a diligent manner.

The prosecutor relies on the above evidence, and in particular on the defendant's involvement in safety inspections (noted in paragraphs 171 and 177 above) and its chairing of safety committee meetings as demonstrating a sufficient degree of control over the works so as to make it liable for the spill. The safety inspections and safety committee meetings, however, seem to me to have been more concerned with general " housekeeping " matters rather than technical or structural matters.

Although Mr Stewart furnished the post-spill work method statements to the prosecutor, this appears to have been at the prosecutor's request (as noted in paragraph 130 above). I have previously observed that the defendant's involvement in the post-spill cleanup and rectification works, alleged by the prosecutor to demonstrate control over the works on the part of the defendant, is equally explicable for other reasons. (See paragraph 143 above.) It is to be noted that the spill was reported to the Sydney Ports Corporation by Mr Beveridge and Mr Jones of McConnell Dowell. The notations made by Mr Hawkins of the meeting of 2 March 1998 suggests that McConnell Dowell was the overall co-ordinator of the cleanup and recovery operation.

Other evidence points to McConnell Dowell as being relevantly in control, rather than the defendant.

As noted in paragraphs 148 and 149 above, it seems that McConnell Dowell had accepted, at least post-spill that it had to identify the potential hazard and to do the actual work. The evidence of Mr Callaghan, noted in paragraph 151 above, suggests that the investigation by the prosecutor was not as thorough as it should have been. The extract from Mr Beveridge's diary obtained by Mr Callaghan appears to confirm that Moltoni, as McConnell Dowell's sub-subcontractor, was to supply all work method statements, risk analysis and permits and to remove and dispose of the pipeline (see paragraph 152 above). Mr Moltoni's evidence, noted in paragraph 156 above, confirms that Moltoni was to include the removal of the pipeline in its work.

It seems that McConnell Dowell was involved in checking on the presence of services, as appears from its inquiry of Sydney One Call Service (noted in paragraph 153 above).

Mr Moltoni received day-to-day instructions from McConnell Dowell's supervisors, did not receive any instructions from the defendant relating to the works and when tendering for the works stated that all his conversations were with Mr Beveridge (as noted in paragraph 154 above). Mr Moltoni considered it inappropriate to check on the status of the pipeline with the defendant given that his contract was with McConnell Dowell (noted in paragraph 158 above).

When the pipeline had been exposed prior to the spill, Mr Blair reported this fact to Mr Petracca of McConnell Dowell. Mr Blair also said that personnel from the defendant did not give instructions or directions as to what work was to be done and how it was to be done and that he received his instructions from McConnell Dowell's demolition supervisor (as noted in paragraph 164 above). I have referred to Mr Manihera's evidence in paragraphs 141 and 167 above, which suggests that McConnell Dowell was controlling or directing the demolition work being carried out by Moltoni.

The opinions of Mr Rech were based, it seems, on his understanding of the operation of the Occupational Health & Safety Act, rather than on an understanding of either the contractual arrangements between the various parties or on an understanding of the actual roles performed by the various parties on the site. His statement that in the absence of a licence (which was not required) then it is the head contractor who has responsibility for the conduct of demolition activities was a statement (a) made from the point of view of the regulatory authority under the Occupational Health & Safety Act, (b) was made in ignorance of the various contractual obligations between the parties and (c) could easily apply to McConnell Dowell as the head contractor for the demolition activities. The defendant is, of course, not charged with any offence under the Occupational Health & Safety Act, but under a different Act.

I should refer to Mr Rech's statement that, even if the pipeline was apparently empty, it needed to be purged before its demolition. I also should refer to Mr Rech's further statement that in his opinion the post-spill work method statement of 24 March 1998 should have been in place and the previous method statement of 14 November 1997 was apparently inadequate. Mr Moltoni, Mr Blair and Mr King were, as I have said, aware that it was industry practice to treat such pipelines as " live ". Mr King said that the hazard identification in the 14 November 1997 method statement was prepared on the assumption that there was oil residue in the pipeline. Mr Rech's evidence suggests that the hazard identification in the work method statement of 14 November 1997 was thus inadequate. It seems to me that the actions of McConnell Dowell in engaging the services of Moltoni and of the defendant in approving Moltoni as a sub-subcontractor to McConnell Dowell were the acts of responsible bodies, having regard to Moltoni's experience and expertise in major demolition projects, noted in paragraph 155 above. In other words, I am of the opinion that both McConnell Dowell and the defendant were reasonably entitled to rely upon Moltoni's acknowledged experience and expertise in producing the hazard identification and method statement of 14 November 1997 Moreover, I am of the opinion that the defendant was reasonably entitled to rely upon the experience and expertise of McConnell Dowell in subcontracting to it the substructure works, including the hazard identification and method statements which McConnell Dowell furnished to the defendant.

I am thus left with the overall impression that the evidence that I have described in paragraphs 127 to 181 above does not satisfy me beyond reasonable doubt, or at all, that the defendant exercised such control over the works being performed by Moltoni or by McConnell Dowell as to render it criminally liable for the spill. Such evidence as exists which might implicate the defendant is counterbalanced, in my view, by evidence which is exculpatory of the defendant.

The prosecutor relies upon a large amount of documentary evidence which, it asserts, demonstrates that the defendant exercised such control over the site and the works being carried out thereon as to attract liability for the offence. The documents upon which the prosecutor relies fall into two major categories: those which precede the spill on 25 February 1998 and those which relate to the defendant's control over the cleanup activities and its aftermath after the spill. The defendant, on the other hand, asserts that much of the documentary material in evidence is exculpatory of the defendant.

The prosecutor relies in particular on a large number of documents which are said by it to supports its submission that the defendant exercised control of and responsibility for various aspects of the work, including the timing and scheduling of the work, access to the site, directions with respect to the work and the method of work, control over demolition activities and specific control over safety matters. The prosecutor also asserts that the material upon which it relies shows that the defendant had control over the cleanup activities after the spill on 25 February 1998, that the defendant relevantly had possession of the site and of the pollutant and that the defendant was aware of the hazard and of demolition work near the pipeline.

Whilst I acknowledge that many of the documents upon which the prosecutor relies support the propositions for which it contends, they do not lessen the impact of the subcontract between the defendant and McConnell Dowell and the sub-subcontract between McConnell Dowell and Moltoni. For example, whilst the defendant may initially have been responsible to its principal, Wharf Developments Pty Ltd, for general control of and responsibility for the works, the prosecutor's contentions overlook the fact that the defendant then passed control and responsibility to McConnell Dowell and specifically control and responsibility for the substructure works.

I do not propose to set out all of the documentary evidence upon which the parties have relied. To do so would result in a judgment of unwieldy proportions without progressing or advancing a resolution of the issues, since much of the documentary evidence which was tendered is equivocal. That is to say, many of the documents advance neither the prosecutor's case nor the defendant's case. By way of example, I now describe the first few documents upon which the prosecutor relies and which, the prosecutor submits, demonstrate the defendant's general control over and responsibility for the works.

The first such document is a development programme prepared by the defendant and dated 6 November 1995. This document is a typical table which sets out the various stages of the development and the estimated time for the completion of each such stage. As noted in paragraph 6 above, it must be remembered that the development is essentially a joint venture by both Walker Corporation and the defendant. This document is typical of the kind of exercise that any developer would prepare for its purposes and basic to its planning, financing and marketing of the project.

The next documents upon which the prosecutor relies are minutes of a building application committee meeting held at Sydney City Council on 22 May 1997. The aim of the meeting is said in the minutes as being: " To expedite the approval of the 'skeletal' DA for the Finger Wharf to allow work to commence on Wharf 11 ". Those present at the meeting included staff of Sydney City Council, Mr Robert Bird of Robert Bird & Partners, Mr J Adamus of Adamus Consulting Practice, Mr J Oultram of Clive Lucas Stapleton (architects), Mr J McInerney and Mr B Bennett of City Plan Services, Mr J Reddy of The Wharf at Woolloomooloo Pty Ltd, Mr G McGilvery and Mr M Rose of Walker Corporation Ltd and Mr R West, Mr A Scionti, Mr G Baxter and Ms C Hart of the defendant. The minutes note, inter alia , that the defendant required approval by 30 June 1997 for the Wharf 11 structural works and Level 1 slab, that the Finger Wharf substructure works, pile renewal and rectification approval is required by 1 August 1997, that a demolition approval is required for the stripping out of the Finger Wharf by 14 July 1997 and that the defendant and the Wharf at Woolloomooloo Pty Ltd had confirmed that a site rectification deed was being put in place for the project. Attached to the minutes is a table prepared by the defendant which sets out the time lines for the various approvals required. It seems to me that no particular significance can be attributed to these minutes and the attached table. As with the previous document they represent no more and no less than the kind of planning which any developer would undertake. It says nothing about who will do the work and who will control the work which is to be done.

The next document is a table setting out a preliminary development programme dated April 1997. It sets out time lines for finance, for Wharf 11 building application documentation, demolition and excavation and for the Finger Wharf building application documentation, substructure works and main constructions works. The comments which I have made in relation to the first two documents apply equally to this document. Indeed, by its reliance on such documents as these my immediate impression is that the prosecutor's case, having nothing better upon which to rely, is devoid of any substantial evidence implicating the defendant.

The next document upon which the prosecutor relies is a facsimile transmission from McConnell Dowell to the defendant dated 11 November 1997, seeking permission " pursuant to clause 16 of the draft subcontract agreement " to assign various portions of the work, and in particular to assign demolition to Moltoni Corporation Pty Ltd. The facsimile also states: " The contractors mentioned have been selected on the basis of their expertise on similar projects ... ". I note that this statement supports the defendant's submission that Moltoni was experienced in demolition work generally and in wharf demolition work in particular.

Next is a document of the defendant dated 5 December 1997 and said to be a quality compliance audit of McConnell Dowell's work and documentation. It seems to me that this document, rather than evidencing any form of control or direction by the defendant, is nothing more than a survey by the defendant to ensure that it was getting what it was paying for. That is to say, the defendant was checking to see whether McConnell Dowell was performing its part of the subcontract as it had agreed to do so that the defendant could be satisfied that what it was paying for was in fact being done.

The next document is a facsimile transmission dated 14 January 1998 sent by the defendant to Mr Beveridge which states: " Please find attached a description of incomplete works under the wharf. The attached needs to be rectified ASAP ". There is a two page list containing 35 items which accompanied the facsimile transmission, such list including the following: " Grid 30. North-south Central Roadway. Existing pipe to be removed ". ..." Grid 16. East-west Central Roadway. Remove existing pipe ". ... " Grid 22-23. Central Road. Remove old oil pipeline ". Most of the other items in the list require the removal of formwork. Again, this document appears to me to be explicable as the act of a principal to ensure that it is getting what it is paying for. It does not seem to me to be an attempt at telling McConnell Dowell how to do the work. It does, however, confirm the fact that McConnell Dowell had full knowledge of the existence of the pipeline.

The next document is a letter dated 22 January 1998 from the defendant to McConnell Dowell which states: " Due to the crane being serviced on Tuesday 27 January 1998 it will cease to operate after 3.00 pm. Please contact myself on 9358 2055 if this arrangement causes a problem ". The letter is signed " George Diamond. Site Engineer ". I must confess that I have no idea why the prosecutor relies upon this document. There is no evidence of what task the crane was performing on the site and no evidence of how it affected McConnell Dowell's work. I do not see how this letter advances the prosecutor's case, neither do I see its relevance. There are many other documents which fall into this category and about which I could make similar comments.

The next document is a report provided by McConnell Dowell to the defendant on the subject of building and apron piles dated 28 January 1998. The report lists by pile number the piles which have been completed and those which are currently under construction. The prosecutor notes that some of the piles would have been adjacent to the oil pipeline. It seems to me that this report was merely furnished by McConnell Dowell to the defendant for information. It is not evidence, as the prosecutor asserts, of any control exercised by the defendant over the works.

The next document is headed " Notes From Meeting With McConnell Dowell Subcontractors Wednesday 4/2/95 5 pm ". There is no evidence of who was present at the meeting, neither is there any evidence of who prepared the document. The prosecutor relies on a statement in the document which reads: " Bird Engineers not to give instructions directly to McConnell Dowell or subcontractor workers, but to give recommendations to MPX Management who will pass the message on through foremen ". I assume that the reference to Bird Engineers is a reference to Robert Bird & Partners. I should observe that no evidence was called to explain the role of Robert Bird & Partners.

Next is a facsimile transmission from the defendant to Mr Beveridge which states: " We confirm that static pile testing is not required. We do however require written certification from Hardcastle and Richards that the installed piles comply with their design. Please provide this certification for the 1st 24m. of piling for the main building & the north building piles to date. The certification needs to include the building raking piles ". It seems to me that all this facsimile transmission does is to require certification by McConnell Dowell's engineers, Hardcastle and Richards, that the piling complies with their design. That is to say, the defendant requires certification that McConnell Dowell had done its job and for which it is being paid by the defendant. This document does not, in my opinion, support the prosecutor's argument that the defendant was in control of the works being performed by McConnell Dowell. There is no suggestion that the defendant was by this facsimile instructing McConnell Dowell how it should be doing its work. The defendant was, on the contrary, relying upon others, namely Hardcastle and Richards, in relation to how the work should be done.

The abovementioned documents are the first few examples of those upon which the prosecutor relies. As I have said, I do not propose to go through each of the very large number of documents in evidence since this would become an unwieldy exercise. It is sufficient to say that I have read and re-read all the documentary material which has been tendered. As noted in the few examples given above, many of them do not necessarily demonstrate control over or responsibility for the works on the part of the defendant, but are equally explicable on the basis of the defendant ensuring that it was merely getting what it was paying for under its subcontract with McConnell Dowell. I have referred in paragraph 143 above to the defendant's explanation for its post-spill involvement in the cleanup and its aftermath. The additional documentary material relied upon does not persuade me beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had control of and responsibility for the works which were being performed by McConnell Dowell and whose subcontractor's employee was responsible for the oil spill which occurred on 25 February 1998.

I have set out (in paragraph 16 above) the five issues identified by the prosecutor and which it says are each satisfied in this case. It seems to me, however, that there is some overlapping of the issues. Issues (ii) and (iv), for example, appear to be in substance the same. It also seems to me that as between those two issues and issues (i) there is some overlapping. The prosecutor's own submissions tended to blur any distinction between these issues.

As I understand the prosecutor's submissions, it asserts that the defendant was the occupier of the Finger Wharf for the purpose of the definition of "occupier" in s 5 of the Clean Waters Act and was in control of the premises pursuant to its contract with Wharf Developments Pty Ltd. The defendant was accordingly in possession of the pollutant on premises which it controlled and the pollutant got into the waters of Woolloomooloo Bay as a direct result of being where it was (cf Majury v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd , at 662-663). The defendant was thus directly liable under s 16(1) of the Act.

Further or alternatively, the prosecutor relies upon the deeming provisions in s 16(2) of the Act: the defendant placed, or caused or permitted the pollutant to be placed in a position where it fell or descended, or was likely to fall or descend, into the waters of Woolloomooloo Bay (in this context the prosecutor referred to Environment Agency v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1998] 2 WLR 350 [1998] All ER 481 HL.)

In support of these assertions the prosecutor's counsel spent some days in submission canvassing the detailed evidence, both oral and documentary, upon which the prosecutor relies. Again, I do not propose in this judgment to set out all the detailed evidence to which the prosecutor's counsel referred. To do so would be to depart from what Kirby J has described as " the judicial trinity " for effective judgment writing: " brevity, simplicity and clarity " ( On the writing of judgments, 64 ALJ 691 at 704, 708). It is sufficient to note in a general way the nature and scope of the submissions as I understood them.

In the prosecutor's submission, inter alia , the defendant was in control of the premises pursuant to its contract with Wharf Developments Pty Ltd; the defendant controlled who went on to the site, approved the work methods, was responsible for safety on the site and gave directions as to the work methods and safety issues; the defendant was aware of the location of the pipeline and was told to assume the presence of marine fuel oil in the line; the defendant was in possession of the substance in the pipe; as a direct of result of where the oil was, being in the pipeline, it got into the waters of Woolloomooloo Bay; the defendant failed to tell McConnell Dowell or anyone else to assume that marine fuel oil remained in the pipes; the defendant failed to comply with the relevant Australian Standard for the demolition of structures (as required by condition 8 of the building approval); the defendant permitted work in the vicinity of the pipeline when the risk of damage thereto was apparent; and the defendant did not take specific precautions to prevent pollution by the presence of the hazard, namely the oil in the pipeline.

I now turn to issue (iii) as identified by the prosecutor, that of vicarious liability. The prosecutor submits that the defendant is liable for the acts and omissions of McConnell Dowell and its employees and of Moltoni and its employees. The prosecutor relies, in particular, on Tiger Nominees Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1992) 25 NSWLR 715, State Pollution Control Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Ltd (1992) 74 LGRA 387 and Environment Protection Authority v Taylor Woodrow (Australia) Pty Ltd (1997) 101 LGERA 226. The prosecutor submits that there is no need for there to be a contract between the defendant and McConnell Dowell's employees, or between the defendant and Moltoni or Moltoni's employees, for the defendant to be vicariously liable for their acts or omissions. In this respect the defendant relies upon Mousell Bros v London & North Western Railway [1917] 2 KB 836. The prosecutor places importance on the fact that the offences created by s 16 are " result offences " as described in Brownlie v State Pollution Control Commission (1992) 27 NSWLR 78 and Bathurst City Council v Environment Protection Authority (1995) 89 LGERA 79. Again, the prosecutor's counsel referred extensively to the evidence, both oral and documentary, which is said to support its submissions on this issue.

As to issue (v) as identified by the prosecutor, that is, the defendant owed a non-delegable duty of care to prevent the pollution of the waters of Woolloomooloo Bay, I have noted that the prosecutor relies on Burnie Ports Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd . The prosecutor submits that the principle of non-delegable duty established by Burnie Ports is separate from the defendant's contractual obligations, although the latter are relevant in determining the control that the defendant had over the Finger Wharf in terms of access and the work to be done. The prosecutor submits that there are two points of identity in this case with Burnie Ports : firstly, the presence of a pipeline which had furnace oil remaining in it and secondly , demolition activity occurring above and around it. There was a foreseeable risk of pollution unless precautions were taken to avoid that risk. The prosecutor concedes, however, that Burnie Ports has not been applied to attach vicarious liability to a defendant in a criminal case.

Finally, the prosecutor submits that a defendant cannot contract out of criminal liability; or put another way, the defendant cannot avoid liability for an offence under the Clean Waters Act by provisions of contract. The prosecutor, referring to May v O'Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654, also submits that since no one from the defendant has given evidence, it may thus be legitimate to more readily draw an inference of guilt.

I have attempted to summarise the prosecutor's principle submissions, as I understand them. The prosecutor also made a number of subsidiary submissions. For example, the prosecutor submits that the involvement of the defendant in the post-spill clean up and other conduct of the defendant is evidence of a consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant. I comment on the prosecutor's subsidiary submissions as necessary in the course of these reasons.

The defendant's approach to the case is that there are three basic or essential allegations against it:

(1) The defendant by its acts and/or omissions directly introduced into the waters of Woolloomoolloo Bay oil which was, prior to the spill, in the possession of the defendant on land it occupied, or caused or permitted the same. (The prosecutor's issues (i), (ii) and (iv).)

(2) The defendant is vicariously liable for the acts and/or omissions of McConnell Dowell and/or Moltoni and their respective employees. (The prosecutor's issue (iii).)

(3) The defendant was under a non-delegable duty to protect the waters of Woolloomooloo Bay. (The prosecutor's issue (v).)

The defendant's approach to the issues is consistent with the view that I have taken of the issues identified by the prosecutor and which I have briefly discussed in paragraphs 207 to 213 above. In answer to the three basic allegations made against it the defendant says: (1) no sufficiently proximate act or omission on the part of the defendant caused the spill, (2) the evidence adduced by the prosecutor does not establish beyond reasonable doubt vicarious liability on the part of the defendant for the acts or omissions of McConnell Dowell and/or Moltoni or their employees and (3) the principle of a non-delegable duty to protect the waters of Woolloomooloo Bay is not an available head of liability under s 16(1) of the Clean Waters Act. The defendant also relies upon an overall defence to allegations (1) and (2) of honest and reasonable mistake, namely: that McConnell Dowell was taking steps to deal with potential hazards such as pollution or explosions in removing the pipeline; that the work method statements and the statements contained in the hazard identification register would not only reduce the possibility of explosion or pollution, but would if implemented eliminate fire and explosion risks as well as totally controlling oil spillage from pipe residues; and that McConnell Dowell had accepted and was carrying out its obligations under its contract with the defendant.

As to issue (1) as identified by the defendant, it submits that the prosecutor must prove that the defendant caused the oil to get into the waters of Woolloomooloo Bay; that what caused a certain event to occur is essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense; and that none of the omissions relied upon by the prosecutor could ever as a practical question of fact using one's ordinary common sense establish beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the oil to find its way into Woolloomooloo Bay. The defendant also submits that as a matter of common sense the immediate and proximate cause of the oil getting into Woolloomooloo Bay was the negligent act of an employee of Moltoni. A further causative act, according to the submission, was the failure of McConnell Dowell (which had undertaken the responsibility to remove the pipeline and its contents) and of Moltoni to ensure that the pipeline was purged or cleared of its contents prior to the spill. The only acts or omissions proven beyond reasonable doubt to have caused the pollution are the acts of Moltoni's employees or, at the very least, the Court could not find beyond reasonable doubt that any acts or omissions of the defendant caused the pollution.

The defendant also submits that the acts or omissions of Moltoni and of employees of McConnell Dowell are novus actus interveniens in relation to causation of the spill, should it ever be found that the defendant's acts or omissions had causal significance; and that no act or omission on the part of the defendant can be said to constitute the legal or proximate cause of the oil spill.

The defendant submits that the following circumstances, or any of them, exclude any acts or omissions of the defendant as a causative factor: the negligence of Mr Manahera in striking the oil pipe, having earlier been told by Mr Blair to leave it alone, the failure of McConnell Dowell to have purged the pipeline of oil, knowing the industry practice to treat it as " live ", or the assurance given by Mr Beveridge to Mr Moltoni in November 1997 that the pipeline had been drained. The defendant submits that these things could not in any way be regarded as " in the general run of things as a matter of ordinary occurrence " but rather were " so far out of the ordinary course of things that in the circumstances any [acts or omissions] of the defendant fade into the background ". The defendant also referred in this context to Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd v National Rivers Authority .

The defendant submits that Majury v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd is not authority for the proposition that s 16(1) creates an offence not requiring proof of causation. The prosecutor seems to have made the submission that the defendant is liable because it simply " possessed " the oil in the pipeline. Majury makes it clear, however, that causation still has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant submits that a recent decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, Environmental & Earth Sciences Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority [1999] NSWCCA 192, confirms the necessity for causation to be proved. It has never been held that s 16(1) creates an offence of absolute liability (as distinct from one of strict liability in which no mens rea needs to be proved).

The defendant further submits on this issue that the prosecutor has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was either in possession of the oil in the pipeline or that the pipeline was on land occupied by the defendant at the relevant time. The defendant submits that at all relevant times McConnell Dowell and/or Moltoni were the persons in possession, occupation or control of the pipeline.

As to issue (2) as identified by the defendant, that of vicarious liability, there is here an unusual situation that a person whose act breached the pipeline is an employee of a sub-subcontractor to a subcontractor to the defendant. The defendant submits that it is thus necessary for a court to consider not only the extent to which the defendant had an involvement in the work of the subcontractor, to consider not only the relationship between McConnell Dowell and Moltoni, but also to consider what relationship, if any, existed between the defendant and Moltoni. The defendant submits that the cases in this Court of Environment Protection Authority v Munters Pty Ltd (1998) 98 LGERA 279, Environment Protection Authority v Taylor Woodrow (Australia) Pty Ltd (1997) 101 LGERA 226 and Environment Protection Authority v Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation Ltd (1994) 83 LGERA 51 adequately state the principles of law dealing with questions of vicarious liability in prosecutions under s 16(1) of the Clean Waters Act. The defendant also relies upon Hetherington v Mirvac Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 443 as demonstrating that the liability of a principal for the acts of an independent contractor is not unlimited and, when the principles to which that case refers are applied to the facts of this case, could not result in an adverse finding against the defendant on this issue.

The particular facts relied upon by the defendant to refute the allegation of vicarious liability include the following: Moltoni received no instructions from the defendant, other than safety directions consistent with the duties of the safety committee established under the relevant legislation; Moltoni spoke only to Mr Berveridge of McConnell Dowell during the tendering process, not to the defendant; Moltoni never checked the status of the pipeline with the defendant because its contract was with McConnell Dowell; when demolition was occurring the area was barricaded by Moltoni; the hazard identification register was completed by McConnell Dowell and Mr King signed and dated it; when the pipe was found to be close to the works Mr Blair of Moltoni reported that fact to Mr Petracca of McConnell Dowell; the only evidence of control over Moltoni is of McConnell Dowell exercising control over Moltoni and not the defendant exercising control over Moltoni; the defendant subcontracted the substructure works to Mr Connell Dowell because of the latter's acknowledged expertise in such works; the Moltoni tender documents reveal the unquestionable expertise of Moltoni in demolition works and in particular in wharf demolition; and the defendant did not control and supervise either McConnell Dowell or Moltoni in the manner in which the work was done.

As to issue (3) as identified by the defendant, it submits that the concept of a non-delegable duty of care does not appear to have been previously applied so as to impose criminal liability for a strict liability offence such as 16(1) of the Clean Waters Act. The offence in this case is not a " status " offence, the hallmark of which is the nomination of a class or status of person under a statutory obligation, such as a licensee or occupier, so as to give rise to liability for a non-delegable statutory obligation. The defendant relies on R v Winson [1969] 1 QB 371, in which Lord Parker CJ, speaking for the Court of Appeal, said that the doctrine of delegation " comes into play and only comes into play in cases ... to which knowledge is inherent "; that is, those offences requiring mens rea .

The defendant further submits that if, despite its submission that s 16(1) does not impose a non-delegable duty, the court finds to the contrary, then the factual matrix of this case does not come within the classes of case in which the existence of a non-delegable duty has been recognised, such as employer/employee, hospital/patient, school/student and claims that previously came under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher [1866] LR 1 Ex.265. The defendant submits that expansion of the principle beyond these classes of case is to be exercised with caution (relying upon Northern Sandblasting Pty Ltd v Harris (1995) 188 CLR 313, per Kirby J at 399 ff). Alternatively, the critical aspect of proximity which may elevate the ordinary duty of care to the special duty of care is what is described as the " central feature of control ", which the defendant did not have. The defendant submits that either the owner of the wharf and of the pipeline (the Marine Ministerial Holding Corporation), the owner of the oil (the Commonwealth of Australia), the ultimate developer (the Wharf at Woolloomooloo Pty Ltd) or the entity responsible for the design and construct contract (Wharf Developments Pty Ltd) better sit within the notion of a " central feature of control ". Also absent in this case, in the defendant's submission, are key factors found in the tort cases of non-delegable duty of care and said to be required before the duty applies, including the special dependence or vulnerability on the part of an identifiable injured party.

As with the prosecutor's submissions I have attempted to summarise only the defendant's principal submissions. I comment on the defendant's subsidiary submissions as necessary in the course of these reasons.

It is, I think, convenient to consider the issues in the way they have been identified by the defendant and which I have noted in paragraph 216 above. As I have also noted, the issues identified by the prosecutor tend to overlap, particularly the prosecutor's issues (i), (ii) and (iv). There is even some overlapping of the prosecutor's issues (iii) and (v). It is to a consideration of the issues as identified by the defendant that I now turn.

Issue (1): Did the defendant pollute the waters of Woolloomooloo Bay or place, cause or permit the pollutant to be placed in a position where it fell or was likely to fall into those waters .

I have reformulated this issue to encapsulate the prosecutor's issues (i), (ii) and (iv) and the defendant's issue (1).

I have set out in paragraph 15 above the provisions of s 16(1) and (2) of the Clean Waters Act. As noted in the same paragraph, the prosecutor relies upon both subsection (1) and on the deeming provision in subsection (2). As to subparagraph (1) I have noted in paragraph 208 above the prosecutor's submission that the defendant was in possession of the pollutant and was in control of the premises. I have also noted the prosecutor's assertion that the defendant was within the definition of " occupier " in s 5 of the Clean Waters Act: 'Occupier', in relation to any premises, means the person in occupation or control of the premises ...

I accept the defendant's submission that the definition of " occupier " is inapplicable. Nowhere in s 16 does the word " occupier " appear. The word does, however, appear elsewhere in the Act, for example, in ss 17 and 18. The limited operation of a definition in a statute is explained by Barwick CJ, McTiernan and Taylor JJ in Gibb v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 118 CLR 628 at 635: The function of a definition clause in a statute is merely to indicate that when particular words or expressions the subject of definition, are found in the substantive part of the statute under consideration, they are to be understood in the defined sense - or are to be taken to include certain things which, but for the definition, they would not include. Such clauses are, therefore, no more than an aid to the construction of the statute and do not operate in any other way. As was said by Sutherland ( Statutes and Statutory Construction , 2nd Ed., vol.2, p. 687), "Such definitions can, in the nature of things, have no effect except in the construction of the statutes themselves".

It follows that where a word is defined in a statute having a particular meaning, that is an artificial meaning which applies solely to the use of that word in the statute. The ordinary meaning of the word does not apply. Conversely, if a word is not defined then the word should be construed according to its ordinary meaning ( Louinder v Stuckey [1984] 2 NSWLR 354 at 357, 360 CA). Insofar as the prosecutor asserts that the defendant was the occupier of the Finger Wharf, the defined meaning of the word " occupier " has no application and the ordinary meaning of that word must apply, so far as it may be relevant.

The prosecutor also relies on the definition of " pollute " (s 5), a word which is used in both subsections (1) and (2) of s 16: " pollute", in relation to any waters, means: (a) to place in or on, or otherwise introduce into or on to, the waters (whether through an act or omission) any matter, whether solid, liquid or gaseous, so that the physical, chemical or biological condition of the waters is changed; or

(b) to place in or on, or otherwise introduce into or on to, the waters (whether through an act or omission) any refuse, litter, debris or other matter, whether solid or liquid or gaseous, so that the change in the condition of the waters or the refuse, litter, debris or other matter, either alone or together with any other refuse, litter, debris or matter present in the waters makes, or is likely to make, the waters unclean, noxious, poisonous or impure, detrimental to the health, safety, welfare or property of persons, undrinkable for farm animals, poisonous or harmful to aquatic life, animals, birds or fish in or around the waters or unsuitable for use in irrigation, or obstructs or interferes with, or is likely to obstruct or interfere with persons in the exercise or enjoyment of any right in relation to the waters; or

It can be seen that the offence is established if, pursuant to the deeming provisions in subsection (2) of s 16 it is proved that the defendant placed the pollutant (the marine fuel oil) in a position where it falls or descends, or is likely to fall or descend into the waters, or caused or permitted such matter to be placed in such a position. Moreover, the definition of " pollute " is extended to include acts of omission.

In Majury v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd , McClemens CJ at CL considered the effect of similar provisions of the Clean Waters Act. The Act was amended after this decision, but not in a material way. The definition of " pollute " with which McClemens CJ at CL was concerned was relevantly as follows: (a) to place in or on the waters any matter, whether solid, liquid or gaseous, so that the physical, chemical or biological condition of the waters is changed; or

Section 16(1), in the form in which it was considered by McClemens CJ at CL, so far as was material, provided: A person shall not ... cause ... any waters to be polluted . 237. McClemens CJ at CL rejected a submission by the defendant in that case that to justify a conviction the prosecution has to prove a placing in or on the water and a causal connection between that placing and the pollution: and the further submission that before there could be a conviction there had to be an active act of placing in or on the water, such as would happen if a man went to the side of a river and threw in the contents of a garbage tin. His Honour said (at 662-663): In my opinion, there is a placing in or on the water, if the pollutant in the possession of the defendant and on his land gets into the water as a direct result of its being where it is; in other words, if the defendant causes it to get there .

McClemens CJ at CL then turned to the question of whether the defendant caused the waters to be polluted. In this respect his Honour referred to and applied the decision of the House of Lords in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824. That was a prosecution under the English Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951, s 2(1) of which provides: .... a person commits an offence ... (a) if he causes or knowingly permits to enter a stream any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter ...

His Honour relied upon the case only for the purpose of considering the proper definition of the word " cause ". His Honour noted (at 663) that Lord Wilberforce (at 834) analysed the distinction between " causing " and " knowingly permitting " and emphasised that " causing " must be given a common sense meaning. His Honour noted (at 664) that Viscount Dilhorne said (at 839-840): What, then, is meant by the word " caused " in the subsection? If a man, intending to secure a particular result, does an act which brings that about, he causes that result. If he deliberately and intentionally does certain acts of which the natural consequence is that certain results ensue, may he not also be said to have caused those results even though they may not have been intended by him?

Finally, his Honour referred (at 664) to the judgment of Lord Pearson who expressed the view (at 847) that what or who has caused a certain event to occur is essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense rather than by abstract metaphysical theory.

The facts in Majury , briefly stated, are that the defendant occupied land upon which was erected a factory and three holding tanks containing potassium cupro cyanide. Between two of the tanks there was a valve on a connecting pipe. The valve was faulty, causing the chemical to escape and drain into the Cooks River. There was no want of proper care on the part of the defendant. McClemens CJ at CL noted that it was conceded that the defendant was the occupier of the premises; and his Honour found as a fact that the process of storing the chemicals was under the exclusive control of the defendant.

In applying Alphacell to these facts, McClemens CJ at CL said (at 664): I find as a question of fact that the defendant caused the pollution here. In fairness to the defendants I also find specifically that there is no evidence of want of proper care on its part, but that is not the test. The test is whether it caused the pollution. In my opinion it did. There is no question here of the act of a third party or the act of God.

Majury was approved and adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Environmental & Earth Sciences Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Authority [1999] NSW CCA 192. In that case the appellant had engaged a subcontractor to remove underground tanks at a decommissioned service station and to remove and treat contaminated soil. The contaminated soil was removed to adjoining land where a process of bio-remediation was adopted to allow the removal of contamination of the soil by hydrocarbons. The appellant was responsible for supervising the manner and method of disposal of the contaminated soil and the work was carried out under its instruction. The appellant's site supervisor supervised the excavations, the on-site placement of soil and on-site validation. Certain bunds were erected by the appellant, hay bale were put in place and silt fences were erected. The work was not executed properly and dirty water bypassed the bunds, the hay bales and the silt fences. One hay bale had been removed. Dirty water flowed downhill from the site and entered a creek. The Court found that there could be no reasonable basis for the conclusion that the works were properly executed and proper supervision was maintained.

Apart from its endorsement of Majury , I do not derive any assistance from this case. The defendant was, as noted above, responsible for supervising the manner and method of the works. The work was not executed properly and was not properly supervised. Under those circumstances it is not surprising that the verdict of guilty was upheld. Those facts are, however, quite different from those of the present case, in which the prosecutor has not proved that the defendant supervised the manner and method of the work being performed by McConnell Dowell or by Moltoni or their respective employees.

In Alphacell Ltd v Woodward , upon which McClemens CJ at CL relied, the appellants had a manufacturing plant in which wash water was run into two settling tanks and then recirculated and reused. There were two pumps which drew the water out of the settling tanks. At the bottom of the intake pipes of each pump there was a rose, similar to the rose of a watering can, intended to keep out foreign matter while admitting a sufficient flow of water. The pumps failed when bracken, ferns and leaves which had entered the intake pipes through the holes in the rose became wrapped around each impeller. The water overflowed the tanks into a river. The defendant was convicted by magistrates of an offence which was created if a person " causes or knowingly permits to enter a stream any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter ".

In the House of Lords, both Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Salmon doubted that the word " knowingly " before " permits " made any difference to the meaning of the word " permits ". Lord Salmon thought that the word " knowingly " is probably otiose (at 849). Viscount Dilhorne (at 840) said that whether the inclusion of the word " knowingly " before " permits " makes any difference to the meaning of " permits " is open to doubt, quoting Lord Godard CJ in Lomas v Peek [1947] 2 AllER 574, 575: If a man permits a thing to be done, it means that he gives permission for it to be done, and if a man gives permission for a thing to be done, he knows what is to be done or is being done, ...

As to the meaning of the word " causes " in this context, I have referred to the references in the judgments in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward which were relied upon by McClemens CJ at CL in Majury v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd . In addition to the passages relied upon by McClemens CJ at CL there are other passages from the judgments in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward to which I wish to return.

Lord Wilberforce, after noting (at 834) that the relevant words are " ...if he causes or knowingly permits to enter a stream any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter; ... said: The subsection evidently contemplates two things - causing, which must involve some active operation or chain of operations involving as the result the pollution of the stream; knowingly permitting , which involves a failure to prevent the pollution, which failure, however, must be accompanied by knowledge.

After stating that " causing " must be given a common sense meaning, Lord Wilberforce said: There may be difficulties where acts of third persons or natural forces are concerned ... .

Viscount Dilhorne noted (at 838) that the immediate cause in that case was the blocking of the impellers. He continued: " When the works were operating, there was, under the system they had instituted, bound to be an overflow into the river unless the pumps provided were of sufficient capacity and working sufficiently to prevent that happening .... In these circumstances I see no escape from the conclusion that it was the acts of the appellants that caused the pollution ". After making the statement referred to by McClemens CJ at CL and which I have quoted in para 238 above, Viscount Dilhorne also said (at 840): We have not here to consider what the position would be if pollution were caused by an inadvertent and unintentional act. In such case it might be said that the doer of the act had not caused the pollution although the act had caused it. Here the acts done by the appellants were intentional. They were acts calculated to lead to the river being polluted if the acts done by the appellants, the installation and operation of the pumps, were ineffective to prevent it. Where a person intentionally does certain things which produce a certain result, then it can truly be said that he has caused that result, and here in my opinion the act intentionally by the appellants caused the pollution.

Lord Pearson said (at 845): Nevertheless, I think that the magistrates and the majority of the Divisional Court were right in holding that the overflow was caused by the activities of the appellants. Those were positive activities and they directly brought about the overflow. What other cause was there? There was no intervening act of a trespasser and no act of God.

Lord Cross of Chelsea said (at 846) that the section shows " that a man cannot be guilty of causing polluting matter to enter a stream unless at the least he does some positive act in the chain of acts and events leading to that result ". In upholding the finding of guilty in that case Lord Cross said: The appellants having started to operate their plant on that day could only escape being held to have caused polluted effluent to enter the river if they proved that the overflow of the tank had been brought about by some other event which could barely be regarded as being beyond their ability to foresee or control .

Lord Salmon said (at 847) that although the appellants clearly did not cause the pollution intentionally, they caused the pollution by the active operation of their plant. Lord Salmon also said: There was no intervening act of a third party, nor was there any act of God to which it could be attributed. The appellants had been responsible for the design of the plant, everything within their works was under their control; they had chosen all the equipment.

Both parties in the present case have relied upon the House of Lords case of Environment Agency v Empress Car Co (Arbertillery) Ltd . In that case the defendant maintained a diesel tank in a yard which was drained directly into a river. The tank was surrounded by a bund to contain spillage, but the defendant had overridden this protection by fixing an extension pipe to the outlet of the tank so as to connect it to a drum standing outside the bund. It appears to have been more convenient to the defendant to draw diesel from the drum than directly from the tank. The outlet from the tank was governed by a tap which had no lock. The tap was opened by a person unknown and the entire contents of the tank ran into the drum, overflowed into the yard and then into the river. The defendant was charged with an offence against a provision as follows: A person contravenes this section if he causes or knowingly permits any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter or any solid waste matter to enter into any controlled waters.

The case was about whether the defendant caused polluting matter to enter the river. In upholding the original conviction of the defendant by the Crown Court the House of Lords held that there was evidence upon which it was open to the Crown Court to find that the defendant had caused the pollution. The principal judgment was delivered by Lord Hoffmann. After referring to the statement of Lord Wilberforce in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward which I have set out in paragraph 246 above, Lord Hoffman, said (at 354): Putting the matter shortly, if the charge is " causing " the prosecution must prove that the pollution was caused by something which the defendant did, rather than merely fail to prevent. It is, however, very important to notice that this requirement is not because of anything inherent in the notion of " causing ". It is because of the structure of the subsection which imposes liability under two separate heads: the first limb simply for doing something which causes the pollution and the second for knowingly failing to prevent the pollution. The notion of causing is present in both limbs: under the first limb, what the defendant did must have caused the pollution and under the second limb, his omission must have caused it. ... Liability under the first limb, without proof or knowledge, therefore requires that the defendant must have done something.

Lord Hoffmann went on to state (at 355) that it was not a requirement that the positive act of the defendant be the immediate cause: The only question was whether something which the defendant had done, whether immediately or antecedently, had caused the pollution.

In the present case, the Crown Court found that the escape was caused by the way the company maintained its tank of diesel fuel. Maintaining a tank of diesel is doing something and therefore, provided that it was open to the court to find the necessary causal connection established, they were in my view entitled to convict.

Lord Hoffmann proceeded to express the opinion that the active intervention of a third party may, but does not necessarily, negative causal connection. At p 359 Lord Hoffmann said: While liability under section 85(1) is strict and therefore includes liability for certain deliberate acts of third parties and (by parity of reasoning) natural events, it is not an absolute liability in the sense that all that has to be shown is that the polluting matter escaped from the defendant's land, irrespective of how this happened. It must still be possible to say that the defendant caused the pollution. Take, for example, the lagoons of effluent in Price v Cromack [1975] 1 WLR 988. They leaked effluent into the river and I have said that in my view the justices were entitled to hold that the pollution had been caused by the defendant maintaining leaky lagoons. But suppose that they emptied into the river because a wall had been breached by a bomb planted by terrorists. I think that it would be very difficult to say, as a matter of common sense, that the defendant had caused the pollution.

On the question of third party involvement or a natural event, Lord Hoffmann also said that foreseeability is not the criterion for deciding whether a person caused something or not. As to the deliberate acts of third parties " ... it seems to me that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary is the only common sense criterion by which one can distinguish those acts which will negative causal connection from those which will not " (at 361). Finally, Lord Hoffmann said (at 362): The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary is one of fact and degree to which the justices must apply their common sense and knowledge of what happens in the area.

On the question of third party involvement or a natural event, Lord Clyde said (at 363): Furthermore, in determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant caused the pollutant to enter the waters account has to be taken of natural forces, acts of God and the actions of third parties, if the evidence justifies taking such considerations into account either as contributing causes or even as excluding any operation of the defendant as a causative factor.

The Australian authorities, like the English authorities to which I have referred, support the view that the word " knowingly " is otiose and also construe the word " permits " as meaning " to intentionally allow ". Examples of such cases are Broad v Parish (1941) 64 CLR 588 at 595, Starke J; Miller v Williams (1990) 53 SASR 82 at 87-92; and Regina v Lonie & Anor [1999] NSWCCA 319 at [87] et seq. In Miller v Williams Cox J said (at 90) that there does not have to be actual knowledge - " a belief that a contravention is highly likely or probable will suffice ". Cox J drew a distinction between knowing that something will happen and having reason to anticipate or suspect that it will happen: " the latter is entirely consistent with complete unsuspecting ignorance on a defendant's part ... but it does not put the test high enough for a crime ... ".

In Regina v Lonie & Anor the relevant phrase was " suffers or permits ". Smart AJ, speaking for the Court of Criminal Appeal said at [89] that the question of " permitting " is usually one of fact. Smart AJ at [90] adopted what was said by Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ in Adelaide Corporation v Australasian Performing Rights Association (1928) 40 CLR 481 at 504: Mere inactivity or failure to take some steps [by the owner of the town hall] to prevent the performance of the work [a song in a vocal concert by another] does not necessarily establish permission ... It is a question of fact in each case what is the true inference to be drawn ... .

In applying the principles which emerge from the abovementioned cases I draw the following conclusions. Subsection (1) of s 16 of the Clean Waters Act is fairly straightforward and clear: a person shall not pollute waters. The offence is clearly established if a person puts a pollutant into waters. In the present case, for example, Mr Manahera infringed this subsection, since it was he who broke the pipe which contained the oil, which then fell into the waters of Woolloomooloo Bay. There is no doubt that he polluted the waters. He placed or otherwise introduced into or on the waters, within the expanded definition of " pollute ", a pollutant. I set aside for later consideration the issue of vicarious liability. I do not think it can be said that the defendant polluted the waters in this sense.

I have noted the prosecutor's submission that the defendant was directly liable under subsection (1) because it was in possession of the pollutant on premises which were under its control and the pollutant got into the waters as a direct result of being where it was. I have also noted the prosecutor's reliance on Majury v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd for this submission.

I do not agree with the submission. In Majury , upon which the prosecutor relies, the offence was: " a person shall not ... cause ... any waters to be polluted ". The word " cause " is no longer part of subsection (1). The submission is only vindicated by recourse to subsection (2). It is under subsection (2) that a defendant may become liable by being in possession of the pollutant on premises which are under its control and the pollutant gets into the waters as a direct result of being where it is. In applying the deeming provision of subsection (2), however, the concept of causing extends liability in a common sense way to the natural consequences of what the defendant may have done or omitted to do. This includes liability for the ordinary or natural consequences of the defendant's conduct, but not for any extraordinary consequences or other contributing causes which exclude any operation of the defendant as a causative factor.

Having regard to the meaning given by the courts to the words " permits ", namely, " to intentionally allow ", I do not think there is sufficient evidence in this case to require a finding beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant permitted the pollution of waters within the meaning of subsection (2). I have previously referred to both McConnell Dowell and Moltoni's respective expertise in demolition work and in particular in the demolition of wharf structures. I have also previously referred to the preparation by Moltoni of a work method for the removal of the oil pipes, of which work method Moltoni said: " This will eliminate fire and explosion risks as well as totally controlling oil spillage from pipe residues ". In my opinion the only basis upon which the prosecutor might be able to establish liability on the defendant under the subsection is by reliance on the word " causes ": that is to say on an assertion that the defendant caused the pollutant, which was in its possession on premises which were under its control, to be placed in a position where it fell or was likely to fall into the waters.

264 I have set out (in paragraph 211 above) some of the facts upon which the prosecutor relies in submitting that the defendant is liable under the deeming provision in subclause (2) of s 16. I have also set out (in paragraph 218 - 222) the defendant's principal submissions on this issue.

At a glance

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Judgment (259 paragraphs)

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Cases Cited (31)

Cited By (13)