Relevant factual background
16 The relevant facts concerning SPA, its administration and subsequent deregistration, which were established by the evidence at the first hearing, were set in Endless Solar No 1 at [15]-[31]. The key events are as follows:
(a) SPA's business comprised products for the construction of walls, using lightweight panels which could be filled with a concrete inner core.
(e) In 2016, SPA and its related companies were facing financial difficulties. Mr Scheuer had supplied personal guarantees to SPA's lender, National Australia Bank Limited (NAB), which exposure was at times up to $20 million.
(f) On 21 March 2017, administrators were appointed to SPA and two of its related companies, Speedpanel (Vic.) Pty Ltd and Speedpanel Corporate Services Pty Ltd.
(g) The administrator's report dated 29 August 2017 set out the shareholdings of SPA based on "unverified records of the Company". The report indicated that the shares held by Mr Scheuer in his personal capacity and as trustee of the Asher & Wald Trust comprised 11,654,707 shares (being approximately 23% of the issued capital) and shares held by Endless Solar comprised 636,338 shares (being approximately 1.3% of the issued capital).
(h) The administrators' report dated 29 August 2017 also recorded that, as at the date of the report, NAB was owed $16,506,488 by the group of companies.
(i) On 9 October 2017, the administrators of SPA exercised their powers pursuant to s 442A of the Act to remove two directors of the company, Mr Steve Happell and Mr Visser.
(j) On 10 October 2017, a deed of company arrangement (DOCA) for SPA and its related companies, which had been proposed by Mr Scheuer, was executed, after receiving approval from creditors. Under the terms of the DOCA, amongst other things:
(i) all assets and employees of SPA and the two related companies were, in effect, transferred to two new companies controlled by Mr Scheuer and owned by parties associated with him, being Speedpanel Systems Pty Ltd and Speedpanel Holdings Pty Ltd (cl 7);
(ii) Mr Scheuer paid to the DOCA administrators a "Contribution Sum" of $3,000,000 (cl 1, 5.1) and a "Proponent Adjustment Amount" (comprising payments in respect of wages, employee entitlements, rent and outgoings) (cl 1, 6.1(a));
(iii) Mr Scheuer paid to NAB a "NAB Debt Reduction Payment" of $500,000 (cl 1, 6.1(b)); and
(iv) a "Deed Fund", including the "Contribution Sum", "Proponent Adjustment Amount" and other amounts, was established to meet the claims of other creditors (cl 9).
(k) On 29 March 2019, the DOCA was wholly effectuated. The Deed Administration ended and SPA returned to the control of its directors. At that time, the directors of SPA were Mr Scheuer, Mr Bernhardt and Dr Muchnicki.
(l) On 3 June 2020, Mr Scheuer and Dr Muchnicki resigned as directors of SPA. Mr Bernhardt resigned on 2 July 2020. The directors were not replaced. From 3 July 2020, there were no directors of SPA. SPA no longer had any business or assets.
(m) On 19 June 2022, SPA was deregistered by ASIC pursuant to s 601AB of the Act.
17 It becomes relevant to note that, according to ASIC records, SPA's directors in the period from 2016 to 2020 were as follows:
(a) Mr Scheuer from 2004 until 3 June 2020;
(b) Mr Bernhardt from 2010 until 2 July 2020;
(c) Dr Muchnicki from 2014 until 3 June 2020;
(d) Mr Visser from 2004 until 9 October 2017;
(e) Mr Happell from 31 January 2017 until 9 October 2017; and
(f) Mr Ronald Lazarovits from 31 December 2015 until 7 March 2017.
18 Each of Messrs Visser, Happell and Bernhardt had executive roles with SPA. Mr Visser was Managing Director, Mr Happell was a General Manager and Mr Bernhardt was a Technical Manager (responsible for product development and manufacturing, research, and development, and developing and maintaining SPA's IT systems).
19 As discussed in Endless Solar No 1 (at [33]), at the first hearing Mr Craig deposed that Endless Solar sought reinstatement of SPA in its capacity as a shareholder of SPA at the time of deregistration because Endless Solar wished to bring a claim for oppression against SPA. Mr Craig deposed that: he believed that SPA had valuable property in the form of claims for breach of duty against certain of its former directors and service providers, including Mr Scheuer, and that Endless Solar wished to bring a derivative proceeding on behalf of SPA against those persons. Mr Craig also deposed that Endless Solar's claim against SPA and SPA's claims against certain former directors and service providers was supported by documentary evidence (including, but not limited to, a bundle of documents adduced in evidence) and testimony which Mr Craig proposed to give. The bundle of documents included, amongst other things: company searches for various companies, documents relating to the administration of SPA (including the administrators' report to creditors), correspondence between former directors of SPA and PwC, documents relating to the resignation of the directors of SPA and a copy of the Constitution of SPA.
20 In Endless Solar No 1 (at [34]), I concluded that the evidence adduced by Endless Solar at the first hearing was wholly insufficient to establish that Endless Solar has any viable claim against SPA. Mr Craig's belief was unsupported by any relevant evidence. Endless Solar sought to rectify that deficiency by its supplementary evidence adduced for the second hearing, principally through the affidavit of Mr Visser.
21 At the second hearing, Mr Visser deposed to the following matters:
(a) Mr Visser was the Managing Director of SPA from about 2000 until he was removed as a director by SPA's administrators on about 9 October 2017, immediately before the sale of SPA's business under the DOCA. Mr Visser was the inventor of the technology which underpinned the fire and acoustic rated building products manufactured and supplied by SPA.
(b) Prior to the appointment of administrators in March 2017, SPA was a technology company which manufactured and supplied fire and acoustic rated building panel products throughout Australia, and licensed its products for sale in New Zealand, using proprietary technology developed over a 20-year period.
(c) By 2016, SPA was undergoing a period of transition. At this time, it was growing fast, and was anticipating international expansion and a possible initial public offering of shares. It had experienced significant sales growth, with approximately $8.4 million sales revenue in FY13, $13.8 million in FY14 and $19 million in FY15. SPA purchased land in Bayswater and fitted out an existing factory on that site to manufacture its proprietary building panel products. It incurred significant one-off costs associated with a temporary manufacturing process split across two locations. It also pursued overseas opportunities, including by spending more than $1.29 million in R&D expenditure and a proposed agreement with the Worthington Armstrong Venture (WAVE) - a joint venture between two publicly listed US companies, Worthington Industries and Armstrong World Industries - for WAVE to import and separately license and produce SPA's products in the US.
(d) On about 26 August 2016, SPA's newly acquired land was being upgraded and was valued at the amount of $12.3 million "as is" and $13.15 million "as if complete" in an independent valuation prepared by Knight Frank Valuers for NAB. In September 2016, plant and equipment was valued in-situ in the SPA factory at the amount of about $8.9 million in an independent valuation prepared by Slattery Asset Advisory for NAB.
(e) In around September 2016, a Chinese consortium called DCF Properties offered to invest $8 million in SPA in exchange for 20% of the company's equity on a valuation of "not less than $40 million and ... not more than $55 million". In addition to the proposed equity investment, the DCF offer also contemplated the licensing of SPA's products for sale in Asia, and the establishment of a joint venture company to pursue that opportunity. The offer was subject to due diligence investigations. Mr Scheuer objected to the DCF offer. In emails sent in mid-September 2016, Mr Scheuer stated that the business was worth more than $50 million and up to $100 million. Mr Scheuer and SPA's CFO, Andrew Hornibrook, took charge of supplying the necessary due diligence information to DCF's representative, Warren Galgut of Pitcher Partners. The process did not go well and DCF complained of not being able to access information necessary to complete the process. By December 2016, the due diligence process had ended and the investment opportunity did not proceed.
(f) On or about 7 December 2016, Mr Visser attended a meeting with NAB, together with Messrs Happell and Hornibrook. NAB agreed to provide SPA with $1.5 million in short term funding and agreed to consider increasing that amount to $3.5 million (and extending the life of the facility) subject to completion of an independent review of the company's financial position. McGrathNicol was subsequently appointed to conduct the independent review in early January 2017.
(g) In the period from about December 2016, Mr Scheuer began claiming that SPA's financial position was distressed and that the company was insolvent. Mr Visser said that Mr Scheuer's behaviour occupied a great deal of the Board's attention from this time until the administrators were appointed. His actions were a distraction and had the effect of destabilising the SPA Board and its relationships with shareholders, creditors, suppliers, and customers. Mr Visser said that, while trading conditions in the market for building products were tough at this time and SPA was experiencing some short-term financial pressure by reason of its growth strategy, he believed Mr Scheuer's claims to be ridiculous, especially given his assessment of SPA's value less than three months before and his "disdain" for the DCF offer and the money it would have provided. Mr Visser came to believe that the true purpose of Mr Scheuer's conduct was to scare off potential investors, complicate the NAB independent review process and distress SPA, so that he could make a further equity investment of sufficient size to take a controlling equity stake on the cheapest and best terms possible for him.
(h) At 1.26 pm on 3 January 2017, Mr Scheuer sent an email to Mr Lazarovits, copying Messrs Visser, Muchnicki and Bernhardt, stating that Messrs Scheuer, Bernhardt and Muchnicki had met and agreed to form an interim management committee (comprising Messrs Scheuer, Bernhardt, Muchnicki, Visser and Hornibrook) that would replace the Managing Director position. Mr Visser did not receive any notice of the meeting (and the email suggests that Mr Lazarovits also did not attend).
(i) By reason of Mr Scheuer's behaviour, at 2.07 pm on 3 January 2017, Mr Visser sent an email to the Board calling for an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders of SPA to vote on vacating all director positions and conducting a new election of directors. The extraordinary general meeting was postponed on a number of occasions and was ultimately held on 20 March 2017.
(j) At 8.23 am on 4 January 2017, Mr Scheuer sent an email to Mr Happell, copying Mr Goldman (a lawyer at Kliger Partners, which became KCL Law), Dr Muchnicki and Mr Bernhardt, stating that Mr Visser's "tenure with SPA had been terminated", that Mr Visser was "currently trespassing on the property", and that unless Mr Visser left "immediately we will have no option but to call police".
(k) On 5 January 2017, Mr Goldman gave advice to Messrs Scheuer, Muchnicki and Bernhardt concerning the proposed resolutions to be put at the extraordinary general meeting.
(l) On 10 January 2017, Mr Scheuer sent an email to Mr Hornibrook asking him to delay the NAB independent review.
(m) Mr Visser lost confidence in Mr Hornibrook (believing that he was meeting secretly with Mr Scheuer) and terminated his employment with SPA on 24 February 2017.
(n) On 2 March 2017, NAB expressed concern about the lack of information that SPA had provided to McGrathNicol for the independent review (which had been the responsibility of Mr Hornibrook).
(o) On 7 March 2017, Mr Scheuer sent an email to PwC asserting that the SPA Board had agreed that Mr Visser was not to be involved with any further discussions with PwC and that any correspondence from Messrs Visser and Happell was to be disregarded.
(p) On the morning of Sunday 19 March 2017, Mr Visser and Mr Happell signed a term sheet and option agreement for licensing and distribution of SPA products in the USA with WAVE (WAVE Agreements). Representatives of WAVE were due to fly to Melbourne the following day to begin the final due diligence process contemplated by the WAVE Agreements. On 20 March 2017, Mr Visser received an email from WAVE's general counsel stating that, late on 19 March 2017, Mr Goldman (in the presence of Mr Scheuer and Dr Muchnicki) had telephoned WAVE's CEO stating that SPA wanted to make changes to the WAVE Agreements.
(q) Also, during the evening of Sunday, 19 March 2017, Mr Scheuer sent an email to SPA shareholders stating that the Board had received an offer from Mr Scheuer (or his nominated entity) to subscribe for 28,079,551 shares in SPA at a total price of $1.25 million ($0.0445 per share) on or before 30 March 2017. The email referred to the rights of shareholders to participate in such an offer on a pro rata basis, but asserted that the funds were needed urgently as "the company will be trading insolvently". The email required shareholders to accept the offer by contacting Mr Scheuer by 2.00 pm the following day, 20 March 2017, or otherwise sign a document waiving their pre-emptive rights and return the document to Mr Scheuer "as soon as possible". The email also asserted that if Mr Scheuer did not hear from a shareholder by 2.00 pm on 20 March 2017, the "Board of Directors will deem this offer to shareholders to be declined and proceed to issue the shares is [sic] favour of Nathan Scheuer (and/or his nominated entity)". The email purported to be authorised by Mr Visser and Mr Happell, as well as the other directors.
(r) The extraordinary general meeting was held on 20 March 2017. Mr Visser deposed that proxies already submitted were voted and SPA's shareholders passed a resolution removing Mr Scheuer and Dr Muchnicki as directors. Mr Happell sent an email to shareholders (including to Mr Scheuer and Dr Muchnicki) following the meeting advising the results. The email also called a meeting of the directors. Mr Happell also sent notification to SPA's lawyer, Mr Goldman, SPA's auditors, PwC, and to NAB.
(s) During the afternoon of 20 March 2017, Mr Scheuer, Dr Muchnicki and Mr Bernhardt met at the offices of SPA's accountants and purported to resolve that:
(v) Mr Scheuer and Dr Muchnicki be reappointed as directors of SPA;
(vi) Mr Visser be removed as a director of Speedpanel (Vic) Pty Ltd and Speedpanel Corporate Services Pty Ltd, Mr Happell be removed as secretary of those companies, and Mr Scheuer and Dr Muchnicki be appointed as directors of those companies; and
(vii) administrators be appointed to each of SPA, Speedpanel (Vic) Pty Ltd and Speedpanel Corporate Services Pty Ltd.
(n) In late March 2017, Mr Hornibrook was re-appointed by the administrators as CFO of SPA.
(o) In the 5-month period of the administration, from March 2017 until October 2017, the administrators were able to trade SPA's business at a profit, notwithstanding the increased administrative costs of the administration process.
22 Three observations can be made about the evidence of Mr Visser. First, the evidence raises questions about possible corporate misconduct on the part of Mr Scheuer. In so far as the evidence concerns KCL Law (and specifically Mr Goldman) and Mr Bernhardt, the evidence has far less strength. Second, the evidence principally concerns conduct and events that occurred prior to the appointment of the administrators (on 21 March 2017), although those events also cast the administration in a potentially adverse light. Third, the evidence indicates that Mr Visser, and I infer Mr Craig, had knowledge of the alleged misconduct (at least with respect to Mr Scheuer) at the time it occurred. This is not a case in which misconduct has only recently come to light.
23 Neither Mr Scheuer nor Mr Bernhardt adduced any additional evidence at the second hearing that was responsive to the evidence of Mr Visser.
24 Mr Goldman deposed that, in the period from July 2014 to around March 2017, Kliger Partners (which, as noted above, changed its trading name to KCL Law) acted for SPA on a range of matters and received instructions from many representatives of SPA including Messrs Scheuer, Happell, Visser, Muchnicki and Bernhardt, each of whom were directors of SPA. Mr Goldman further deposed that:
(a) In early 2017, it became difficult to obtain instructions from SPA due to what he perceived to be dysfunction at board level.
(b) On 20 March 2017 at 9.54 am, he was copied to an email from Mr Happell which stated, amongst other things, that an extraordinary general meeting of SPA shareholders had taken place at 9.00 am that day and that Mr Scheuer and Dr Muchnicki had been notified that they were no longer directors of SPA.
(c) On 20 March 2017 at 10.01 am, he received an email from Mr Happell, which directed him not to have any further contact with either of Mr Scheuer or Dr Muchnicki in relation to SPA or its related companies, and not to take any instructions from Mr Bernhardt, who remained a director.
(d) On 20 March 2017 at 2.51 pm, he sent an email to each of Mr Visser, Mr Happell, Dr Muchnicki, Mr Scheuer and Mr Bernhardt, stating, amongst other things, that it was clear that the KCL Law could not act for either SPA or any of its directors in relation to matters related to SPA until the matter (being the contest around the Board composition) was resolved.
(e) On 20 March 2017 at 3.20 pm, Mr Happell sent Mr Goldman an email asking him to confirm that he would not act for Mr Scheuer as an individual during the period of instability and if he would take direction from two directors of SPA, given that the Board of SPA consisted of three directors in total.
(f) On 20 March 2017 at 6.55 pm, Mr Goldman sent an email to Mr Happell stating that until the issues at SPA Board level were resolved, KCL Law would not act for Mr Scheuer individually in relation to any SPA related matter and that KCL Law did not believe it could continue to act for SPA.
(g) KCL Law did not act for SPA after 20 March 2017.
25 Mr Visser's evidence begs the question of why no action was taken to redress the alleged misconduct at the time it occurred or in the ensuing years. Mr Craig's supplementary evidence was principally directed to the question of delay in seeking redress. Mr Craig deposed to the following matters:
(a) At the time administrators were appointed to SPA and its subsidiaries on about 21 March 2017, his expectation was that the administration would be short-lived and would result in the return of SPA to the control of its directors. At the time of the administration, Mr Craig was prepared to await the conclusion of that process and felt confident that, even if the results of the 20 March 2017 shareholders' meeting needed to be confirmed or the resolutions to remove Mr Scheuer and Dr Muchnicki put to shareholders again, it was just a matter of time before that could occur.
(b) In mid-2017, when the administrators indicated that they would consider a sale process for SPA's business, Mr Craig assisted Mr Happell and Mr Visser to source potential buyers for the administrators. Almost all potential buyers that Mr Craig helped introduce to SPA's administrators reported having difficulty in extracting timely information from the administrators that was necessary to progress their interest. For that reason, Mr Craig did not think that the proposed sale process was a particularly serious attempt to sell the business and he still expected control to eventually be returned to the directors.
(c) The period in which Mr Scheuer's DOCA was proposed and accepted was a period of great stress for Mr Craig (although Mr Craig provided no evidence as to the cause of that stress). Mr Craig's recollection is having been in something like a state of shock and he is not sure that he knew at the time that there was anything that could be done once the administrators had accepted the offer, had recommended to creditors that they accept it as an alternative to liquidation, and once the resolution had been voted on and passed.
(d) Mr Craig contacted Victoria Police about the events and, between 2018 and 2020, a police investigation occurred. Mr Craig refrained from taking legal action during the investigation. Mr Craig was then informed that the matter had been referred to ASIC, but heard nothing further.
(e) Between 2020 and 2021, Mr Craig was isolated at home by reason of the COVID-19 pandemic (Mr Craig was 72 years old at the onset of the pandemic).
(f) As the pandemic subsided in 2022, Mr Craig and Mr Happell began the process of engaging with law firms in relation to the matter. Mr Craig said that he was aware of the 6-year limitation period and was focussed on that date (which I infer is a reference to the date of the appointment of administrators). Mr Craig first became aware of the deregistration of SPA in "mid-late" 2022 as part of the process of discussions with law firms.