Consideration
23 I accept the Secretary's submission that, in its reasons, the Tribunal was only dealing with the discretionary trust in clause 5(b) of the will. I reject the Elliotts' written submission to the contrary.
24 The more important question - whether the aggregate of the beneficial interests in the corpus or income of the trust held by the Elliotts and their daughter amounted to 50% or more - is essentially one of statutory construction, having regard to the rights of the discretionary beneficiaries under the trust created by clause 5(b) of the will. In order to answer it, some meaning must be given to the concept of "beneficial interests" in par 1207V(2)(d) of the Social Security Act.
25 The Social Security Act does not define "beneficial interests". The expression "beneficial interest" has no precise received meaning: compare RP Meagher, JD Heydon, and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity Doctrines and Remedies (Butterworths, LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2002) at [4-040] and R Speed, "Beneficial Ownership" (1997) 26 ATR Rev 34 at 50. Indeed, the word "interest" is itself "capable of a very wide and general meaning": see Gartside at 617 per Lord Wilberforce; Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Livingston (1964) 112 CLR 12 ("Livingston") at 22 per Viscount Radcliffe; and CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2005) 224 CLR 98 at 114 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ. The expression "beneficial interests" therefore falls to be interpreted principally by reference to the statutory context in which it is used, and any guidance that the general law can provide. The Court may also have regard to extrinsic materials such as the second reading speech or the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill to confirm that the ordinary meaning of the expression is applicable or to assist in resolving any ambiguity: see Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 15AB.
26 The expression "beneficial interests in the corpus or income of the trust" appears in subs 1207V(2), which is an important part of Pt 3.18 of the Social Security Act. Part 3.18 introduced a system for the attribution to individuals of the assets and income of private companies and private trusts: see Anstis v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2002] FCA 1043 at [3]-[4]. It must be borne in mind that, broadly speaking, in order to qualify for a pension under the Social Security Act, a person must satisfy an assets test and an income test. Simply put, a would-be pensioner may receive the lower of the two amounts that result from the application of the assets test and the income test. Pt 3.18 is part of this regime.
27 Subsection 1207X(2) of the Social Security Act, which is in Pt 3.18, concerns private trusts. This subsection relevantly provides that, for the purposes of Pt 3.18, if a trust is a "controlled private trust" in relation to an individual (and par 1207X(2)(b) is satisfied), then the individual is an "attributable stakeholder" of the trust (unless the Secretary determines otherwise). If the individual is an attributable stakeholder, then, pursuant to pars 1207X(2)(d) and (e), the individual's "asset attribution percentage" and "income attribution percentage" in relation to the trust is either 100%, or such lower percentage as the Secretary determines. Pursuant to subs 1207V(1), for the purposes of Pt 3.18, a trust is a "controlled private trust" in relation to an individual if the trust is a "designated private trust" (as defined in subs 1207P(1)) and the individual passes the "control test" in subs 1207V(2) or the "source test" in subs 1207V(3). No issue arises in this case as to the application of subs 1207V(3).
28 Subsection 1207V(1) of the Social Security Act provides:
For the purposes of this Part, a trust is a controlled private trust in relation to an individual if the trust is a designated private trust and:
(a) the individual passes the control test set out in subsection (2); or
(b) the individual passes the source test set out in subsection(3).
It is common ground that the trust created under clause 5(b) of the will is a "designated private trust": see subs 1207P(1).
29 Subsection 1207V(2) provides:
For the purposes of this section, the individual passes the control test in relation to a trust if:
(a) the individual, or an associate of the individual … is the trustee, or any of the trustees, of the trust; or
(b) a group in relation to the individual was able to remove or appoint the trustee, or any of the trustees, of the trust; or
(c) a group in relation to the individual was able to vary the trust deed or to veto the decisions of the trustee; or
(d) the aggregate of:
(i) the beneficial interests in the corpus or income of the trust held by the individual (whether directly or indirectly); and
(ii) the beneficial interests in the corpus or the income of the trust held by associates of the individual (whether directly or indirectly);
is 50% or more; or
(e) a group in relation to the individual had the power (by means of the exercise by the group of any power of appointment or revocation or otherwise) to obtain, with or without the consent of any other entity, the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or income of the trust;
(f) a group in relation to the individual was able in any manner whatsoever, whether directly or indirectly, to control the application of the corpus or income of the trust; or
(g) a group in relation the individual was capable under a scheme of gaining the enjoyment or the control referred to in paragraph (e) or (f); or
(h) a trustee of the trust was accustomed or under an obligation (whether formally or informally) or might reasonably be expected to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of a group in relation to the individual. (Emphasis added.)
30 It is common ground that the only question in this proceeding is as to the application of par 1207V(2)(d). As noted above, the Elliotts challenged the Tribunal's finding that they passed the control test in relation to the trust established under clause 5(b) of the will on the basis that they satisfied par 1207V(2)(d) of the Social Security Act. The Tribunal confined its attention to this paragraph. It did not consider whether the Elliotts satisfied the control test by reference to any other paragraph in subs 1207V(2), the SSAT having previously determined to the contrary. The Secretary did not contend that there was any error in its approach in this regard.
31 For the purposes of Pt 3.18, in determining whether a trust is a controlled private trust in relation to an individual, an associate of an individual includes a relative of an individual: see ss 1207A and 1207C. For this purpose, a relative, in relation to a person, includes a spouse, child or other lineal descendant: see s 1207B. It was common ground that Susan Elliott was a relative of the Elliotts: see par 1207B(1)(f). The Elliotts were relatives of one another: see par 1207B(1)(a). Moreover, if in being, any other discretionary beneficiary would also be a relative of the Elliotts. If the trust is a "controlled private trust" pursuant to par 1207V(2)(d) of the Social Security Act, the applicants are deemed to be "attributable stakeholders" of the trust under s 1207X of the Social Security Act.
32 Prior to the introduction of Pt 3.18, the valuation of assets was not thought to extend to trusts and private companies. The purpose of the introduction of Pt 3.18 and provisions such as s 1207V is probably clear enough from its terms, but it is confirmed by the extrinsic materials to which I was referred. In his Second Reading Speech on the Bill, which introduced Pt 3.18, the Minister for Community Services (Mr Anthony) said:
This measure has been prompted by the increased use of private trusts and private company structures to gain social security and veteran's affairs entitlements. A primary aim of the measure is to forestall the continued growth in the use of this strategy.
…
It is designed to ensure that income support entitlements are based upon a person's level of resources, not on the way in which he/she holds those resources.
In relation to the control test, the Minister said:
It is clear that often the controller of a structure can be considered to be the de facto owner of the structure's assets where he or she can use the assets for his or her own purpose or benefit. This test will also make it possible to determine who is the ultimate, or actual, controller of a structure. It is possible for the actual controller of a structure to be different to the apparent controller. This test will make reference to the concept of an 'associate'. An 'associate' is a person who may, because of their relationship with the actual controller, assist this controller with maintaining control of the structure. The relationship between the controller and an associate is broader than just a family relationship.
33 The EM also confirms what is reasonably evident in the provisions themselves. According to the EM, the purpose of Pt 3.18 and associated provisions was "to ensure that customers who hold their assets in private companies or private trusts receive comparable treatment under the means test to those customers who hold their assets directly". The EM further stated (at p 2):
A key principle of our social security system is that people with similar levels of private resources should receive similar pension or allowance payments. However, the existing means test treatment of private trusts and private companies is inconsistent with the principles underlying effective targeting of social security payments. Under current social security law, assets and income are only attributed to a person where legal ownership or a fixed right to income is established. This means that private trusts and private companies may be used to hold and control assets and/or income outside the scope of the means test.
…
This measure employs specially designed tests to 'look through' interposed structures to identify who controls a particular structure and who is the source of the structure's assets. These complementary tests - the 'source' and 'control' tests - will enable ownership of the assets and/or income of a private trust or private company to be attributed to appropriate individuals for the purposes of the means test.
A test based on identifying control of a structure is justified on the grounds that the controller of a structure can be considered the de facto 'owner' of the structure's assets when he or she can use the assets for his or her own purposes or benefit. In assessing whether an individual passes the control test, the interests of that individual and of the individual's 'associates' (as defined in the legislation) will be taken into account. This prevents a person in relation to whom a trust or company is a controlled private trust or company from diluting his or her interest in a structure (for example, by issuing non-voting shares in a company).
The EM commented that:
New paragraph 1207V(2)(d) provides that, if the individual, alone, or the individual and the associates of the individual together hold 50% or more of the beneficial interests of the trust, whether directly or indirectly, then the individual passes the control test in relation to that designated private trust.
34 With these comments in mind, it is open to doubt whether the regime established by Pt 3.18 was intended to extend to persons who (like the Elliotts) have minimal, if any, control over the corpus or income of a trust. As the following discussion shows, neither singly nor together are the Elliotts (or the Elliotts and their daughter) able to control the disposition of the income or capital of the trust.
35 The nature of the rights enjoyed by the beneficiaries of a discretionary trust depends very much on the terms of the discretionary trust in question: see, e.g., the discussion in Carey at 515-6 per French J. Adopting the terminology that his Honour there uses, the trust created under clause 5(b) is a "non-exhaustive" trust because the trustees have a discretion (subject to the directions previously mentioned at [15] above) to distribute part or none of the income and capital of the trust as they see fit: see Carey at 516. The discretionary beneficiaries are an "open" class: see Carey at 516. That is, the trust is capable of benefiting not only living family members (the Elliotts and their daughter) but also persons as yet unborn. As French J commented in Carey at 516, "[t]he naming of these species of discretionary trusts, like the term 'discretionary trust' itself, is a matter of taxonomical convenience rather than expository of principle". At the same time, as French J's discussion in Carey shows, the distinction between "exhaustive" and "non-exhaustive" and "closed" and "open" trusts may have a significant bearing on the nature of the rights or interests held by the discretionary beneficiaries.
36 For example, as French J records, the Court of Appeal in Re Nelson [1928] Ch 920 at 921-2 ("Re Nelson") held that the three beneficiaries of an exhaustive discretionary trust with a closed class were able to mortgage their share and interest under a will since they were "of age and sui juris" and concurred "in assigning by way of mortgage their interest". In that case, Swinfen Eady MR distinguished the earlier case of Re Coleman (1888) LR 39 Ch D 443 ("Re Coleman"), where the trustees had power to apply the income of the trust fund for the benefit of a class or any one of them to the exclusion of the others (as in the present case). In Re Coleman, one of the beneficiaries assigned his share and claimed that an appropriate portion should be paid to his assignee. In Re Nelson at 921, the Master of the Rolls said (in relation to the issue in Re Coleman):
The answer to that was that he did not take an equal fourth or any other share and the trustees could have applied the whole of the income to the other members of that class. That is quite a different case from the present, where all the members of the class have assigned their shares to the mortgagees.
Having regard to these authorities, French J concluded in Carey (at 517) that "[w]here there is an exhaustive discretionary trust with a closed class of beneficiaries, then all the beneficiaries may collectively require the trustee to transfer the fund to them or deal with the property subject to discretion as if they were the absolute owners of it". This is not, however, the position with respect to a non-exhaustive trust where the class of objects is open, as in the case of the trust created under clause 5(b) of the will.
37 I accept that, as counsel for the Elliotts submitted, it would not be open to the Elliotts to terminate the trust under clause 5(b) of the will. Put simply, this is because the trust is non-exhaustive and its class of discretionary beneficiaries open. I accept that, as clause 5(c) of the will contemplates, this trust will end only with the death of the survivor, when a different trust may come into existence. The class of discretionary beneficiaries is open to more descendants until that event terminates the trust.
38 Thus, this case is different from Montefiore, where Kearney J held, by reference to the rule in Saunders v Vautier, that, where the class of objects of a discretionary trust was closed and the income was required to be paid each year to one or more of the objects, the objects acting together could terminate the discretionary trust: see Montefiore at 410-11. Whilst his Honour considered it "odd" that "all the objects should collectively enjoy a beneficial ownership entitling them to invoke the rule in Saunders v Vautier which is different in character from the aggregate of their individual interests", he held nonetheless that such an entitlement existed: see Montefiore at 411. In contrast to this, the terms of the trust under clause 5(b) do not require the trustees to pay the trust income at any particular interval or at all to one or other of the objects, but, subject to the directions already noted, would permit the trustees to accumulate income as they saw fit and, as already stated, the class of discretionary beneficiaries is not closed: compare JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Jacobs' Law of Trusts in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2006) at [2315].
39 Under clause 5(b) of the will, each of the Elliotts and their daughter has a right to be considered by the trustees as a possible recipient of a payment out of the income and capital of the trust in accordance with the terms of the trust. They also have a right to have the trustees consider whether they should be permitted to reside rent free in any property forming part of the estate. Each of them has a right to have the trust administered duly and properly: compare Gartside at 617-8 per Lord Wilberforce. They also had a right to receive information about the management of the trust fund and to see trust documents: see [44] below. Furthermore, the discretionary beneficiaries have a right to trace and follow the trust assets if they are misappropriated: Livingston 23-24; also Hardingham IJ and Baxt R, Discretionary Trusts (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1984) at [517]. It is by no means self-evident, however, that, because of these rights, any of them has "beneficial interests in the corpus or income of the trust" within the meaning of par 1207V(2)(d) of the Social Security Act.
40 The authorities provide little direct assistance on the principal question in the case. The Secretary referred to Geeves, which gave rise to the question whether a court-ordered trust fund was to be taken into account in valuing the "assets" held by the sole beneficiary for the purpose of the assets test in s 198(1B) of the Social Security Act. Geeves is, plainly enough, a different case from the present. It did not concern a discretionary trust where the entitlement of a beneficiary is unascertained. Geeves related to a private trust with an ascertained beneficiary, who therefore held a proprietary interest in the property subject to the trust. The Full Court upheld the primary judge's decision that the trust was an "excluded trust" and therefore its assets could not be attributed for the purposes of the assets test. This finding provides no guidance here. Keifel J, with whom Weinberg J agreed, also held that the beneficiary's interest in the trust assets was not to be regarded as 'property' or 'assets' within the meaning of s 11 of the Social Security Act, because the trust assets could not be utilised by the beneficiary: see Geeves at 141. Keifel J's comments in this regard have some bearing on the present case. Her Honour said (at 141-2):
The evident focus of the Act, in my view, is upon assets which are available for a person's use. It does not seem to be consistent with the purpose of the Act to require that assets which are not able to be utilised by a person are to be taken into account in assessing whether they qualify for the benefit in question. …
Even on a wider view of property a discretionary trust would not qualify. It could in no sense be said to be the property of a person who is not yet identified as a beneficiary of it. For the purposes of the Act, however, some beneficiaries of discretionary trusts in reality, if not in law, have access to the trust assets because they are in a position to control the trust. The amendments of 2000 recognise and deal with such a situation. They and the Explanatory Memorandum tend to confirm, in my view, that it is assets which are in truth available to a person which are relevant for the purposes of the Act.
…
I would therefore conclude that [the beneficiary's] interest in the trust assets would not be regarded as property or assets within the meaning of s 11 of the Act. The amendments of 2000 have the effect however that they would nevertheless be attributed to him. Whilst not in control in the same sense as persons who control discretionary trusts, he would pass the control test set up by s 1207V(2) because his beneficial interest in the trust fund would be 50% or more. The presumption here is that he does have a measure of control because of the extent of his interests. The Secretary's declaration exempts a court-ordered trust, such as that in question here, from the attribution rules. It puts beyond doubt that they are not to be included in the value of the care receiver's assets.
It seems to me that, to the extent that this passage elucidates the present question, it tends against the Secretary's argument. First, it emphasises that the purpose of subs 1207V(2) is to make assets that are in reality available to a person relevant for the purposes of determining pension entitlements and, secondly, it underscores the fact that regard must be had to the question of control, having regard to the particular trust in question. This indicates that it is incorrect to view every discretionary trust in the same light; instead, attention must be paid to the particular terms of each trust, whether fixed or discretionary, and to the criteria to which subs 1207V(2) direct attention.
41 As noted earlier, counsel for the Elliotts placed a good deal of reliance on the decision of the House of Lords in Gartside in which a question arose as to whether a person who might benefit, in his lifetime, from the exercise of a trustee's power to make payment to him out of a fund under a discretionary trust held an "interest in possession" within the meaning of s 43 of the Finance Act 1940 so as to attract a tax on death. Gartside held that there was no "interest in possession" within the meaning of the relevant statute: see Gartside at 618 per Lord Wilberforce, with whom Lord Hodson agreed; also 607 per Lord Reid, with whom Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Lord Guest agreed. Whilst the answer is immaterial here, their Lordships' consideration of the nature of the right held by an object of a discretionary trust is helpful. The trust in question was similar in relevant terms to the trust created by clause 5(b) of the will, as the following observations of Lord Wilberforce (at 614-5) show:
Under the trusts of income which applied during his life, no one of [the] beneficiaries had any right to receive any income. The trustees had an absolute discretion to distribute or to withhold distribution of the income of any year, and, as regards any income they decided to distribute, to give all or none of it to any one beneficiary. Any undistributed income had, during the permissible period, to be accumulated, i.e., added to capital.
… It is also necessary to appreciate that the discretionary beneficiaries taken together had no right to receive any or, a fortiori, all of the income. … [T]he trustees had power to accumulate so much as they did not distribute, which might be the whole, for the possible benefit of persons unborn. To describe them as 'the only people who could during the relevant period obtain any benefit from the property or have any beneficial enjoyment of it' may be misleading, unless one bears in mind that, singly or collectively, they had no right in any year to receive a penny.
42 Gartside therefore reinforces what is largely evident from clause 5(b) - that, until the trustees exercise their discretion in his or her favour, none of the discretionary beneficiaries has a right to receive any payment of income or capital. At most, each has a right to require the trustees to consider whether to make such a payment in accordance with the terms of the trust: see [39] above. The question remains whether the Elliotts' entitlements as discretionary beneficiaries gives rise to "beneficial interests in the corpus or income of the trust" within par 1207V(2)(d) of the Social Security Act.
43 The second of the decisions relied on by the Elliotts was that of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Anchorage, which involved contempt proceedings for alleged breach of a Mareva injunction. The question for determination was whether certain transactions amounted to breach of the injunction. A person bound by the injunction exercised his power as the appointor under a trust deed to make his son guardian of the trust and removed himself as appointor. His son removed the other trustee, Anchorage, and appointed a company with which he was associated in its stead. The new trustee, with his consent and that of his wife, declared that they were excluded as general beneficiaries. The Bank argued that the transactions breached the injunction. On appeal, Owen J, with whom Ipp J agreed, held that a beneficiary of the trust in question did not have any proprietary interest in any particular assets of the trust fund or in the fund as a whole. Owen J said (at 79):
The Trust Deed confers on the trustee a mere power. It is a power of very wide import. The trustee can determine whether an individual beneficiary is to benefit at all, and if so, in what way, from the exercise of the power in his or her favour. In this sense, the beneficiary has nothing more than an expectancy. The trustee has a duty to administer the trust bona fide having regard to the purpose for which it was established. This is a duty which the court will enforce at the behest of a beneficiary. In this way, the remedy defines the nature of the interest of an individual beneficiary. It is to require the trustee to consider the matter, to decide whether or not to exercise the power and, if the power is to be exercised, to do so correctly in accordance with the terms of the trust … Such a right is an equitable chose in action.
Owen J added (at 80) that, in the case of a beneficiary under a discretionary trust, '[t]he exercise of the rights implicit in the chose in action might not result in any financial benefit to the beneficiary concerned". At the level of principle, Anchorage affirms Gartside but, once again, provides limited guidance on the question at hand.
44 The third of the decisions on which the Elliotts relied was that of French J in Carey, where a receiver was appointed under s 1323 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in respect of the property of a person under investigation. Holding that the provision applied to the relevant person's equitable estate or interest in property the subject of a non-discretionary or fixed trust, his Honour turned to the "less straightforward question … when the relevant person is a beneficiary of a discretionary trust": see Carey at 515. At 518-9, his Honour stated his opinion that "in the ordinary case the beneficiary of a discretionary trust, other than perhaps the sole beneficiary of an exhaustive trust, does not have an equitable interest in the trust income or property … amenable to control by receivers under s 1323". His Honour accepted that "there are some rights enjoyed, even by the beneficiaries of a non-exhaustive discretionary trust with an open class of beneficiaries" such as the right to inspect trust documents, the right to require the trustee to provide information about the management of the trust fund, and a right to enforce proper management of the trust by the trustee. In Carey at 520, French J rejected the submission that a beneficiary under a discretionary trust held a contingent interest, saying:
The difficulty with applying the notion of contingent interests to beneficiaries of a discretionary trust lies partly in the uncertain scope of the distribution be it income or capital, which may be made in favour of any given beneficiary. I am inclined to think that a beneficiary in such a case, at arms length from the trustee, does not have a "contingent interest" but rather an expectancy or mere possibility of a distribution.
His Honour noted that different considerations arose where a discretionary trust is controlled by a trustee "who is in truth the alter ego of a beneficiary" (at 520). This observation is pertinent in the context of subs 1207V(2) of the Social Security Act.
45 Carey is helpful at the level of principle, amongst other reasons, because it concentrates attention on the terms of the particular trust in question. It also draws attention to the fact that the degree of control, if any, that a discretionary beneficiary may enjoy under a discretionary trust depends on the terms of the trust, having regard to the circumstances of the case. Subsection 1207V(2) works on a similar assumption. It is therefore a mistake to treat all so-called discretionary trusts in the same way, as the Secretary's argument tends to do.
46 Furthermore, Gartside, Anchorage, Carey and Livingston (see Weinberg J's discussion in Geeves at 143) make it plain that, although the object of a discretionary trust holds a bundle of rights, these rights do not necessarily amount to what can be termed an "interest" or "beneficial interest", when considered from the perspective of a particular statute: compare M Stone and V Lesnie, "Some Thoughts on Beneficial Interests and Beneficial Ownership in Revenue Law" (1996) 19(1) UNSW Law Journal 181 at 183 and David Hayton, Paul Matthews & Charles Mitchell, Underhill and Hayton Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees (LexisNexis Butterworths, 17th ed, 2006) at [1.1]. Of course, this is not to say that, in a particular statute, such rights might not be so regarded and described. The question, then, is whether or not the rights of the discretionary beneficiaries in this case amount to "beneficial interests in the corpus or income" such that they might be "aggregated" within the meaning of par 1207V(2)(d).
47 I accept that, as the Secretary submitted, the word "aggregate" in par 1207V(2)(d) is used in its ordinary sense, signifying "[t]o gather into one whole or mass; to collect together, assemble; to mass": see Oxford English Dictionary. Paragraph (d) of subs 1207V(2) presupposes, however, that there are in fact "beneficial interests in the corpus or income of the trust" that are capable of aggregation. If neither the individual nor his or her associates hold any such beneficial interests, then the paragraph cannot apply.
48 Subsection 1207V(2) is intended to ensure that those assets that an individual can control and therefore utilise are taken into account in assessing whether that individual qualifies for a benefit under the Social Security Act. Subsection 1207V(2) therefore provides for the "control test" to be satisfied by reference to criteria for control set out in paragraphs (a) to (h). As noted above, if a trust satisfies any of these criteria, then it is a "controlled private trust" for the purposes of the Part (subs 1207V(1)) and the income or assets of the trust are attributable to the individual.
49 The criteria in paragraphs (a) to (h) of subs 1207V(2) mean that the control test can be passed in various ways. The criteria all reflect a requirement that the individual, or his or her associate, or a "group" in relation to the individual (being either the individual, or an individual's associates, acting either as a group or alone (subs 1207V(4)), exercise some legal or practical control over the trust, whether because the individual or an associate is the trustee (par 1207V(2)(a)); or can remove or appoint the trustee (par 1207V(2)(b)); or can vary the trust deed or veto the decisions of the trustee (par 1207V(2)(c)); or possesses the power to obtain the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or income of the trust (par 1207V(2)(e)); or can control the application of the corpus or income of the trust (par 1207V(2)(f)); or has the power to gain that control (par 1207V(2)(g)). The control test may also be passed where the trustee of the trust was accustomed or under an obligation, or might reasonably be expected to act in accordance with the instructions or wishes of a group in relation to the individual (par 1207V(2)(h)). Paragraph (d) of subs 1207V(2) must be construed in this statutory context. This paragraph sets out a standard, which, if satisfied, supports the conclusion that the individual (alone or with his or her associates) has some practical control over the corpus or income of the trust. In summary, the expression "beneficial interests in the corpus or income of the trust" in par 1207V(2)(d) signifies interests that, when taken together, would, practically speaking, permit the individual (acting alone or through his or her associates) to control the disposition of trust capital and income in some way, so that the individual (acting alone or with his or her associates) can enjoy the economic benefit of the trust.
50 In this case, neither of the Elliotts acting alone or together, or with their daughter (or with any lineal descendant as yet unborn) have any legal or practical capacity to take control of the testamentary trust. Consistently with this and in accordance with the trust deed, the trustees (so the Tribunal found) exercised their independent judgment in considering whether or not to make payments to any of the discretionary beneficiaries. In this context, it is inapt to attribute to the Elliotts "beneficial interests in the corpus or income of the trust fund", which are capable of aggregation, as par 1207V(2)(d) contemplates. This is a case in which each discretionary beneficiary possesses certain limited rights. I doubt that these rights might ever be aggregated in any relevant sense, but, even if they could, they would not permit the discretionary beneficiaries to require the trustees to make any distribution of any kind, whether out of income or capital, to them or any of them.
51 As noted above, pursuant to clause 5(b) of the will, in exercising their discretion with respect to the income or capital of the trust, the trustees are required always to have primary regard to the needs of the first applicant, Paul Elliott. This would appear to place Mr Elliott in a more advantageous position than the other discretionary beneficiaries. Neither the Elliotts nor the Secretary sought to rely on this as a factor in support of their respective arguments. Neither party sought to argue that this direction changed the essential nature of the trustees' discretion from an absolute discretion to something relevantly less than this.
52 Indeed, it does not seem to me that the direction alters the essential nature of the rights held by Mr Elliott and the other discretionary beneficiaries. They remain as set out above. Acting in accordance with the terms of the trust, in considering an exercise of discretion, the trustees will always have primary regard to Mr Elliott's needs and, in consequence, his needs will be considered first, but, having considered his needs, it remains for the trustees to determine whether to make a payment out of trust income or capital to him, or to another discretionary beneficiary, and, if so, how much that payment should be. The existence of the direction does not turn the bundle of rights that Mr Elliott enjoys into beneficial interests in the corpus or income of the trust. Nor does it affect the nature of the rights held by the other discretionary beneficiaries. The direction does not enable any aggregation of beneficial interests for the purposes of par 1207V(2)(d) of the Social Security Act. Part 3.18 of the Social Security Act is not, I think, intended to operate through subs 1207V(2) so as to require that assets that the individual cannot turn to his own use as he wishes to be taken into account in determining whether that individual qualifies for a benefit under the Social Security Act.
53 For these reasons, the Tribunal erred in holding that the trust under clause 5(b) of the will was a "controlled private trust". The Tribunal erred in holding that, on the facts as found by it, the Elliotts passed the control test because they satisfied par 1207V(2)(d) of the Social Security Act.
54 As to the form of orders, subs 44(4) of the AAT Act empowers the Court to "hear and determine the appeal and make such orders as it thinks appropriate by reason of its decision". In appropriate circumstances, the court may make a decision in substitution for that under review: see, e.g., Harradine v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1989) 25 FCR 35 and Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health v Theologidis (1991) 33 FCR 186. Pursuant to subs 44(5) the power extends to the making of an order affirming or setting aside the decision of the Tribunal and an order remitting the case. By subs 43(1), the Tribunal itself is empowered to make a decision affirming, varying or setting aside the decision under review and, in the latter event, making a decision in substitution or remitting the case for reconsideration.
55 It was common ground that whether or not the trust created under clause 5(b) of the will is a controlled private trust is to be determined solely by reference to par 1207V(2)(d) of the Social Security Act. This is essentially a matter of statutory construction, having regard to the terms of the trust. If the trust is not a controlled private trust, then the Tribunal was in error in setting aside the decision of the SSAT and ought to have affirmed the decision of the SSAT. There is little point remitting the case to the Tribunal, which would be bound, upon a remission, to affirm the SSAT's decision. In this circumstance, it is appropriate for the Court itself to make this order, thereby relieving the Tribunal and the parties of a further hearing. Thus, I would order that the decision of the Tribunal given on 15 November 2006 be set aside and that the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal made on 7 October 2005 be affirmed. The respondent should pay the Elliotts' costs of the appeal.
I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Kenny.