Penalty
13 For reasons already mentioned, it is necessary to exercise afresh the discretion as to penalty.
14 As with other civil penalty regimes, the principal, if not sole, objective of penalisation of a contravention of s 321D of the Electoral Act is general and specific deterrence: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson (2022) 274 CLR 450 (Pattinson), at [15] - [16] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ). Objectives such as retribution, denunciation and rehabilitation, which are also served by a criminal law sentencing regime, are not ends to which a civil penalty regime is directed.
15 The objective of deterrence means that a civil penalty must be fixed at such a level that incurring it cannot be regarded either by the contravener, or those who may likewise be disposed to contravene the provision concerned, as an acceptable price. In the present context and to paraphrase an observation made by the Full Court in Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012) 287 ALR 249, at [62], expressly approved in Pattinson, at [17], the penalty must be fixed with a view to ensuring that it is not to be regarded by Mr Laming, or others, as an acceptable cost of doing electoral business.
16 Ensuring that penalisation serves the objective of deterrence does not mean that any "notion of proportionality" is to be eschewed, only that care must be taken to understand what is meant by that in the context of a civil penalty regime. That was explained by Burchett and Kiefel JJ in NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285, at 293, in a passage also expressly approved in Pattinson, at [40]:
[I]nsistence upon the deterrent quality of a penalty should be balanced by insistence that it "not be so high as to be oppressive". Plainly, if deterrence is the object, the penalty should not be greater than is necessary to achieve this object; severity beyond that would be oppression.
17 It is this balance which must be struck in relation to the imposition of any penalty on Mr Laming. It is necessary to say "any penalty" because Mr Laming submitted that the object of deterrence could sufficiently be served in this case just by the granting of declaratory relief in respect of the contraventions and considering the burden of any costs order. Alternatively, he submitted that such a burden was a moderating consideration in relation to the determination of penalty. The Commissioner took issue with each of these propositions.
18 In earlier civil penalty cases under other statutory regimes, factors which, depending on the circumstances of a given case, can be relevant have been identified: see, notably, Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-076, at 52, 152-52, 153 (French J, as his Honour then was). Lists of such factors are not to be approached as if they were some rigid catalogue and care must be taken to differentiate in such lists factors which more aptly serve objectives other than deterrence: Pattinson, at [19]. Obviously enough, the nature and extent of the contraventions concerned will always be relevant.
19 I discuss below submissions concerning factors which were said to be relevant in the circumstances of this case and identify their role in the fixing of appropriate penalty.
20 Mr Laming submitted it was relevant to consider the impact of a costs liability. A threshold difficulty with that submission is that, if relevant at all, it could only be relevant at a very general level of abstraction and impression. That is because Mr Laming placed no evidence before the primary judge as to his financial circumstances and did not seek leave to introduce any such evidence if it fell to the Full Court to exercise afresh the sentencing discretion. Further, the precise sum payable pursuant to any order for costs to which Mr Laming is, or may be, subject has not been quantified.
21 A like point arose for consideration by Perry J in Australian Communications and Media Authority v Limni Enterprises Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 795 (Limni). That case, like the present, was a regulatory proceeding, governed by civil practice and procedure, in which the purpose of the civil penalty regime was to buttress compliance with norms of behaviour ordained by statute by deterring, by penalisation, departure from those norms. In Limni, at [94], Perry J highlighted, by reference to authority, how this deterrence purpose of a civil penalty regime distinguished it from the purposes of criminal proceedings, which included punishment. Her Honour also distinguished the deterrence purpose of a civil penalty regime from the indemnification purpose of the conferral on a court of a power to award costs.
22 The resultant view which Perry J expressed in Limni, at [95] was:
The highest it might be put, in my view, in the civil penalty context is that a liability to pay the costs of the regulator might be able to be taken into account in ensuring that the penalties to be imposed are not oppressive and thereby exceed the level required to achieve the objects of specific and general deterrence. On the other hand, there may be strong policy reasons as to why that approach might not be taken or which call for a high degree of caution before adopting such an approach. In particular, it might become a disincentive for a respondent to co-operate with the regulator if the respondent's liability for the regulator's costs could, in effect, be offset to some degree against the civil penalty which might otherwise be imposed.
However, as Perry J also stated in Limni, at [95], it was unnecessary to determine the point, as to the relevance of subjection to a costs liability in the determination of the appropriate penalty to impose, because the individual concerned had not given evidence of his complete financial position. In that sense, the present case is similar to Limni.
23 Since Limni, Abraham J, in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Select AFSL Pty Ltd (No 3) [2023] FCA 723 (Select AFSL), has considered the relevance of a costs burden in relation to the determination of penalty and Perry J has revisited that subject in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Phoenix Institute of Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2023] FCA 859 (Phoenix Institute).
24 In Select AFSL, Abraham J saw merit in the views Perry J expressed in Limni. So do I. Abraham J identified, at [199], another policy reason why one needed to be cautious about making too much of a respondent's costs liability in a civil penalty proceeding, stating:
It would appear to be a rather unusual circumstance where a defendant could choose to defend proceedings (regardless of the strength of the plaintiff's case against them), incur legal fees in so doing, yet seek to have any penalty imposed reduced because of the amount of fees or costs incurred.
25 Her Honour added, at [200], that, at its highest, the impact of legal fees incurred might impact upon the financial position of a respondent, which was a relevant but not determinative consideration when assessing penalty.
26 The reason why Abraham J considered that the financial position of a respondent could not be determinative flowed from a line of authority which she identified in Select AFSL, at [119] - [120]. Of these, it is only necessary to mention this observation made by the Full Court (Heerey, Finkelstein and Allsop JJ) in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Ltd [2006] ATPR 42-091, at [11]:
Moreover, as deterrence (especially general deterrence) is the primary purpose lying behind the penalty regime, there inevitably will be cases where the penalty that must be imposed will be higher, perhaps even considerably higher, than the penalty that would otherwise be imposed on a particular offender if one were to have regard only to the circumstances of that offender. In some cases the penalty may be so high that the offender will become insolvent. That possibility must not prevent the Court from doing its duty for otherwise the important object of general deterrence will be undermined.
The later, emphatic affirmation in Pattinson of the objective of deterrence as the rationale for a civil penalty regime underscores the correctness of this observation. If penalisation at a particular level is necessary to achieve the objective of deterrence in the circumstances of a given case then the fact that the penalty may be ruinous for the respondent individual or corporate respondent concerned is no reason not to fix penalty at that level. A penalty so fixed will not be oppressive. I also agree with the further observations made by Abraham J in Select AFSL concerning the relevance, if any, with respect to the fixing of penalty of a respondent's subjection to a costs liability.
27 Phoenix Institute offers an example of how achieving the objective of general deterrence can warrant the imposition of penalties even in circumstances where a respondent company is being wound up, but that case does not warrant any detailed reference in the circumstances of this case.
28 Mr Laming's submissions sought to draw an analogy between cases concerning penalisation of contempt of court and the relevance of a costs liability as a moderating consideration in relation to the imposition of a civil penalty. Indeed, he went further and submitted that the statutory objective was sufficiently served just by the granting of declaratory relief in conjunction with a costs order. It is true that, in some cases, a finding that a contempt has been committed and a related subjection of a respondent to a costs liability can be a sufficient response to the contempt concerned. However, the objectives served by a power to deal with contempt are much broader than just that of the deterrence objective attending a civil penalty regime. The analogy is not relevant.
29 Closer support for Mr Laming's submission about the relevance of a costs liability is offered by Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (No 2) (2011) 196 FCR 430 (Healey). In that case, at [227] - [228], Middleton J allowed that a liability to pay costs was a matter that could be relevantly considered in determining any penalty, either because of its impact on a respondent's financial circumstances, and thus their ability to pay a penalty, or as another consequence for a respondent of proceedings in which contraventions have been found. For reasons already given, and thus subject to the overarching importance of serving the objective of deterrence, an impact of a costs order may have relevance in relation to a respondent's financial circumstances. However, like Abraham J in Select AFSL, at [201], I consider that to afford what were clearly obiter observations in Healey about the relevance of a costs liability any greater role in penalty determination would be to afford them more weight than they can bear.
30 The absence of any detail as to the amount of any costs liability to which Mr Laming is or may be subject, in conjunction with the absence of evidence as to the nature and extent of his assets, other liabilities (if any) and income, makes it unnecessary further to consider the impact in this case of costs in relation to the fixing of penalty.
31 There must always be "some reasonable relationship between the theoretical maximum and the final penalty imposed": Pattinson, at [10]. That theoretical maximum offers a "yardstick" for the imposition of penalty in a given case. As at the time of these contraventions and given the then value of a penalty unit, the maximum civil penalty for a single contravention of s 321D(5) by an individual of 120 penalty units amounted to $25,200.
32 For reasons given in upholding ground 1 in the appeal, in respect of the First, Second and Fifth Posts, there were overall 28 contraventions. This total followed from the posts being seen by six, eight and 14 people respectively. That means that the total, theoretical maximum penalty was not $75,600, as the primary judge concluded, and Mr Laming submitted, but instead $705,600.
33 Although sentencing principles from criminal law and practice are not, given the more singular objective of a civil penalty regime, uncritically to be applied in the fixing of a civil penalty, that does not render it irrelevant to consider any evident course of conduct when fixing penalty: Pattinson, at [45]. The relevance of a course of conduct was summarised by Rangiah J (with whom Allsop CJ and Griffiths J agreed) in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (The Nine Brisbane Sites Appeal) (2019) 269 FCR 262 (The Nine Brisbane Sites Appeal), at [124], by reference to Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Registered Organisations Commissioner (No 2) (2018) 267 FCR 40, at [84] - [91]:
124 In Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Registered Organisations Commissioner (No 2) (2018) 267 FCR 40 at [84]-[91], the Full Court, referring to other judgments of the Full Court, considered the application of the course of conduct principle in the assessment of pecuniary penalties. The principles include the following:
(1) The purpose of the common law course of conduct principle is to ensure that, having regard to the circumstances (factual and legal), a party is not penalised more than once for the same conduct.
(2) That phrase should not simplistically be adopted to transfer multiple contraventions into one contravention, or, necessarily, to impose one penalty by reference to one maximum amount.
(3) The principle cannot, of itself, operate as a de facto limit on the penalty to be imposed.
(4) The application of the principle must be informed by the particular legislative provisions relevant to the proceedings. In particular, weight must be given to the fact that the legislature has deliberately and explicitly created separate contraventions for each relevant action.
(5) The application and utility of the principle must be tailored to the circumstances.
(6) A judge is not obliged to apply the principle if the resulting penalty fails to reflect the seriousness of contraventions.
(7) The task is to evaluate the conduct and its course and assess what penalty is, or penalties are, appropriate for the contraventions.
(8) It is necessary to examine all the conduct and enquire how its course and its explanation factually and legally informs the imposition of penalties, in order to avoid double punishment.
[see Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (The Non-Indemnification Personal Payment Case) (2018) 264 FCR 155 at [31]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki Corporation (2018) 262 FCR 243 at [231]-[236]; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Williams (2009) 191 IR 445; 262 ALR 417 at [16]-[19]; Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2017) 254 FCR 68 at [148].]
34 Although in each of the 28 instances there was a contravention of s 321D(5), it does not follow that there was but one course of conduct by Mr Laming. At a general level of abstraction each of these posts related to the Redland Hospital. However, the timing, content and related circumstances of each of these posts are different. They are detailed in the reasons of the primary judge. The First, Second and Fifth Posts constitute three discrete courses of contravening conduct flowing from three discrete Facebook posts. It is relevant to take these evident courses of conduct into account in the way identified in The Nine Brisbane Sites Appeal.
35 Mr Laming took issue with the primary judge's conclusion that he had deliberately concealed his identity in the First Post. Yet this flowed as a matter of ordinary English from the text of that post and Mr Laming's authorship of it. Whether to reach such a conclusion was fully identified and debated in submissions before the primary judge. As was his right, Mr Laming chose not to give evidence, so the proposition as to deliberate concealment could not be put to him in cross-examination. Instead, the proposition was left to inference from the proved facts of post content and authorship. The post is written in the third person, as if a commentary on an action of Mr Laming, "we were delighted when Andrew Laming announced an $83million dollar funding boost to our local hospital service". The primary judge observed (PJ at [141]), of this post that, "His conduct brings to mind the observation of Griffith CJ in [Oldham] at 358 that the weight attributed by the electors to printed articles, 'may be greater or less than would be attributed to those articles if the electors knew the real authors'." That observation was apt. That feature does indeed, as the primary judge concluded, make the First Post the source of the most serious contraventions of s 321D(5) in this case. However, the absence of any hint in any of the three posts that Mr Laming is their author means that each post was subversive of the purpose of the statutory requirement. That was the end to which each course of conduct was directed.
36 Although Mr Laming accepted that penalisation needed to serve the objectives of general and specific deterrence, he submitted that, in relation to specific deterrence, it was not accurate to describe him, as had the primary judge (PJ at [248]), as someone who, as a then member of the House of Representatives, "ought to have made himself familiar with the requirements of the Electoral Act". Mr Laming pointed to the failure of the Commissioner's case in respect of the Third and Fourth Posts as indicating that the characterisation of whether a post was or was not "electoral matter" was not without difficulty. At the margin, that may be so. But that merely heightens a need for care and prudence as to disclosure of authorship if making communications to persons which may constitute "electoral matter". Of all persons who ought to take such care and exercise such prudence, a member of either House of Parliament offers the paradigm example.
37 Although Mr Laming was a member of the House of Representatives at the time when each of the First, Second and Fifth Posts was made, he is no longer. He has not been a candidate in a federal election since the May 2019 election. However, there is no evidence that he has permanently and irrevocably disengaged from political life. It remains possible that he may attempt to re-enter politics. That said, as did the primary judge (PJ at [252]), I accept his submission that he is unlikely to engage again in like contravening conduct. So the need for specific deterrence is limited.
38 In any event, the need for a penalty which will act as a general deterrent is overwhelming. That objective would not be served merely by the declaratory relief granted. The digital age offers via the internet opportunity and ready facility for communication of electoral matter to persons as never before. Although, as the institution of the proceeding exemplifies, the Commissioner can and does monitor legislative compliance, it is an inescapable conclusion that a vast commitment of public resources, with an inevitable opportunity cost, would be needed to monitor the internet and analyse and investigate communications for suspected contraventions of s 321D(5). Necessarily to achieve the statutory purpose without that vast commitment, that calls for penalties to be fixed at a level that puts an economically unacceptable price on contravening conduct, of chancing one's hand as it were, on the internet.
39 For all that, although I differ from the primary judge as to the number of contraventions, I agree with his Honour that the contraventions were neither systemic nor organised nor calculated to reach a mass audience (PJ at [250]). That is a moderating factor, as is, in relation to specific deterrence, the absence of any prior contravening conduct by Mr Laming. So, too, is the degree of co-operation by him with the Commissioner in relation to the proceeding, as noted by primary judge (PJ at [254]). That this did not extend to admission of liability does not mean penalty should be increased beyond what is apt to serve the statutory objective because Mr Laming chose to contest some issues.
40 The absence of any loss or damage to any person because of any of the First, Second and Fifth Posts must be noted. It is also a moderating factor. However, the potential reward in this type of contravening conduct is not directly monetary but rather electoral advantage.
41 When all is said and done, the task of penalisation is one of "instinctive synthesis". The error made by the primary judge as to the number of contraventions led, in my view, to an under penalisation in resultant total amount, given the objective of deterrence. That said, even to adopt a like proportion to that of the primary judge of the true individual and total maximum penalties would yield penalties so high as to be oppressive, far beyond what is necessary to serve the objective of deterrence in the circumstances of this case. It would afford insufficient weight to the three revealed courses of conduct, to the fact that these were not mass communications to the world at large but only to those disposed to look at the Facebook page and to the relatively few who were proved to be so disposed.
42 Taking into account the existence of three courses of conduct but recognising that the First Post was the most egregious, the contraventions flowing from the First Post should carry the higher penalty.
43 When one removes that egregious consideration and appreciates that each entailed a single course of conduct involving relatively few persons, there is nothing to choose between the Second and Fifth Posts in terms of penalisation.
44 Although each of the posts employed the facility of the internet, they were not, as mentioned, directed to a mass audience, only to those disposed to look at the Facebook page. That in my view removes the conduct from anything approaching the worst category such as would warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty.
45 By s 85(1) of the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014 (Cth), the Court is permitted to make a single civil penalty order against a person for multiple contraventions of a civil penalty provision if proceedings for the contraventions are founded on the same facts, or if the contraventions form, or are part of, a series of contraventions of the same or a similar character. The three posts gave rise to a series of contraventions of the same or similar character. A single penalty can therefore be imposed but its composition needs to be explained.
46 That single penalty should, for all the reasons given, be $40,000.00, calculated in this way:
(1) $20,000.00 in respect of contraventions flowing from the post on 24 December 2018 (the First Post);
(2) $10,000.00 in respect of in respect of contraventions flowing from the post on 7 February 2019 (the Second Post); and
(3) $10,000.00 in respect of in respect of contraventions flowing from the post on 5 May 2019 (the Fifth Post).
47 I consider that a penalty so comprised in this total amount bears an appropriate relationship with the theoretical maximum when measuring the circumstances of the case by reference to the objective of deterrence. In fixing the aggregate penalty, I have expressly considered whether the sum of $40,000.00 is, in total, nonetheless too great. Given the number of contraventions and even allowing for the revealed courses of conduct, I do not consider that total too great in the circumstances of this case.
48 Given the appellant's success in the appeal and the cross-appeal, which leaves intact the conclusions of the primary judge as to which of the posts was a source of contraventions, albeit greater in number than as apprehended by the primary judge, there is no reason to disturb the percentage apportionment of costs made in the original jurisdiction.
49 It will be necessary to hear from the parties in relation to the costs of the appeal (including those relating to the respondent's notice of contention) and of the cross-appeal.
I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Logan.