Electoral Commissioner, in the matter of an inquiry relating to an election for an office in the Australian Education Union (No 2) [2025] FCA 57

Relevant facts

1. The factual background giving rise to the inquiry is set out in the Dougan affidavit, and was summarised in Re AEU (No 1) at [22]-[51]. Each of the Plitsch affidavit and the Aulich affidavit address further matters, including the arrangements for the conduct of an election for delegates to the next annual Brach Conference which is scheduled to be held on 2 August 2025.
2. The AEU is registered as a body corporate under the Act. Its branches are subject to the democratic control of its members. Each year, the Victorian Branch of the AEU convenes an Annual Branch Conference to which members of the Branch are elected as delegates.
3. The election of delegates to the Branch Conference is governed by r 51 of the Rules of the Australian Education Union in relation to the Victorian Branch (Rules). Once elected, a delegate holds office for one year or until his or her successor takes office: r 51(1). The election of delegates is to be completed at least one month before the Annual Branch Conference: r 51(6).
4. Relevantly, r 51(5) of the Rules requires nominations for the positions of delegates to be signed by the nominee and the nominator, each of whom must be a financial member of the relevant sector and region. In the case of the Office, the nominator and the nominee were required to be financial members of the Primary Sector and the Broadmeadows Region.
5. The present case concerns a "recall election" that was held in respect of unfilled positions after insufficient nominations were received to fill all available positions of delegates to the 2024 Branch Conference. Ms Dougan was appointed as the Returning Officer for the recall election, and nominations were open from 26 April 2024 to 24 May 2024.
6. Ms Halima McGlashan provided a written nomination for the Office dated 5 May 2024. The nomination was received by Ms Dougan in her capacity as the Branch Returning Officer on 7 May 2024. In accordance with r 57(3) of the Rules, Ms Dougan checked the nomination for compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Ms Dougan considered that the nomination was defective because it did not comply with the requirements of r 51(5)(c), in that neither of Ms McGlashan's nominators were financial members of the Primary Sector - Broadmeadows Region. Rather, each of the nominators who signed the nomination were members of the Secondary Sector.
7. Ms Dougan sought to notify Ms McGlashan of the defect in her nomination, and to give her the opportunity of remedying that defect, as required by r 57(3) of the Rules. However, for reasons that are more fully explained in Ms Dougan's affidavit, the notice was sent to an incorrect email address that had been mistakenly entered into the AEU's electronic management system, and was not received by Ms McGlashan at the relevant time: see AEU (No 1) at [30]-[38]. In the absence of any response from Ms McGlashan, Ms Dougan proceeded to reject her nomination for the Office, and notified her of that rejection by a further email which was again sent to the incorrect email address.
8. Although the AEC's email server sent auto-generated notifications that the emails which had been sent to the incorrect email address were undeliverable, those notifications were received into a "junk email" folder within the relevant inbox of the Industrial Elections and Ballots (IEB) team at the AEC. As a consequence, the notifications did not come to the attention of Ms Dougan, who was unaware that the correspondence had not been sent to the correct email address and therefore had not been received by Ms McGlashan.
9. The results of the election were declared on 21 June 2024. Apart from Ms McGlashan's defective nomination, there was only one other nomination in respect of 16 vacant positions. Accordingly, that candidate was elected uncontested, and the remaining 15 positions were unfilled.
10. On 5 July 2024, Ms McGlashan contacted the AEC and informed Ms Dougan that she had not received the notification regarding the defect in her nomination or the letter informing her that her nomination had been rejected. Ms McGlashan told Ms Dougan that she was unhappy about the situation and that she would have been able to remedy the defect in her nomination if she had been given the opportunity to do so.
11. Upon a further review, Ms Dougan discovered that the email address for Ms McGlashan had been inputted incorrectly in the AEC's electronic management system, and the correspondence had therefore been sent to the incorrect email address. Ms Dougan also checked the junk email folder within the IEB Events mailbox and located the auto-generated notifications that the emails sent to Ms McGlashan at the incorrect email address were undeliverable. Ms Dougan was unable to explain why the auto-generated notifications were located in the junk email folder, stating that in her experience such notifications are usually delivered to an email inbox which is monitored by junior staff in the IEB team.
12. On 1 August 2024, the AEC wrote to Ms McGlashan and conceded that, as a result of the typographical error made by the AEC when recording her email address in its system, she was not notified about the defect in her nomination nor provided the opportunity to remedy that defect, in breach of the Rules. The AEC's email stated that the Commissioner had formed the view that the result of the election for the Office had been affected by an irregularity, and had set in train the process for making an application under s 200 of the Act for an inquiry into the matter.
13. In an email sent to the AEU on the same date, the AEC noted that the primary purpose of the Office was to attend the Annual Branch Conference which was held on 20 July 2024, that the Office was only held for 12 months, and that the inquiry may take some months to conclude. After stating that "[a]ccordingly, the Federal Court taking steps to remedy the irregularity at this stage may lack utility", the email from the AEC asked the AEU to "advise what other functions, duties or powers members who hold the office of Branch Conference Delegate have, and the frequency with which they exercise them".
14. On 8 August 2024, in response to the AEC's request, the AEU outlined the functions, duties or powers of members who hold the Office. Without reproducing that response in full (which was set out in Re AEU (No 1) at [47]), the AEU relevantly advised that:
15. delegates hold office for one year, or until their successor takes office, and are entitled to attend the annual meeting of the Branch Conference and to deal with all matters that appear on the conference agenda;
16. the annual meeting of the Branch Conference was held on 20 July 2024, at which all matters that appeared on the conference agency were dealt with;
17. there was no current indication that a special meeting of the Branch Conference would be convened before the next annual meeting (and that such a special meeting had not occurred in the past 28 years);
18. under r 7 of the Rules, the Branch Council has all of the powers of the Branch Conference when it is not in session, other than the power to alter the Federal Branch Rules, and any matter relating to the financial management of the Branch;
19. under r 10 of the Rules, the Branch Executive has power to conduct and manage the affairs of the Branch between meetings of the Branch Council;
20. the Branch Council meets at least eight times each year, and the Branch Executive meets at least once a month with the exception of January; and
21. the prescribed information for the election of delegates to the next annual meeting of the Branch Conference in 2025 (with an indicative date of 2 August 2025) would be lodged with the Fair Work Commission by the end of August 2024.
22. The AEU also asked the AEC to provide information about any additional measures it had taken "to mitigate a similar error from happening again". On 19 August 2024, the AEC outlined various steps it had taken, including updating its staff briefing materials and implementing an additional verification step to check data entry and identify human errors.
23. On 13 September 2024, a delegate of the General Manager of the Fair Work Commission, having received from the AEU the prescribed information in relation to the election of delegates to the 2025 Branch Conference, decided to make arrangements for the conduct of that election. The offices to be filled for a new term of office include 15 delegates for the Primary Sector in the Broadmeadows Region.
24. On 22 November 2024, the AEC wrote to the AEU outlining the arrangements and proposed timetabling for the election for delegates to the 2025 Branch Conference. On 28 November 2024, the AEU advised the AEC that the proposed timetable was suitable.
25. On 28 January 2025, Ms Aulich, in her capacity as the Branch Secretary of the Victorian Branch of the AEU, caused a Notice of Election for the 2025 Branch Conference to be issued to members of the AEU.
26. The next annual meeting of the Branch Conference is scheduled to be held on 2 August 2025. Nominations for election as delegates to the Branch Conference are open from 29 January 2025 to 26 February 2025. If a ballot is required, the postal ballot will be conducted between 2 April 2025 and 7 May 2025. The result of the election will be declared within 14 days after the close of the ballot.
27. Ms Aulich relevantly deposes in her affidavit that:
28. all of the business of the 2024 Branch Conference was completed at the annual meeting held on 20 July 2024;
29. between 2 April 2024 (when the results of the first election for delegates to the Branch Conference were declared) and 28 January 2025, Ms Aulich had not issued any notice of special meeting of the Branch Conference, nor had the Branch Council called a special meeting, nor had the Branch President received a requisition from members or delegates requesting a special meeting; and
30. at the time of her affidavit, Ms Aulich has no reason to believe that a special meeting of the Branch Conference will need to be called or will be called.

The parties' submissions

1. Both parties have submitted that the Court should order that the inquiry be terminated under s 206(6) of the Act. However, there are some differences in the positions taken by the Commissioner and the AEU respectively.
2. The Commissioner submitted that the Court should be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there was an irregularity in relation to the election for the Office, namely the breach of r 57(3) of the Rules in failing to notify Ms McGlashan of the defect in her nomination and the failure to give her the opportunity of remedying that defect.
3. Further, the Commissioner submitted that the irregularity affected the outcome of the election, on the basis that the Court should infer that Ms McGlashan could and would have remedied the defect if it had been brought to her attention in accordance with the Rules. The Commissioner submitted that such an inference could be drawn from the large number of financial members of the Primary Sector in the Broadmeadows Region who would have been eligible to nominate Ms McGlashan under r 51(5)(c) of the Rules, together with the evidence of statements made by Ms McGlashan to Ms Dougan that she was unhappy about the situation and would have remedied the defect if she had been given the opportunity to do so. If the defect had been remedied and an effective nomination had been submitted, Ms McGlashan would have been elected to the Office uncontested, in circumstances where there were 15 unfilled positions at the conclusion of the election.
4. Nevertheless, the Commissioner submitted that the Court should not make any order under s 206(4) of the Act at the conclusion of the inquiry. The Branch Conference was held on 20 July 2024, and the results of the election for delegates to the next annual Branch Conference are likely to be declared in May 2025. In such circumstances, the Commissioner submitted that there would be little utility in making an order declaring the election, or any step in relation to the election, to be void under s 206(4)(a), or making an order for a new election to be held under s 206(4)(c)(ii) or (4)(d). The Commissioner also submitted that an order declaring a person not to have been elected or declaring another person to have been elected under s 206(4)(b) was inapt, because there is no basis on which to conclude that the sole candidate who was duly elected should not have been elected or that Ms McGlashan should be elected in his or her stead.
5. Accordingly, the Commissioner submitted as follows: In circumstances where the annual meeting of the Branch Conference has already occurred and where the results of a further election are likely to be declared only 3 months after the conduct of the inquiry, the Commissioner submits that the appropriate relief at the conclusion of the inquiry would be to terminate the inquiry under s 206(6) of [the Act]. Such an order would result in the least disruption to the AEU and its members (relative to any of the orders that could be made under s 206(4)) and is not inconsistent with the statutory objects of [the Act].
6. While the AEU agreed that the inquiry lacks utility and should be terminated under s 206(6) of the Act, it submitted that such an order should be made "at the earliest possible time". The AEU noted that the Court has power to terminate the inquiry at any time after it begins, and is not required to make any factual findings as to the existence or non-existence of an irregularity. The AEU submitted that, unless the Court is satisfied that making an order under s 206(4) would affect the "real-world democratic control and accountability" of the AEU, the preferable course most beneficial to the AEU and its members is the termination of the inquiry.
7. The AEU accepted that there is a sufficient factual foundation for the Court to find on the balance of probabilities that an irregularity has happened in relation to the election for the Office: see s 206(2) of the Act. However, given the unavailability of declaratory relief and in the absence of practical utility in making orders under to s 206(4) of the Act, the AEU submitted that the appropriate course is the immediate termination of the inquiry with no further order.
8. In a departure from the submissions advanced on behalf of the Commissioner, the AEU argued that there is insufficient evidence before the Court to find on the balance of probabilities that the result of the election to the Office was affected by the irregularity in relation to the rejection of Ms McGlashan's nomination. The AEU submitted that it is necessary for there to be some probative material to support such a finding, referring to Menon, in the matter of an election for offices of the Manufacturing Division of the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) [2021] FCA 1263 at [9] (Wheelahan J) (Re Menon (No 3)). In the present case, the AEU submitted that there is no "persuasive material" before the Court that Ms McGlashan may have been properly nominated in accordance with the Rules had the irregularity not occurred. The AEU contends that any such material "would need to rise above mere speculative hearsay, and ought to demonstrate with precision suitably qualified individuals who agreed they would have nominated Ms McGlashan if given the chance".
9. The AEU joined in submitting that there would be no utility in any of the orders under s 206(4) of the Act, which would not affect the real-world democratic control and accountability of the Union, nor otherwise be beneficial to the AEU or its members. The AEU relevantly submitted:
10. An order under s 206(4)(a) declaring the election, or any step in relation to the election, to be void is not available because the Court cannot be satisfied that the result of the election may have been affected by the irregularity: see s 206(5). In addition, any declaratory relief would lack utility having regard to the efforts made and steps taken by the AEC to avoid a repetition of the error that resulted in the irregularity.
11. An order under s 206(4)(b), declaring a person not to have been elected and declaring another person to have been elected, was not available in circumstances where no person had been elected to the relevant Office. (This submission ought to be understood as referring to the unfilled or vacant positions for the Office, as opposed to the single candidate who was declared elected to one such position.)
12. An order under s 206(4)(c) for a new election would lack utility, given that the 2024 Branch Conference had concluded and had no work to do, and that the delegates to that Branch Conference are shortly to be replaced by their successors. Any new election for delegates to the 2024 Branch Conference would result in unnecessary expense and could have no impact on the accountable and democratic control of the AEU.
13. Accordingly, the AEU agreed with the Commissioner that the Court should make an order under s 206(6) of the Act to terminate the inquiry.

The inquiry should be terminated

1. The action that may be taken by the Court in an inquiry under Pt 3 of Ch 7 is prescribed by s 206 of the Act, which provides as follows: 206 Action by Federal Court (1) At an inquiry, the Federal Court must inquire into and determine the question whether an irregularity has happened in relation to the election, and such further questions concerning the conduct and results of the election as the Court considers necessary. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Court must determine whether an irregularity has happened on the balance of probabilities. (3) In the course of conducting an inquiry, the Court may make such orders (including an order for the recounting of votes) as the Court considers necessary. (4) If the Court finds that an irregularity has happened, the Court may, subject to subsection (5), make one or more of the following orders: (a) an order declaring the election, or any step in relation to the election, to be void; (b) an order declaring a person purporting to have been elected not to have been elected, and declaring another person to have been elected; (c) an order directing the General Manager to make arrangements: (i) in the case of an uncompleted election - for a step in relation to the election (including the calling for nominations) to be taken again and for the uncompleted steps in the election to be taken; or (ii) in the case of a completed election - for a step in relation to the election (including the calling for nominations) to be taken again or a new election to be held; (d) an order (including an order modifying the operation of the rules of the organisation to the extent necessary to enable a new election to be held, a step in relation to an election to be taken again or an uncompleted step in an election to be taken) incidental or supplementary to, or consequential on, any other order under this section. (5) The Court must not declare an election, or any step taken in relation to an election, to be void, or declare that a person was not elected, unless the Court is of the opinion that, having regard to the irregularity found, and any circumstances giving rise to a likelihood that similar irregularities may have happened or may happen, the result of the election may have been affected, or may be affected, by irregularities. (6) Without limiting the power of the Court to terminate a proceeding before it, the Court may, at any time after it begins an inquiry into an election, terminate the inquiry or the inquiry to the extent that it relates to specified matters.
2. Thus, the Court is required first to "inquire into and determine the question whether an irregularity has happened in relation to the election", and then to determine "such further questions concerning the conduct and results of the election as the Court considers necessary". The question whether an irregularity has happened is to be determined on the balance of probabilities: s 206(2). An "irregularity" in relation to an election is relevantly defined in s 6 of the Act to include "a breach of the rules of an organisation or branch of an organisation".
3. If the Court finds that an irregularity has happened, its powers are limited to making one or more of the orders set out in s 206(4) of the Act: see Clancy, in the matter of an application for an inquiry in relation to an election for offices in the Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation [2017] FCA 460 at [24] (Siopis J).
4. However, the Court has power under s 206(6) to terminate an inquiry at any time after it begins that inquiry. For such purposes, the inquiry is taken to have been instituted when the Court has made orders fixing a time and place for conducting the inquiry: s 201; see Menon, in the matter of an election for offices of the Manufacturing Division of the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2021] FCA 859 at [7]-[9] (Wheelahan J). Among other things, an inquiry may be terminated under s 206(6) in circumstances where it becomes clear that none of the orders available under s 206(4) could have any utility. The power to terminate an inquiry can be exercised before determining whether an irregularity has happened in relation to the election, or any consequential questions concerning the conduct and results of the election.
5. The powers conferred on the Court by Pt 3 of Ch 7 are to be exercised "in a way that seems most beneficial to the organisation and its members, bearing in mind any relevant statutory objects": see, in relation to the powers conferred by s 206(4), Re Menon (No 3) at [13] (Wheelahan J), referring to Re Australian Journalists' Association; Ex parte Nicholson (1990) 27 FCR 75 at 83 (Wilcox J).
6. In this regard, the expressed intention of Parliament in enacting the Act is to enhance relations within workplaces between federal system employers and federal system employees and to reduce the adverse effects of industrial disputation, by requiring associations of employers and employees to meet the standards set out in the Act in order to gain the rights and privileges accorded to such associations: ss 5(1), (2). The standards set out in the Act, relevantly, ensure that registered organisations are representative of and accountable to their members, and provide for the democratic functioning and control of organisations: ss 5(3)(a) and (d).
7. In the present case, the Commissioner submitted that there were three questions to be addressed in the inquiry: (i) whether there was an irregularity in relation to the election; (ii) if so, whether the result of the election may have been affected by the irregularity; and (iii) what relief should be granted by the Court.
8. In relation to the first question, a finding that an irregularity has happened is a necessary precondition to an exercise of power to make any of the orders under s 206(4) of the Act. Any such finding is required to be made on the balance of probabilities: s 206(2). To the extent that there is any burden of proof on this question, the person who claims that there has been an irregularity in relation to an election bears the onus of producing evidence to satisfy the Court that the claimed irregularity or irregularities did in fact happen: Re Nimmo; Application for an inquiry relating to an election for an office in the Australian Education Union (NT Branch) (2011) 192 FCR 111 at [28] (Reeves J).
9. In relation to the second question, a finding under s 206(5) that the result of the election may have been affected is a necessary precondition to making certain kinds of orders, namely, any declaration under s 206(4)(a) that an election or a step taken in relation to an election is void, or any declaration under s 206(4)(b) that person was not elected. The finding required under s 206(5) is that the result of the election may have been affected, and not that the result was or would have been affected. This question is to be assessed "as a matter of 'real not merely theoretical possibilities'": Re Nimmo at [69] (Reeves J). Nevertheless, it is enough that the Court is satisfied that there is a "real or distinct possibility" that the result of the election may have been affected: see Electoral Commissioner, in the matter of an inquiry relating to elections for offices in the Australian Federal Police Association Branch of the Police Federation of Australia [2016] FCA 469 at [74] (Katzmann J).
10. Section 206 of the Act does not expressly provide for the standard of proof that is applicable to a determination whether the result of an election may have been affected. In so far as the fact in issue involves demonstrating the existence of a possibility, some caution should perhaps be observed in applying the balance of probabilities standard: cf. NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37; 97 ALJR 1005 at [60]. However, any facts from which such a possibility is sought to be established or inferred ought to be based on some probative material: see Re Menon (No 3) at [9] (Wheelahan J). Further, any possible effect on the result of the election must be more than mere speculation, that is, it must be a real and not merely "theoretical" possibility.
11. Section 205(3) of the Act otherwise leaves the procedure at an inquiry within the discretion of the Court, and provides that the Court "is not bound to act in a formal manner and is not bound by any rules of evidence, but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it considers just".
12. It seems clear on the material before the Court that there was an irregularity in relation to the election for the Office, in that Ms McGlashan was not notified by the Branch Returning Officer of the defect in her nomination and was not given an opportunity of remedying that defect in accordance with the requirements of r 57(3) of the Rules. In such circumstances, there is no reason not to make a finding to that effect.
13. I do not accept the AEU's submission that the Commissioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving that there is a real or distinct possibility that the result of the election may have been affected by that irregularity, or that the evidence before the Court is insufficient to make any such finding.
14. There is evidence that Ms McGlashan was "very unhappy" about the rejection of her nomination and the failure to give her an opportunity to remedy the defect. In a contemporaneous record made by Ms Dougan of her conversation with Ms McGlashan on 5 July 2024, Ms McGlashan expressed her unhappiness about the situation and advised that she would have been able to remedy the defect if she had been given the opportunity to do so. Subsequently, on 11 July 2024, Ms McGlashan responded to an email from Ms Dougan raising a query about why she was not afforded the opportunity "of receiving a phone call to clarify the details in [her] application" (i.e. the nomination).
15. In so far as this comprises hearsay evidence, the Court is not bound by the rules of evidence: s 205(3)(b). Accepting that such evidence must still be treated with "the usual caution" (see e.g. Re Nimmo at [32] (Reeves J)), there is little difficulty in making a finding regarding Ms McGlashan's intention or motivation at the relevant time to take whatever steps were necessary to remedy the defect in her nomination, had she been given the opportunity of doing so.
16. Of course, Ms McGlashan's assertion that she "would have been able to remedy the defect if she had been given the opportunity to do so" does not itself establish her ability to obtain the signature of a financial member of the Primary Sector in the Broadmeadows Region who would have been willing to nominate her for the Office. In such circumstances, the AEU submitted that the Court could not know whether the defect in the nomination could or would have been remedied. However, I do not consider that it is necessary to make a finding on the balance of probabilities that there was a financial member of the relevant sector and region who was available and willing to sign Ms McGlashan's nomination at the relevant time. It is enough that there is a sufficient prospect that Ms McGlashan might have obtained the signature of an eligible or qualified nominator as to give rise to a real and distinct possibility that the result of the election may have been affected.
17. In the light of the large number of members of the Primary Sector in the Broadmeadows Region, and the fact that Ms McGlashan needed only one such financial member to sign her nomination, it is likely that Ms McGlashan would have been able to remedy the defect in her nomination if she had been given the opportunity to do so. Ms Dougan deposed that had Ms McGlashan remedied the defect within the time required, she would have accepted the amended nomination. In such circumstances, Ms McGlashan would have been declared elected without the need for a ballot. Accordingly, I find that the election for the Office may have been affected by the irregularity.
18. There was nevertheless a consensus between the Commissioner and the AEU that it was not appropriate to make any of the orders in s 206(4) of the Act. Ultimately, this was largely based on the lack of utility of any such orders, in circumstances where an election is underway for delegates to the 2025 Branch Conference, who will succeed any delegates elected in relation to the Branch Conference that was held in 2024.
19. In relation to s 206(4)(a), it is not appropriate to make an order declaring the election, or any step in relation to the election, to be void. The irregularity did not affect the nomination or election of any other candidate. Even if it were possible to declare the rejection of Ms McGlashan's nomination to be void as a result of the failure to comply with r 57(3) of the Rules, such a declaration would not itself have any utility without an order declaring Ms McGlashan to have been elected or directing that a new election be held. Neither of those orders is warranted in circumstances where the business of the 2024 Branch Conference has been completed and the election of delegates to the 2025 Branch Conference is currently in progress.
20. Similarly, in relation to s 206(4)(b), it is not appropriate to make an order declaring a person purporting to have been elected not to have been elected. The particular office to which Ms McGlashan sought to be elected was ultimately unfilled. The irregularity in relation to the rejection of Ms McGlashan's nomination did not have any bearing on the nomination and election of the single candidate who was elected as a delegate to the Branch Conference. In so far as s 206(4)(b) contemplates an order "declaring another person to have been elected", this appears to be linked to the making of a declaration that a person purporting to have been elected was not elected. Any power to declare a person to have been elected to an uncontested office would need to be found in s 206(4)(d), for example, as incidental or supplementary to or consequential on an order made under s 206(4)(a) declaring a step in relation to the election to be void.
21. Further, I note that neither the Commissioner nor the AEU have sought an order either declaring any step in relation to the election to be void or declaring Ms McGlashan to be elected, and Ms McGlashan has not taken up the opportunity to seek leave to appear at the inquiry or make submissions as an interested person.
22. In relation to s 206(4)(c), there is no utility in an order directing the General Manager to make arrangements for a step in relation to the election, including the calling for nominations, to be taken again, or for a new election to be held.
23. Ms Aulich deposes that the principal role of an elected delegate to the Branch Conference is to participate in debates and vote on resolutions at the Branch Conference, and at any special meeting thereof. The Branch Conference took place on 20 July 2024, from which there is no outstanding business. On the evidence before the Court, there is no prospect that a special meeting will be called pursuant to the Rules, at least not before the conclusion of the election for delegates to the 2025 Branch Conference.
24. The election process for delegates to the 2025 Branch Conference is in progress, with nominations open until 26 February 2025, and any postal ballot to be conducted between 2 April 2025 and 7 May 2025. In such circumstances, an order for a new election for the Office would serve no purpose and would potentially interfere with the democratic processes of the AEU.
25. In the absence of any order under s 206(4)(a) to (c), the power to make incidental, supplementary or consequential orders under s 206(4)(d) does not arise.
26. Accordingly, as no relief is available or appropriate under s 206(4), it is appropriate to terminate the inquiry under s 206(6) of the Act.

Conclusion

1. For the reasons set out above, the inquiry is terminated. I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Horan.