Is the development a dwelling?
45A fundamental issue for the Court is to determine whether the development as proposed is one dwelling. In this regard, the applicant has advised that it is intended to use the building for occupation by the applicant's family and a subgroup of that family, being a widowed relative and her family. The occupation and manner in which the building is used is one factor that would go to the determination of whether the building is a dwelling or more than one dwelling. So too would the facilities provided within the building.
46The most relevant consideration however, is the definition of a dwelling as defined in the Dictionary to the LEP. That definition is at [25] and if the building is found to contain two or more dwellings, it would be a dual occupancy in accordance with that definition. The application before the Court is for a dwelling and not a dual occupancy and the parties agreed that the application could not be amended in accordance with clause 55 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (Regulation) as that would be outside the provisions of that clause.
47In determining whether the building is a dwelling, the definition does not include the subjective intention of the applicant to use it in a particular manner. To be a dwelling, it must be a room or suite of rooms occupied or used, or so constructed or adapted as to be capable (emphasis added) of being used, as a separate domicile. The two limbs of the definition have been examined by Pepper J in Dobrohotoff v Bennic [2013] NSWLEC 61 where Her Honour noted:
[33] The definition of "dwelling" has two limbs. The first concerns the actual occupation or use of a room or rooms as a separate domicile and the second deals with the hypothetical test of whether a room or rooms are "so constructed or adapted as to be capable of being occupied or used" as a separate domicile (Leichhardt Municipal Council v Mansfield (1985) 57 LGRA 214 at 221; Warringah Shire Council v Jennings Group Ltd (1992) 75 LGRA 402 at 407; Wollongong City Council v Vic Vellar Nominees Pty Ltd [2010] NSWLEC 266; (2010) 178 LGERA 445 at [28] and Wollondilly Shire Council v 820 Cawdor Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWLEC 71 at [19])....
48The first limb requires consideration as to whether the actual occupation or use of a room or rooms would constitute a dwelling. Whilst the application is for the use of the building once completed as a dwelling and the second limb is more relevant, the two issues must be considered. From the evidence provided and the information detailed on the plans, it is clear that the building is capable of being occupied as two dwellings. That is because the rear or "outbuilding" section of the structure contains all of the facilities and services required for individual occupation as a home and, would be occupied by one family. So too would the main building.
49The provision of linkages between the two buildings does not alter the way in which the two sections of the building are capable of being occupied. Both have separate entries, entry foyers, kitchens, laundries, bathrooms, living spaces, dining areas and bedrooms. The suites of rooms are on different levels to each other. These two separate families, despite the fact that those families are related, would actually use those rooms independently of the other. The relationship between the families is irrelevant to the determination of the issue. There is no need for any interaction between the two occupancies, no facilities are absent that are required to use each area as a separate home and the independent use of each suite of rooms can occur without the need for any additional building works.
50The other important test is whether they are separate domiciles. This issue was also considered by Pepper J in Dobrohotoff and the line of authority considered at [45] where Her Honour states:
45 Furthermore, when considering the first limb of the definition of "dwelling", regard must be had to the notion of "domicile" contained within it (820 Cawdor Road at [24]), and the critical element of permanence. Inherent within the term "domicile" is, as a long line of authority in this jurisdiction has established, the notion of a permanent home or, at the very least, a significant degree of permanence of habitation or occupancy (Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63; (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 288; North Sydney Municipal Council v Sydney Serviced Apartments Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 532 at 538A-B; KJD York Management Services Pty Ltd v City of Sydney Council [2006] NSWLEC 218; (2006) 148 LGERA 117 at [8]-[18]; City of Sydney Council v Waldorf Apartments Hotel Sydney Pty Ltd [2008] NSWLEC 97; (2008) 158 LGERA 67 at [38]; Warlam Pty Ltd v Marrickville Council [2009] NSWLEC 23; (2009) 165 LGERA 184 at [35]-[36]; Najask Pty Ltd v Palerang Council [2009] NSWLEC 39; (2009) 165 LGERA 171 at [15]; Vic Vellar at [32]; Dooralong Residents Action Group Pty Limited v Wyong Shire Council [2011] NSWLEC 251; (2011) 186 LGERA 274 at [110]; 820 Cawdor Road at [24]; GrainCorp Operations Limited v Liverpool Plains Shire Council [2012] NSWLEC 143 at [20]-[27] and Haddad at [47]).
51The evidence is that both families would occupy the separate suite of rooms as their permanent residence. For the reasons outlined above, I conclude that the two suites of rooms would be so constructed as to be capable of being used as separate domiciles and are therefore two dwellings.
52Whilst I accept that a dwelling house can have more than one kitchen, in this case, the layout, configuration, levels and design of the proposal is such that it is capable of being used as separate domiciles. I distinguish this case from that of Murrell C in Luke and Warnock v Lane Cove Council [2011] NSWLEC 1094, in that, from my reading of the judgment, that case involved a kitchen associated with an outdoor recreation space rather than formed part of a suite of rooms to be occupied as a separate domicile.
53The applicant accepts that if the proposed building is not a "dwelling" as defined in the LEP, consent cannot be granted. This conclusion means that the development application appeal must be dismissed.